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We are pleased to introduce the 12th volume of International Development 
 Policy, Drug Policies and Development: Conflict and Coexistence.
This volume explores the challenges of drug policy in the context of devel-
opment. It addresses the impacts of the war on drugs on vulnerable popula-
tions, the consequences of the new movement towards legalisation of recrea-
tional drugs, and the ‘stakeholders’ affected by drug policy. It also delves into 
specific policies and localised consequences, looking at how drug trafficking 
in conflict zones inhibits peace processes, and analysing practices adopted by 
governments and development practitioners to help small farmers and villages 
escape reliance on illicit cultivation for their livelihoods.
The volume is composed of contributions from authors with a broad 
range of expertise and disciplinary approaches, including academic schol-
ars, researchers, health professionals, policymakers and civil society actors. 
It contains research articles, case studies across different regions, and policy 
comments, which provide both high- level perspectives and on- the- ground 
viewpoints on the far- reaching implications of drug policy. These 15 diverse yet 
complementary pieces shed light on the paradoxes and blind spots of drug pol-
icies adopted at national and international levels, and on how these policies’ 
limitations can have significant impacts on a variety of populations. They draw 
attention to the progress made in drug policy development and implementa-
tion in recent years, but also urge the international community to continue 
putting these in the spotlight in order to address shortcomings.
After an introduction on how drug control policies affect sustainable devel-
opment, the collection is organised into three sections. The first section focus-
es on the context in which drug policies developed, and on how the history of 
the cross- border drug trade has affected current policies, and it addresses some 
of the impacts these policies have at every level— from local populations to the 
global drug market. The second section explores how drug policies affect, and 
are affected by, conflict and governance, and how these matters involve differ-
ent types of stakeholders. It includes an interview with José Ramos- Horta, for-
mer President of Timor Leste and current Member of the Global Commission 
for Drug Policy (gcdp). Finally, the third section approaches the cross- cutting 
themes involved in drugs and development, such as the environmental im-
pacts of intensive cannabis cultivation, and how drug policies affect women, 
children, public health and people who use drugs.
Draft chapters were presented and discussed in an animated Author’s 
Workshop held in Geneva in October 2019. We would like to thank workshop 
 
x Foreword
participants for providing relevant input to the authors, and two anony-
mous peer reviewers for their insights, as well all those who commented on 
earlier drafts. Finally, we are grateful to the Swiss Agency for Development 
and  Cooperation (sdc) and the Republic and State of Geneva— Service for 
 International Solidarity (ssi) for their financial support.
Our hope is that this volume will make a positive contribution to discus-
sions on how drug policy affects the development process, and will be help-
ful in promoting debates among scholars, practitioners, policymakers and a 
broader audience interested in exploring how drugs and development coexist 




International Development Policy is a critical source of analysis of development 
policy and international cooperation trends, with an audience of scholars, pol-
icymakers and development professionals. It offers a diverse range of academ-
ic views from both industrialised countries and emerging economies.
International Development Policy is edited by the Graduate Institute of Inter-
national and Development Studies, an institution of research and higher ed-
ucation dedicated to advancing world affairs. Located in Geneva, at the heart 
of an international centre of multilateral governance, the Graduate Institute 
benefits from a rich legacy linked to the founding of the international system 




We extend our thanks to the Swiss Agency for Development and  Cooperation 
(sdc) and the Republic and State of Geneva— Service for International 
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chapter 1
Are Barriers to Sustainable Development 
Endogenous to Drug Control Policies?
Khalid Tinasti , Julia Buxton and Mary Chinery- Hesse
 Abstract
This introductory chapter explains the rationale behind the 12th thematic volume 
of International Development Policy, which explores the tension between devel-
opment and drug control goals, both current and historic. The volume of fifteen 
chapters draws on a broad spectrum of thematic issues to address the following key 
questions: Are prohibition and development mutually exclusive or complementa-
ry international agendas? How do the harms associated with drug policy enforce-
ment undermine development prospects? The diverse group of authors highlight 
the corrosive effects of criminalisation and prohibition- based approaches on the 
livelihoods and fundamental rights of those who are vulnerable, including wom-
en, children, people who count on drug cultivation and trafficking to make a liv-
ing, and people who use drugs. They also address the limitations and feasibility of 
development- focused interventions in drug control strategies within the context of 
the prohibition paradigm.
Since the ratification in 1961 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the in-
ternational drug control regime (unodc, 2013) has seen the world through the 
lens of achieving ‘drug free societies’. This ambition of eliminating mind- and 
mood- altering substances— except in robustly controlled medical and scien-
tific circumstances— is historically rooted and based on a simple premise: that 
prohibiting access to substances such as opium, morphine, cocaine and can-
nabis would eliminate demand and ‘evil’ dependence. The progress of pro-
hibition from a US- based nineteenth century political movement (Mennell, 
1969) to a global drug strategy was premised on the assumption that state au-
thorities possessed the legitimacy and capacity to enforce prohibition across a 
neatly defined national territory, and that citizens would accept this policing 
of their livelihoods and personal behaviours. Criminalisation, stigmatisation 
and repressive punishment have been the primary tools used by states to en-
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coca, cannabis) and the manufacture, distribution and use of their derivatives 
(Bewley- Taylor, 2012).
The six decades since the 1961 Convention have seen immense political and 
economic change. The experience of decolonisation, Soviet communism, the 
Cold War and globalisation have reshaped geographical spaces, cultures and 
identities; epidemics and health emergencies modified the public health ar-
chitecture by making patients active partners in the response; new technol-
ogies have emerged, science has advanced, and fundamental rights and free-
doms have been recognised. International drug control policy, by contrast, has 
ridden waves of seismic change to persist, unchanged and seemingly immune 
to the uptake of international obligations and scientific evidence (gcdp, 2019). 
The international commitment to prohibition has been reaffirmed through 
four political declarations since the 1990s (UN, 1990; unodc, 2019).
Increasingly repressive (sometimes militarised) efforts to achieve (con-
stantly renewed) international and national level goals of ‘drug free societies’ 
have run parallel to a flourishing of illegal markets. These continue to expand 
and diversify, including through synthetic drug manufacture, crypto- markets 
and other digital innovations (Aldridge and Décary- Hétu, 2016). Not only have 
six decades of prohibition failed to eliminate illegal markets, repressive en-
forcement efforts have created multiple, sharply regressive outcomes (Csete 
et  al., 2016). These have been explored through the lens of race, health and 
gender outcomes (Nougier, 2018). This volume considers the specific case of 
development, and how global development goals are impacted by prohibition- 
based drug strategies (gcdp, 2018).
In 2008, the UN acknowledged the ‘unintended’ consequences of drug con-
trol (unodc, 2008). These included the ‘value added’ by criminalisation to 
otherwise worthless plants, shrubs and chemicals; the generation of an illicit 
market with an estimated annual turnover of usd 500 billion; the displace-
ment of cultivation, manufacture and trafficking routes following interdic-
tion; the violence and insecurity created by confrontations between law en-
forcement and criminal actors; ill health and disease spread; and policy and 
budgetary displacement in national policies. These unintended consequences 
have major implications for the implementation of programmes that aim to 
advance the Sustainable Development Goals (sdg s) and for the institutional 
environment in which development objectives are meant to be achieved.
This volume explores the tension between development and drug control 
goals, both current and historic. The contributions draw on a broad spectrum of 
thematic issues to address the following key macro questions: Are prohibition 
and development mutually exclusive or complementary international agen-
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development prospects? The volume’s opening contribution, from Buxton 
(Chapter 2), discusses the historical salience of development issues to interna-
tional drug policy debates. It details the evolution of supply- focused and law- 
and- order based responses in global- and national- level drug strategies, and 
how this approach has imposed a disproportionate cost on some of the poor-
est and most unequal countries of the world. While the shift to development- 
oriented strategies in the 1990s and the new millennium was to be welcomed, 
she argues that early expectations have not been met, in part owing to shifts in 
contemporary development strategy and the failure to address land reform, as 
well as to the economic incentives created by the persistence of criminalisa-
tion. Collins (Chapter 3) then separates out development concerns from drug 
policy narratives, arguing that ‘innovations’ such as alternative development 
(ad) policies have a long historical trajectory and are not a logical extension 
of the international drug control system. Through a focus on colonial Asia, he 
argues that local elites and colonial administrations long wrestled with ques-
tions of development in drug crop cultivation areas. Continuity is seen to per-
sist in the challenge of containing the ‘alienating force’ of illicit drug crops and 
offsetting the advantages that cultivation provides in terms of ‘self- sufficiency, 
capital accumulation, resources for paid access to private health and economic 
and security services’.
In a policy comment, Brombacher and David (Chapter  4) of the Ger-
man Corporation for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit, giz) explore the uptake by national gov-
ernments of development- led approaches to drug crop cultivation. They 
trace the evolution of ad in drug supply control from the 1970s and the insti-
tutionalisation of development- oriented responses in United Nations (UN) 
drug conventions and political declarations. The Outcome Document of the 
2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug 
Problem (ungass) is cited as a particular milestone for its provision of a 
chapter dedicated to development- oriented drug control. Endorsement and 
uptake have not, however, translated into an increase in funding for ad ini-
tiatives. This has eroded the viability of development- focused responses. For 
Mansfield (Chapter  5), the ideological, conceptual and programmatic con-
fusions around ad were manifest in Afghanistan, to the detriment of opi-
um poppy reduction and development ambitions. Alternative development 
‘came to mean different things to different people’, with aid used for a variety 
of purposes and without consistency or clarity of ends. Despite the centrality 
of Afghanistan to the opium trade, and years of ‘best practices’ and ‘lessons 
learned’ on ad, Mansfield notes the absence of a strategy to transition farm-
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International drug policy is at an important turning point. The historic con-
sensus on prohibition is fracturing and giving way to national- level reform ini-
tiatives (Hall, 2018). For Bewley- Taylor, Jelsma and Kay (Chapter 6), this opens 
up new forms of inequality, de- development and market exclusion. The boom 
in medical cannabis and the legal regulation of adult non- medical cannabis 
consumption has enabled for- profit cannabis companies in the global North 
to capture cannabis markets aggressively. Small- scale traditional farmers from 
the global South are excluded from these hesitant openings. Traditional culti-
vators are being pushed out of emerging legal markets, despite the economic 
and development opportunities participation can bring. It is argued that af-
firmative action, regulation of foreign investment, and well- designed legisla-
tive and market strategies are required to ensure ‘a more equitable, fair(er) 
trade cannabis regulation model’.
The second part of this volume comprises a series of commentaries that fo-
cus on the wider conditions of development, addressing human development 
and the interconnections between drug policy, insecurity, participation, poli-
tics and institutions. Reitano (Chapter 7) analyses drugs and drug policies as 
factors driving violence and weakening prospects for conflict resolution and 
peace processes in conflict- affected states. Linking back to and broadening 
the earlier critiques of ad, her contribution argues that the drug policy com-
munity has significantly failed to ‘offer proven alternatives beyond the point 
of cultivation for actors further along drug supply chains’. Tinasti (Chapter 8) 
furthers consideration of the detrimental institutional impacts of drug control 
with the argument that drug policy embeds neo- patrimonial practices in drug 
producing and transiting countries. For Tinasti, criminalisation enables pene-
tration by organised crime, fuels corruption of state and security officials and 
exacerbates electorally driven clientelist practices. Moreover, prohibition nar-
ratives feed into populist political campaigns and sloganeering that stigmatise 
minority populations of people who use drugs.
Fordham (Chapter  9) turns her attention to the participatory aspects of 
drug policy governance. Her commentary considers the important question of 
stakeholders in drug policy processes and their relative power and influence. 
She argues that exclusionary practices, including those due to criminalisa-
tion, marginalise populations who are most directly and negatively impacted 
by drug policy enforcement. Despite powerful interests in the persistence of 
the prohibition paradigm and established patterns of influence lobbying, she 
notes the attention now given to health, human rights and development con-
cerns as a result of activism by civil society groups. José Ramos- Horta, former 
President of Timor- Leste, former UN Special Representative, Head of the UN 
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Commission on Drug Policy, shares his views on prohibition as the guiding 
principle of drug policy, the vulnerability of politics to illicit financial flows, 
and his experience as former UN Special Envoy in Guinea- Bissau (Chapter 10).
The third section presents thematic case studies relating to the environ-
ment, health and the rights of women and children in order to draw attention 
to the effects of drug policies on development and human development. Af-
sahi (Chapter 11) highlights the environmental impacts of intensive cannabis 
cultivation using the comparative cases of California and Morocco. This con-
tribution explores the relationship between cannabis cultivation and water 
use, land, forests and wildlife. Linking back to the earlier issues of fair- trade 
cannabis raised by Bewley Taylor, Jelmsa and Kay, Afsahi considers the experi-
ences and vulnerability of cannabis farmers and their communities.
The drug trade and enforcement practices are sharply gendered. Illicit 
market structures, law- and- order responses and generic drug ‘violence’ af-
fects men and women differently. Giacomello (Chapter  12) unpacks these 
gendered dynamics through the lens of women incarcerated and detained for 
drug- related offences. While highlighting the over- incarceration of women as 
one of the crudest manifestations of contemporary drug policy failings, the 
chapter demonstrates how this draconian policy approach reproduces vio-
lence towards women and exacerbates their vulnerability and marginalisation. 
Giacomello addresses drug control as a driver of rights violations, and as a ‘silo’ 
area of global governance that frequently violates and contradicts other in-
ternational bodies and priorities. Similarly, Barrett and Lohman (Chapter 13) 
focus on children to emphasise the recurrent clash of treaty and rights obli-
gations in the international system, which they cite as corrosive for develop-
ment. They highlight that young people are frequently at the centre of policy 
debates, with prohibition justified as a means of protecting future generations 
from harm. The reality, for Barrett and Lohman, is one of superficial discourse 
that is particularly weak in addressing the risks and harms caused to children 
by supply- side control activities (crop eradication, interdiction). Their contri-
bution focuses on commitments made through the Sustainable Development 
Goals (sdg s) (indicator 3.8, access to essential medicines, and indicator 8.7, 
addressing the worst forms of child labour) and how these are undermined by 
the process of scheduling drugs under international control, in turn speaking 
to sdg indicator 16.6 on accountable institutions and the arguments put for-
ward by Fordham.
Our final two contributions address the health dimension of drug policies— 
an integral element of both rights- and development- based agendas, which is 
regularly undermined by criminalisation. Csete’s policy comment (Chapter 14) 
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development— can be positively influenced by the reform of drug policy ap-
proaches, for people who use drugs and their communities, as well as with 
regard to general access to pain relief and essential controlled medicines for 
patients in need. Under current criminalisation approaches, however, drug 
policy inflicts a high toll ‘on the health of people and communities touched by 
drug consumption, drug crop cultivation and drug law enforcement’.
Scheibe, Versfeld and Shelly (Chapter 15) conclude this volume with a con-
tribution that focuses on South Africa and draws on their experience as re-
searchers and medical practitioners. They argue that criminalisation policies 
and the stigmatisation of people who use drugs in South Africa have had nega-
tive effects on health outcomes, but that the country is locked into existing ap-
proaches as a result of local conservatism and international aid conditionality. 
Reinforcing this volume’s emphasis on accountability in drug policy processes, 
their contribution calls for mechanisms to better hold officials and policymak-
ers responsible for the health and human rights of all people.
This volume is a call to the development community to better engage with 
the impacts of drug policy on development objectives. It highlights the corro-
sive effects of criminalisation and prohibition- based approaches on the liveli-
hoods and fundamental rights of vulnerable women, men and children. It aims 
to address the limitations and feasibility of development- focused interventions 
in drug control strategies within the context of the prohibition paradigm. It 
also highlights the fact that criminalisation and draconian enforcement strat-
egies have impacts that undermine progress towards the sdg s, while reform 
initiatives such as cannabis legalisation risk reproducing new forms of formal 
market exclusion.
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chapter 2
Drug Control and Development: A Blind Spot
Julia Buxton
 Abstract
Development questions have been central to international drug policy since the first 
tentative steps towards a global control regime over a century ago. The strategy that 
was devised to limit the cultivation of mind- and mood- altering plants imposed a 
disproportionate cost on cultivating territories in the global South. This burden in-
tensified in the post- war period and as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
and United States ‘war on drugs’ in the 1970s institutionalised ‘narcotics’ as a securi-
ty issue and a law enforcement concern. Despite criminalisation and coercive state 
eradication efforts, illicit narcotic plant cultivation (opium poppy, coca) has persisted, 
reaching record highs after 2015. Recent decades have seen improved understanding 
of development deficits as the driver of sustained illicit cultivation. However, high- 
level efforts to promote inter- agency and thematic linkages between drug strategy and 
global development goals have seen the reinvention of orthodox approaches to both 
drug control and poverty reduction. Neither has a record of sustainable success or of 
raising concerns as to the counterproductive impacts of policy reproduction. In patch-
ing together new ideas within failing paradigms, alternative development is better 
 understood as ‘policy bricolage’.
1 Introduction
In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem (ungass) adopted the landmark Action Plan on Internation-
al Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative 
Development (UN General Assembly, 1998). This recognised alternative de-
velopment (ad) as ‘a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation 
of plants containing narcotics and psychotropic substances through specif-
ically designed rural development measures in the context of sustained na-
tional growth and sustainable development efforts in countries taking action 
against drugs, recognizing the particular socio- cultural characteristics of 
the target communities and groups, within the framework of a comprehen-






de- escalation (at least in declaratory terms) of coercive efforts to eliminate 
the cultivation of narcotic drug crops— specifically opium poppy and coca. 
The 1998 Action Plan was an implicit acknowledgement that state eradication 
strategies had not reduced local or global cultivation volumes, or the manu-
facture and supply of derivatives— opiates (morphine, heroin) and cocaine. 
Chemical fumigation and manual destruction of plants had instead contrib-
uted to ‘set- backs, surprising developments and unintended consequences’ 
(unodc, 2009, 2, 163). Embracing of development dimensions marked rec-
ognition by international drug control bodies (the United Nations Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs (un cnd) and the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (unodc)) that it was necessary to engage with the drivers of 
sustained cultivation. This was reiterated in the 2016 United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session Outcome Document (ungass Outcome Document). 
Institutional endorsement of ad promised a shift in supply control strate-
gy. Rather than interpreting cultivation as incentivised by criminal gain, ad 
drew attention to development deficits that characterised cultivation zones 
(Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019, 89), including those resulting from vi-
olent conflict in key cultivating territories such as Colombia, Afghanistan, 
Peru and Myanmar.
Recognition of development aspects in drug control ran parallel with in-
creased attention to illicit drug economies from the development and security 
communities. The correlation of drugs, poverty, conflict and organised crime 
embedded drugs as an intra- agency concern, with drug economies viewed as 
an obstacle to peace, state building, rule of law and poverty reduction. The 
promotion of thematic linkages across portfolios (Alimi, 2019) and the shift 
from a hard, militarised to a soft, development orientation in drug control was 
an opportunity to push evidenced and rights- based responses to drug crop 
cultivation, and for the uptake of best practice in gender mainstreaming, con-
flict sensitivity, stakeholder participation and ‘local ownership’ as promoted by 
United Nations (UN) agencies.
In the two decades since the 1998 Action Plan, record levels of coca and opi-
um poppy cultivation were recorded, pushing the volume of cocaine and opi-
ate manufacture to historic highs (unodc, 2018). In looking at the record of 
ad over the last twenty years, a benign interpretation lends to the view that it 
has been a marginal, ill- defined and underfunded element of supply reduction 
strategies. At worst, ad has framed misguided interventions that have caused 
more harm than good in complex and vulnerable rural communities. This 
chapter argues that ad cannot be successful without a shift in the internation-
al drug policy paradigm of prohibition. The persistence of prohibition- based 
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impacts that ad cannot absorb, and it causes wider development harms, 
which are addressed in this chapter. The effort to promote thematic linkag-
es across peace, security and development has led to an uptake of the ‘prob-
lematisation’ of drugs that perpetuates counterproductive counter- narcotics 
strategies, norms and narratives. In working within the prohibition paradigm, 
international development is re- embedding a control strategy that is skewed 
against the global South and that leads to the reproduction of strategies that 
have been tried, that have failed, and that continue to set back development 
prospects. ad has assumed a capital- centric interpretation of development 
(Selwyn, 2017) within a global trade and financial framework that emphasises 
neo- liberal orthodoxies. This is in line with the mainstream development con-
sensus that economic growth is the driver of poverty reduction, an approach 
that is coming under intense critical scrutiny for its record of inequality gener-
ation, failure to address the most impoverished, and reluctance to effect mean-
ingful popular participation and empowerment. The assumptions of orthodox 
development strategies have been absorbed into ad, despite questions as to 
their appropriateness for poverty reduction in general, and for the challenge of 
illicit drug crop cultivation in particular. As the conjoining of prohibition and 
neo- liberal ‘development’ strategies, ad represents the worst of both policy 
worlds.
This chapter provides an overview of the incentives for cultivation created 
by the prohibition paradigm. It incorporates a broad historical sweep to high-
light the salience of development questions over the longue durée of interna-
tional drug control and to demonstrate how a system so antithetical to the in-
terests of global South countries has been institutionalised. In its historicism, 
the chapter addresses geographical spaces that have seen changes in power, 
governance and territory over the century of drug control. In socio- economic 
terms these relate to low- and middle- income countries (lmic s) and geo-
graphically they are concentrated in the global South. The use of the global 
South terminology illustrates the binary approach that has underpinned the 
evolution of drug control.
2 Establishing the Global Divide: from Free Trade to Trade 
Regulation
Development questions have been at the heart of international drug control 
since the foundational 1909 Shanghai Conference. The follow- up 1912 The 
Hague International Opium Convention and four subsequent pre- war (World 




that regulated the historic and booming international trade in opium poppy, 
coca and their  derivatives.
Peru’s national development plans at the end of the first decade of the 
twentieth century had looked to an expansion of dynamic coca leaf and co-
caine exports to the United States (US) and central Europe. Expanding mar-
kets for coca leaf and cocaine- based beverages, tonics and pharmaceuticals 
had driven massive expansion of Peruvian coca leaf exports, from 7.9 tonnes 
in 1877 to 943 tonnes (mt) by 1905 (Gootenberg, 2001). Markets were trans-
formed by the publication of Sigmund Freud’s Über Coca (1884) and uptake 
of cocaine in medical practice and anaesthesia. Coca leaf exports from Java 
(Indonesia) rose from 26 mt in 1904 to 430 mt in 1910 on the back of Dutch and 
pharmaceutical sector investment. Opium export revenues and state licens-
ing systems were a strategic stream of finance for colonial administrations in 
South Asia. India was the engine of the British opium trade, with over 1.5 mil-
lion households in east and west India (Bengal and Malwa regions) cultivating 
opium for export to China. After defeating China in two wars (1839‒42 and 
1856‒60) Britain forced open the Chinese market for Indian opium exports, 
which soared from 200 mt in 1800 to 6,500 mt by 1880 (unodc, 2008, 23). 
Opium revenues accounted for 53 per cent, 29 per cent and 6.5 per cent of the 
total state revenues of the British colonial administration in Singapore, Hong 
Kong and India, respectively, in 1907. In French Indochina (Vietnam, Cam-
bodia), monopolies and licensing systems raised 17.1 per cent of revenues for 
the colonial administrations. In the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) this figure 
was 14.3 per cent (unodc, 2008, 43). After the British forced China to accept 
the de facto legalisation of domestic opium poppy cultivation in 1880, opium 
production boomed to an estimated 35,353 mt by 1906. Swaths of the Persian 
and Ottoman empires were under poppy cultivation, with authorities in both 
territories encouraging opium exports to offset trade deficits with Europe. 
Turkey produced an estimated 150 tonnes of opium in 1907, while Persian opi-
um production was in the range of 450‒900 tonnes (unodc, 2008, 34). As in 
India, this was at the cost of food production, with the substitution of opium 
poppy for wheat contributing to Persia’s Great Famine of 1870‒72, in which 
some 1.5 million people died.
The early control system obliged a role for the state and colonial adminis-
trations in limiting, to medical and scientific purposes, the cultivation, export, 
import and use of these plants and their mass- commercialised derivatives. 
The approach sought to navigate the dual- use dilemma of plants and drugs 
with valuable pain- relieving properties also being liable to misuse. This re-
sponded to a lobby of evangelical (in the US), Quaker (in the United Kingdom, 
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that critiqued the exploitative colonial relations underpinning the opium 
trade and campaigned against the moral and social damage attributed to the 
use of these substances. US Christian groups propagated anti- opium, canna-
bis and cocaine norms that mobilised racist tropes and anti- immigrant senti-
ment and played to concerns around restive colonial subjects (Musto, 1999). 
It followed that international action and national legislation were necessary 
to protect citizens from these ‘narcotics’, and that cultivating territories had 
a moral and economic responsibility to accept and police a small, regulated 
international market.
The Shanghai conference was a ‘critical juncture’ (David, 2007). It triggered 
new institutional formations and a new path. In line with the emerging treaty 
frameworks, national and international bureaucracies were created to monitor 
and report cultivation, manufacture and import/ export trends to the League of 
Nations. The US was among a number of countries that introduced restrictive 
domestic legislation preventing access to opiates, cocaine, and cannabis. This 
path marked dramatic change in the management of historically traded agri-
cultural commodities. It had enormous implications across the globe, akin in 
its reverberations to steps to ban coffee, sugar or rice today.
2.1 The Impact of International Trade Regulation
The source focus in the control model required empires, European colonial 
administrations, and subsequently independent states to forgo sales and tax 
revenues from popular cash crops, to jettison commodity- led rural develop-
ment strategies, and to accept rural unemployment and reduced household 
incomes without compensation. For the US— the country that championed 
the foundational Shanghai conference— the financial impacts were negligible. 
By contrast the nascent regulatory framework required searing adjustment by 
cultivating regions. Millions of households were involved in the opium poppy 
and coca economies, with the cultivation, transportation and trading of these 
cash crops being the backbone of rural and national incomes. As outlined by 
Ghiabi in relation to Iran (2019, 44– 45), ‘Labourers, commission and export 
merchants, brokers, bazaar agents, chiefs, clerks, manipulators, packers, por-
ters, carpenters, coppersmiths, retailers, and mendicants were part of this line 
of production. During harvest time, they were often accompanied by a motley 
crowd of dervishes, story- tellers, musicians, owners of performing animals and 
a whole industry of amusement providers who were paid for their company’.
The pre- war regulatory system and subsequent conditions of global war 
were successful in dramatically reducing global volumes of opium poppy, opi-
ates, coca and cocaine. This was despite gaps of non- compliance. Peru’s coca 





1929. ‘Because of wobbling downward prices […] it was a painful collapse, 
especially given the early national hopes for cocaine’ (Gootenberg, 2001, 12). 
In Java, where the Dutch had built ‘an especially productive and integrated 
industrial cocaine regime’, this was ‘dismantled by decree almost as quickly 
as it arose’. The Java coca and cocaine sectors were taken over by Japanese 
pharmaceutical companies such as Hoshi, Sankyo, Shiongo and Koto following 
Japan’s invasion and occupation of Java in 1942. This made Japan the centre 
of ‘an increasing autonomous Asian coca- cocaine network [that] appeared 
from 1920– 45’, which was subsequently suppressed by occupying US forces 
(Gootenberg, 2001, 11).
Opium markets experienced a similar decline. British India observed im-
port restrictions imposed by third country ports and authorities in the 1920s, 
leading to a drop in opium exports across South Asia and, most precipitously, 
to China. This was on the back of Manchu dynasty reforms that included opi-
um cultivation and consumption reduction, as well as a bilaterally negotiated 
export reduction agreement in 1907 between China and the UK, which saw 
‘the last chest of Indian opium […] publicly burned in Shanghai in January 
1919— ending the 300 year Indian- Chinese opium trade’ (unodc, 2008, 49). 
Surveillance and conditions of global war after 1939 obliterated transnational 
and local networks for unauthorised supply and distribution.
Going into the immediate post- war period, opium poppy cultivation con-
tinued its vertiginous decline amid the turmoil of decolonisation, coups, 
revolution and state repression, and as competition turned to capturing 
supply of the authorised, global medical market. In Iran, which was author-
ised to fulfil 25 per cent of the global legal opiate supply, the Shah imposed 
a total ban on unauthorised opium poppy cultivation in 1955, including a 
three- year prison sentence for possession of opium poppy seed. The prohi-
bition impacted some 300,000 poppy farmers and rolled back a programme 
of opium expansion under a state monopoly established in 1928. In China, 
Maoist forces ran an opium suppression campaign that was pursued with 
ferocity after the 1952 Directive on Eradication of Drug Epidemic (Zhou, 1999), 
while in Turkey, opium poppy cultivation was prohibited in 1969 amid pro-
tests (Evered, 2011). This progress in reducing cultivation in historical zones 
was offset by the rise of new cultivating territories and the reinvigoration of 
demand- side dynamics. The post- war geography of drug cultivation shift-
ed, dissipated and resumed an upward trajectory. As discussed below, this 
can be linked to the tightening of the international control regime, the shift 
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3 The Post- war ‘Drug War’: Americanisation and Criminalisation
In the construction of the pre- war system, European powers baulked at the US 
preference for an ‘unambiguous prohibitionist global drug regime’ (unodc, 
2008, 48). US and Christian evangelical pressure for blanket prohibition was 
seen as unenforceable. According to unodc, ‘the typical line of argument 
used by pragmatists was that: drug abuse could not be eliminated, therefore 
efforts should focus on limiting the consequences of drug abuse. These colo-
nial powers felt results would be best achieved via high taxes and licence fees’ 
(unodc, 2008, 48).
3.1 The 1961 Single Convention
Just as cultural and social change at the turn of the twentieth century had 
opened a window of opportunity for the anti- opium campaign, so geopoliti-
cal change in the post- war (1945) period provided the US with the leverage to 
shift the international system from regulation to prohibition (Bewley- Taylor, 
2012). Through the use of military, diplomatic and economic tools, the US 
reconfigured the international system toward proactive interdiction, deter-
rence and punishment to eradicate drug markets. This was underpinned by 
the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which criminalised engagement 
in unauthorised supply and distribution activities of dangerous psychoactive 
substances. These were to be ‘punishable offences when committed inten-
tionally’, and it was stated ‘that serious offences shall be liable to adequate 
punishment particularly by imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation 
of liberty’ (Article 36). A 15- year time frame was established for the achieve-
ment of zero illicit opium poppy cultivation and 25 years in the case of coca, 
including the elimination of recreational, religious and cultural consumption 
practices.
Compliance with international drug treaty obligations was a mechanism via 
which the US could influence the Cold War security apparatus of strategically 
important states. This was initially exemplified by the experience of Turkey 
(Gingeras, 2013) and Iran (Gingeras, 2012). In relation to Iran, Ghiabi (2019, 
49) sets out that ‘By the end of World War ii, a small number of US narcot-
ics officials, many of whom had been previously working as intelligence of-
ficers, helped the Pahlavi state to re- produce a prohibitionist regime in Tehran, 
which, in their strategy had to embody a global model for the rest of the region 
and beyond. Through this collaboration, US influence within Iran increased 
significantly, especially for what concerned the repressive, coercive institu-








3.2 The US ‘War on Drugs’
The adoption of a more coercive approach to the enforcement of prohibition 
gained traction in the early 1970s after the administration of President Richard 
Nixon re- conceptualised drugs as a national security threat. This first iteration 
of the US drug war was domestic in focus. As acknowledged by Nixon’s nation-
al policy advisor John Ehrlichman, there was continuity with prohibitionist 
strategies of associating drugs and drug use with threatening (racial and polit-
ical) ‘out groups’ (Baum, 2016).
During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, a relaunching of the drug war saw 
repressive domestic drug control efforts conjoined with externally focused 
supply prevention efforts. At the institutional level, this was characterised by 
growing security sector influence and autonomy in counter- narcotics policy 
(Buxton, 2015, 15), the militarisation of policing responses, an expansion of US 
personnel overseas working on drug policy portfolios (Ayling, 2005) and an 
escalation of unilateral US action to stem the flow of drugs from source coun-
tries, including through decertification (after 1986)  and military assistance 
programmes. The transfer and militarisation of US counter- narcotics strate-
gies was largely concentrated in its southern ‘backyard’ of Mexico, Bolivia and 
Peru from the 1970s to the 1990s (Youngers and Rosin, 2004), and moved into 
Colombia in 1998 with Plan Colombia, followed in the subsequent decade by 
the Mérida Initiative of 2007 and the 2008 Central American Regional Securi-
ty Initiative (carsi). The 1988 Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which obliged international co operation 
in policing, interception and extradition, marked the universalisation of US 
counter- narcotics approaches, including through a focus on transnationally 
organised gangs, the militarisation of enforcement, and punitive criminal jus-
tice responses (Woodiwiss and Hobbs, 2009).
International and national level declarations and action plans followed the 
conventions (and US pressure) in assuming narcotic plants could be eradicat-
ed from the planet. Yet as outlined by the Organization of American States 
(oas) (oas, 2013, 19), ‘Such a conclusion assumes that the illegal economy 
could in fact be made to disappear— an assumption for which there is no em-
pirical basis or historical proof— and that the process of combating it would 
not have costs in and of itself, which is contradicted by the historical evidence 
available’. Ambitious targets were repeatedly set for the achievement of a ‘drug 
free world’, the slogan of the 1998 ungass, at which member states commit-
ted to achieving significant and measurable reductions in illegal drug supply 
and demand within a ten- year period. The metrics of international drug policy 
were favourable to this approach. Monitoring systems developed in the pre- 
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data relating to unauthorised cultivation and manufacture levels, drug seizure 
and drug related arrests to the International Narcotics Control Board (incb). 
This international exercise in collating enforcement statistics incentivised 
national- level, short- term gains over strategies for long- term and sustainable 
reductions.
Cultivator countries (re)embarked on recurrent campaigns to achieve zero 
cultivation, including in Bolivia (see Kurtz- Phelan, 2005), and in Peru, where 
authorities unveiled ambitions to eliminate illegal coca cultivation within a 
five- year period— by 2007 (Rojas, 2003, 13)— a timeframe shared with Laos 
pdr for the ending of opium poppy cultivation under the Accelerated Rural 
Development Programme (see Windle, 2017). Coercive responses were being 
accelerated at the same time that unodc was finally recognising alternative 
development as a viable tool in supply reduction with the 1998 Action Plan. 
This raised tensions and contradictions in supply responses that were long- 
running and that were brought to the fore in the throes of dynamic expansion 
and change in post- Cold War illegal drug markets.
The emphasis that was placed on delineated markets and supply- side con-
trols by the pre- war regulatory regime established a form of path dependence 
in international drug control, with path dependence defined as ‘decisions and 
courses of action available in the present being constrained by those taken in 
the past, thereby limiting the field of possibilities’ (Buxton, Bewley- Taylor and 
Hallam, 2017, 39). This had four key implications. Firstly, the evolution of in-
ternational drug control treaties, agencies and approaches in the post- war pe-
riod saw the embedding of the disproportionate and historic burden imposed 
on cultivator territories in the global South. Related here is that the post- war 
evolution of drug control as a ‘suppression regime’ (Boister, 2002) rendered 
global South cultivating and subsequently transit territories vulnerable to in-
ternational pressures, intervention and loss of sovereignty under the rubric of 
co- operation in counter- narcotics enforcement. Secondly, the emphasis on 
supply termination to eliminate unauthorised markets, rather than demand 
reduction (in lucrative North American and European consumer markets), set 
in motion decades of wrangling over ‘shared responsibility’ for the world ‘drug 
problem’ and dispute over the importance of global North demand as the driv-
er of South supply incentives. A third aspect is cultural. Opium poppy, canna-
bis and coca were prized in local medicines, religion and social practices. These 
traditions and opportunities for developing indigenous botanical knowledge 
came to an abrupt end with the post- 1909 system. There was seen to be nothing 
to be gained from non- Christian and non- Western ritual and learning around 
plants that had been cultivated back to the earliest of times, and increasingly 







(Barsh, 2001). Finally, the pre- war system placed disproportionate emphasis on 
the control of psychoactive plants, in contrast to the more lenient regulatory 
treatment afforded to synthetic drugs manufactured in the global North (Bux-
ton, Bewley- Taylor and Hallam, 2017). This insulated synthetics and pharma-
ceutical drugs from robust regulatory oversight (Brunn, Pan and Rexed, 1975), 
while the controls around plant organics were progressively tightened, most 
saliently in the case of cannabis (Bewley- Taylor, Jelsma and Blickman, 2014).
4 Accounting for Persistence
US strategy, the valued added created by criminalisation, sustained demand in 
lucrative markets, and ongoing conditions of poverty and instability in culti-
vating territories are important for understanding the post- war growth of cul-
tivation in the context of a drug ‘suppression regime’.
4.1 US Pragmatism
The US has played a Janus- faced role in global drug control. While a vigorous 
promoter of prohibition, US agencies also condoned and encouraged illegal 
cultivation, manufacture and trafficking activities when in the national geo-
strategic interest. This realpolitik in US ‘narco diplomacy’ has been demon-
strated in the development of the south- west Asian opium trade in the 1950s 
(McCoy, 1991), South American cocaine markets in the 1980s (Webb, 1999) and 
Afghanistan’s opium ‘boom’ in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty- 
first century, not to mention in the links between US security, intelligence and 
political actors and a variety of domestic and international trafficking net-
works and interests (Campbell, 1977; Raab, 2005).
McAllister (1999, 183) explains US tacit acceptance of cultivation through 
reference to geopolitical concerns: ‘The Cold War warped attempts to impose 
stringent limitation by creating countervailing pressures favouring increased 
agricultural production and pharmaceutical manufacture. Fears that drug 
control measures could cause economic hardship or political upheaval, which 
in turn might drive strategically located producer states into the Soviet camp 
hindered the efforts of control advocates’. On a less benign note, the illegal 
drug trade provided US agencies with a mechanism to fund and enable right- 
wing and anti- communist insurgencies through off- budget financial channels 
(Levine and Kavanau- Levine, 2012; McCoy, 1991; Webb, 1999), and acted as a 
bargaining tool with criminal groups and non- state actors (allowing or acting 
against their cultivation interests), allowing these agencies to gain political 
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advocacy of prohibition, yet assume a pragmatic posture on drug production 
and trafficking, reflects institutional, agency and ideological divisions that put 
US policymakers and programme officials at cross purposes (defence, intel-
ligence, aid). As a 2018 US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Recon-
struction (sigar) (sigar, 2018, 44) report outlined, ‘Everyone did their own 
thing, not thinking how it fitted in with the larger effort. State was trying to 
eradicate, usaid was marginally trying to do livelihoods, and dea was going 
after bad guys’.
4.2 Economics of Criminalisation
Criminalisation created a lucrative black market for otherwise worthless agri-
cultural crops that had crashed out of global markets at the end of the Second 
World War. But success in reducing cultivation in traditional zones revealed 
the flawed assumptions of prohibition. Other territories filled illicit global 
market share, setting off a ‘balloon effect’ from the 1950s. This was charac-
terised by the recurrent pattern of cultivation suppression being followed by 
geographical relocation and replanting. This was (and continues to be) ob-
served between and within states, and across drug types. For example, US in-
terdiction of cannabis from Colombia and Mexico led to its replacement with 
cocaine in the 1970s, and opiate suppression led to methamphetamine man-
ufacture in Thailand, Myanmar and Afghanistan thirty years later. Coca culti-
vation pinballed across the Andean states, from Bolivia (Chapare and Yungas) 
to Peru (the valley of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (vraem) and Co-
lombia (the Amazon region into Caquetá, Guaviare, Putumayo and Antioquia) 
in response to coercive eradication. An intra- state ‘balloon effect’ saw cultiva-
tion reductions in one territory (Badakshan and Balk, Afghanistan; Caquetá 
and Guaviare, Colombia; Kokang and Wa regions, Myanmar) absorbed by cul-
tivation increases in another part of the national territory (Helmand and Kan-
dahar, Afghanistan; Putumayo and Cauca, Colombia; the north- east and south 
of Shan State, Myanmar) (see Buxton, 2015, 13; Dion and Russler, 2008).
Caulkins and Reuter (2010, 5) emphasise risk and prices in understanding 
the limited gains of cultivation- eradication programmes:  ‘Prices in source 
countries account for only 1– 2  percent of retail prices in developed coun-
tries. So even if alternative development, crop- eradication, or enforcement 
in source countries quintupled prices in source countries, the effect on retail 
prices downstream could be modest […] Sometimes source- country interven-
tions reduce production in one country, but unfortunately there seems to be no 
shortage of peasant farmers and criminals in relatively lawless regions who are 
willing to take up the slack’. Disruption of plant based drug markets (combined 






as it galvanised synthetic drug markets (mdma and amphetamine- type stimu-
lants (ats), amphetamine, and methamphetamine) and synthetic substitutes 
for plant based drugs for two decades, starting in the 1990s. The 2018 World 
Drug Survey showed cocaine (produced in Latin America) to be the least con-
sumed of the traditional narcotics, at an estimated 17 million users annually. 
By contrast, there were 22 million annual users of mdma and 37 million ats 
users. The rise of markets for synthetics challenged the South- to- North supply 
paradigm and underscored the ramifications of the more lenient treatment 
afforded to non- plant based substances in the treaty framework. Synthetic 
drugs had the advantage of mobile and small- scale manufacture with readi-
ly available household products and pharmaceuticals, such as the decongest-
ant pseudoephedrine used in methamphetamine manufacture and reagents 
such as iodine and phosphorous. Manufacture, distribution and supply chains 
for synthetics were condensed, contrasting with the long, farm- gate- to- retail 
chain of opiates and cocaine and its associated interception risks. Western and 
central European countries developed as important supply states, with East 
European and Asian countries such as India and China assuming roles in in-
dustrial chemical supply. The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988) imposed controls on twenty- two pre-
cursor chemicals, but the capacity for robust enforcement was eroded by the 
dual- use nature of the scheduled chemicals, with ‘widespread uses in textile, 
chemical, and pharmaceutical industries’ (Kumar, 1998).
Aggressive opiate- interception and coca/ cocaine- eradication efforts in the 
1980s and 1990s had multiple forms of ‘blowback’, bringing more countries into 
the illegal trade as onward distribution points in reconfigured plant and syn-
thetic markets. This geographical expansion was accelerated in the post- Cold 
War period amid easier movement of people, goods and finance, as well as 
technological advances. Countries undergoing political transitions and regime 
change processes (the collapse of Soviet communism; end of military authori-
tarianism/ single- party rule) and characterised by poverty and inequality, weak 
rule of law, institutional fragilities and a poorly remunerated security sector 
were particularly vulnerable to penetration by displaced drug markets. This 
had implications for their political (democratic), security and development 
prospects. The repatriation of criminal offenders from the US (1996 Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) and the UK (2002) 
to Central America and the Caribbean was an additional driver of drug trade 
dissipation and enforcement cost accretion to global South countries. The US 
deported 46,000 convicted offenders to Central America, ‘some of whom had 
a record of drug trafficking and drug use’, and over 160,000 undocumented mi-
grants (oas, 2013, 21; caricom, 2008).
 
 
Drug Control and Development: a Blind Spot 25
4.3 Enforcement Costs
The dissipation of the drug trade and drug use into previously insulated terri-
tories, the 1988 Convention, and the elision of the wars on drugs and terrorism 
after 11 September 2001 increased pressure for aggressive counter- narcotics 
responses from national authorities and draconian new drug laws in transi-
tion countries. This extended the network of countries locked into bilateral 
(US) and multilateral (European Union (EU)) counter- narcotics agreements, 
with the requisite channelling of limited public resources (and development 
assistance) to enforcement activities (see, for example, Gibert (2009) on Guin-
ea Bissau). Increased law enforcement spending reduced the ‘availability of 
resources for other activities or services critical for development, such as ed-
ucation, infrastructure, environmental conservation, and social protection’ 
(oas, 2013, 18). To substantiate their argument that ‘the opportunity cost of 
these resources for developing countries, for investments in health, education, 
or infrastructure, is almost surely larger than that in richer countries’, Keefer, 
Loayza and Soares (2010, 13) highlight that ‘The Mexican government […] is 
currently spending $9 billion per year to fight drug trafficking, more than three 
times the amount the United States spends relative to gross domestic prod-
uct (gdp) […] the Colombian government committed to increasing defense 
expenditures from 3.6 per cent of gdp in 2003 to 6 per cent by 2006 […] In 
contrast, public expenditures on health in Colombia were around 5 per cent 
of gdp in 2000’.
For the oas, the forfeiting of public investment was egregious given that 
‘such investments plausibly have particularly high returns in lower income 
countries, suggesting that the opportunity costs of drug enforcement per dol-
lar spent may be particularly high in countries where the needs for poverty 
alleviation programs and public investments are acute’ (oas, 2013, 40). Com-
paring the value of illicit drugs transiting lmic s to the financial capacity of 
these states reveals an unbridgeable disconnect. The wholesale value of co-
caine transiting West Africa was estimated by unodc in 2006 to be usd 1.8 
billion. By contrast, the annual gdp of Guinea Bissau was usd 304 million and 
the annual public budget just usd 125 million. Similarly, the value of illegal 
cocaine traffic through Central America was estimated to be usd 50 billion, 
compared to annual gdp s of usd 28 billion, usd 16 billion, and usd 7 billion 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, respectively (2006 figures, unodc).
4.4 Sustained Demand
Prohibition worked on the assumption that demand for mind- and mood- 
altering substances would be eliminated as supplies evaporated. Where con-








harsh criminal sanction were used to punish offenders. At the national level, 
this was marked by a vast expansion of the powers of states to police and pun-
ish private behaviours. This included through laws to remove the family, em-
ployment, housing, liberty and even the life of drug offenders— thirty- three 
jurisdictions adopted capital punishment for drug related offences. Neverthe-
less, the global demand for drugs continued to grow. By 2018, and despite the 
roll out of punitive anti- drugs laws in post- Soviet, African, and South Asian 
states, an estimated 275 million people (5.6 per cent of the global population 
(unodc, 2018)) had used drugs at least once over the previous year. Rather 
than reducing the size of illegal drug markets or advancing the 1998 ungass 
ambition of a drug free world within a decade, the international drug ‘sup-
pression’ regime presided over the diversification of markets into a range of 
cheaper and purer synthetic, organic and diverted pharmaceutical substanc-
es, as well as the emergence of a post- Cold War ‘Global Habit’ (Stares, 1996) 
of drug consumption that broke down the traditional bifurcation of Southern 
cultivating and Northern consuming countries.
Coercive ‘prevention’ regimes escalated in response, with record global lev-
els of incarceration for minor, low- level, and possession- related drug offences, 
in addition to ever more brutal and violent state campaigns of forced treat-
ment, arbitrary detention and extrajudicial killing. Prisons in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Thailand were operating at 436 per cent, 202 per cent, and 145 
per cent capacity, respectively, in 2018, and in South and Central America, El 
Salvador and Guatemala had a prison occupancy level of 333 per cent. The fig-
ure was 254 per cent in Bolivia, 226 per cent in Peru, and 165 per cent in Brazil. 
In the US, which led on the policy transfer of incarceration, imprisonment for 
drug related offences increased from 40,000 in 1980 to more than 500,000 in 
2010 (Fellner, 2009). These statistics are underpinned by pronounced social 
and racial disparities, with policing and criminal justice processes discrimi-
nating against poor and marginalised communities and increasingly targeting 
women (wola, 2016; Fleetwood and Torres, 2011). This reinforced patterns of 
socio- economic marginalisation and rights violations drove the intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty, and served as an incubator of violence (Camilo 
Castillo, Mejia and Restrepo, 2014) and disease (Csete et al., 2016). Coercive po-
licing was additionally corrosive of the legitimacy of state actors. As outlined 
by the oas, ‘The criminalization of broad sectors of the population may also 
have the pernicious effect of making crime and rule- breaking more “natural” 
for a growing proportion of society’ (oas, 2013, 25). In relation to problematic 
use, the oas cited factors of vulnerability linked to the breakdown of social 
cohesion, educational and employment deficits, and poor prevention, treat-
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treatment needs and decreased state credibility in drug policy underpinned 
buoyant and innovative supply chains, which were in turn incentivised and 
lucrative due to criminalisation.
4.5 Conditions in Cultivating Areas
A final aspect of sustained cultivation relates to conditions of marginalisa-
tion, isolation and poverty that render engagement in the illegal drug trade 
(including in harvesting, collection, transportation and brokerage) a rational, 
if not the only option for sustaining livelihoods. Those communities that have 
continued with, transplanted or taken up cultivation typically live in remote, 
inhospitable areas and are cut off or excluded from state services, security 
provision and public goods due to conflict, orthodox economic adjustment 
processes, geography or weak (illegitimate) state penetration. These circum-
stances of multidimensional poverty particularly relate to displaced popula-
tions, communities marginalised due to ethnicity or race, and social sectors 
impacted by poverty (land, cash, infrastructure, access to markets). Where 
these structural characteristics intersect, the incentives for cultivation are 
pronounced (see Buxton (2015) for a summary of the literatures). Illicit crop 
cultivation offers a host of advantages over participation in formal agricultural 
systems with licit crops. Initial input costs are low; coca and opium poppy 
offer quicker and more frequent plantation- to- harvesting cycles; they are resil-
ient crops with high resistance to blight and disease; they have a ring- fenced 
market usually supported by guaranteed intermediaries; they provide access 
to land and credit; and, most importantly, they do not need facilities for stor-
age, refrigeration and speedy market delivery. Illegal cultivation responds to 
the needs and deficits of the most impoverished, as well as those who lack the 
assets, resilience networks and capital to participate in formal economies and 
transnational market chains.
While providing economic and other forms of security, illicit cultivation 
has negative ramifications for cultivating communities. It brings vulnerability 
to violence and coercion from the state, criminal organisations and informal 
power- holders (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010) and food insecurity, and it 
contributes to environmental degradation (soil erosion; water and land pollu-
tion from chemicals in derivative manufacture) (oas, 2013, 35).
Coercive counter- narcotics measures vigorously pursued under the mantle 
of the US- led ‘drug war’ and national counter- narcotics initiatives have exac-
erbated the vulnerabilities of cultivating communities and the accountability 
and legitimacy deficits of the state. Forced eradication has been characterised 
by state violence, rights abuses, land grabs and forced displacement, resulting 






contributed to environmental and ecological degradation, including through 
the use of fumigation by chemical herbicides (glyphosate use in Colombia) 
and the burning and bombing of illicit cultivation sites and manufacturing fa-
cilities (Clemencia Ramírez, 2005). In response to the fear of eradication, ille-
gal drug cultivators speed up production cycles or move deeper into protected 
areas and national forests to disguise cultivation from aerial surveillance, com-
pounding the environmental damage associated with the illegal drug trade 
and counter- narcotics responses (Buxton, 2015; oas, 2013, 34).
Crop destruction eliminates livelihoods, encouraging violent defensive re-
actions from cultivators and initiatives by cultivators to seek support and pro-
tection from insurgent groups, informal power holders and other non- state ac-
tors. Eradication is also a mechanism for corruption, empowering state actors 
to derive financial gain from tip- offs and negotiated eradication avoidance. An 
evaluation of the forced eradication strategies that have been implemented 
over the last four decades points to a poor record, with displacement, dissipa-
tion and transplantation offsetting short- term gains (Jelsma, 2001; Mansfield, 
2016; Felbab- Brown, 2016).
4.6 National- Level Impacts
Illegal drug exports can create wealth, employment and hard currency earn-
ings, but with distorting effects on the wider macroeconomy. This includes 
through loss of fiscal revenues due to untaxed but lucrative economic activ-
ities; vulnerability to ‘commodity dependence’ and Dutch Disease, including 
exchange rate appreciation; reduced economic management capacity; and 
resource accumulation and concentration (land, cash and infrastructure). 
The formal economy is undermined by the loss of capital, entrepreneurs, and 
workers to the illegal drug sector; by increased (fiscal) risk, and by burdensome 
regulations intended to address the informal sector (anti- money laundering 
regulations; export and import certifications). This imposes operating costs 
that are elevated in the context of proximate drug related violence (security 
expenditures; kidnap and extortion risk) (Fleming, Roman and Farrell, 2000; 
Miron 2010; Thoumi, 2002).
The damage done by unruly but financially robust drug markets to gov-
ernance, transparency and the rule of law has been extensively documented 
and is another important element of the drugs and development nexus. It in-
cludes the corruption of state actors and institutions by bribery and coercion, 
impunity, and a narrowing of participation and political debate as wealthy 
illegal drug interests purchase security, information and political protection 
(Inkster and Comolli, 2012). For the oas, this situation ‘produces a vicious 
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and procedures are weakened, the more state institutions are susceptible to 
being permeated by the illegal drug economy’. Prohibition based strategies 
presume a functioning state, and incorruptible law enforcement. This liberal 
institutionalism frames a clean, ‘white’ public administration that is contrast-
ed with the dark forces of the ‘black economy’. This ideal type has no reality 
in practice, with all countries located within a grey area of corruption, bribery, 
lawbreaking and fraud.
5 Alternative Development
A dramatically different approach to militarised eradication strategies recog-
nised that cultivation was driven by more complex factors than criminal gain. 
It addressed household reliance on illegal crops, with the goal of enabling a 
sustainable transition of the household into the formal economy (Boonwaat, 
2001). This ad approach was a form of ‘puzzling’ (learning from failure, see 
Wood, 2014) within the established policy paradigm of prohibition. It accepted 
the fundamentals of drug control, operating ‘within a framework of ideas and 
standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are 
meant to be addressing’ (Hall, 1993, 279).
5.1 The Thai Experience
ad is viewed as having been most successfully implemented in Thailand, 
where opium poppy cultivation had been prohibited in 1959. After a decade 
of unsuccessful military- led eradication efforts within a wider anti- communist 
campaign, the Thai Royal Family took the lead in addressing ongoing cultiva-
tion in the Northern Highlands by Hmong minorities displaced from China. 
Led by King Boumibol, the Thai Royal Highlands Project encouraged Hmong 
community participation to identify and address citizenship and infrastruc-
ture deficits. Economic formalisation was supported through investment and 
skills training. Recognising the livelihoods vulnerability caused by the lag be-
tween crop eradication and employment in alternative, formal agriculture, it 
was agreed eradication would be undertaken on a negotiated basis, and only 
when cultivators had economic alternatives in place. In addition, the Hmong 
were permitted to cultivate small amounts for personal consumption (Renard, 
2002). The continuity and legitimacy provided by the Royal Family has been 
a key factor in the success of the (ongoing) project and accounts for the long- 








For some critics, the Thai ad experience was a nationalist project of ‘state 
extension through the administration of development- orientated projects’ 
(Windle, 2016, 97). From this perspective, ad was a means of securing the 
state’s presence in its frontier territories and instilling in Highland groups ‘a 
sense of belonging and national loyalty to the nation’ (Windle, 2017, 371). Nev-
ertheless, it was successful in achieving sustained reductions in Thai opium 
poppy cultivation and it served as a model of best practice in long- term, non- 
coercive approaches to illicit cultivation elimination that was initially copied 
by Laos in 1994 with the Comprehensive Drug Control Programme (Boomwaat, 
2001; Windle, 2017, 368).
The Thai model and official endorsement of ad in the 1998 United Nations 
Action Plan on Alternative Development and the 2016 ungass Outcome Doc-
ument encouraged a move away from simple crop substitution programmes 
that had been trialled in a number of Latin American cultivating zones in the 
1980s— with limited success in reducing cultivation. These initiatives lacked 
the resources and long- term donor commitment necessary to achieve sustain-
able cultivation reductions. They were variously critiqued for encouraging up-
take of agricultural crops that were poorly remunerated and vulnerable to rot 
and disease; for focusing on white elephant projects; for failing to provide cul-
tivators with the skills, assets and resources required for long- term formalisa-
tion; and for failing to engage cultivators as stakeholders in the design and de-
livery of ad projects. Conditionalities attached to development assistance and 
including prior destruction of narcotic crops failed to recognise the livelihoods 
vulnerabilities of cultivators, and criminalisation of cultivation precluded 
trust and confidence building between cultivators, development agencies and 
state authorities. The result was inappropriate, short- term, foreign- designed 
projects that had negligible impact on cultivating communities (Léons and 
Sanabria, 1997).
5.2 To al and dodc
On the back of these criticisms and supported by the 1998 Action Plan, drug 
control authorities became engaged in more complex projects that incorpo-
rated health, education and infrastructure investments (giz, 2006; Mansfield, 
2006) termed alternative livelihoods (al) and development oriented drug 
control (dodc). These emphasised holistic approaches that addressed the 
development needs of cultivation zones within a wider framework of nation-
al poverty reduction and political incorporation. al and dodc absorbed the 
participatory thrust of the Thai Royal Highlands Project, sensitivity to the gen-
dered dynamics of cultivation and onward marketing activities, and uptake 
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‘development’ approaches, these reformulated ad initiatives did not impose 
prior crop- eradication as a condition for development support.
Despite this innovation and cross- sectoral learning, the record of ad has 
remained poor (Farthing and Ledebur, 2015; 2005; Jelsma, 2002; Mansfield and 
Paine, 2005). Key challenges most recently highlighted in relation to Afghan-
istan and Colombia include the lack of clear, consistent and long- term stra-
tegic planning; persistent funding shortfalls; short- term cycles; and program-
matic incoherence. The last of these challenges is epitomised by the lack of 
joined- up planning and information sharing within and between foreign and 
domestic counter- narcotics and development agencies, and the persistence 
of divergent approaches and interpretations of the cultivation ‘problem’ (The 
Economist, 2018).
Support for militarised strategies is embedded within key actors, institutions 
and processes (the US, domestic security sectors) and has been reinforced by 
the conflict dynamics that pervade most cultivation areas. The terrorist attacks 
on the US of 11 September 2001 led to a reassertion of coercive supply con-
trol strategies driven by the elision of the ‘war on drugs’ and ‘war on terror’. 
This marked a return to the narrative of cultivating communities as criminals 
and terrorist enablers, in turn legitimising state violence and eroding trust and 
partnership in cultivation reduction (Tickner, 2014). Particularly problematic 
has been the lack of consensus around the sequencing of crop eradication and 
receipt of development support, with domestic and foreign actors following 
distinct and uncoordinated approaches.
The interlinking of drugs and counter- insurgency has led to a reassertion 
of the security sector as the primary actor in counter- narcotics, and absorp-
tion of development briefs and budgets into security portfolios. This has 
resulted in strategies that have been dictated by the primacy of security and 
stabilisation concerns, in turn leading to dramatic policy and programme 
shifts and a lack of predictability in ad funding patterns. In some cases, se-
curity actors have assumed responsibility for quips (quick impact projects) 
informed by strategic and ‘hearts and minds’ considerations rather than sus-
tainable, integrated and measurable development objectives (Isacson, 2006; 
2012; Vargas Meza, 2011). Mechanisms for channelling ad funding have been 
criticised for the mobilisation and empowerment of traditional community 
‘gatekeepers’, informed by political pragmatism and resulting in poor over-
sight, corruption and the generation of new forms of rural inequality and 
stratification. In this context, local ownership, rights- based approaches and 
‘stakeholder participation’ in ad programme design and monitoring and eval-









While dodc promoted greater national ownership of localised illicit econ-
omies and encouraged a shift away from addressing cultivation zones as ‘en-
clave’ areas, it failed to gain the high- level uptake, domestic ownership, legal 
institutionalisation or the bureaucratic capacity necessary to steer more ef-
fective integration into national programming. Conversely, in emphasising na-
tional rather than localised dynamics, ad/ dodc was critiqued for failing to 
take into account the social, political, economic and cultural conditions of cul-
tivating areas. Programme assessments were thin, informed by weak baseline 
information and metrics narrowly focused on drug control not development 
indicators. The absence of development- oriented metrics underscored the 
limitations of ad as ‘experimentation’ within the existing prohibition policy 
paradigm (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004).
5.3 The Limitations of ad
In both its traditional and more contemporary development- oriented forms, 
ad does not have transformative potential. It does not challenge the structural 
causes of cultivation, including land inequalities, racial and ethnic marginal-
isation, or the imbalances of power that enable privileged spoilers to disrupt 
and dismantle development initiatives. The capacity of ad programmes to 
deliver long- term and well- remunerated rural livelihoods is eroded by the re-
ality of conditions in formal and global markets comprised of transnational 
supply chains and downward consumer pricing dynamics. In the absence of 
large- scale social investment, land redistribution programmes and large- scale 
capital investment, ad does not offer cultivating communities the resources 
or the resilience necessary to maintain household incomes in fiercely compet-
itive domestic and international markets. In geographical and programming 
terms, it is a limited response that has been confined to rural areas without 
engaging with the challenges presented by urban drug markets and synthetic 
substitution (unodc Plenary Session, March 2019). Particularly problemat-
ic is the ongoing lack of institutional clarity around ad, al and dodc— the 
terminology and ambitions of the last of these largely jettisoned in a return 
to the traditional and generic programming narrative of ‘ad’. ‘Development’ 
has continued to be variously construed as externally defined, market- led with 
conditional assistance (US), locally driven with unconditional assistance but 
market oriented (EU; oas) or as state- led modernisation (China; Laos). The 
emphasis is on the role of the private sector or state entrepreneurs in leading 
investment and identifying market opportunities in vulnerable, unequal and 
unstable territories. These approaches do not enable economic empowerment 
of cultivating communities and do not address structural inequalities, and 
they create new market- driven forms of livelihoods insecurity.
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At the national level, ad programmes have been subject to flux resulting from 
governance shifts, altered priorities and divergent problem interpretations— 
Colombia in the transition from President Juan Manuel Santos to Ivan Duque 
being a pertinent case study of such trends. Bolivia is a cogent example of the 
interlinked challenges of national ownership, policy innovation within the pro-
hibition paradigm, and policy shifts linked to political change. In 2004, Bolivia 
legalised registered coca leaf cultivation, initially up to one cato (1,600‒2,500 
square metres). This was formalised in the 2009 Constitution introduced by 
the government of Evo Morales, former leader of the coca farmers union, 
and in line with his administration’s Coca si, Cocaina no policy (Farthing and 
Ledebur, 2015; Grisaffi, 2019). The policy ended coercive, US- led eradication 
strategies and empowered indigenous communities to cultivate for the domes-
tic coca market. Implementation was administered and policed by coca unions 
and communities, a strategy of participatory alternative development that was 
funded by the EU. But it faced strong opposition from the incb and put the 
Morales government on a collision course with the US government. The move 
required Bolivia’s withdrawal from, and subsequent readmission into, the trea-
ty framework (Grisaffi, 2019). Despite the institutional hurdles and US antago-
nism, the policy was acknowledged to have been successful in reducing illicit 
cultivation and the violence associated with eradication exercises, as well as 
in generating sustainable incomes for local communities (Farthing and Kohl, 
2005; Farthing and Ledebur, 2015). After the Morales government collapsed 
following a contested presidential election and Morales fled the country in No-
vember 2019, an ‘interim’, military- backed administration avowedly opposed to 
the Coca si strategy took power. The policy was reversed as the ‘interim’ govern-
ment transitioned Bolivia back to the US diplomatic and political orbit.
While presented as radical and innovative, ad is a conservative initiative 
that accepts modest policy adjustment in to order to keep the fundamentals 
of prohibition the same. It is framed by the ‘zero cultivation’ logic and supply 
orientation of the existing control system, and the rapidly disintegrating mod-
el of arbitrarily delineated medical, regulated and unauthorised markets. As 
outlined under objective 1 of the 1998 Action Plan on ad, states are required 
‘to take appropriate measures to prevent the illicit cultivation of plants con-
taining narcotic and psychotropic substances and to operate to improve the 
effectiveness of eradication efforts, inter alia, giving support to alternative de-
velopment’. ad is a new tool within an existing international policy and nor-
mative framework of prohibition that is biased against the global South, which 
continues to displace enforcement costs to lmic s and locks down the histori-
cal focus on plants. It is tepid in only addressing cultivation rather than wider 





states, and in emphasising market- based solutions to critical problems of 
structural and global inequality. As such, it is a response to the ‘accumulation 
of anomalies’ resulting from coercive eradication efforts, but as outlined by 
Wilder and Howlett (2015, 106), ‘The potential for defeat in discursive battles 
to institutionalize ideas also raises the possibility that some or most elements 
of the existing paradigm may be retained and not replaced’.
6 Development: a Prohibition Blind Spot
Drugs and development questions are comprehensively intertwined, includ-
ing in relation to the financial, social and political impacts on development 
prospects of coercive counter- narcotics strategies. Yet as outlined by the oas 
and notwithstanding high- level commitments to better thematic and pro-
grammatic linkage, ‘drug and development policies tend to be formulated in 
isolation’ (oas, 2013, 9), including due to the protracted resistance of drug con-
trol bodies (Bridge, 2017; Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019, 90). Efforts to 
break down institutional and agency silos and promote policy and operational 
synergies were reflected in the 2016 ungass Outcome Document and incor-
poration of drug- related crime and health concerns in the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals (sdg s, 16 and 3, respectively). However, the integration 
of drugs and development comes at a time when the record of development 
is— like drug policy— coming under critical scrutiny.
‘Development’ and ‘sustainable development’ are contested and ambig-
uous in concept and practice, with a ‘veritable industry of deciphering and 
advocating what sustainable development really means’ (Robert, Parris and 
Leiserowitz, 2005, 11). At its most basic, development can be defined as a 
collective responsibility for a process of change that enables individuals to 
realise potential, fundamental rights and improvement. On this score, the 
optimism of the opening decade of the twenty- first century and hopes of 
transformative change for all has given way to more sceptical evaluation of 
the recent record of development. Statistics on poverty reduction (and World 
Bank data) have come under scrutiny, including on the basis of measurements 
used and their reliability (Hickel, 2018; Sumner, 2016); the egregious concentra-
tion of wealth in the top 1 per cent (Selwyn, 2017); the precarious nature and 
low remuneration of employment in global market chains; and the challenges 
presented by a new geography of poverty that has emerged in those countries 
that have experienced the most dynamic growth (middle income). Liberal and 
market- centric assumptions have been a key concern, most specifically in the 
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the driver of development. Contemporary development goals are based on a 
broad international consensus that is epitomised in commitments such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (mdg s), the sdg s and in mechanisms such 
as national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (prsp s). For critics, however, 
this represents a minimum consensus, does not address issues of power, and 
obscures a gap between declaratory statements and implementation (Corn-
wall and Brock, 2005; Vandemoortele, 2003).
For Cornwall and Brock, ‘Three words— “participation”, “empowerment” 
and “poverty reduction”— have recently gained considerable purchase in 
the language of mainstream development’. These have created an agenda for 
transformation that ‘combines no- nonsense pragmatism with almost unim-
peachable moral authority’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, 1043), provides ‘a neat 
route- map for implementation’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, 1044), and which 
assumes measurability. But the extent to which development and anti- poverty 
agendas represent any meaningful shift in politics, policy and practice is ques-
tioned. It is argued that the radical roots of concepts such as ‘participation’ and 
‘empowerment’ have been narrowed, neutered and ‘reconfigured in the ser-
vice of today’s one- size- fits- all development recipes, spun into an apoliticised 
form that everyone can agree with’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005, 1048; Stewart 
and Wang, 2003). The persistence of unequal market power, the accumulation 
of elite wealth, the consolidation of corporate power and the persistence of 
poverty raise serious questions as to how far the contemporary development 
agenda represents a significant change to patterns of capital accumulation, 
exploitation, participation and gender relations (Crewe and Harrison, 1999; 
Groves and Hinton, 2004; Mosse, 2005; Whitehead, 2003).
As with ad, contemporary development strategy is critiqued for having 
created new classes of poor while simultaneously maintaining a narrative of 
reaching the poorest of the poor. As highlighted by Christian Aid (2019, 7), ‘the 
sdg s are barely touching the places where peacebuilding challenges are most 
urgent:  the margins (both geographical and economic) and the borderlands 
where violence, fragility and displacement are rife’. Cultivation zones and drug 
economies are a ‘blind spot’ for development in general and the sdg s in par-
ticular, failing— like ad— to meaningfully engage with power dynamics, col-
lation of quality data or an adequate understanding of ‘how men and women 
in local communities mitigate risks through illicit activities’ (Christian Aid, 
2019, 10). The retention of drug criminalisation within a development- oriented 
framework is untenable, perpetuating rights abuses, stigmatisation, violence 
and harm. As surmised by Christian Aid (2019, 14), ‘Overall, the sdg s reflect 
the conventional view that illicit drug crop economies lie outside the devel-












of those living on the margins, these economies are treated as a “distortion” 
or pathology that must be isolated, combatted and destroyed. Therefore, law 
enforcement— including policies associated with the war on drugs— rather 
than development and peacebuilding are at the leading edge of efforts to com-
bat drug economies in fragile, borderland regions’.
7 Conclusion
The integration of drug policy and development policy provides an opportu-
nity for new thinking on deeply embedded structural inequalities that exist 
between North and South and within global South countries. While efforts 
to promote improved synergies between drug and development policies are 
to be welcomed, limited progress can be achieved by enhancing the interface 
between policy paradigms that are counterproductive, unrealistic and that 
cause more harm than good. The 1998 Action Plan, the sdg s, and the 2016 
ungass Outcome Document are notable for ignoring and excluding meaningful, 
evidence- driven engagement with the development impacts of criminalisation. 
Complex development questions cannot be addressed within the institution-
al and normative framework of criminalisation, with the associated primacy 
of law- and- order approaches, security actors, and enforcement metrics. Pro-
hibition is an impediment to rights- based agendas, stakeholder participation 
and structural reform processes that should be the basics of any meaningful 
international and national effort to address poverty and insecurity. Rather than 
supporting policy alignment, the development community must be at the fore-
front of pressure for drug policy paradigm change, and as national policy exper-
iments in the decriminalisation and legalisation of cannabis bring issues of fair 
trade, comparative advantage and global North hypocrisy to the fore.
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chapter 3
Imperial Drug Economies, Development, and  




This chapter challenges contemporary policy conceptions on the historical relation-
ship between drugs and development policies. It uses a historical analysis to examine 
the interaction of drugs, governance, security, welfare and economic development 
policies within drug producing contexts in Asia, from colonialism through the period 
of decolonisation. It highlights that although modern narratives of drugs and devel-
opment tend to view the latter as new and involving even immediately contemporary 
innovations for dealing with the outcomes of drug economies and drug policies, the 
historical reality is much more complex. Managing drugs and development was a fun-
damental historical process of state regulation, control and the settling of geographi-
cal boundaries, both economically and physically. This chapter posits two foundation-
al ideas. First, the issues of drugs and development have always been fundamentally 
linked, from the globalisation of trade through mercantilist imperial policies, state 
formation, the limits of governance, the distribution of economic gains, and political 
economy outcomes stretching from the local to the global. Drugs, licit and illicit, have 
therefore always been an issue of economic development. Second, policymakers have 
long recognised and developed state responses based on the above reality. While not 
going under its now ‘official’ title, many of the principles of ‘alternative development’ 
have been ingrained in policy responses and limitations over the past several centuries.
1 Introduction
Modern narratives of drugs and development tend to view the latter as new 
and even immediately contemporary innovations for dealing with the out-
comes of drug economies and drug policies (UN General Assembly, 2013). 
Alternative development is seen as a logical evolution of the United Nations 
(UN) drug control system, rather than a phenomenon whose doctrines long 






illicit economies and their management to the Sustainable Development Goals 
(sdg s) again view this as a novel framework, the tenets of which policymakers 
have historically shunned. In both cases, the historical reality, as this chapter 
will demonstrate, was far more complex. Opium and the licit– illicit economy 
divide was always a fundamental issue of political economy and economic de-
velopment. Moreover it was treated as such by local elites and European colo-
nial elites. Its typification into a simple dichotomy between eradication and 
development, as often encapsulated within one- dimensional views of ‘alterna-
tive development’, misses this larger historical story. Drugs and development 
was a fundamental historical process of state regulation, control and the set-
tling of geographical boundaries, both economically and physically. This chap-
ter attempts to tell this story through the long history of drugs as development 
and the history of drug policy as development within the Asian region up to 
the period of decolonisation.
This paper posits two foundational ideas for better understanding contem-
porary drugs and development policies. First, the issues of drugs and develop-
ment have always been fundamentally linked, from the globalisation of trade, 
through mercantilist imperial policies, state formation, the limits of govern-
ance, the distribution of economic gains, and political economy outcomes 
stretching from the local to the global. Drugs, licit and illicit have therefore 
always been an issue of economic development. Second, policymakers have 
long recognised and developed state responses based on the above reali-
ty. While not under the official title of ‘alternative development’, many of its 
principles have been ingrained in policy responses and limitations over the 
past several centuries. British administrators sought to navigate the political 
economy of the Indian opium trade. Administrators in Burma promoted a 
development- first, harm reductionist approach (although not specifically la-
belled as such) that placed economic and political stability ahead of ideolog-
ical and drug fetishist goals of eradication and prohibitions, even if this ran 
counter to emerging international norms and obligations. Beneath often lofty, 
ideological and normative aspirational goals, policymakers frequently and ex-
plicitly recognised the issue of drugs and drug markets as one of economic 
development and economic fundamentals.
This of course raises the complicated and contested question of how one 
defines ‘development’, particularly over a long historical case study. For exam-
ple, it might be pointed out that, Asian countries, during the colonial period, 
had little agency or right over national governance issues that were determined 
to a large extent in the capitals of Europe. This raises the question of ‘whose 
development?’ Nevertheless, to proceed with this discussion we must build a 
model of development based on a selection of criteria (Bassi et al., 2019). As  
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this is a discussion of the role of development within drug control, we must 
use the two most commonly referenced frameworks— that of alternative de-
velopment and how the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
the World Drug Problem in 2016 addressed this (UN General Assembly, 2016), 
and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development agreed in 2015 (UN General 
Assembly, 2015). This chapter thereby engages questions of development and 
drug control policies from UN frameworks that serve as the basis for under-
standing contemporary donor and member state approaches. Furthermore, 
it draws on drug crop cultivation literature that utilises development para-
digms to understand the ‘double- edged sword’ of illicit drug economies (Bux-
ton, 2015; Mansfield and Pain, 2005). That is, that they represent an alienating 
force with regard to many mainstream development processes, in many ways 
separating the communities from the political and economic core, while also 
providing cash crops to enable self- sufficiency, capital accumulation, resourc-
es for paid access to private health and economic and security services. The 
question, therefore, is not simply one of drug crops providing short- term eco-
nomic gains or ‘growth’. It is instead about understanding the impacts of these 
changing drug economies and the regulations governing them, on the funda-
mental social, economic, political, environmental and security circumstances 
of communities and nation states experiencing them. These are, under the 
umbrella of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, key issues relat-
ed to economic development and can be conceptualised as such in historical 
analyses. This is the jumping off point for this chapter.
2 Drugs as a Historical Phenomenon
As historian William O. Walker iii wrote, ‘[t] here is no adequate way […] to 
understand the foreign and security policy issues affecting Asia without appre-
ciation of opium’s role’ (Walker, 1992). This chapter expands this statement to 
include the role of development: there is no way to understand the economic 
development and development policies of large parts of Asia without a thor-
ough understanding of the role of drugs.
First, the globalisation of the opium trade in Asia closely resembled the 
globalisation of transnational labour and population flows. Beginning in the 
nineteenth century, China provided the first large- scale ‘free wage labour’ 
for parts of Southeast Asia. Migrant workers moved en masse into these 
regions— namely Malaya, Sumatra, southern Siam, Tonkin and Borneo— and 
were quickly recruited into tin or gold mines, or plantations of pepper, gambi-








had less of an impact on more populous regions, such as Siam, Java, Cochin- 
China and Southern Burma (Trocki, 2002), the migration of Haw, Hmong and 
other tribes from China into other parts of Asia favoured the spread of opi-
um cultivation and consumption (Chouvy, 2013). The two often moved hand 
in hand. For example, an official League of Nations Commission of Enquiry 
reported in 1930 that ‘[c] ontact with Chinese Immigrants has in other Far- 
Eastern territories usually been the cause of the indigenous population ac-
quiring the opium- smoking habit’ (League of Nations, 1930, 37). Indeed, the 
recognition of this interaction between commodity trades and labour move-
ments helps explain the historical plurality of regulatory frameworks en-
forced within many Southeast Asian territories, with different rules applying 
to different migrant or indigenous communities within the same geographic 
territories (Collins, 2017a).
Second, the expansion of drug markets was an inevitably economic, and 
thereby developmental, phenomenon. The expansion of drug supply and drug 
markets globally was an innate process of globalisation. As Chouvy writes, 
‘[t] he caravan tracks of the Haw, which crisscrossed Siam very early, largely 
contributed in turning Thailand into a privileged hub of heroin trafficking’ 
(Chouvy, 2013, 4). Meanwhile, the contemporary trade routes serving legal and 
illegal commodities were effectively the same as those the Burmese had used 
previously to invade Siam, including in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries 
(Chouvy, 2013). The link between illicit economies, empire, state formation 
and conflict is at once inextricable and innately complex.
Third, the production and consumption of mind- altering substances has 
been an inextricable part of social history. Globalisation merely accelerated 
and magnified this phenomenon, making it global. As David Courtwright 
highlights, like other global commodities drugs were influenced by techno-
logical changes that significantly increased the gross tonnage of supplies 
and trade. Efforts to control drugs were an inevitable by- product of their in-
creasing prevalence, ubiquity, visibility and economic impacts (Courtwright, 
2012). Global control initiatives therefore focused on regulating and restrict-
ing supply to socially determined notions of ‘legitimate’ use. As McAllister 
and Spillane write, ‘The central question’ at the turn of the twentieth century 
‘was not whether the state would ultimately restrict some aspects of distri-
bution and sale, but whose authority would be privileged in the process of 
creating and implementing those regulations’ (Spillane and McAllister, 2003, 
S.6). State interactions with drug markets, and attempts to define the limits 
of acceptability, desirability and the benefits/ costs that accrued to governing 
political entities, represented a modern extension of earlier social norms and 
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premodern societies while modern empires and states sought to control these 
commodities through regulations and prohibitions in pursuit of political– 
economic ends.
3 European Empires, Mercantilism and Control of the Sino- Indian 
Opium Trade
Historian Peter Dale Scott similarly argues that in order to understand post- 
World War ii illicit drug trades in Asia, one must first understand the opium 
policies of the British Empire in the nineteenth century (Scott, 2010). The Sino- 
Indian opium trade began in the mid- sixteenth century, and was soon taken 
over by Portuguese, British and Dutch traders. A fragmentary and ultimately 
localised trade soon became subsumed under the monopoly of the British East 
India Trading Company (eic). With it, India became the dominant regional, 
and thereby global actor in the trade (Windle, 2012). Thus, European empires 
transformed the issue into a global one, with concomitant cross border geopo-
litical and legal issues. Where one imperial state, China, increasingly sought 
to restrict and prohibit the domestic consumption of opium (Westad, 2012), 
European empires looked to it as a corrective to major trading imbalances and 
thereby a mercantilist route towards trading and political power within the 
region (Trocki, 1999).
China’s early opium concerns became acute as it manifested as a foreign 
influence. The prohibitionist policies of 1729 directly reflected its perception 
as a practice centred on the south- east coast. Opium, under this conception, 
was not a problem related to cultivation or consumption but to smuggling 
and foreign interference (Bello, 2003). As opium became associated with 
Western consumption practices, namely the mixing with tobacco to form 
smokable opium known as ‘madak’, so too did the sense of foreign incur-
sion and threat (Courtwright, 2012). These early concerns became amplified 
when it became apparent that the Chinese state was haemorrhaging silver 
to buy Indian opium. Qing efforts to counter these outflows ultimately pro-
duced the Opium Wars with Great Britain (Bello, 2003). China’s defeat in 
these conflicts, and its forced opening to trade with the West, saw China le-
galise opium. This was formalised under the Convention of Peking of 1860, in 
part to provide revenues to sustain the ever- weakening Chinese government 
(Brown, 2002).
Meanwhile, at a more local level, the development of Yunnan as a major 
source of opium reiterated both the formidable economic role of the commod-











Qing prohibition in the southwest alerted authorities to the existence of 
an alternative domestic source of opium that thrived on weaknesses in 
the imperial administrative system. Ethno- geographic conditions in Yun-
nan weakened the central government’s local administrative presence, 
which was already prone to a dependence on unconventional revenue 
sources. The southwestern traffic was well placed to exploit these weak-
nesses. Moreover, local cultivation of opium proved particularly suited 
to the needs of the indigenous peoples, Han peasants, and merchants, as 
well as local dynastic officials, because it was powerful enough to gener-
ate incomes for all concerned.
bello, 2003, 1134
Meanwhile, the Qing State itself became reliant on opium revenue, a reality 
that helped negate central government efforts to enforce prohibition in many 
interior regions (Bello, 2003, 1135). Indeed, Bello continues, ‘it was competition 
from southwestern afurong, not pressure from central government prohibi-
tion, [that] ultimately drove Indian opium from China’ (Bello, 2003, 1134).
The development of opium markets in Asia thereby had undoubtedly 
large macroeconomic and thus political impacts. These often simply rein-
forced economic development processes already underway. European pow-
ers used revenue farming systems to minimise their imperial administrative 
and political cost base. In this way, they ‘farmed out’ revenue collection to 
indigenous elites by auctioning the right to tax or develop a monopoly on 
distribution or sale of a specific good, including opium, alcohol, sex work, 
gambling and other activities. Opium represented a particularly liquid enter-
prise with high cash flow and thereby an ability to accumulate large capital 
stocks. Trocki goes further, arguing that the opium farming systems exist-
ing in parts of India, China and virtually all Southeast Asian states ‘were im-
portant adjuncts of capitalist development within the region’ (Trocki, 2002, 
297). Therein developed a premodern economic fabric to weave together 
the complex strands of governance, taxation, local elite development and 
control of the most fundamental principle of sovereignty— the ability to tax. 
Again, as Trocki writes,
The farms also financed commodity production and helped to generate 
the infrastructure for consumer economies. These institutions helped to 
create the finance and state structures that protected businessmen and 
their profits […] In fact, all Asian governments depended upon opium 
farms for major portions of their revenue.
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There seems little to question, therefore, regarding the common belief that 
opium held ‘immense importance’ for the Indian and global economy in the 
nineteenth century (Richards, 2002a, 151). For all its merits, however, Trocki’s 
work derives from a heavily critical framework, perhaps too deterministic in 
its utilisation of macroeconomic indicators to demonstrate an imperial inflec-
tion point in Asian economic development. This may help overshadow the 
situational role of opium within local political economies. Taking the latter 
approach may instead place imperialism as one strand in a broader web of 
development. Furthermore, Trocki’s work perhaps serves to fetishise opium as 
a sole determinant of imperial expansion. Extending Trocki’s macroeconomic 
insights, a microeconomic level analysis provides some additional potentially 
useful insights.
Kranton and Swamy examine the market structures surrounding the eic 
opium monopoly and compare it to its textiles trade (Kranton and Swamy, 
2008). The eic initially operated an opium contract system, but accusations 
of corruption, abuse of locals and low quality products led to the adoption 
of an ‘Agency System’ in 1797 (Kranton and Swamy, 2008, 982). Private culti-
vation and sale was banned; agents provided capital advances to producers 
on behalf of the Company; farmers had to grow in specific areas, harvest and 
deliver opium to agents. It was then generally marked for auction in Calcutta 
to privateers, who would largely sell on to China (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). 
Profits were high, and monopoly power was openly wielded to thwart compe-
tition, and occasionally utilised to flood the market, such as during the 1830s. 
Meanwhile, standards and quality maintained the Opium Agency and ensured 
it survived for over a century. By 1860, around the time the Crown ended the 
eic and assumed direct administration of India, opium represented 17 per 
cent of the Government of India’s revenues (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). Sim-
ilar stories pervaded the region. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
the Netherlands’ Indies opium farms accounted for 18 per cent of total colonial 
revenue, or 35 per cent of tax revenue, and French Cochin- China and Siam 
showed comparable figures (Trocki, 2002). In Siam in 1905‒6, opium farms 
yielded one- fifth of total government revenue, almost double the second most 
important revenue source, gambling farms. Yet in 1907 the Siamese govern-
ment abolished the opium farm system and took over sole administration of 
the opium monopoly (Brown, 1993).
As a counterexample, the eic operated a typical procurement process for 
textiles— providing a capital or input advance with a promise to deliver by the 
supplier, whereupon compensation would be provided. This proved difficult to 
enforce given opportunities for both sides to partially go back on these com-









buyers gave weavers many potential outlets, linkages between the eic and 
its local agents were weak and undermined by information asymmetries, and 
centralised eic control in London limited the ability of local actors to adjust 
to market clearing prices (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). The eic Opium Agen-
cy avoided many of these problems. It was a legal monopsony and monopoly, 
and thereby negated legal competition for suppliers’ produce. Local agents 
had greater flexibility on pricing, while the eic simultaneously pursued great-
er oversight of agents and reinvested supernormal profits into anti- corruption 
measures (Kranton and Swamy, 2008). Nevertheless, over time, the indigenous 
poppy growers of Yunnan and Sichuan provinces in China supplanted the role 
of traffickers and opium from British India. This meant that by the close of the 
nineteenth century, Qing China, specifically its south- west provinces where 
enforcement capabilities were more limited, was the world’s largest producer 
of opium (Bello, 2003).
Burma, meanwhile, proved a complicated case. Ethnic divisions produced 
differing policies. Nineteenth century rulers in Burma had sought to prohibit 
opium use by ethnic Burmans, but largely excluded Chinese, Shan and Kachin 
inhabitants from restrictions on consumption. Initially, British conquest 
brought a standardisation of policies with India, including prohibitions on lo-
cal production and mandating purchases of Indian monopoly opium. Howev-
er, following the conquest of Upper Burma in 1885, a more strict policy was in-
stituted, effectively mimicking the regulations imposed by previous Burmese 
rulers, forbidding the sale of alcohol or opium to Burmans, while establishing 
shops to sell to Chinese and non- Burmans (Richards, 2002b). Eventually, re-
formist pressure at home forced an application of these more stringent rules to 
Lower Burma also (Richards, 2002b). Thereby, within Burma, the Government 
of India had shifted from a pragmatic policy of what Richards terms ‘maxi-
mum revenue from minimum consumption’ and now ‘committed itself to a 
new level of social control— one that would be exceedingly difficult to enforce’ 
(Richards, 2002b, 413 and 418). A surge in the illicit market drove the govern-
ment to quickly backtrack. It relaxed restrictions on licensed shops in Lower 
Burma and these gradually expanded, supplied by Indian opium as well as sei-
zures of Chinese and Shan State Illicit Opium.
3.1 Rethinking the Socioeconomic Impacts of the Sino- Indian 
Opium Trade
Conventional analysis has portrayed the Sino- Indian opium trade in stark 
terms. It was an aggressively extractive imperial enterprise that impoverished 
and degraded all but investors in the metropole. As Alfred McCoy wrote, Brit-
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an unwilling China’ (McCoy, 2003, 78). This conception represented conven-
tional wisdom for much of the last century, with many improbably attribut-
ing impoverishment to the suppliers as well. A 2019 bbc article, for example, 
sought to remind audiences ‘How Britain’s opium trade impoverished Indians’ 
(Biswas, 2019).
More recent historical analysis, however, does not seem to support the view-
point that ‘opium causes poverty’. Some scholars attribute the development of 
capitalism in Southeast Asia to the revenue farming system, of which opium 
was a key pillar. As Trocki writes,
Before the nineteenth century, it is no exaggeration to say that capitalism 
did not really exist in Southeast Asia […] Even those who did produce 
for the global market rarely sold their goods into the market and they 
consumed even less from it. Many exchanges were ritualised and took 
place within relations of dependence. Despite centuries of commerce, 
there was no real middle class in any Southeast Asian society, nor was 
there any ‘free’ wage labour. There was no properly commercial forms 
of production, finance or banking and there were no systems of law that 
would have protected or regulated such enterprises. Rulers were arbitrary 
and absolute; wealth in itself could not effectively exist without the pro-
tection of the power elites.
trocki, 2002, 299
It was the European empires that brought capitalism and stitched the South-
east Asian economies into the global economic system. Opium, at least in part, 
enabled this. However, it was not solely a European creation. Instead, it was the 
Chinese who largely created the local capitalist institutions capable of inter-
facing with the global economy. Under these conditions, opium farming served 
as a key impetus and mechanism, serving also as likely the largest financial 
generator for emerging Chinese businesses. Opium farming conferred primacy 
of wealth and political power, making contract holders ‘inevitably the richest 
and most powerful individuals in their communities’, extracting massive rents 
while engaging in minimal day- to- day activities (Trocki, 2002, 299). This is not 
to say that these contract holders had a largely passive role. They were key 
intermediaries, coalescing financial resources and investors, and subsequently 
managing the resultant investments. The farms, thereby, served as major focal 
points for capital accumulation, and with it economic and political power. This 
reality leads Trocki to label the opium farms as ‘the first and perhaps most ef-
fective means of accumulation in nineteenth- century Southeast Asia’ (Trocki, 







ceased to be a concern of the eic and would change hands multiple times 
before ending up with one of the large Chinese exporting firms, which would 
ship it to Shanghai via Hong Kong or south China ports and their mainland 
wholesalers (Newman, 1989).
Richards, meanwhile, argues that the trade ‘benefitted the Indian econ-
omy and some groups in society more broadly than is generally recognised’ 
(Richards, 2002a, 152). Both its export value and quantity increased over the 
nineteenth century. Coupled with a high value- to- weight ratio, this meant that 
its large profit margins had strong direct and indirect impacts on the econo-
my (Richards, 2002b). The 1878 Opium Act superseded provincial regulations 
and their inconsistent application, and gave the Government of India the sole 
right to regulate and control production through distribution and possession 
(Richards, 2002b). By the 1880s it was still likely one of the highest value com-
modities in global trade routes, with roughly 5,400 metric tons departing from 
Calcutta and Bombay each year, producing 93.5 million rupees in government 
revenue (Richards, 2002b, 377). Simultaneously, the Opium Act served to fur-
ther cement a process already underway, namely shrinking the geographic ar-
eas under cultivation (Richards, 2002b).
Nevertheless, reformist pressure grew in Britain for the outright abolition of 
the trade. A Royal Commission on Opium was appointed to examine the ques-
tion. Its findings, however, ran directly counter to the claims of abolitionists. 
The Commission minimised the impact that the trade was having on social 
and political decay, while pointing to the substantial financial and economic 
impacts an end to the trade would impose on India. Furthermore, China sim-
ply stood ready to step into the Indian void. China was under no actual obli-
gation by that point to accept Indian opium as the British Government had 
publicly relinquished a right of intervention (Richards, 2002b). Reformists 
lambasted the report as pushing an economic status quo and ‘whitewashing’ 
of the reality on the ground (Berridge, 1999; Richards, 2002b). This negative 
view of the Commission has permeated much historiography since, although 
more recent revisionist historiography has pushed back. As Richards writes in 
2005, to  assume
[t] hat the Government of India somehow deceived the members of the 
Commission by a Potemkin village façade is also erroneous […]The Roy-
al Commission on opium was not a whitewash […] Opinion in the Indi-
an- owned English language and Indian language press strongly opposed 
prohibition […] [meanwhile] a majority of the leaders of the fledgling 
Indian National Congress, while uneasy with the moral aspects of the 
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in England and […] saw the reform campaign as a form of cultural 
 imperialism.
richards, 2002b, pp. 380– 1
Richards goes further:
In their zeal to attack the iniquities of the opium traffic and the British 
imperial interests that supported and profited from it, the reformers sen-
sationalised the presumed harm done to Indian consumers of opium and 
minimized the costs to India of ending the traffic. They ignored Indian 
sensitivities by denying any cultural and social value to the use of opium. 
The opium reformers were blinded by strongly ethnocentric biases— 
more so than those British officials, physicians and others who actually 
lived in India.
richards, 2002b, 381
In many ways, the British rulers feared most the social unrest that could fol-
low any attempts to interfere with local cultural sensibilities, economic activ-
ities or other political sensitivities. Since the 1857 revolt, they had assiduously 
avoided anything that could provoke local backlash, such as interfering with 
the opium system. As Richards writes,
[f] or opium, as for alcohol and cannabis (ganja), the Government of In-
dia avoided absolutist positions. It assumed that consumption of these 
substances would continue, that abstinence was a chimera and that the 
best the state could do would be to restrain these habits. The system that 
emerged in each major region of the subcontinent was sensitive to vary-
ing local conditions, cultural preferences and economic circumstances.
richards, 2002b, 409
This would be mirrored by the approach of British administrators in Burma 
half a century later. Still, proponents of the status quo faced a losing battle. 
Professional moralists and reformers only increased pressure and internation-
al regulations, at first bilateral, then multilateral.
4 New Regimes
The beginning of the end of the mercantilist opium systems came with the 






reluctant protagonist in the international control system, in fact helped in-
augurate it through these far- reaching bilateral agreements. From its peak in 
the 1870s, opium had been supplanted by domestic Chinese opium by 1900. 
Still, it represented the Government of India’s third largest source of revenue 
and China’s biggest source of customs revenue as well as a major cash crop 
for millions of Indian peasant farmers. Opium also served as an important 
social and ‘quasi- medical’ outlet for large numbers of labourers throughout 
the region, a physical and mental escape from the daily toil of back- breaking 
work (Newman, 1989). While traditional historiography portrayed Britain and 
other imperial powers as pursuing naked economic self- interest in bucking 
reformist calls for international prohibitions, more recent work has drawn 
a more complex picture. Imperial powers were at once conflicted and am-
bivalent about opium’s role within the economic systems and societies they 
managed, but ultimately reluctant to attempt grand experiments with social 
engineering, such as prohibition (Collins, 2015; McAllister, 2000; Mills, 2014; 
Newman, 1989).
Nevertheless, changing economic realities helped weaken the opposition 
to prohibitions. Transportation improvements reinforced the comparative 
attractiveness of producing bulkier and perishable commodities for global 
markets. Wheat, barley, sugar, tobacco and potatoes all pushed poppy out 
of fields (Newman, 1989). In Ghazipur, opium production succumbed to rice 
and oil seed production in the 1880s, opium ending the century at roughly 
half the production it had seen in 1875. In other parts, famine and irrigation 
difficulties and labour shortages drove a decline in production (Newman, 
1989). Meanwhile, in the midst of controversy over the Royal Commission 
on Opium and accusations that local officials had ‘ruthlessly stage managed’ 
the field visits, Indian opium departments proved unwilling to allow opium 
prices to rise. Cultivators fled en masse to other crops, never to return. This 
led Robert Neuman to describe the sympathetic stance of the Royal Com-
mission as ‘a pyrrhic victory from which the Government of India never 
recovered’ (Newman, 1989, 530). These issues only served to reinforce the 
critical challenge posed by Chinese domestic cultivation (Richards, 2002a) 
alongside incipient competition from Persian and Turkish opium within the 
region (Newman, 1989).
International opinion only hardened further against opium in the interim. 
A chorus of progressive and missionary opinion in the United States (US) coa-
lesced with a vocal domestic China lobby. The latter in particular, saw opium as 
a policy bridge to strengthening Sino- US commercial relations (Collins, 2015). 
Simultaneously, the US encountered its own opium dilemma through its oc-
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prohibition, despite the misgivings of its local administrators (Musto, 1999). 
Washington looked at the European monopolies not as a mechanism to con-
trol a complicated trade, but as an attempt to provide legitimacy to a large 
source for potential diversion into illicit supplies. The only regulation the US 
argued as sustainable was outright prohibition except for medical and scientif-
ic use. Although the European powers initially continued to push back against 
this aggressive approach, the tide was clearly working against them (Collins, 
2015; Musto, 1999).
China meanwhile took pre- emptive action. It announced with an imperi-
al edict in 1906 that ‘foreign and native opium’ would be eradicated within 
ten years (quoted in Newman, 1989, 531). Despite significant scepticism, and 
mixed implementation, the campaign proved surprisingly effective, in the 
short run at least. The domestic mood in China had turned strongly against 
opium. These Chinese domestic efforts rendered resistance from British and 
Indian elites seemingly more indefensible (Newman, 1989). The Government 
of India and their Chinese counterparts reached an agreement whereby India 
would reduce its exports of opium to China by ten per cent per year, resulting 
in a predicted cessation of the trade in 1917. This agreement, the first of the 
Anglo- Chinese Opium Agreements, was signed in December 1907 and came 
into force in January 1908 (Newman, 1989). Britain, quite justifiably, viewed 
itself as having made a major concession, at a significant cost to its imperial 
coffers. In most areas— particularly Bihar and Benares, where it constituted a 
monopoly— the agreement largely served to reinforce trends away from opium 
cultivation. These trends were driven by various push and pull factors already 
discussed. In the more complicated region of Malwa, reduction proved more 
difficult from legal, administrative and economic perspectives. As Newman 
writes,
The opium interests in Malwa faced difficulty if not ruin. Local mer-
chants needed to sell their chests with a minimum of delay to the export-
ers in Bombay if they were to recoup their investment; moreover, many of 
them were holding substantial reserves of old opium which now seemed 
unlikely to find a market at all. If local merchants and moneylenders be-
came bankrupt they would reduce the supply of credit to Malwa peasant-
ry and hamper the process of crop substitution, which was already less 
advanced in Malwa than in northern India […] the decline of the China 
trade endangered many of the princely economies […] [while] [i] n the 
matter of agricultural diversification and development there was little 
beyond exhortation that the Government of India could do.








China meanwhile surpassed its targets, as provincial officials bought into the 
policy, ripped up local crops, closed dens and thereby sought to minimise 
foreign imports. This was simply reinforced by the economic turmoil within 
China’s regions (Newman, 1989). These factors weighed on the next round of 
Anglo- Chinese opium negotiations, which began in mid- 1910. This, instead of 
an agreement, took the form of a treaty, formalising a continued and more 
legalistic commitment to 10 per cent annual reductions. The compromise out-
come was praised in London but raised the ire of communities in India and 
China. The former lamented that their ‘opium revenues are now practically 
gone’ leaving them ‘in a nice financial mess’, while Chinese anti- opium groups 
reacted angrily to concessions made to India (quoted in Newman, 1989, 551). 
The reality, however, was the formalisation of Britain’s commitment to the 
eradication of the opium trade with China.
In the meantime, multilateralism took root. Under Article 6 of The Hague 
Opium Convention of 1912, states parties committed to the gradual ‘suppression 
of the manufacture, the internal traffic in and the use of prepared opium in so 
far as the different conditions peculiar to each nation shall allow’ (The Hague 
International Opium Convention, 1912, Paragraph 6). Going into force following 
the Versailles settlement of World War i, under the aegis of the League of Na-
tions, the international drug control system sought to implement this goal. It did 
so, however, in a broadly uneven manner. Opium smoking continued in the East 
Indies, Malaya, the Unfederated Malay States, Brunei, Sarawak, Burma, India, 
Ceylon, North Borneo, Hong Kong, Indochina and Siam (Collins, 2017a). Many 
governments argued that opium consumption in many of these contexts rep-
resents a form of medical use, which could be termed ‘quasi- medical’ use (Col-
lins, 2015). Furthermore, outright prohibitions were seen as potentially wors-
ening local conditions. This included undermining gains made in regulating 
consumption via rationing and registration, control over what would otherwise 
become an illicit market, and the positive spillovers from driving the revenue 
from opium into government coffers rather than actors that might seek to use it 
to weaken governance in the territories in which they operated (Collins, 2017a).
The international regulatory system, meanwhile, continued to develop at 
the intersection of these Sino- US and European colonial visions (Collins, 2018). 
However, its practical impact was limited by the functional collapse of the Chi-
nese state. From 1917, local military leaders encouraged cultivation to strength-
en their financial base in the face of dwindling central government control 
(Taylor, 1969). Japan also increased its role in the Chinese opium economy, 
shifting towards self- sufficiency in opium production and then becoming a 
leading supplier of illicit narcotics into China through its Southern Manchuria 
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a government- run monopoly, going against the grain of League of Nations 
control efforts and buying from states perceived as rogue operators within the 
emerging control regime (Collins, 2017b). Many have ascribed conspiracy to 
Japan’s efforts— a forceful ‘narcotisation’ of China in pursuit of imperialist 
goals. Indeed, the same accusations were levelled against Japan in its war with 
the US (Collins, 2015). Others have pointed to economic– structural determi-
nants. Japan was, like so many protagonists in licit and illicit drug markets, 
merely following strategic and economic necessities dictated by local political 
economies. As Meyer and Parssinen write, ‘[w] hat looked like genocide and 
conspiracy at the highest levels’ actually represented ‘political compromise in 
pursuit of larger goals’ (Meyer and Parssinen, 2002, 280). In reality, both Japa-
nese and Chinese forces utilised the opium trade for local and national strate-
gic ends (Collins, 2017b).
The 1930s in India saw an appropriation of prohibition policies. The peri-
od 1920‒40 witnessed a rapid decline in domestic consumption. The Indian 
National Congress Party pursued policies of local prohibition from 1937, and 
looked towards prohibition throughout the nation (Brown, 2002). World War 
ii placed a temporary hold on these efforts, but US pressure on Britain had 
produced a broad, although not uniform, commitment to end the practice of 
opium smoking in territories upon reoccupation (Collins, 2017a). Furthermore, 
after independence in 1947 the National Congress reinstituted its policy aim of 
prohibiting all production and consumption except for medical and scientific 
use. The government established a Narcotics Commission to assume control of 
all aspects of production and pricing. Over the following six years, consump-
tion reportedly fell by 45 per cent, largely due to restricted production and in-
creased price. In 1959, sale was completely prohibited, and oral consumption 
was prohibited except for registered consumers. The shift in policy has been 
described by one scholar as ‘one of the world’s most successful campaigns to 
limit the drug’s cultivation and use’ (Brown, 2002, 627).
Others offer a more critical appraisal. As Richards writes,
Opium offered a cash crop to perhaps two million of the most skilful cul-
tivators in both northern British and western Princely India. When opi-
um exports dwindled and eventually ended in 1935, the Indian economy 
lost an economic asset, just as it did when indigo, for example, ceased to 
be a viable cash crop.
richards, 2002b, 180
Burma, meanwhile, emerged as a key actor in its own right in international 










to the various international treaties, but with no clear sense that it held the ca-
pacity to do so. The 1923 Opium Order established an effective legal monopoly 
over supply, making Cis- Salween Sawbwas opium monopsonists and further 
limiting sale to consumers (Maule, 1992). However, implementation varied. For 
example, the Northern Shan States operated via monopoly auctions, policed 
by the monopoly owner. In the Trans- Salween Shan States, weak political con-
trol negated such an approach. Proximity to China and the unchecked produc-
tion underway there was viewed as a key limiting factor. This only strength-
ened British resolve that any risk of social unrest was too high a price to pay 
for the uncertain promise of additional opium prohibitions (Maule, 1992). Se-
curity, governance and development came first, for officials in Burma at least 
( Collins, 2016).
In 1931 Burma officials had proposed a closed system of control, with li-
cenced shops being supplied by Shan State opium and potentially exporting 
excesses to Siam, French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. London and 
the Government of India quickly vetoed the idea, citing, among other issues, 
international obligations under the emerging League of Nations treaty sys-
tem. A  compromise arrangement saw a commitment from the Government 
of India to continue supplying Burma with cheap opium, coupled with a light 
touch approach to the fluid production and informal trading arrangements on 
the borders with Siam and China. With formal separation from India in 1937, 
the idea of utilising Shan opium became appealing once again (Maule, 1992). 
Burma received a significant mark- up reselling cost price Indian opium, pro-
ducing roughly 500 per cent profit. Although opium had collapsed to around 1 
per cent of India’s government revenue by the 1930s, for Burma the loss of this 
supply provoked a more acute fiscal unease. Recognising this reality, London 
sought to redirect the international spotlight away from the situation in Bur-
ma, for example exempting the Shan States from new obligations agreed at 
the 1931 Bangkok opium conference (Maule, 1992). Beneath this protective ap-
proach was a concern that any increased reliance on Shan opium would come 
at the cost of increased leakages into the illicit market and would thereby draw 
new international attention. The issue was not so much political will as regu-
latory capacity, something the Burmese government lacked in these outer re-
gions (Collins, 2017b).
British policies produced a de facto division of the country based on 
governance capabilities and a pluralistic approach to policy enforcement 
(Collins, 2017b). Burma gained independence in January 1948 and focused im-
mediately on internal security and economic recovery and development. It 
adopted a strict policy of neutrality in the emerging Cold War; however, the 
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region as well as a potential ‘back door’ into China (Selth, 2010). The Com-
munist takeover of China in 1949 saw the greatest historical influx of refugees 
into the mountains of Shan and Kachin States. These refugees settled with-
out the permission of the Burmese government and included remnants of 
the Kuomintang (kmt) army and local Yunnan militias. These groups quickly 
coalesced into guerilla forces in the 1950s, their bases providing security and 
governance infrastructure, which drew in civilian refugees seeking protection 
from the Burmese army and local ethnic militias (Chang, 2009). The pro-
longed economic crisis in Burma resulted in a shortage of consumers’ goods, 
which in turn stimulated the cross border illicit trade, which in turn funded 
the militias through taxation. Some estimates placed the trade at 80 per cent 
of Burma’s total consumption, most of which came via Thailand and through 
the Shan State (Chang, 2009, 550).
5 Decolonisation and the Emergence of the Golden Triangle
The Golden Triangle would ultimately emerge at the intersection of these forces 
and geographic areas. It centres on the bordering regions of Burma, Laos and 
Thailand. It is a remote, densely forested area populated by a diverse array of 
ethnic groups, many of whom traditionally followed semi- nomadic slash- and- 
burn agriculture practices (Chouvy, 2013). As Chouvy writes,
[T] he international borders of Burma, Laos, and Thailand also cut across 
two zones that are intricately woven together:  the Tai linguistic zone, 
composed of Shan, Thai, and Lao peoples, over which is superimposed a 
more complex zone of numerous other ethnic groups that are dispersed 
throughout the tri- border area and in neighbouring China.
chouvy, 2013, 1
The region flourished as a postcolonial centre of the illicit trade for the same 
reasons it had proven so difficult to incorporate under colonial economic and 
political systems of control. It is based within untamed terrain of mountains, 
rivers and forest, with minimal infrastructure and a reality of annual monsoons 
that negate whatever infrastructure does exist for several months of the year. 
In such circumstances, the reliance on cash crops becomes not only explicable 
but often essential to community survival. Much like the earlier evolutions of 
the opium trade within the region, however, these geographic and ethnic de-
terminants were not sufficient explainers for the emergence of the Golden Tri-








factor. Evaluating the economic and developmental overlaps between the co-
lonial and postcolonial periods, however, is the focus of another paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the linkage between drugs and development is 
a longer historical phenomenon. While contemporary discourses rightly seek 
to carve greater space for development criteria within drug policy debates, this 
need is driven by a more recent systemic approach to drugs that has viewed 
its policy goals and outcomes in terms of repression, market reduction and an 
ever- greater reliance on prohibition (Collins, 2016). Development practitioners 
highlight that the most recent international drug control treaty, the 1988 UN 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
references the role of development, but in subservience to eradication efforts. 
Development could serve as a mechanism to achieve drug control goals, but 
has not been seen as an end in itself (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019). This 
chapter has sought to highlight the historical counter- narratives to this prohibi-
tionist mindset that captured UN discourses following the Second World War.
Drug economies have been inextricably tied to processes of globalisation, 
economic development and governance over the past several centuries at 
least. Drug economies were often central to economic development, rather 
than something parallel or running counter to mainstream state consolidation 
efforts. Policymakers frequently viewed the issue through economic and polit-
ical lenses and formulated complex policy responses based on a mix of regula-
tory and prohibitionist elements. The drive towards prohibition as a sole global 
policy goal began to slowly coalesce around the turn of the twentieth century, 
but was far from an inevitability or a natural policy goal. Administrators and 
local populations throughout Asia had a more complex interplay with these 
local, regional and international drug economies than is often recognised. Al-
though the Royal Commission was accused of an amoral ‘whitewashing’ of the 
Sino- Indian opium trade in the region, the reality is just as likely that moral-
isers and subsequent internationalists and prohibitionists were equally, if not 
more, guilty of whitewashing the complexity of the socio- economic- political 
linkages between drug economies and societies in Asia. The recentring of 
the Sino- Indian opium trade into the Golden Triangle attests to the reality of 
drugs and drug economies as complex economic and development phenom-
ena, eschewing dichotomous labels of ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’, or dichotomous policy 
frameworks of ‘regulation’ and ‘prohibition’. Recognising these realities and 
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likely a good starting point for a better understanding of the linkages between 
drug economies and economic development.
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chapter 4
From Alternative Development to Development- 
Oriented Drug Policies
Daniel Brombacher and Sarah David
 Abstract
This policy comment aims to trace the evolution of the concept of alternative 
development (ad)— alongside changes in the global drug control regime during 
recent decades— from a practitioner’s point of view. Since the 1970s, drug supply 
reduction was primarily concentrated on law enforcement and crop substitution 
programmes. Following negative experiences, some governments focused on devel-
opment- led approaches that consider the socio- economic and political conditions of 
drug crop cultivating areas. Both the 1988 United Nations drug control convention 
(Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances), 
the first to mention the concept of ad, and the 1998 Political Declaration created 
the latitude necessary for ad to evolve into a ‘third pillar’ within the traditional drug 
supply control system. Another political milestone was the Outcome Document of the 
2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem 
(ungass), as it was the first to dedicate an entire chapter solely to development- ori-
ented drug control.
In recent years— unexpectedly given the niche that ad had formerly been— a 
growing number of countries have declared that they either implement domestic 
ad measures or support them abroad. The observable increase in ad interventions 
may be due to a growing engagement of governments, but could also be explained 
by a rebranding of existing measures, given the increased popularity of ad. The 
funding situation in light of this enhanced political momentum is, however, rath-
er poor. Latest figures, from 2013, show that ad only accounts for 0.1 per cent of 
global official development assistance. Though there seems to have been a slight 




AD TO DEVELOPMENT-ORIENTED DRUG POLICIES 65
1 The Evolution of the Concept of Alternative Development1
The concept of alternative development (ad) has evolved alongside the 
changes that the international drug control regime has been experiencing 
during the past four decades, moving within a field of tensions between 
national interests and highly diverse approaches to tackling domestic drug 
problems. Accompanied by emotional debates and often arguments that 
lack an evidence base, ad has shifted from a merely crop substitution- based 
approach in the 1970s and 1980s to a development- oriented method that aims 
to promote sustainable rural development and reducing poverty in drug crop 
cultivation areas (giz, 2016).
Drug crop cultivation, such as coca and opium poppy, had been widespread 
for centuries before the modern United Nations (UN) drug control system 
identified it as being problematic in terms of supplying illicit drugs and due 
to its high visibility as a form of illicit agriculture. The 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs (UN, 1961) was the first to include illicit drug crop cultiva-
tion in international narcotics law. As pointed out by Collins (2018, 284), ‘an 
illicit market accompanied growing international demand for various forms of 
consumption through the 1960s and beyond [,] meanwhile hubs of global inse-
curity emerged as key supply hubs’. Historically, state weaknesses and develop-
ment deficits were often the primary cause of emerging illicit drug producing 
areas and corridors for drug trafficking. Illicit drug economies depend on ena-
bling settings in order to thrive— weak governance and infrastructure and lack 
of access to legal markets and opportunities, as well as poverty, being some 
of the main root causes (Brombacher, 2013). Hence, ‘drug economies flourish 
because the framework conditions permit them to do so’ (giz, 2016, 6). Re-
sponding to the growing illicit market, the 1961 Single Convention has frequent-
ly served as a normative framework used to justify drug crop eradication efforts 
in drug producing countries by some governments (Jelsma, 2018). While the 
evident nexus between development and drugs is widely acknowledged today, 
it has not always been accepted within the global drug control regime.
ad was first mentioned in the 1988 Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (UN, 1988) as an ‘integrated rural 
development’ measure (§14 (3)) to ‘prevent illicit cultivation’ and ‘eradicate 
plants containing narcotic or psychotropic substances’ (§14 (2)). Initial expe-
riences of ad were, however, rather disappointing from a supply control point 
 1 Both authors are employees at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenar-
beit (giz). The chapter reflects exclusively the opinions of the authors and not those of the 










of view. The today widely acknowledged notion of drugs also being a develop-
ment issue is partly the result of substitution programmes that proved ineffec-
tive, only focusing on replacing drug crops like coca and opium poppy with le-
gal alternatives, leaving aside the underlying social and economic root causes 
of the persistence of illicit drug economies. Some governments in South Amer-
ica and Southeast Asia started to promote sustainable development measures 
in drug crop cultivating areas that were not exclusively substitution- oriented 
at an early stage, thereby changing the paradigm in international drug control 
strategies towards development- oriented drug policies, often with the support 
of Germany and certain European governments. Over the last 20  years, the 
approach has evolved into a more integrative approach to development, as 
reflected in the 2016 Outcome Document of the 30th United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (ungass) (Council of 
the European Union, 2018). It includes sustainable rural development meas-
ures in drug crop cultivating areas, but as opposed to traditional substitution 
programmes, also considers enhancing governance and security, respecting 
human rights, and fostering women’s empowerment.
2 From the 20th to the 30th ungass— Milestones that Paved the Way
The first internationally agreed definition of ad was set out in the 1998 un-
gass Action Plan on International Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug 
Crops and on Alternative Development.2 Furthermore, the principles of a bal-
anced approach and shared responsibility were first introduced in the 1998 
Political Declaration (pd) (UN General Assembly, 1998a, §2, 2). The universal 
recognition that both consumer and drug producing countries share the same 
amount of responsibility has since then been confirmed by countless resolu-
tions, action plans and policy framework documents of the United Nations 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (un cnd). The co- responsibility of both ends 
of the supply chain turned into the ‘life insurance’ of ad (Brombacher and 
Westerbarkei, 2019, 90), in many cases funded by donors from the northern 
 2 ad was defined as ‘a process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plants con-
taining narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural de-
velopment measures in the context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable 
development efforts in countries taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular so-
ciocultural characteristics of the target communities and groups, within the framework of a 
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hemisphere in the decades that followed. This created the latitude necessary 
for ad to become a sort of third pillar within the traditional drug supply con-
trol system, establishing the normative basis for development- oriented drug 
policies as part of international cooperation on drugs. Quite notably, ad was 
for decades the only socio- economic development element within the global 
drug control system that was considered legitimate and had even passed the 
test of being included in a UN drug control convention.
As the 20th ungass set out the political framework for the next decade, UN 
member states agreed to review implementation progress ten years after the 
1998 pd. Without having reached significant progress towards the goal of ‘[…] 
eliminating or reducing significantly the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the 
cannabis plant and the opium poppy’ (UN General Assembly, 1998a, §19, 4), 
a new Political Declaration and Action Plan (un cnd, 2009) were adopted in 
2009, after months of difficult debates. ad took on a prominent role within the 
2009 pd. Germany and the European Union (EU) pushed for the inclusion of 
two fundamental principles, proper sequencing and non- conditionality, which 
had already been pillars of the EU Drugs Action Plan (2009‒12) and the Ap-
proach of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (bmz) to Alternative Development (giz, 2012; giz, 2016). The concept 
of proper sequencing was included in the 2009 Action Plan (un cnd, 2009, 
§47(f), 45), despite its controversial character. It refers to the establishment 
of alternative sources of income before any eradication measures take place. 
Despite the agreement in 2009, only the 2013 UN Guiding Principles on Alter-
native Development (UN General Assembly, 2013) reflect this approach, while 
no other forthcoming UN framework drug policy document ever explicitly 
stated the principle of proper sequencing again. The 2009 pd and Action Plan 
partly represent the minimal consensus among states whose approaches and 
fundamental views differ considerably. Although it ‘adopted the broader term 
of “development- oriented drug control” to describe socio- economic interven-
tions addressing a wide range of drug- related problems beyond the mere drug 
crops, this term could not sustainably replace the term ad— and by that nar-
row down the concept’ (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019, 90).
The following years were marked by a continued effort at ‘both the nation-
al and the international level to evaluate programmes and to exchange best 
practices and lessons learned during international workshops and expert 
group meetings’ (Me and Kamminga, 2018, 2), which resulted in the adoption 
of the milestone of the UN Guiding Principles on Alternative Development (UN 
General Assembly, 2013) by the General Assembly in October 2013. Facing the 
consequences and high costs of repressive means, the widely criticised ‘war 










affected countries— including Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico— en route 
to ungass 2016, leading to calls for a re- evaluation of international drug pol-
icy (Fordham and Haase, 2019). While expectations were high, for many drug 
policy players the 2016 ungass Outcome Document was initially perceived as a 
disappointment (Collins, 2018; Klein and Stothard, 2019). This notion changed 
rapidly, however, due to some of the groundbreaking elements in global drug 
policy that the Outcome Document provided. The Document has been a signif-
icant door opener for development within UN drug control. The involvement 
of civil society, especially through the creation and strategic representation of 
the Civil Society Task Force— en route for and during ungass 2016— had a 
significant impact on strengthening development in the Outcome Document 
of ungass 2016 (Fordham and Haase, 2019). Major changes between the 2009 
pd and the 2016 ungass Outcome Document can be found in their structure 
and in how the latter addresses socio- economic issues as a main driver for il-
licit drug crop cultivation. The 2016 ungass Outcome Document was the first 
UN drug policy document to dedicate individual chapters to human rights and 
development- oriented measures, thereby highlighting both issues in the glob-
al debate. A stronger focus on women, farmers and communities as well as the 
need to consider measures for rural and urban areas alike are just some exam-
ples of the progressive language and aspects introduced (Permanent Mission 
of Norway to the United Nations, 2018). By referring to certain aspects of the 
drugs value chain, including ‘cultivation, manufacture, production of and traf-
ficking in drugs’ (UN General Assembly, 2016, §7(h), 25), the Document reflects 
the development- driven positions not only of producer, but also of transit 
countries. Remarkably, ad is no longer directly dependent on the illicit cul-
tivation of drug crops, nor does it constitute a measure aiming at a complete 
elimination of drug consumption (Permanent Mission of Norway to the Unit-
ed Nations, 2018). The Document further links ad to Agenda 2030 and the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (sdg s), highlighting that drug policy is indeed a 
development issue. Furthermore, it suggests the use of human development 
indicators in order to properly reflect ad as a development and not as a crop 
substitution concept. It also refers to ‘environmental sustainability and other 
measurements in line with’ the sdg s (UN General Assembly, 2016, §7(g), 25), 
thus broadening the scope of ad to reach beyond the realm of drugs.
By ‘strengthening a development perspective as part of comprehensive, in-
tegrated and balanced national drug policies and programmes […], addressing 
risk factors affecting individuals, communities and society, which may include 
a lack of services, infrastructure needs, drugrelated [sic] violence, exclusion, 
marginalization and social disintegration, [ad] contribute[s] to the promotion 
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Brombacher and Westerbarkei (2019) point out, the application and definition 
of ad has broadened to an unexpected scale. UN member states have expand-
ed ad from traditional rural settings to take in interventions aimed at foster-
ing socio- economic development in urban areas, traditionally non- growing 
countries pushing for ad, and generally countries adapting ad to their own 
circumstances and necessities, thereby meeting one of the fundamental cri-
teria for the success of ad. Meanwhile, issues such as the ‘conflicting targets’ 
of ad (giz, 2012, 8), proper sequencing, and gender mainstreaming in project 
design (giz, 2019), as well as long- term financial and political commitment, 
among others, remain a challenge for affected countries and implementation 
organisations alike.
3 The Post- ungass Scenario— Are We There Yet?
As the 2009 pd set 2019 as the target date for the review of the commitments 
made, the un cnd adopted a Ministerial Declaration in March 2019 that reaf-
firmed the 2009, 2014 and 2016 documents (un cnd, 2009; 2014; UN General 
Assembly, 2016) as ‘the commitments made by the international communi-
ty over the preceding decade to counter the world drug problem’ (un cnd, 
2019, 2), avoiding prioritising any one of them. Since the ungass 2016 process, 
development- oriented drug policies have played a more significant role within 
the international drug control regime than even before. Meanwhile, reforms 
in other areas of drug policy seem to have come to something of a halt, the 
Ministerial Declaration 2019 being proof of this stagnating debate. There also 
seems, however, to be a widespread understanding that the implementation of 
the ungass Outcome Document’s chapters is as vital as ever.
With the 1998 pd, the phrase ‘with full respect for […] all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ (UN General Assembly, 1998a, §2, 2) was introduced 
as an underlying condition for drug policy. Additionally, there are several in-
ternational guidelines on specific human rights issues that are applicable to 
drug policy, but until recently there have not been any explicit international 
standards existent, ‘let alone in the specific case of illicit cultivation’ (Jelsma, 
2018, 10). In order to fill that gap, a coalition of UN organisations and UN 
member states3 joined forces to develop the International Guidelines on 
 3 The Guidelines were initiated by the United Nations Development Programme (undp) and 
the International Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy at the University of Essex, sup-
ported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (bmz) 













Human Rights and Drug Policy, which were presented to the un cnd in 2019. 
The Guidelines constitute a further step towards expanding drug multilat-
eralism by establishing long- known linkages between development deficits 
and the rights of people who cultivate illicit crops and are ‘dependent on il-
licit drug economies’ (undp, 2019, §3, 10), thereby reminding states of their 
human rights obligations. Drug policies can be counter- effective to develop-
ment if they are not evidence- and human rights- based (UN System Coordi-
nation Task Team, 2019).
In December 2018, the Council of the EU adopted the Council Conclusions 
on Alternative Development, which replace the EU Approach to Alternative De-
velopment of 2006 (Council of the European Union, 2006). This political com-
mitment highlights the direct link between the implementation of the un-
gass 2016 Outcome Document (UN General Assembly, 2016), the ‘2030 Agenda 
and the principle of “ensuring that no one is left behind” at the global level […]. 
ad programmes aim to improve livelihood opportunities and alleviate poverty, 
and thus contribute to the implementation of the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals’ (Council of the European Union, 2018, §9, 5). Perceived as a ‘soft 
reformer’ on the international spectrum, the EU has been pushing evidence- 
based approaches in compliance with human rights for the last decade and 
‘backs these calls with extensive international cooperation projects in third 
countries’ (Klein and Stothard, 2019, 10). While the political will to implement 
development- oriented drug policies has broadened, actual application needs 
to be scaled up.
4 The Reality of ad— a Niche Becomes a Pillar
With the ‘political emancipation of the role of development within the inter-
national drug control system’ (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019, 95) in the 
course of the ungass 2016 process, international recognition of ad and related 
interventions has reached unprecedented levels. In 2014, 23 UN member states 
reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) that they 
had implemented ad interventions between 2010 and 2013 (unodc, 2015a, 81). 
While this included the traditional source countries for coca and opium poppy, 
such as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Myanmar and Peru, countries such as 
Egypt, Pakistan and Vietnam also declared they had implemented ad projects 
(unodc, 2015a). In recent years, several governments in South Asia, West Afri-
ca and Latin America and the Caribbean have embraced ad in their domestic 
drug strategies or action plans. These include non- traditional source countries, 
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by drug trafficking, but not by drug crop cultivation. Almost 30 countries de-
clared either that they had run domestic ad interventions or that they were 
supporting them abroad (unodc, 2015b, 10). These numbers are rather unex-
pected given the niche ad had formerly constituted within the UN drug con-
trol system.
At the same time, this push for development has become quite visible 
through the increased political attention given to the issue within the frame-
work of the un cnd and related international fora, including un cnd- 
mandated expert group meetings (giz and unodc, 2014; Governments of 
Germany, Peru, Thailand and unodc, 2019). In the course of the past five ses-
sions of the un cnd, around 40 member states from all world regions consist-
ently co- sponsored the respective annual resolutions on ad. There also seems 
to be widespread recognition within expert and practitioner networks that ad 
is an effective tool for addressing illicit drug crop cultivation, as an expert sur-
vey by unodc shows (unodc, 2015b, 8). This growing recognition of ad is 
happening at a moment when the global community is facing record highs in 
illicit drug crop cultivation. The two main suppliers of opium/ heroin and co-
caine/ crack, Afghanistan and Colombia, report record levels of opium poppy 
and coca cultivation (unodc, 2019a).
With ungass 2016 as a ‘turning point’ (Alimi, 2019, 38) the role of devel-
opment within UN drug control was enhanced. It seems quite reasonable to 
assume that the growing international disenchantment with the external con-
sequences of a belligerent strategy with regard to drugs has led to a revalori-
sation of development- driven approaches on the supply- control side. Forced 
eradication is not widely considered by experts to be an effective option for 
addressing illicit drug crop cultivation and there is evidence that its human 
and environmental costs are high (Garzón, 2019). The increase in reported ad 
interventions may well be due to the growing engagement of governments, but 
it could equally be explained by a rebranding of existing drug policy interven-
tions, given the increased popularity of development- led versus repression- 
oriented approaches.
At the same time, many clichés persist with regard to ad. There is still 
frequent mistrust within academia and civil society spheres toward the po-
tential hidden interests behind ad, labelling it as a disguised form of forced 
eradication or accusing it of being a securitised development intervention 
driven by counter- insurgency intentions (Buxton, 2015). Despite a lack of 
clear evidence, there is widespread belief that ad is economically unattrac-
tive for farmers or that farmers exclusively focus on income and not on a 
broader notion of secure livelihoods (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019). 











militarisation of ad has happened and is happening in some cases, its se-
curitisation is not inherent to the concept. Neither the 1998 definition of 
ad nor the subsequent 2009 Action Plan, ungass 2016, or any of the annu-
al un cnd resolutions on the issue link it explicitly to counter- insurgency 
objectives. On the contrary, a majority of the key proponents and donors of 
ad promote an approach that relies on development objectives and indica-
tors, seeking a close alignment to the sdg s. This is, for example, the case for 
Thailand and Germany (Brombacher and Westerbarkei, 2019; Diskul et al., 
2019). The broad array of different interpretations of the concept of ad is 
enhanced by the outdated nature of its definition from 1998, giving scope for 
militarised, development- led, or in some cases even legalisation- oriented 
approaches.
5 Talk Is Cheap— the Funding Situation for Alternative Development
Considering the indisputably growing political support for development 
in global drug control, the key question that arises is that of implementa-
tion. How does the funding situation evolve in light of the enhanced polit-
ical momentum? A comprehensive, cross- cutting comparison of the fund-
ing situation for ad is available in the UN World Drug Report 2015 (unodc, 
2015a). However, the aforementioned conceptual heterogeneity of ad and 
the potential rebranding of interventions make the classification of allocat-
ed budgets difficult. Some governments label respective projects as rural 
development interventions, others as law enforcement or as private sector 
investment, or even as part of their military budget. At the same time, non- 
oecd countries may not report potential budgets for ad or may use differ-
ent markers. As Alimi (2016, 8) states, ‘to date, available data do not allow 
charting with exactitude a clear global ad portfolio. Some trends may how-
ever be noted and provide at best, an impressionist quantitative picture of 
total ad budget’.
This rough overall picture is rather underwhelming. From 1998 to 2013, an 
average of usd 219 million per year was spent on ad by oecd countries (un-
odc, 2015a). In 1998, when the concept of ad was defined by the ungass, 
ad accounted for 0.11 per cent of global official development assistance 
(Alimi, 2016). This share had almost tripled by 2008, but gradually decreased 
again, reaching 0.1 per cent in 2013. While in 2007 roughly usd 470  mil-
lion were invested in ad, by 2013 this amount had fallen to usd 185 million 
(Alimi, 2016). Between 2005 and 2013, the major international donors for ad 
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government. ad was therefore described as a ‘poor cousin of international 
cooperation’ (Alimi, 2016, 8). Considering the political role the approach has 
gained in recent years, it may be more like a poor but popular cousin:  ‘De-
spite the amount of attention given to alternative development at the inter-
national level, and its crucial role in realising sdg 8, there is a disconnect 
between international rhetoric and funding’ (UN System Coordination Task 
Team, 2019, 36).
Taking into consideration the preliminary results of a new unodc study, 
there seems to have been a slight increase in funding from 2013 to 2017 
( Figure  4.1). The 53 alternative development projects identified in the 
three main coca bush (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) and two opium poppy 
(Afghanistan and Myanmar) cultivating countries had a total annual budget 
of between usd 190 and usd 275 million (unodc, 2019b).
The clear rise in funding for ad in Colombia is, however, based on the 2016 
peace agreement of La Habana and the subsequent crop substitution pro-
gramme (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito, 
pnis), the biggest domestic ad programme so far. According to the aforemen-
tioned study, the United States and Germany are still the largest donors of ad 
among 14 countries, together with the EU (Figure 4.2).4
TotalMyanmarPeruColombiaBoliviaAfghanistan
 figure 4.1  Total annual budget of ad projects per country and year (2013‒17, annual budget, 
in million usd)
  source: unodc (2019b, 17)
 4 The 53 projects that were analysed for this study have received funds from one or more do-










In addition to the current slight increase in funding of ad in rural settings, 
there is anecdotic evidence on actual ad projects in urban settings as endorsed by 
the 2016 ungass Outcome Document, usually described as urban development 
initiatives (ud as opposed to ad), though little is known about most of those 
interventions (Governments of Germany, Peru, Thailand and unodc, 2019).
6 Conclusion
Despite the partial information on enhanced investment in ad, there is clearly 
a gap between the overall political support for ad within the un cnd and other 
relevant international or regional bodies and the actual availability of funds. For 
many of the countries who do report to the unodc that they are implementing 
ad, there is no evidence regarding the scope, volume and objectives of those 
interventions. While the political endorsement of development- led responses 
to drug economies does trickle down to domestic levels— as indicated by the 
growing number of governments including ad in their national or international 
drug strategies— a real surge in funding is not in sight so far. Repressive meas-
ures on the supply side may be less popular these days, but they do receive more 
financial support by far. The good news is that there is growing recognition of 
development as a pillar of an integral drug policy. The concept of development- 
oriented drug policy has spread out to countries and world regions where re-















 figure 4.2  Percentage of ad projects per international donor (2013‒17)
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Alternative development has had little success in Afghanistan. Understood and imple-
mented as geographically bounded interventions designed to reduce drug crop cul-
tivation, these projects failed to achieve their objectives throughout the 1990s. Since 
2001, following the fall of the Taliban, unprecedented rises in levels of opium produc-
tion, and an inflow of substantial amounts of aid, alternative development came to 
mean different things to different people in Afghanistan. To some, alternative devel-
opment continued as short- term interventions designed to extract agreements from 
communities to reduce opium production, or reward those that had already done so. 
To others, it could be any development programme implemented in a poppy grow-
ing, or potential poppy growing, area often without any consideration of the causes of 
cultivation and how they differed by location, gender or socio- economic group. This 
chapter argues that a lack of consistency and clarity in approach— and in particular 
the failure to articulate and implement a strategy to support farmers transitioning to 
licit livelihoods within a changing framework of development assistance— confined 
alternative development and efforts to reduce poppy cultivation though rural develop-
ment to the margins in Afghanistan. To quote Corinthians, in trying ‘to be all things to 
all people’, alternative development saved no one.
1 Introduction1
The term alternative development has confused many, perhaps no more so 
than in Afghanistan (unodc, 2009). To those specialising in the subject, the 
 1 About the chapter title: In the King James Bible, Corinthians 9:19‒23, Paul talks of ‘becoming 
all things to all people, so that I might by any means save some’. 
This chapter draws heavily on work the author did on alternative development in Afghan-
istan for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2004‒19), EastWest Institute 







intention of alternative development is clear— it is an intervention specifically 
designed to support rural communities in abandoning drug crop cultivation. 
Yet to most development practitioners and policymakers outside this narrow 
clique, alternative development remains an opaque term, defined by its intend-
ed outcome— a reduction in opium, coca, or indeed cannabis cultivation— 
with little guidance as to how this might best be achieved.
Differences between those in the drug control community further confound 
development policymakers and practitioners working in drug crop- producing 
areas. For example, some donors, such as the United States Bureau of Inter-
national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (inl), and often the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc), press for development assis-
tance to be contingent on reductions in cultivation— a concept known as 
conditionality— and tied to eradication of the opium crop. Other donors, such 
as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (giz) and 
the European Union (EU), talk of alternative development as inclusive, par-
ticipatory, pro- poor, and not tied to reductions in cultivation per se, but to im-
provements in human development indicators. These contrasting approaches 
can leave many of the main bilateral and multilateral donors asking if alter-
native development does not differ from other development programmes, 
why does its implementation lie with specialised institutions such as unodc, 
which have a drug control mandate and rather limited development capacity? 
In addition, recent moves to expand the alternative development concept to 
include urban communities exposed to crime or drug use have further con-
fused development donors as to what exactly alternative development is.
Afghanistan is one place where this confusion has possibly played out more 
than most. While some may dismiss the experience of alternative develop-
ment in Afghanistan as anomalous due to the challenging security environ-
ment, the scale and amount of rural development assistance undertaken has 
been significant, with the United States (US) alone spending usd 1.46 billion 
on alternative development as part of usd 2.3 billion on agriculture, within a 
total budget of usd 30.5 billion on governance, economic and social develop-
ment between 2002 and 2019 (sigar, 2019a, 132). While over the last decade 
some districts have been ‘off limits’ due to the insurgency, large amounts of 
development assistance have been delivered in rural Afghanistan, including 
many areas where poppy is concentrated. Moreover, as the country responsi-
ble for the production of almost 90 per cent of the world’s illegal opiates, it is 
hard to argue that the experience of alternative development in Afghanistan is 
somehow irrelevant.
In fact, the experience in Afghanistan is akin to what has been seen in oth-
er illicit drug crop- producing countries, including Colombia, Pakistan and 
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Bolivia, with development efforts to curb cultivation veering from short- term, 
single- sector interventions aimed at coercing farmers to abandon opium pop-
py cultivation (or rewarding those that have done so already) to large rural 
development programmes. In Afghanistan, many of these rural development 
programmes have been referred to or budgeted as alternative development, 
but given little to no consideration to the causes of opium production and how 
farmers might respond to the activities pursued, including the risk of increased 
opium poppy cultivation.
Drawing on extensive documentation, interviews, and the author’s direct 
experience in Afghanistan since the 1990s, this chapter documents the con-
tinuing schism between those who see development interventions as a means 
of extracting an agreement from communities to reduce or abandon opium 
poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and those who distance themselves from 
the entire drug economy, despite their responsibility for delivering significant 
amounts of aid to rural areas, and who at best see a reduction in opium poppy 
cultivation as an externality of the development process and feel no obligation 
to ensure that their interventions do not make matters worse.
The chapter is divided into five further sections. Section 2 outlines the 
methodology— an approach that draws heavily on the author’s own experi-
ence in- country and direct access to both grey literature and internal policy 
debates. Section 3 offers a brief history of alternative development in Afghan-
istan in the 1990s— the programmes, the actors and the reasons for its failure. 
Section 4 examines the period since the collapse of the Taliban regime, as well 
as efforts to redefine and recast alternative development within the context 
of significant inflows of development assistance, dominant multilateral and 
bilateral donors, and sector- based interventions. Section 5 examines why the 
effort to adopt a more effective strategy, widening the responsibility for ad-
dressing the causes and consequences of illicit drug crop cultivation to include 
international and national development institutions, failed. The final section 
offers a conclusion.
2 Methodology
This chapter is a retrospective exploratory inquiry and draws on the author’s 
experience of more than two decades specialising in rural development in 
poppy growing areas in Afghanistan, and more than 25 years’ work on alterna-
tive development and research in drug crop growing areas in Afghanistan, and 
elsewhere. It draws on data from direct observation, largely collected through 







evaluation reports, project documents and other grey literature; and research 
on the ground with those growing opium poppy in Afghanistan for organisa-
tions such as the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (areu) and the 
United Nations Drug Control Programme (undcp)— now unodc.2
The author’s experience in Afghanistan included working for undcp’s 
Afghanistan Programme between 1997 and 2001 as a Monitoring and Eval-
uation Specialist on the Afghanistan Opium Poppy Reduction Project. He 
then worked for the Government of the United Kingdom (UK) between 2001 
and 2014, when it was designated the lead, then partner, nation for counter- 
narcotics under the Security Sector Reform process. Work for, and subsequent 
reporting to, the UK government, included contracts with the World Bank, 
EU, Asian Development Bank, giz, the governments of the Netherlands and 
of Canada, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (sigar) 
and a number of non- governmental organisations. These and earlier contracts 
focused on supporting the integration into rural development programmes of 
measures that addressed the causes of opium poppy cultivation, as well as the 
evaluation of interventions in areas where drug crops were concentrated.
This experience provided direct first- hand knowledge of the workings of 
a number of multilateral, bilateral, national, and non- governmental institu-
tions and how they understood drug crop cultivation and what might be done 
to address it. Acting as a participant in policy discussions, and both planning 
and monitoring and evaluation missions, it was possible to document the 
perceptions of policymakers and practitioners with regard to alternative de-
velopment, and the extent to which decision makers and implementers be-
lieved development and alternative development interventions could be used 
to meet political, development and drug control objectives. The author was 
actively involved in these discussions, as well as in the monitoring and eval-
uation of a range of different programmes, including giz’s Project for Alter-
native Livelihoods Program Eastern Afghanistan (pal), usaid’s Alternative 
Livelihoods Program— East (alp- East), and its successor Incentives Driving 
Economic Alternatives— North East West (idea- new), the World Bank’s Na-
tional Emergency Rural Access Project (nerap), the UK funded Comprehen-
sive Agricultural and Rural Development - Facility (card- f), and the Helmand 
Food Zone (hfz).
 2 The author’s research on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan is extensive. It includes 24 re-
ports on his in- depth research for areu alone, and more than 75 reports in total. This work 
includes more than 20,000 household interviews and fieldwork in a wide range of rural are-
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In doing this work, and subsequently leading sigar’s Lesson Learned 
project on counter- narcotics— an ex poste evaluation of the US government 
counter- narcotics effort between 2002 and 2017— the author conducted an 
extensive review of programme and project documents, which provided a fur-
ther opportunity to determine the degree to which policies and programmes 
directly incorporated efforts to curb opium production and/ or mitigate the 
risk that they could result in rising levels of cultivation.
3 Alternative Development: the Bounded and Failing Interventions 
of the 1990s
During the 1980s and throughout much of the early 1990s Afghanistan was 
at war. Following the Soviet Union’s retreat in 1989 and the collapse of the 
Najibullah Government in 1992, the country divided along geographic and po-
litical lines, ruled by the different protagonists in what had been the armed 
opposition to the communist regime— the mujahidin. By the end of 1993, the 
United Nations (UN) had developed a rehabilitation and humanitarian mis-
sion in consultation with these regional leaders. The mission proposed a wide 
range of interventions aimed at supporting rural communities’ efforts to im-
prove their economic position, but also aided an embryonic peace process 
(undcp, 1995b). This was an environment constrained by contested space, 
the challenges of working with and directing aid through armed groups, and 
limited funds.
Part of the UN mission in Afghanistan in the 1990s included efforts to curb 
the production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs. In addition, during much of 
the 1990s there were a number of development interventions implemented in 
Afghanistan under the label of alternative development, their primary objec-
tive being the reduction of opium poppy cultivation. unodc, and the Narcot-
ics Affairs Section (nas) of the US Embassy in Islamabad, funded the vast ma-
jority of these interventions, which included a wide array of rural development 
initiatives in poppy growing areas scattered across a large number of districts 
in Afghanistan. Some interventions took in activities aimed at improving ag-
ricultural yields and incomes, and these included irrigation projects. Others 
involved livestock interventions and the provision of agricultural inputs. Some 
programmes more resembled all- encompassing, multi- sector programmes 
that looked to improve the health and education of the local population, as 
well as local incomes. The only common feature of these alternative develop-
ment programmes was their specific tie to achieving drug control targets with-




Problems beset each of these projects and programmes:  all closed early, 
and none succeeded in reducing opium poppy cultivation. For example, both 
unodc projects— the Afghanistan Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation Pro-
gram (adcrrp), which ran from 1989 to 1996, and its Afghanistan Pilot Pro-
gram’s Poppy Reduction Project (C28), which ran from 1997 to 2000— ended 
earlier than planned due to a lack of funding. The US government also ceased 
its support for an alternative development project implemented by Mercy 
Corps International (1989‒99), a US- based non- governmental organisation. 
This two- year programme called for communities in central Helmand to re-
duce opium poppy cultivation by 80 per cent in return for crop substitution 
and the rehabilitation of a canal, but it was closed a year early due to increased 
opium poppy cultivation (Mansfield, 2001, 7).
A detailed review of these alternative development interventions, particu-
larly adcrrp and C28, indicates that each suffered from the same structur-
al weakness:  the lack of a coherent and effective strategy for addressing the 
causes of opium poppy cultivation and, as a consequence, the setting of what 
were unrealistic goals and time frames. In the absence of a clear strategy as to 
how interventions might address the multifunctional role that opium played 
in livelihood strategies, each project adopted a rather crude model, trading de-
velopment assistance for reductions in opium poppy cultivation. Sometimes 
this operated directly with the community and its political elite; sometimes in 
conjunction with local political– military actors; and, in the case of unodc’s 
C28, with the Taliban authorities themselves (Mansfield, 2004; 2001).
The time frame within which communities were expected to abandon opi-
um poppy in return for assistance was short (between two and four years); the 
development assistance was insufficient, geographically dispersed, and failed 
to take account of both the uneven nature of the development process and 
the fact that motivations and factors that influenced opium poppy cultivation 
varied across population groups. The approach was so unrefined that it was 
often hard to tell the difference between projects funded under the rubric of 
‘alternative development’ and those designed simply to offer respite to a rural 
population that was experiencing vulnerability due to conflict and poverty.
adcrrp was an exemplar of such an alternative development intervention. 
Consisting of over 200 sub- projects implemented by more than 40 different 
international and national non- governmental organisations (ngo s) and with 
a budget of only usd 9.2 million (undcp, 1996, 4), its activities were scattered 
across multiple districts in the five provinces of Badakhshan, Helmand, Kunar, 
Nangarhar and Kandahar. There was little hope that adcrrp could achieve 
much beyond the delivery of rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in the 
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and infrastructure. In fact, undcp’s own assessment concluded, ‘It is a dis-
turbing fact that as yet there is insufficient evidence to state positively that 
the program of alternative development had made any reduction to opium 
production […] Projects undertaken in the provinces have been scattered and 
cannot be linked to any specific reduction’ (undcp, 1995a, 23‒24).
Despite the limited development impact that adcrrp was expected to 
achieve, the programme stipulated that communities that received assistance 
should cease opium poppy cultivation altogether regardless of the activities 
delivered or who accrued the benefits. It was not apparent how the delivery of 
the particular sub- projects selected could actually manifest in reducing opium 
poppy cultivation beyond the requirement that communities sign an agree-
ment to abandon the crop— ‘a poppy clause’ (undcp, 1995a, 23‒28).
The poppy clause itself was criticised by implementing ngo s (Afghanaid, 
1989, 22‒24) as well as unodc’s own review team, which went so far as to sug-
gest it was counterproductive. The signed agreements brought communities, 
ngo s and the UN into the dispute (undcp, 1995a, 24). At the time, some of the 
ngo s involved in humanitarian work such as demining questioned the eth-
ics of making assistance conditional on reducing poppy cultivation. In some 
cases, the poppy clause pressed local military commanders to destroy the opi-
um crop of remote rural communities, despite limited evidence of develop-
ment impact (Afghanaid, 1989, 22‒24). In most cases, continued cultivation 
did not lead to the termination of project activities. In the end, adccrp was 
deemed ineffective in reducing opium poppy cultivation (undcp, 1995a, 25). 
The UK’s Department for International Development (dfid) went further, 
and— unable to discern a clear programme strategy that distinguished adcr-
rp from other rural development programmes— questioned the efficacy of 
funding unodc to undertake what appeared to be conventional rural devel-
opment projects (Kapila et al., 1995, 52).
unodc’s follow- up Poppy Reduction Project (C28) offered some improve-
ments on its predecessor, adcrrp, but ultimately very few. Learning from the 
experience of adcrrp and its disparate geographic spread, C28 did focus its 
efforts on four target districts: Shinwar district in Nangarhar in the east, and 
the districts of Ghorak, Khakrez and Maiwand in the province of Kandahar in 
southern Afghanistan.
C28, however, also consisted of more than 200 sub- projects implemented 
by ngo s, Drug Control and Coordination Units (dccu s)— which belonged 
to the Taliban authorities of the time— and the Agricultural Departments of 
the Universities of Kandahar and Nangarhar. Like adcrrp, the budget for C28 
was also insufficient for the task. Of the usd 10.5 million that unodc received 









well as on a number of provincial- level initiatives aimed at gaining the support 
of the provincial Taliban authorities (Sloane, 2000, 10).
Like adcrrp, C28 also committed to dramatic reductions in opium poppy 
cultivation over a short period. In the case of C28, opium poppy was to be elim-
inated in each of the target districts over a four- year period. Future develop-
ment assistance was contingent on meeting an agreed schedule of reductions, 
formalised in what became known as Drug Control Action Plans (dcap s), 
which were drawn up by unodc and signed by the Taliban authorities and 
representatives of local communities.
Multiple reviews of unodc’s Afghanistan programme expressed concerns 
regarding the ambition of C28 and the targets that it had set for reducing opi-
um poppy cultivation. The donors raised questions about unodc’s relation-
ship with the Taliban, or, as they were referred to at the time, ‘the presumptive 
authorities’; the capacity- building work the Office was doing with Taliban in-
stitutions (undcp, 1997, 17); the technical and financial assistance that unodc 
provided to the Taliban’s efforts to electrify Kandahar (undcp, 1997, 17); and 
the then Executive Director’s efforts to launch a ten- year national programme 
(undcp, 1997, 15), which would undoubtedly have led to the channelling of 
further support to the Taliban (undcp, 1997, 15 and 17).
The dcap s and the ‘conditionality’ under which C28 operated were also 
subject to criticism. Perceived as inflexible (Mackrell, 1999, 7; Gelbert, 2000, 27; 
Sloane, 2000, 30), inappropriate for what was meant to be a pilot programme de-
signed ‘to develop and implement replicable methodologies for achieving reduc-
tions in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan’ (undcp, 1997), and lacking communi-
ty ownership, the dcap s often became little more than fora in which the Taliban, 
the local authorities and community representatives could request and negotiate 
assistance. Moreover, despite yearly breaches of elimination schedules, develop-
ment assistance was not withdrawn (Sloane, 2000, 27). As with adcrrp, the final 
Project Impact Report described C28 as ‘largely a district wide, village level agri-
cultural development project with little to distinguish it from many other such 
projects implemented by international agencies and ngo s’ (Sloane, 2000, 27).
Based on the level of opium poppy cultivation in 1997, the year in which C28 
began, Shinwar experienced a 12 per cent reduction in cultivation between 1997 
and 2000, Ghorak a 60 per cent reduction, Maiwand a 22 per cent reduction, 
and Khakrez an 11 per cent increase. According to the revised dcap s, which 
used 1998 as the base year, all four districts witnessed a reduction in opium 
poppy cultivation between 1998 and 2000: 5 per cent in Shinwar, 49 per cent in 
Ghorak, 60 per cent in Maiwand, and 61 per cent in Khakrez. The final review 
concluded, however, that the results in the three districts in Kandahar prov-
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In sum, by the turn of the millennium alternative development had fallen 
into disrepute in Afghanistan. In the absence of a coherent strategy to address 
the different reasons why farmers produced opium and the multiple roles that 
the crop played in livelihood strategies, alternative development became close-
ly associated with crude efforts to encourage those who had gained military 
power— first local warlords and then the Taliban— to coerce the rural popu-
lation to abandon opium poppy cultivation. The drug control community, too, 
favoured this persuade- to- coerce standpoint, rather than seeing development 
assistance as a means by which to improve the quality of the lives of those cul-
tivating the crop. Devoid of a clear understanding of the multifunctional role 
of opium production and how to replace it, alternative development largely 
engaged in horse- trading— making offers of assistance to the local authorities 
and elites within communities in return for poppy elimination.
In reality, none of those involved in this horse- trading kept their end of 
the deal. For those delivering the development assistance, the funds received 
were insufficient and too short- term to deliver the necessary development out-
comes required if farmers were to meet their basic needs. Moreover, the bene-
fits that did accrue from development assistance tended to go to the wealthier 
members of the community, who were the least dependent on opium (Gelbert, 
2000, 5; Sloane, 2000, 17). Regarding the rural population, few reduced opium 
poppy cultivation even where they had signed agreements to refrain from pro-
duction, arguing that they could not sustain themselves on the limited assis-
tance provided without recourse to opium production.
Finally, those charged with imposing a ban and eradicating the crop were 
reluctant to compel farmers to abandon the crop if the rural population was 
not provided with viable alternatives. Indeed, local authorities rarely acted 
against the crop, aware of the fact that power in rural Afghanistan is negoti-
ated, decentralised and contested. In the absence of a concentration of co-
ercive power, the politico- military leadership in rural Afghanistan remained 
concerned that marginalising large sections of the rural population, through 
eradication or imposing a ban on opium poppy, would result in a loss of sup-
port, and ultimately of political power (Mansfield, 2016).
4 Alternative Development: Attempts to Redefine, Recast and Widen 
Ownership
With the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the political and economic landscape 
in Afghanistan changed significantly. Alongside shifts in development 





focused alternative development interventions implemented in Afghanistan 
in the 1990s. There was also little appetite for interventions that put drug 
control at the forefront of international state- building efforts in order to ex-
tract reductions in cultivation from Afghan leaders in return for develop-
ment assistance.
Furthermore, at the turn of the twenty- first century, donors began to prior-
itise sector- based interventions, with Western nations and multilateral insti-
tutions supporting more wide- scale reform across entire areas of government 
delivery, including health, education, rural development and roads. In Afghan-
istan, sectoral assistance often took the form of technical support to central 
ministries in Kabul, as well as funds for the delivery of national development 
programmes. Much of this assistance was directed through the World Bank, 
which took the lead in the design and oversight of the National Priority Pro-
grams (npp s) and administered the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund 
(artf), from which donor funds were pooled and prioritised.
The Security Sector Reform (ssr) process also placed key donors in charge 
of coordinating the international effort with regard to the reform of the Afghan 
army (US), police (Germany), disarmament and reintegration (Japan), justice 
(Italy) and counter- narcotics (UK). These ‘lead nations’, initially charged with 
coordinating international assistance with the newly formed Interim Admin-
istration and supporting the authorities in developing comprehensive strat-
egies, soon acquired a growing responsibility for funding and implementing 
programmes in their particular area of Security Sector Reform.
Within the development architecture of sectoral assistance, npp s, and ssr, 
there was less space for the kind of alternative development projects of the 
past. Many rural areas were decidedly more congested than they were in the 
1990s, with multiple agencies and initiatives operating in the same districts 
and communities, often regardless of whether opium poppy was cultivated 
or not. With large national sectoral programmes being designed and imple-
mented and a multitude of national, international and non- governmental or-
ganisations working across rural Afghanistan, there were few areas that drug 
control organisations such as unodc could set apart, call their own, and use 
to implement a range of different sectoral programmes tied to reductions in 
opium production. The policy of conditionality was also rejected in the initial 
years after the fall of the Taliban by most of the major donors, on the grounds 
that it would undermine efforts to build a social contract between the Afghan 
state and the rural population, one of the core objectives of the reconstruction 
effort. In fact, there was broad support for an approach that put reconstruction 
and development first, and situated the reduction in drug crop cultivation as 
an externality of the development process.
Trying to Be All Things to All People 89
Even those leading global counter- narcotics efforts within the US 
administration— who had long been advocates of aggressive eradication and 
dramatic reductions in drug crop cultivation in other parts of the world— 
initially argued that the situation in Afghanistan was qualitatively different 
from that in other drug- producing nations. For example, Rand Beers, the then 
head of the US Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs (inl), argued that the scale of cultivation within the 
country, the formidable challenges the population faced following the civil 
war, drought, the collapse of state institutions, and the amount of reconstruc-
tion and development assistance that was to be made available meant that 
responses to drug production in Afghanistan needed to be different from those 
in other source countries (Mansfield, 2016, 148). As such, until 2005, neither 
inl nor usaid pressed for rural development programmes specifically aimed 
at reducing opium poppy cultivation or for making development assistance 
contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation (sigar, 2018a, 107). Instead, the 
emphasis in these initial years was on designing a wide range of development 
interventions that would meet the immediate needs of the Afghan population 
and, in part, address the causes of opium poppy cultivation.
Indeed, the term ‘alternative livelihoods’ was established to signify change 
and to move away from the alternative development model that had been 
rejected by the development community in Afghanistan and more broadly 
(unodc, 2015, 84 and 118)  (see Table  5.1). This represented a break from an 
approach to development assistance that had— perhaps unfairly— become in-
creasingly associated with crop substitution as well as with unodc, an organ-
isation whose development capacity was being questioned by many donors 
following its experience with adcrrp and C28 in the 1990s. The development 
funding available for Afghanistan far exceeded any of the alternative develop-
ment programmes of the past and was beyond the capacity of a single agency 
to manage. For example, multilateral initiatives, such as the first phase of the 
National Solidarity Program (nsp)— a community- based rural development 
programme implemented between 2003 and 2007— cost usd 600  million. 
Bilateral programmes, such as the US government’s Rebuilding Agricultural 
Markets Program (ramp), had a budget of usd 143 million between 2003 and 
2007. The development landscape of the post- Taliban era was fundamentally 
different from that of the 1990s.
It was also recognised that there was no single project or programme that 
could address the multiple factors that led to the expansion of opium pop-
py cultivation in Afghanistan, and that a more concerted and comprehensive 
effort was required. Counter- narcotics had been made a cross- cutting issue 





table 5.1 What are the differences between ‘alternative development’ and ‘alternative 
livelihoods’?
Alternative development Alternative livelihoods
Characteristic 
feature
Discrete, area- based project 
approach
Mainstreaming of counter- 





Problem definition usually 
limited to the presence of 
illicit drug crops within a 
specific area
Analysis of the drivers of the 
opium poppy economy
Agenda Primarily reduction of illicit 
drug crop cultivation and 
treats the symptoms of 
cultivation
A wider state- building and 
development agenda that 
addresses the causes of 
cultivation
Actors Designed and implemented 
by both national and 
international drug control 
organisations
Designed and implemented 
by development actors; 
coordination and technical 




Attempts to replace on- farm 
income generated by coca 
and opium poppy
Address the factors that 




Measured in reduction of 
hectares of illicit drug crop 
cultivation
Measured in both human 
development terms as well 
as drug control indicators; 
seeks to understand the 
processes that influence 
households in their 
shift from illicit to licit 
livelihoods
Strengths Previously the only way of 
delivering development 
assistance to marginalised 
illicit drug crop- producing 
areas
Recognises overlap between 
development and drug 
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table 5.1 What are the differences between ‘alternative development’ and ‘alternative 
livelihoods’? (cont.)
and the National Drug Control Strategy (ndcs) of 2003 called for the main-
streaming of counter- narcotics policy in national and provincial plans and 
strategies (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2003). Inti-
mately linked with the concept of counter- narcotics mainstreaming, the in-
tention of alternative livelihoods was to integrate efforts to address the causes 
of opium poppy cultivation in the wider policies and programmes of inter-
national, national and non- governmental organisations working in rural Af-
ghanistan. This move was a recognition that the drugs issue in Afghanistan, 
as it is elsewhere, was a complex and ‘wicked problem’ where a ‘whole- of- 
government’ approach was needed, not only by the Afghan government but 
also by the donors and particularly by the development institutions within 
Western governments that programmed much of the assistance being given 
to Afghanistan ( Conklin, 2001).
There were periods when some of the largest development donors in Af-
ghanistan engaged heavily in efforts to integrate an understanding of drug 
crop cultivation and the multifunctional role it played in rural livelihood strat-
egies into broader development planning. The Asian Development Bank, the 
Alternative development Alternative livelihoods
Weaknesses – Poor understanding of 
the process of change from 
licit to illicit livelihoods; 
often reduced to adoption of 
“conditionality clause”
– Rarely linked to wider 
national development 
strategy
– Ignores broader role of 
illicit drug crops
– Little consideration of key 
development issues, poverty, 
gender and environment
– Danger of being reduced 
to alternative income source 
projects and ignoring the 
broader institutional issues
– Complex to implement




European Commission and the World Bank all pursued initiatives aimed at 
designing their programmes so that they could be more effective in addressing 
the causes of opium poppy cultivation. A number of npp s were also appraised 
during design and implementation to ensure that they took better account of 
the fact that opiates were produced, traded and used in Afghanistan. These 
programmes were adjusted so that their activities might better address the 
causes or, at least, not make matters worse. This included programmes such as 
the National Emergency Rural Access Project (nerap), the National Emergen-
cy Horticulture and Livestock Project (nehlp) and the National Emergency 
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (neirp).
The World Bank also developed a guideline note for Treating the Opium 
Problem in World Bank Operations in Afghanistan, or what became known as 
‘counter- narcotics mainstreaming guidelines’. dfid and the World Bank went 
further, producing a major report examining how development efforts might 
better address the causes of opium poppy cultivation (Ward et al., 2008). This 
report served as the justification for the design of the Comprehensive Agri-
culture and Rural Development - Facility (card- f), a rural development pro-
gramme designed to identify and then support potential turnkey operations 
in rural areas of economic opportunity where opium poppy had been all but 
eliminated.
Ultimately, these efforts to recast and redefine how development actors 
should respond to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan were shaped by 
political events, and in particular the changing policy positions of the major 
donors, as well as the Afghan government itself. The perception of the ‘state- 
building project’ in Afghanistan and its close association with the amount of 
opium poppy cultivated were critical. With each rise in cultivation there was 
growing political pressure, particularly from the US government— and within 
it inl— for initiatives that would lower opium production and do so quickly. 
While the main thrust of this pressure was directed at increasing levels of erad-
ication, in particular the push for the introduction of aerial spraying, it also 
impacted on rural development initiatives in poppy growing areas, especially 
the reintroduction of conditionality.
For example, in 2005, the US government launched a large bilateral Alter-
native Livelihoods Program in direct response to the rise in cultivation seen 
across Afghanistan the previous year. This programme consisted of projects 
in the east (usd 115.8  million), north (usd 50.9  million), and south (usd 
166.4 million), with a subsequent extension into the south- west (usd 75.1 mil-
lion) that ran until 2009 (sigar, 2018a, 112). So that the programme could be 
seen to be explicitly addressing opium poppy cultivation, projects called for 
farmers to ‘voluntarily subscribe to the reduction of cultivation of poppy’ and 
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called for assistance to be halted where they failed to do so (usaid, 2009, 5).3 
The same knee- jerk reaction— and attempt to tie development programming 
directly to poppy reduction— could be seen with the Helmand Food Zone 
(hfz) in 2008. This was a UK and US government funded effort to drive down 
opium production in the face of the unprecedented level of opium poppy cul-
tivation in Helmand that year and lasted until 2011. Consisting of three parallel 
prongs— wheat seed and fertiliser provision, an awareness campaign to deter 
planting, and eradication— this programme also required farmers to sign guar-
antees that they would not cultivate opium poppy. Conditionality was back 
(sigar, 2018a).
This was despite usaid’s reticence to incorporate inl’s efforts to make de-
velopment assistance contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation (usaid, 
2001). As an institution they had learned the challenges of linking aid direct-
ly to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and other drug crop- producing 
countries (usaid, 2001). The guarantees signed by farmers under adp were 
rarely enforced and the evaluation of the alp- south questioned whether the 
project had any impact on poppy at all. The perceived success of the hfz— 
where cultivation fell by 37 per cent in the short term from 103,000 hectares 
in 2008 to 63,000 hectares in 2011 (see Figure 5.1)— changed that. It also led to 
usaid being pressed by the Department of State and the US Ambassador at 
the time to launch a similar largely single sector, two- year programme in the 
neighbouring province of Kandahar in 2012, the Kandahar Food Zone (kfz), 
where conditionality was once again applied (sigar, 2018a, 124).
Alongside these more short- term, single- sector programmes that were 
akin to the alternative development programmes of the 1990s, usaid ran a 
range of large- scale rural development programmes, many of them partly 
funded from a Congressional budget for ‘alternative development’. In con-
trast to programmes like hfz and kfz, these programmes all but ignored 
opium production, fuelled by the belief that a growing legal rural economy 
would offer farmers an alternative and deter drug crop cultivation (usaid- 
Afghanistan, 2016).
 3 For example, the draft notes of discussions of an Alternative Livelihoods Seminar on 3 Sep-
tember 2005 state ‘Al Merkel from usaid added that usaid alp had a two year “condition-
ality” clause in place in its programmes, which meant that if after two years there was no 
impact on poppy cultivation then assistance would be halted’. The workplan for radp n also 
states that ‘The requirement that farmers voluntarily subscribe to the reduction of cultiva-
tion of poppy is an important criteria for final selection of target areas’ (usaid, 2006, 21). The 
project completion report for adp North also refers to the fact that ‘Conditionality may be 










The scale of this assistance was impressive. So much so that by 2018 the US 
government had spent usd 1.46 billion on what it termed alternative devel-
opment, the vast bulk of which was rural development programmes in poppy 
growing areas that made little direct reference to opium poppy in their design, 
implementation or subsequent evaluations (sigar, 2018a, 118). These included 
projects such as the Accelerated Sustainable Agriculture Program (2006‒10) at 
a cost of usd 132.6 million, the Community Development Program, West, East, 
South and Kabul (2009‒12) with a total budget of usd 334 million, the Afghan-
istan Vouchers for Increased Production in Afghanistan (2008‒13), costing 
usd 323 million, and the Commercial Horticulture and Agriculture Program 
(2010‒19) at a cost of usd 71 million.
All of these projects were funded from the US government’s alternative de-
velopment budget line, and operated in poppy growing areas in Afghanistan 
but did not offer any indication of how the interventions they delivered would 
support farmers’ transition out of opium poppy cultivation (sigar, 2018a, 
118‒119). As usaid/ Afghanistan itself concluded:
USAID’s general approach with respect to [alternative development] 
funding, therefore, has been to assume that investments to increase high 
value crop production would, as a matter of course, discourage poppy 
production. However, there has been little effort given to examining the 
HFZ UNODC HFZ USG (Full Area) HFZ USG (Common Area)
Helmand Province UNODC Helmand Province USG
 figure 5.1  Opium poppy cultivation in Helmand, 1999‒2018 (in hectares)
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impact of our programs on poppy cultivation, or as importantly, the im-
pact of poppy production on the implementation of USAID programs. 
This has left USAID’s [alternative development] efforts relatively diffused 
and unfocused, and, it is argued, led to marginal or unsustainable im-
pacts on poppy cultivation.
USAID/ Afghanistan, 2014, 4
In the absence of any mandatory requirement by the Afghan government or 
their own governments to incorporate interventions that would deter opium 
poppy cultivation, other development donors adopted the same position. In 
fact, by 2009, counter- narcotics had fallen off the wider political agenda, in 
part displaced by the growing insurgency and the challenges of the presiden-
tial elections, but also by reductions in opium poppy cultivation overall. Devel-
opment donors welcomed the opportunity to delegate all responsibility for re-
ducing opium poppy cultivation to law enforcement, and to usaid and other 
donors that supported initiatives such as the hfz and kfz, while they focused 
on supporting economic growth.
The challenge with many of these development programmes was not 
that they did not explicitly tie themselves to the objective of reducing opi-
um poppy cultivation— this was beyond their legal mandate and ability to 
deliver, and few other than unodc thought that applying conditionality 
across all development assistance would deliver on either development or 
drug control objectives. The issue was more that they did not look at how 
they might best contribute to reducing farmers’ dependence on opium as a 
livelihood strategy, or— more importantly— ensure that they did not make 
matters worse.
The result was that some of these interventions, like that of the hfz and kfz, 
inadvertently encouraged opium poppy cultivation. For example, fertiliser was 
diverted to opium production, and improved irrigation led to more land falling 
under higher yielding opium poppy. Less direct effects could be seen from con-
ventional rural development programmes that focused on increasing wheat 
production, such as the Regional Area Development Programs (radp) that 
usaid launched at the cost of usd 300 million (sigar, 2018a). These risked 
(i)  displacing the land- poor, who had relied on the labour- intensive opium 
crop to gain access to land as a sharecropper, including to former desert areas 
where they would cultivate even more poppy, as had been done under the hfz, 
and (ii) improving wheat yields, so that more land was available for high value 
crops, including opium poppy. Other programmes, such as the extension of 
high value horticulture, could also lead to those that sharecropped land find-




uprooting their families and looking for land elsewhere where they could grow 
opium poppy.
In sum, while there were understandable reservations regarding the adop-
tion of a crude and counterproductive conditionality as a means of being seen 
to be explicitly addressing opium poppy cultivation, ignoring the fact that opi-
um poppy was grown in an area was not an option. Turning a blind eye to such 
cultivation could, in fact, encourage further cultivation, as well as displace and 
marginalise the poor, rendering development programmes ineffective in ful-
filling their pro- poor mandates and making matters worse with regard to illicit 
drug crop cultivation.
5 Alternative Development: Resistance to Change
By 2018, the clock appeared to have been turned back all the way to the 1990s. 
usaid was no longer involved in any development programming with links 
to opium poppy cultivation (sigar, 2018b, 189). Other donors, such as the 
World Bank, adb, and ec, also ignored opium poppy cultivation even where 
they were funding large- scale irrigation programmes in poppy growing areas 
(World Bank, 2014, 41; Byrd and Mansfield, 2014). inl and unodc were once 
again in the driving seat, pressing for short- term alternative development pro-
grammes that made assistance contingent on reductions in poppy cultivation.
Attempts to reshape the debate on counter- narcotics and alternative de-
velopment in Afghanistan failed. Despite a number of efforts by those donors 
most involved in rural livelihoods programmes to better integrate drugs into 
development programmes, they made little progress with implementation. 
The reasons for this were manifold and were largely political and technical, 
in addition to the ubiquitous challenge of maintaining a quorum of interested 
donors given the rapid staff turnover in Kabul.
As Conklin (2001) defines it, the drugs issue in Afghanistan is a complex, 
‘wicked problem’, one that required cross- government support and owner-
ship, not just within the Afghan government but also among Western donor 
nations. This was not achieved. Then Afghan President Hamid Karzai showed 
little interest in the subject and, despite the UK’s ‘lead nation’ and then ‘part-
ner nation’ role, successive UK prime ministers failed to understand fully what 
was required. What is more, neither the political leadership in Afghanistan nor 
that among the Western allies had a common and consistent understanding 
of the drugs issue or how it related to the wider ‘Afghan project’ in its various 
forms— counterterrorism, state building or counter- insurgency. Those institu-
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the UK Afghan Drugs and Inter- Departmental Unit (adidu) and the inl— did 
not control all the levers, nor did they always have the technical capacity to en-
gage constructively with those institutions responsible for delivering security, 
governance and economic growth.
Set up as a parallel strand of institutions and activities, they found them-
selves in a state of constant competition for resources and the attention of 
senior political leaders, who did not always see the relevance of the drugs is-
sue to the wider mission and lacked a common understanding of how best to 
manage the negative consequences of widespread opium production. More-
over, the drug control community was often seen as pursuing short- term drug 
control targets— specifically, dramatic reductions in annual levels of opium 
poppy cultivation— that were often viewed by members of the development, 
diplomatic and security communities as detrimental to their institutional 
 objectives.
Within the development community itself, there were major challenges 
building ownership over the drugs issue in Afghanistan. This was particular-
ly the case for senior officials in Afghan development ministries and Western 
donors. Both preferred to see the drugs issue as one for someone else to deal 
with— typically, the growing drug control community that inhabited institu-
tions such as the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics (previously the Coun-
ter Narcotics Directorate); inl; the British Embassy Drugs Team (bedt); and 
law enforcement organisations within the Afghan Ministry of Interior and the 
international community, such as the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(dea) and the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (soca).
Western development donors’ senior managers were particularly resistant 
to engaging on the drugs issue. Although technocrats in Kabul responsible for 
programmes promoting development in rural Afghanistan would rarely coun-
tenance designing or funding an intervention that ignored the country’s most 
valuable export, many senior officials in other capitals did not want to see their 
organisation engage on counter- narcotics, fearing they would be held respon-
sible for any subsequent fluctuations in opium poppy cultivation. They were 
of the view that no good would come of being part of what might be perceived 
as a counter- narcotics mandate and would argue that doing so would run con-
trary to the pro- poor development objectives of their institution. Afghan lead-
ership would typically follow this lead, absent pressure to engage from their 
main development donors.
Another obstacle, particularly in the formative years of the Western allies’ 
intervention in Afghanistan, was the largely bilateral strategy of usaid de-
scribed in the previous section. The scale of the US development budget and 
its focus on implementing bilateral ‘alternative development’ programmes 
98 Mansfield
through contractors meant that it could largely pursue its own agenda, sep-
arate from that of the other major donors. Thus, while some of the largest 
development donors involved in rural development would meet to discuss 
how to better integrate the drugs issue into their development plans, and even 
pursue joint initiatives between 2005 and 2009, usaid often was absent from 
the discussions. Instead, it pursued large bilateral programmes, some of which 
were described as alternative development and others as rural development, 
often with no clarity as to what differentiated one from the other (sigar, 
2018b, 128).
The absence of usaid from donor discussions, as well as the perception 
that it persisted with a set of distinct alternative livelihoods/ development pro-
jects, did not match the messages that technocrats in Kabul were presenting to 
the Afghan development ministries. The continuation of a type of ‘alternative 
development’ akin to that of the 1990s reinforced the tendency of senior man-
agers in Western donors to look for bounded development projects that they 
could label as ‘counter- narcotics’. This seemingly allowed senior managers to 
respond to political pressure within their own governments and engage in 
counter- narcotics, while maintaining a strategic distance— they did not have 
to integrate drugs into their wider portfolio of development programmes and 
policy dialogue in Afghanistan.
A further constraint preventing the integration of drugs into wider develop-
ment was the planning process itself. Designed mostly from Kabul, develop-
ment programmes were rather generic, identifying the provinces and districts 
that they would work in with only little detail. They lacked specifics on the 
context of particular areas, the resource endowments and the complex and 
diverse nature of the rural livelihood strategies pursued by the local popula-
tion. This was all to be worked out during the implementation of individual 
npp s or bilateral programmes. Efforts to build synergies between these differ-
ent, centrally designed programmes at the local, district and provincial level 
were often hampered. The National Solidarity Program (nsp) was intended 
to establish local mechanisms for development planning in the form of Com-
munity Development Councils (cdc s), but some ministries and programmes 
were reluctant to work through them. Attempts to build provincial develop-
ment plans under the National Area- Based Development Program (nabdp) 
also faltered. This led to the counter- narcotics community developing provin-
cial counter- narcotics plans for a number of key provinces through the tech-
nical support it provided to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Due to a heavy 
focus on counter- narcotics and the failure to gain traction in the wider devel-
opment community— which held the purse strings— this initiative proved 
 unsuccessful.
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Related to the problem of coherent provincial- and district- level develop-
ment plans was the issue of technical capacity. Integrating the causes of opi-
um poppy cultivation into rural development interventions, understanding 
how the reasons for cultivation differ by socio- economic group, and design-
ing interventions that, at best, would reduce the dependency on opium as a 
livelihood strategy and, at least, would not make matters worse required a 
deep knowledge of rural Afghanistan (Ward et al., 2008). This was knowledge 
that many donors and the contractors that implemented their programmes— 
including those that provided technical assistance to Afghan development 
ministries— did not possess. Although this lack of knowledge became a con-
sequence of the deteriorating security conditions and the stringent duty of 
care that Western donors imposed upon their staff, it was also a function of 
the high staff turnover that had beleaguered the Afghan reconstruction effort 
since its start.
In the absence of knowledge about rural Afghanistan, the default scenario 
for development organisations was to assume that an intervention that pro-
motes growth in the legal economy would lead to a contraction in the opi-
um economy. The usaid bilateral funding programme was littered with pro-
grammes that followed just such a lead, including the radp s for South (usd 
125.1 million), North (usd 78.4 million), West (usd 69.9 million) and East (usd 
28.1 million) (sigar, 2018b, 120), as well as the Commercial Horticulture and 
Agricultural Marketing Program (usd 71 million) (sigar, 2019b, 178) and more 
recently the Value Chain Programs for Livestock (usd 55.6 million), High Val-
ue Crops (usd 54.9  million) and West (usd 19  million) (sigar, 2019b, 178). 
Criticised by usaid’s own Inspector General (usaid, 2012, 5), this approach 
rested on a false assumption in the case of the programme Incentives Driving 
Economic Alternatives- North East West (usd 160 million) in the province of 
Nangarhar (Mansfield, 2015a).
Afghanistan is inundated with a variety of programmes that highlight 
the consequence of failing to adequately consider the impact of their ac-
tivities on opium poppy cultivation. There are numerous examples of the 
deleterious effects of poorly planned and implemented programmes. These 
include the hfz, which ignored the likely effects encouraging widespread 
wheat cultivation would have on different population groups, thereby mar-
ginalising the land- poor and driving them into the former desert areas of 
Helmand where they cultivated more poppy, and rural development pro-
grammes that provided inputs like irrigation and fertiliser that were subse-
quently diverted to produce higher opium yields (see Figure 5.2) (Mansfield, 











 figure 5.2  Irrigation project funded by the Good Performance Initiative being used to grow 
more opium poppy in Pachir Wa Agam, Nangarhar
  source: alcis (2018), cited in sigar (2018b)
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6 Conclusion
In Afghanistan, alternative development has reverted to the default of the 
1990s. Misused and misunderstood, the term came to mean all things to all 
people during the post 2001 reconstruction. Initial development efforts that 
drew on the failures of alternative development in the 1990s looked to avoid 
both initialising area- bound interventions of the past, and making assistance 
contingent on reductions in opium poppy cultivation. Instead, they looked to 
integrate the causes of drug crop cultivation into the design and implementa-
tion of rural development programmes, including the npp s.
However, ultimately, the lack of senior political leadership, the inconsistent 
and insufficient ownership of the drugs issue among the development com-
munity, centralised and disparate development planning processes, and limit-
ed technical capacity resulted in intermittent and inconsistent engagement by 
development organisations on the issue in Afghanistan.
Periods of peak engagement were often when levels of opium poppy culti-
vation increased nationally or in a particular province, especially one where 
a Western government led the Provincial Reconstruction Team, and develop-
ment staff would find themselves compelled to engage directly in counter- 
narcotics efforts. This was largely driven by the perception that rising levels 
of cultivation reflected a failure in the state- building project in Afghanistan 
or, worse still, represented poor performance of a Western nation’s military 
and civilian effort within the province where cultivation was increasing. When 
levels of cultivation were static or falling, there would be no such pressure, and 
senior development officials would even dissuade their staff from engaging in 
the drugs issue at all— even when programmes they were funding were provid-
ing assistance in areas where opium production was concentrated.
In the absence of a more consistent and meaningful engagement on the 
drugs issue by a quorum of development donors and Afghan ministries, the 
drug control community filled the gap. In fact, it is fair to say that the default 
position has typically been one where institutions such as unodc, the Afghan 
Ministry of Counter Narcotics and inl have pushed what they perceive as a 
development model in drug growing areas, repeating calls for conditionality 
or a ‘social compact’ that tied aid to reductions in opium poppy cultivation 
(Costa, 2002; unodc, 2016). Over time, alternative livelihoods came to be 
seen as synonymous with alternative development, and in some areas— most 
notably with the provision of wheat seed in Helmand under the Food Zone 
initiative— even began to look like crop substitution, an approach that even 




The reality is that a simplistic understanding of alternative development 
where it is linked to conditionality, and what appears to be a crude exchange 
of development inputs for a commitment to reduce drug crop cultivation, 
retains a certain attraction, particularly for senior political leadership. First, 
tying development assistance directly to reductions in cultivation infers cau-
sality between development inputs and drug control outcomes, even where 
evidence in rural Afghanistan has shown that it does not exist. Second, it pro-
vides an optic of specificity between an investment of funds and reductions 
in cultivation that development specialists can rarely offer, particularly given 
the weakness in the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of the develop-
ment community in Afghanistan and the reliance on attitudinal surveys, such 
as those deployed in Helmand.4
Finally, perhaps the most valuable aspect of this idea of ‘exchange’ is that it 
provides a political target for subsequent recriminations when reductions in 
opium poppy cultivation do not occur or when they are not sustained. Once 
cultivation fails to fall or there is a resurgence, it is easy to blame the national 
leadership, provincial governors, district officials or even community leaders 
for their ‘lack of commitment’ to drug control, their cynicism in taking devel-
opment monies and not living up to their side of the bargain, and perhaps 
even their corruption and involvement in the drug trade. Although many of 
these claims may be true in part, conditionality fundamentally continues to 
fail to reflect the decentralised and contested nature of political power in rural 
Afghanistan. The reality is that those in positions of power would not have 
the capacity to retain that power if they were to impose prolonged periods of 
hardship on large sections of the rural population.
Without recourse to the kind of coercive capacity required to enforce condi-
tionality, those looking for reductions in drug crop cultivation in Afghanistan 
have to work at a different pace and with unfamiliar instruments. Reaching a 
common understanding with the development community as to how improved 
 4 Examples include the Helmand Monitoring and Evaluation Program (hmep), a UK funded 
initiative used to assess the impact of stablisation efforts in Helmand. The polling conducted 
by hmep was subject to significant bias. For example, hmep reported that only 3– 5 per cent 
of households in Helmand earned a revenue from opium in 2013 despite the scale of cultiva-
tion in the province, which had risen from 75,176 hectares to 100,693 hectares between 2012 
and 2013, with some areas cultivating as much as 62.5  percent of agricultural land. Other 
surveys showed the same systematic underreporting of opium poppy cultivation, including 
large- scale ones such as the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (nrva), and more 
limited ones such as those carried out by Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives– North, 
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welfare, social protection and economic growth can address the causes of opi-
um poppy cultivation and reduce dependency on drug crops as a livelihood 
strategy would help. Working with development donors and ministries to en-
sure that current and pipeline programmes do not lead to growing levels of cul-
tivation or to the population’s increasing dependency on opium production as 
a livelihood strategy would also prove to be an invaluable exercise. It is without 
question in Afghanistan that exorcising the term alternative development— 
and its association with bounded and conditional development assistance— 
would also aid both the debate on what to do about illicit drug crops, but also 
that on the role that the wider development community can play.
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chapter 6
Cannabis Regulation and Development: Fair(er) 
Trade Options for Emerging Legal Markets
David Bewley- Taylor, Martin Jelsma and Sylvia Kay
 Abstract
Significant policy shifts have led to an unprecedented boom in medical cannabis mar-
kets, while a growing number of countries are moving towards the legal regulation 
of adult non- medical use. This trend is likely to bring a range of benefits. Yet there 
are growing concerns over the many for- profit cannabis companies from the global 
North that are aggressively competing to capture the licit spaces now opening in the 
multibillion- dollar global cannabis market. This threatens to push small- scale tradi-
tional farmers from the global South out of the emerging legal markets. Those trying 
to transition out of illegality face huge difficulties due to a combination of the lega-
cy of criminalisation and administrative barriers to entry. Conquering and protecting 
spaces for small- scale farmers within the current overheated and corporate- driven 
market will require affirmative action, regulation of foreign investment, and well- 
designed legislative and market strategies. This policy comment explores the un-
folding market dynamics from a development perspective and offers a set of guiding 
principles and policy proposals upon which a more equitable, fair(er) trade cannabis 
regulation model can be built.
1 Introduction1
Policy changes over the past five years or so have dramatically reshaped the 
global cannabis market. Not only has there been an unprecedented boom in 
medical markets, but, following policy shifts in several jurisdictions, a grow-
ing number of countries are also preparing for the legal regulation of adult 
 1 This article draws on and develops ideas and arguments contained within Martin Jelsma, 
Sylvia Kay and David Bewley- Taylor (2019) Fair(er) Trade Options for the Cannabis Market, 
Cannabis Innovate, Policy Report 1, London/ Swansea, March. Thanks go to the anonymous 
International Development Policy reviewers for their constructive comments and feedback. 





Cannabis Regulation and Development 107
non- medical use. Such moves are triggered by the recognition that decades 
of repressive policies have proved ineffective and have had grave negative 
consequences. A  reckoning with these past failures and a shift towards a 
new model for cannabis regulation look set to bring a clear range of bene-
fits in terms of health and human rights, and potential reductions in crime 
and over- incarceration. Nonetheless, there are also growing reservations re-
garding unfolding market dynamics. Among these is a concern over the many 
for- profit cannabis companies from the global North2 that are aggressively 
competing to capture the licit spaces now rapidly opening in the multibillion- 
dollar global cannabis market. This threatens to push small- scale and mar-
ginalised traditional farmers from countries such as Colombia, Mexico, Ja-
maica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Morocco, South Africa, India, Nepal or 
Thailand out of the emerging markets, even though they have supplied illicit 
markets for decades.3
It is, therefore, vital amongst important and timely discussions surrounding 
both patient access to medical cannabis and the emerging structure of regu-
lated markets for recreational use, particularly within the global North, that 
the socio- economic needs and interests of traditional cannabis producers in 
the global South are not overlooked. The millions of people around the world 
currently depending on the illicit market for their livelihoods should not be 
left behind in this historic transition. There should be no reason why, with the 
right public policies in place, small- scale farmers cannot benefit from these 
market openings, working in mutually beneficial partnership with or alongside 
ethical companies. Such an approach would not only move beyond standard 
corporate social responsibility (csr), it would also align with government ob-
ligations to end poverty, hunger and the causes of structural inequality and 
discrimination in the context of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. 
The 2016 United Nations (UN) General Assembly Special Session on the World 
Drug Problem (ungass) reaffirmed a spirit of ‘shared responsibility’ in that 
regard (UN General Assembly, 2016).
 2 The terms global North and global South are used here to refer to the geographical global 
North/ South divide and the associated unequal distribution of economic and political power 
loosely based on the so- called Brandt Line. That said, a broader non- geographical interpre-
tation is also applicable whereby ‘power- conscious readings of place […] challenge nation- 
based models of the Global North (First World) and the Global South (Third World)’ and 
suggest that ‘one may exist within the other’ (Trefzer et al., 2014, 1).
 3 While these are countries where, to varying degrees, there is currently some discussion about 
market transition, many more states from the global South can be regarded as traditional 
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Drawing on evidence from some of the countries mentioned above,4 this 
policy comment argues that policymakers at a range of governance levels 
should grasp the opportunities afforded by the dramatic shifts in the cannabis 
market to help shape its growth and to ensure that it will enable cannabis 
producers in the global South to transition out of illegality. From a sustaina-
ble development perspective, this would mean putting in place standards and 
charting a course that triggers a race to the top, not to the bottom. Moving 
beyond a set of minimum legal standards would pave the way for an approach 
that is fairer and more equitable than is currently the case within the nascent 
licit cannabis market; what we call a fair(er) trade cannabis model. Conscious 
of the definitional complexities associated with the terms ‘ “Fairtrade”, ‘Fair 
Trade’, ‘Fairly Traded’ or other variations of spelling’ and the ‘contest for mean-
ing between these terms’ (Tiffen, 2019; Walton, 2010; Ehrlich, 2018) yet draw-
ing on many of the high- order principles developed by what might be called 
the ‘Fair Trade Movement’, such a model would, put simply, be built around a 
rights- based, inclusive and environmentally sustainable approach to market 
engagement.
The notion of fair(er) trade cannabis is not as far- fetched as it might at 
first appear. A 2018 review of the cannabis market in the United States (US), 
for example, found about a dozen nationwide voluntary cannabis- specific 
standards- setting organisations that claim to certify cannabis as ‘ethical’.5 
What this means in practice, however, varies considerably. And this also high-
lights problems surrounding voluntary codes/ challenges in (inter)national 
standard setting that are not unique to the cannabis market.6 Beginning with a 
brief overview of the current situation relating to both medical and recreation-
al cannabis, this policy comment moves on to discuss some of the barriers per-
taining to the transition from illegality for small- scale cannabis farmers. Hav-
ing explored some of the key issues surrounding cannabis and development, 
 4 While small- scale and marginalised traditional farmers from a range of countries are being, 
or are at risk of being, pushed out of the emerging market, solid empirical data on the pro-
cess is uneven. Consequently, here the focus is largely on the Americas where information is 
currently more widely available.
 5 These include the Cannabis Certification Council (ccc), Certified Kind, Clean Green, Envi-
roCan, the Foundation of Cannabis Unified Standards, Patient Focused Certification (pfc), 
Resource Innovation Initiative (rii), Oregon Sungrown Certified, and The Cannabis Con-
servancy (tcc), amongst others (Bennett, 2018b).
 6 For example, they are industry- driven, rather than worker- or social movement- driven; lack 
transparent governance structures and consultation- or standard- setting processes; contain 
weak monitoring, evaluation and accountability mechanisms; and do not include methods 
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the chapter concludes by highlighting several considerations, and offers a set 
of key principles to help guide the promotion and development of fair(er) 
trade cannabis.
2 Legal Market Expansion
Beginning with California in 1996, the medicinal use of cannabis has been legal 
for some time in numerous US states, with— as of October 2019— 33 states and 
the District of Columbia permitting patient access. Elsewhere, at the national 
level, the medical cannabis market has been booming in recent years. Almost 
every month another country moves to regulate.7 Although countries such as 
Israel, Canada and the Netherlands might be regarded as early adopters, with 
cannabis for medical use permitted since 1992, 1999 and 2001, respectively, rap-
id expansion has been taking place across Europe (Germany, Greece, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Switzerland), Oceania (Australia 
and New Zealand) and Latin America (Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, 
Mexico, Peru, Paraguay), despite many shortcomings in the regulatory frame-
works in place in most of the countries concerned. This trend is now also 
becoming visible in the Caribbean, Africa (Lamer, 2018) and Asia, in coun-
tries such as Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago, the US Virgin Islands, India, South Africa, Lesotho, Ghana, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, the Philippines and Thailand (Aguilar et al., 2018; Pas-
cual, 2019) (see Figure 6.1).
Moving beyond medicinal uses, beginning with policy shifts in 2012, elev-
en US states plus the District of Columbia have now approved ballot initia-
tives or passed laws to regulate cannabis. Uruguay (2013) and Canada (2018) 
have implemented laws at the national level (see Figure  6.1). These new 
frameworks for the legal regulation of the whole cannabis market, including 
non- medical or ‘adult’ or ‘recreational’ uses, are contributing to fresh debate 
elsewhere in the world. For example, while many countries remain commit-
ted to punitive prohibition, cannabis regulation is on the agenda of the gov-
ernments of Mexico and of Luxembourg, and in New Zealand the governing 
coalition has committed to a ballot initiative by 2020 on whether to legalise 
non- medical cannabis. The Dutch government will be permitting a four- year 
programme of local experiments in regulated cannabis production to supply 
 7 This policy comment does not cover questions concerning the clinical efficacy of medicinal 
cannabis. An overview of the latest scientific evidence can be found, for example, in nasem, 
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the ‘coffeeshops’ where purchase and use has been tolerated since the 1990s. 
Similar experiments are also to take place in Switzerland, and multiple regu-
latory proposals have emerged at municipal and regional levels in other Euro-
pean countries (Blickman et al., 2019). Within the US, additional state ballot 
initiatives are being planned, and more state legislatures are considering can-
nabis regulation bills. In the Caribbean region, the 2018 caricom Regional 
Commission on Marijuana concluded that the UN- based ‘prohibitionist re-
gime on cannabis/ marijuana is not fit for purpose’, recommending ‘significant 
changes to the laws of the region to enable the dismantling of this regime […] 
that has proven to be ineffective, unjust and caused more harm than it sought 
to prevent’ (caricom Regional Commission on Marijuana, 2018, 62). And, 
signalling a shift towards more liberal approaches to the drug, in December 
2018— following in the footsteps of Jamaica— St Vincent and the Grenadines 
as well as Antigua and Barbados adopted legislation regulating medical use 
and decriminalising possession and cultivation for any personal use (Jamaica 
Observer, 2018a; 2018b).
This policy trend towards legal regulation is likely to consolidate and spread 
to more jurisdictions. However, while the medical cannabis boom is— with 
certain conditions— justifiable under the existing UN drug control regime, 
there can be no doubt that the legal regulation of non- medical markets is out 
of compliance with provisions of the UN drug control treaties. As more juris-
dictions move in this direction, treaty tensions will increase, and states will be 
obliged to explore options to reconcile such policy changes with their obliga-




 figure 6.1  Cannabis regulation world map
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3 Corporate Capture
These shifts in attitudes, and subsequently in policies, have generated consid-
erable interest from the business community, including the pharmaceutical, 
tobacco, and alcohol industries and investment bankers and hedge funds. De-
spite the increasingly obvious existence of a speculative bubble, investment 
opportunities are especially attractive in the global South and traditional can-
nabis producing countries. Here, a combination of lower production costs, 
suitable cannabis plant varieties, possible medical cannabis export opportu-
nities, and potential in- region consumer markets for both medical and recre-
ational purposes has resulted in what has been referred to as a ‘green rush’ of 
investors and medical cannabis companies. Attracted to places such as Latin 
America and the Caribbean, these mostly Canadian companies are seeking to 
connect actual and potential demand in emerging consumer states within the 
western hemisphere and Europe with supply from traditional producer states, 
and reap the enormous profits that potentially go with it (Pascual, 2019).
Cannabis companies that went public on the Canadian stock exchange 
accumulated billions of dollars, triggering a financial bubble driven by high-
ly speculative market predictions. Much of the capital generated from those 
share sales was invested in stock promotion, mergers, and acquisitions 
(Rendell and Kiladze, 2019), and part of it was used to establish new cultiva-
tion and production facilities in Southern countries or to buy up local licensed 
companies. To date, however, hardly any international trade in cannabis has 
actually materialised and clear signs of a bursting bubble became visible in 
the second half of 2019. The market value of Canada- based Canopy Growth, 
for example, still the world’s largest cannabis company, dropped from usd 18 
billion (cad 24 billion) in April 2019 to about usd 5.5 billion (cad 7.1 billion) 
in mid- November (Bloomberg, 2019).
Nothing of the ‘green rush’ billions has ended up with traditional cannabis 
growers in the global South, who struggle to get access to the corporate- driven 
market, and do so despite the intention within some governments to encour-
age smaller local groups to enter the market, both in terms of medical cannabis 
and further down the line in relation to more widespread recreational use in a 
range of jurisdictions.
4 The Challenge of Transition
It would seem only fair that those who— often for basic economic survival in 
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cannabis market, those who were most affected by the ‘war on drugs’, and those 
who in many ways paved the way for recent policy changes should be first in 
line to benefit from the emergence of licit spaces in the market. Those trying 
to transition out of illegality, however, face huge difficulties due to a combina-
tion of the legacy of criminalisation and legal and administrative barriers to 
entry. Conquering and protecting spaces for small- scale farmers in traditional 
producing countries (Figures 6.2 and 6.3) in light of the current overheated 
and highly competitive global cannabis market dynamics will require affirm-
ative action, regulation and control of foreign investment and transnational 
corporations, and well- designed legislative and market strategies. And, while 
not our focus here, the same holds true for black and Latino communities in 
the US or for ethnic minorities elsewhere that have been disproportionately 
affected by drug law enforcement (Dufton, 2017, pp. 225‒248). As the market 
continues to emerge and find its shape in the global South, portents of the 
future can already be identified in the global North. Difficulties encountered 
in overcoming the legacy of punitive prohibition are being documented in the 
US and Canada, even in jurisdictions that— engaging with the concept of so-
cial justice— intended to give preferential access to those who had been in-
volved in supplying the illicit market (Avins, 2019). Small cannabis growers in 
the global South (see Figure 6.4) face very similar, if not worse, obstacles to 
conquering a place in the licit market.
There are some positive developments. In late 2018, authorities in St Vincent 
and the Grenadines passed a Cannabis Cultivation Amnesty Bill as part of a 
suite of measures to support small- scale farmers who have been illegally culti-
vating and trading cannabis transition to become legal licenced growers of me-
dicinal cannabis. Nevertheless, the business of securing a licence in St Vincent 
and the Grenadines as elsewhere in the Caribbean is expensive for small grow-
ers, and there are considerable additional set- up costs to meet standards, such 
as establishing security systems (including something as basic as fencing). 
Further expenses are incurred in seeking advice on and changing traditional 
cultivating techniques to adhere to Good Agricultural Practice standards and 
protocols. This means that there is a need to attract and rely on foreign capital. 
In Jamaica, for example, most of the 30 licences awarded by the Cannabis Li-
censing Authority (cla) to cultivate and sell cannabis are said to be supported 
by a significant level of foreign backing. The same goes for the 170 applications 
conditionally approved. Such a dependence on outside investment means that 
appropriate framework conditions must be in place in order to solicit the right 
kind of investment and ensure that wealth is not extracted at the expense of 
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Concern regarding the resulting asymmetry was, in many ways, foreshad-
owed by the caricom Marijuana Commission when it noted, ‘Embracing 
cannabis/ marijuana as a means of economic development is not without its 
challenges’. Adding more detail, it continued by stressing that, ‘A serious con-
cern is that a new system could place economic power and benefit too much 
in the hands of large, foreign business concerns, to the detriment of several 
stakeholders, including small farmers […] cannabis has fuelled important eco-
nomic gains and livelihoods for small farmers and traders, who now fear that 
liberalisation and legalisation might dis- empower them’ (caricom Regional 
Commission on Marijuana, 2018, 56).
Some measures have been introduced to deal with these concerns, in-
cluding stipulations on the kinds of partnerships and agreements into which 
foreign investors can enter. According to Jamaican law, for example, foreign 
companies are obliged to have local partners, who retain— on paper at least— 
majority control. However, it is clear that the relationship with the sources and 
types of investment in the emerging cannabis market is an area that will need 
careful monitoring. This is especially true in the context of cannabis, where 
 figure 6.2  Illicit cannabis cultivation in Westmoreland, Jamaica
  source: photo by author, martin jelsma, august 2018
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access to capital is already fraught with difficulties given the restrictions im-
posed by US banking regulations and the fact that cannabis is still illegal at the 
federal level. Since local Jamaican banks have ties to the US, they are unwilling 
to take on cannabis clients for fear of negative repercussions in the absence of 
correspondent banking regulations (Subramaniam, 2019). While this remains 
hugely challenging, the situation is evolving. St Vincent and the Grenadines 
has, for example, become the first country in the Caribbean to grant permis-
sion for licensed cultivators to open bank accounts with the majority state- 
owned Bank of St Vincent and the Grenadines. This opens up a door for small- 
scale farmers from the country (and other countries) to transition from the 
illegal to the legal market, or for those just wanting to get into the cannabis 
trade for the first time.
5 Cannabis and Development
Several countries have expressed an interest in using the rapidly opening lic-
it spaces in the global market as an ‘alternative development’— or, more ap-
propriately, simply a development— opportunity for small farmers currently 
producing for the illicit market, contrasting this as a more viable alternative to 
failed ‘crop substitution’ projects implemented in the past. In fact, already dur-
ing the negotiations in the late 1950s for the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic 
 figure 6.3  Illicit cannabis cultivation in Colombia
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Drugs, there was some recognition that the treaty obligation to eliminate illic-
it cultivation required the provision of alternative livelihood options for the 
communities involved. Morocco for example, having just gained independ-
ence, drew attention to the problem ‘that thousands of people had for years 
been living on the cultivation of kif, and it was their main source of livelihood’, 
and asked the international community for development assistance (un cnd, 
1958, 28).
While ‘alternative development’ (ad) became a major issue for debate at 
the UN level for coca and opium poppy, only a handful of such projects have 
been set up for cannabis farmers. These have been in Lebanon, Morocco, 
Indonesia and the Philippines, although none have been successful. Repeated 
calls to the international donor community for more development assistance 
in this area, especially from African countries, have fallen on deaf ears. Donors 
do not seem to believe ad could work in the case of cannabis, nor does it rank 
high on the political agenda. The recent regulation trend, however, potentially 
offers a new perspective on providing licit (alternative) livelihood options for 
subsistence farmers currently dependent on the illicit cannabis economy.
For instance, a pilot project with rural communities has recently been 
initiated in Jamaica, representing an important first attempt to utilise the 
< ,  hectares
>  hectares
 figure 6.4  Traditional producer countries
  Notes: Producer countries with less than 10,000 hectares: Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, St  Vincent 
and the Grenadines, South Africa, Swaziland, Thailand. 
  Producer countries with more than 10,000 hectares: Afghanistan, India, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Morocco, Mexico.
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opening of licit spaces in the global cannabis market as an economic oppor-
tunity for small- scale farmers currently producing for the illicit market. In 
2016, the cla introduced a tiered licensing system for medical ganja, meant 
to ‘enfranchise the small farmers who had previously been subject to signifi-
cant punitive action by law enforcement agencies’ (Jones, Porter and Bishop, 
2017, 115). Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness announced that the 
government would, in the first quarter of 2019, ‘unveil a development pro-
gramme for farmers in the ganja sector […] to ensure the small farmers in the 
sector are protected as the global marijuana industry expands. […] because 
it is a real fear that as that industry emerges, becomes more corporatized, 
that the original ganja man, the original farmer, could very well be left out 
of the gains and the benefits’ (Holness, 2019). The cla ‘Alternative Devel-
opment Project’ (adp) is being developed in collaboration with the West-
moreland Hemp & Ganja Farmers Association and the St Elizabeth Maroon 
community and is ‘geared towards transitioning current illicit ganja farmers 
into the legal regulated industry’ (cla, 2017). This goal was emphasised in 
April 2019 by J.C. Hutchinson, minister without portfolio at the Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce, Agriculture and Fisheries. Referring to the adp rollout, 
he stressed that ‘cannabis is one of the crops which the government is mak-
ing sure that the small farmers are involved in growing legally’ (Ferguson, 
2019). The long delay, limited implementation and ongoing confusion about 
its status— as of October 2019 it has not been officially launched (Jamaica 
Observer, 2019)— makes even an initial evaluation of the adp difficult. None-
theless, the scheme is worth monitoring, especially considering the fate of 
programmes in other parts of the world.
Several other countries that have recently chosen to allow the use of can-
nabis for medicinal purposes have attempted to introduce preferential access 
schemes for existing small- scale farmers and restrictions on foreign invest-
ments. Unfortunately, these initial attempts are yet to prove their capacity 
to enable local cultivators to genuinely overcome the difficult hurdles faced 
when entering the competitive global medical cannabis market. Meanwhile, 
foreign, private companies— benefiting from governmental apathy and some-
times even the assistance of local politicians with business interests— stand 
ready to invade and capture these market spaces with millions of dollars to 
invest (Barjas, 2018). Despite perhaps good intentions and public- facing pro-
testations concerning engagement with local communities, the track record 
of many medical cannabis companies currently operating in places such as 
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6 Conclusion
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006 World Drug Report con-
cluded: ‘The world has failed to come to terms with cannabis as a drug. In some 
countries, cannabis use and trafficking are taken very seriously, while in others, 
they are virtually ignored. This incongruity undermines the credibility of the 
international system, and the time for resolving global ambivalence on the is-
sue is long overdue. Either the gap between the letter and spirit of the Single 
Convention, so manifest with cannabis, needs to be bridged, or parties to the 
Convention need to discuss re- defining the status of cannabis’ (unodc, 2006, 
186). Historic policy changes are now reshaping the global cannabis market, 
and the gradual dismantling of the prohibitive regime that reigned in past dec-
ades is a welcome development. It would be a dramatic outcome, however, if 
the legally regulated medical and non- medical markets that are rising from the 
ashes of global drug prohibition ultimately lead to what prohibition intended, 
but never succeeded in achieving:  the destruction of the remnants of tradi-
tional cannabis cultures that barely managed to survive, and the eradication of 
the illicit cannabis survival economies in the global South. The construction of 
the global cannabis prohibition regime was a historic mistake with severe con-
sequences. But if the transition towards a legally regulated market results in a 
corporate takeover that concentrates profits in the pockets of a handful of Big 
Pharma, Agro, and cannabis companies and pushes small- scale farmers in the 
global South out of business, another historic mistake is already in the making.
Ensuring that fair(er) trade principles guide this transition is a respon-
sibility for governments and the cannabis industry alike. Far from being a 
purely quixotic, benevolent endeavour, benefits can be derived for both. For 
governments in the global South, for example, carefully structured producer 
frameworks have the potential to help fulfil human rights commitments and 
to achieve hitherto elusive development outcomes in marginalised commu-
nities, thereby contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (sdg s) as committed to at the UN level. Kate Gilmore, Deputy 
High Commissioner, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
when introducing the draft of the Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and 
Other People Working in Rural Areas in April 2018, referred to the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development and its promise to ‘leave no one behind’: ‘Prom-
ises that no one is to be left behind by discrimination nor poverty; or left out 
through marginalization; or forgotten because their truths are inconvenient to 
the privileged. Yet, those universal promises have not been upheld. Peasants 
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And there is a real risk that this will be especially the case now for those de-
pendent on illicit cannabis cultivation.
Going beyond standard csr, companies in the cannabis sector are likely to 
benefit from the market appeal of ethically sourced, or fair(er) trade, cannabis. 
While that may be the case, as with regulative frameworks around other com-
modities industry voluntarism is only likely to go so far, and appropriate struc-
tures will thus necessitate a degree of public policy monitoring and evaluation. 
The issue is, however, also important for the drug policy reform movement, 
which has played a crucial role in triggering these policy changes by rightfully 
pointing out the many negative consequences of prohibition. Now that the 
wheels of change are turning, it is time to prioritise advocacy for a fair(er) 
trade cannabis market, to protect the rights of small- scale farmers and others 
who bore the brunt of repressive approaches, and to ensure a place for them in 
the emerging licit markets.
The challenges are manifold, and the political, legislative and commercial 
landscapes are fluid. Mindful of the intricate, cross- cutting and complex na-
ture of the commercial and legal environment, careful thought must be given 
to a set of interconnected frameworks relating to producers, consumers, qual-
ity and standards, as well as finance and trade policies. In this regard, lessons 
can be drawn from other global commodity markets and the ongoing struggles 
of small farmers to survive amidst deregulation and globalisation, free trade 
and investment agreements, and unrestricted corporate capture of markets by 
transnational corporations. In fact, in many instances, neo- liberal trends in the 
global economy have directly contributed to an expansion of illicit economies. 
Dramatic price crashes of traditional export commodities such as coffee, ca-
cao and bananas have forced many small farmers in the global South to take 
refuge in the illicit cultivation of opium, coca and cannabis— the few remain-
ing agrarian products where they have a comparative advantage. Their illegal 
nature can offer them higher prices and better chances of survival. In all three 
cases, fair trade markets have emerged with accompanying certification mech-
anisms to preserve at least pockets of these global markets in which some rural 
communities have been able to survive.
Coffee, cacao and bananas require climatological conditions that prevent 
a transfer of production to the global North, while cannabis can basically be 
grown anywhere. The illicit and the emerging licit cannabis markets have 
both experienced a process of import substitution in the major Northern 
consumption markets with rapidly expanding greenhouse and indoor culti-
vation. This poses additional challenges for traditional cannabis growers in 
the global South and for the development of comparable fair(er) trade sce-
narios to protect them. More emphasis will have to be given to arguments 
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around ‘ethical consumerism’ (Bennett, 2018a); branding based on quality 
advantages of native cannabis strains and traditional cultivation techniques, 
using ‘geographical indications’ (Benavente, 2013) or ‘denominations of ori-
gin’ certification for example (European Union, 2016); the significant carbon 
footprint disadvantages of indoor/ greenhouse production facilities (Milman, 
2017); and so on.
On the other hand, fair trade pockets for coffee, cacao and banana had to 
be reconquered in an already established fully liberalised market, while the 
transition from an illicit to a licit global cannabis market is still in an incipient 
stage. Theoretically, this may offer better conditions to shape the market’s con-
tours and introduce social justice and fair(er) trade principles from the outset. 
While the initial ‘green rush’ and rapid growth of big cannabis companies in-
stilled fear of an early corporate capture of the emerging market, the recent 
burst of the speculative bubble may indicate that it is not yet too late to start a 
serious discussion about how to create a more equitable global cannabis mar-
ket. Quite a few Southern traditional supplier countries of the illicit cannabis 
market have recently adopted medical cannabis legislation, struggling to still 
get a piece of the global medical pie. However, as long as major producers such 
as Colombia, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Morocco, South Afri-
ca, Lebanon, India, Nepal or Thailand remain unwilling to also legally regu-
late cannabis for non- medical purposes, millions of small farmers will still lose 
their livelihoods. Preventing that scenario will require the proactive engage-
ment of those countries in regional and global forums soon, with the aim of 
opening the debate about an international cannabis trade regime and defying 
the strictures of the current UN drug control treaties.
Nonetheless, drawing on the initial discussions introduced here and ex-
plored more fully elsewhere (Jelsma et al., 2019), we believe that it is possible to 
develop a set of guiding principles and policy proposals upon which a fair(er) 
trade cannabis model can be built. Foundational principles include:
– A commitment to solidarity and social justice, with initiatives going beyond 
pure profit and business making opportunities to integrate ethical concerns 
as a foundational part of the operation.
– Producer empowerment and community benefit sharing through more equi-
table terms of trade, in which producers are not just seen as providers of raw 
materials but as value creators.
– Environmental sustainability standards in relation to the use of energy, wa-
ter, and agricultural inputs.
– Labour protections to ensure worker safety, health, and satisfaction.
– Democratic control, participation and decision- making processes, through in-
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– Transparency and traceability in the operation of the cannabis market and 
supply chain.
– Longer- term strategies, with special attention placed on marginalised com-
munities and rural areas in (traditional) producing countries.
– Respect for social history and the role of cannabis in the cultural and reli-
gious identities and practices of traditional growing communities.
Based on those overarching principles, several concrete policy measures can 
be considered:
– Quotas that stipulate that a certain percentage of cannabis product must be 
sourced from small growers;
– Minimum pricing for delivery of cannabis so that producers are guaranteed 
a specified income stream;
– Affirmative licensing laws that prioritise, in the first instance, small and tra-
ditional cultivators to give them a head start in the market;
– A development fund from the fees collected from the issuing of licenses and/ 
or other revenue, which could be put back into cannabis growing commu-
nities and regions;
– Lower barriers to entry for small and medium- sized producers in terms of 
administrative, compliance and security costs;
– Restrictions on foreign investment with regard to the acquisition of licenses, 
company ownership, and intellectual property rights over local cannabis 
strains and products;
– Enable a legal national and export market for cannabis- based alternative 
health products alongside high- standard pharmaceutical prescription med-
icines;
– Encourage cannabis growers to organise and register themselves as coop-
eratives to pool resources and coordinate lobbying efforts and negotiations 
with governments and companies;
– Enact land reform programmes where cannabis growers currently find 
themselves without access to land or security of tenure8;
– An amnesty and the expungement of criminal records to facilitate cannabis 
growers to transition out of illegality.
These proposed principles and policy measures are non- hierarchical and non- 
exhaustive. They are intended to stimulate further debate and reflection as 
the licit cannabis market evolves, although there will certainly be a need for 
cultural sensitivity and flexibility based on the diversity of profiles of grow-
ers and consumers in different regions. Above all, however, they are a call to 
 8 We acknowledge that in many parts of the world, land reform is complex and problematic. 
Nonetheless, it remains an important policy measure for consideration.
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policymakers, development agencies and investors to start taking the issue of 
fair(er) trade cannabis seriously and to transform the idea from a utopia into 
a reality.
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The illicit drug economy has emerged as a major factor that can exacerbate violence, 
complicate peace negotiations and corrupt transitions from war to peace. Trafficking 
chains span continents, yet they often take root in fragile and conflict- affected states, 
where violent actors can exploit the ‘violent- governance paradigm’ to entrench their 
economic, political and social influence. When this combines with the international 
narcotics enforcement regime, it has proven to have detrimental consequences for 
the resolution of conflict, as well as for the long- term developmental trajectories of 
those whose livelihoods depend on the drug economy. A  harm reduction approach 
can be argued for, but the drug policy community has yet to demonstrate that it can 
offer proven alternatives beyond the point of cultivation for actors further along drug 
 supply chains.
1 Introduction
Drugs and conflict are almost inextricably interlinked— on the part both of the 
state and the non- state. Throughout history, many conflict actors have been 
fuelled by narcotics while conflicts themselves are funded by taxes on the illicit 
drug economy. While drugs are rarely the reason a conflict begins, there are 
many contemporary examples of the drug economy prolonging and exacer-
bating levels of conflict and violence and preventing successful peacebuilding 
(Cornell, 2005).
An analysis of the Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 
(unsc)— the highest ranking global body with regard to peace and security— 
carried out by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime 
(gi- toc) shows that the drug trade has been a growing concern over the past 
decade. Of a total of 1,219 unsc Resolutions passed between 2000 and 2019, 
drug trafficking was mentioned in 114— around 10 per cent— and is second 






particular significance is, as Figure 7.1 clearly shows, that the rate at which drug 
trafficking is mentioned in resolutions is accelerating. In the period 2010‒19, 
the number of resolutions specifically mentioning drug trafficking exceeded 
20 per cent (gi- toc, 2020a), and the geographic scope of those resolutions 
significantly increased.
Although references in resolutions is an imperfect measure that cannot be 
assumed to be a proxy for the scale of any illicit market, nor necessarily a re-
flection of the real- world nature of conflicts on the ground given the politicisa-
tion and complexity of the Security Council as a multilateral mechanism (Bish, 
2019), the continued and growing recognition of the role of drug trafficking by 
the world’s highest ranking peacekeeping body is nonetheless noteworthy and 
significant.
In their World Atlas of Illicit Flows, interpol, gi- toc, and rhipto— 
the Norwegian Center for Global Analysis— estimate that the proceeds 
from drug trafficking represents 28 per cent of the income of non- state 
armed groups and terrorist organisations in zones of conflict around the 
world. Most of this revenue comes not from the production or distribution 
of drugs, or from other direct means of involvement in the drug trade, but 
from the taxing of drugs that transit through territory controlled by criminal 
groups. This encompasses the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colom-
bia (farc) in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Boko Haram in Nigeria 
and the various extremist groups in West Africa and the Sahel, among others 
(rhipto, 2018).
AfricaAsiaCentral AmericaMiddle EastGlobal
 figure 7.1  Mentions of drug trafficking in UN Security Council Resolutions by region 
(2000‒19)








It has become a well- established assumption that peace, security and de-
velopment will provide the preconditions for a reduction in levels of violence 
(Serwer and Thomson, 2008), and it is equally often assumed that the same 
three factors will reduce illicit activity and criminal behaviour. As a conse-
quence, in the contexts of many of the conflicts of the past two decades, the 
challenges of addressing the illicit economy are pushed aside to be resolved 
after the bigger questions of political settlement are concluded and the peace-
building track is undertaken (Boutellis and Tiélès, 2019).
The drug policy community has remained largely absent or excluded from 
these debates, and consequently there is surprisingly little literature that ad-
dresses why and how drug policy approaches should be considered in a conflict 
setting. This is perhaps because, in parallel over the same period, the attention 
of the drug policy community was more focused on the growing challenges of 
the urban environment, recognising that the countries with the highest levels 
of homicide and violence were no longer conflict zones, but urban areas beset 
by organised crime (unodc, 2019a), and that new approaches were urgently 
needed to address the urban violence paradigm.
While this urgency and imperative were by no means misplaced, the era of 
armed conflict is far from over, and the damage that actors resourced by the 
illicit economy can cause is still manifold. Unresolved, protracted, and dead-
ly civil wars are currently raging, with drug production and trafficking fuel-
ling these conflicts. The rise of Captagon production and trafficking over the 
course of the prolonged conflict in Syria is one notable example (Kravitz and 
Nichols, 2016); the transit of cocaine through the insurgencies of the Sahel and 
its trafficking through the ports of Libya is another (Micallef, 2019). Insurgent 
movements funded by the drug trade remain in Africa, the Americas and Asia.
It has become clear that the world’s fragile states and conflict zones are 
attractive to transnational organised crime groups, which increases the like-
lihood of continued intersection between narcotics and conflict (rhipto, 
2018). This policy comment, therefore, seeks to revisit— at a level higher than 
individual ethnographic research— the question of that intersection, and to 
examine what a drug policy lens can bring to peacebuilding in these contexts.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first analyses the features of 
the illicit drug economy and how those who profit from it operate in situations 
of conflict. The second section concludes by reflecting on what this means for 
the way drug policy should be considered and implemented, and whether in 
fact there is a value to bringing a stronger drug policy approach to conflicts and 
their resolution.
The chapter draws upon the author’s nearly two decades of experience as a 








United Nations staff member, this included work with the United Nations De-
velopment Programme on Afghanistan and Iraq, among other countries, and 
as a policy specialist in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (un-
odc). As the Deputy Director of the gi- toc, the author has carried out ex-
tensive research on conflicts in Africa and the Middle East— including Syria, 
Mali and the Sahel, Guinea- Bissau, Libya, Somalia and the Horn of Africa— 
and on the role of the illicit economy in fuelling and furthering those conflicts. 
In addition, this work offered first- hand involvement in and knowledge of the 
workings of a number of multilateral, bilateral, and civil society initiatives to 
address these challenges. The present chapter also benefits from an extensive 
literature review across multiple continents, drawing from the body of ethno-
graphic scientific research on narcotics and violence, conflict, and peacebuild-
ing, as well as an increasingly rich and insightful set of grey literature produced 
by independent think tanks and civil society groups often using a political 
economy approach to analysing the illicit economy.
2 The Drug Trafficking and Conflict Nexus
The interaction between conflict and narcotics has been observable in the 
conflicts of every continent. Moreover, even long after those conflicts are pur-
portedly resolved, the negative ramifications can still be felt and usually over a 
wider geographic region than the original conflict epicentre. Illicit economies 
and the groups that enable them have proven themselves to be highly durable, 
adaptive and prone to expanding their theatres of operation.
Almost all of the world’s heroin supply is created in the conflict zone that 
is Afghanistan. The two- decade- long struggle to address the nexus between 
poppy cultivation and ‘warlordism’, corruption and underdevelopment in 
Afghanistan— described by Mansfield— is one example of this interaction 
(Mansfield, Chapter 5, this issue). Similarly, many of the longer- standing and 
best known narcotic- fuelled conflicts have been concentrated in producer re-
gions, including Colombia, where coca production was a resource for the farc 
military insurgency (Felbab- Brown, 2005), and in Myanmar, where opium pro-
duction funded the civil war and has left a legacy of chaos and criminality in 
the Shan State borderlands (Cowell, 2005).
The intersection between conflict and production— in these cases and in 
other regions— triggered a range of policy and programmatic options that fo-
cused on alternative development for those dependent on cultivation for their 
livelihoods. These programmes enjoyed limited success, with some criticism 






chapter of this volume, Buxton claims that they failed to tackle the root causes 
of drug production and that they were seldom integrated into a more holistic 
strategy to address the broader illicit economy and the actors within it (Bux-
ton, Chapter 2, this volume). Greater harm, however, was caused by the ap-
plication of established counter- narcotics doctrine including heavy- handed 
eradication campaigns. These not only failed to meaningfully reduce funding 
to the armed militias and belligerent groups that the drug trade was financing, 
but in some notable cases actually strengthened popular support for those 
groups (Felbab- Brown, 2009). These criticisms are discussed in other chapters 
in this volume.
An issue of greater concern to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding com-
munities emerged, however, over the next decade or so when it became ap-
parent in contexts such as Guinea- Bissau and Mali that a transit trade in illicit 
narcotics was a significant contributor to state failure. Neither of these coun-
tries were drug production areas, or even particularly prominent trafficking 
zones, yet the profits of drug trafficking have proven potently destabilising and 
have played a role in the development of unprecedented forms and levels of 
violence. The profits of the drug trade reached into the uppermost levels of 
governments, with complex networks that had overlapping political, business 
and social interests (icg, 2018; Shaw, 2015). The profits of trafficking allowed 
militants to buy arms and political influence (Tinti, 2014), which created enor-
mous challenges for navigating a peace process or political transition.
In the context of these conflicts, however, the heavy prior emphasis on alter-
native development meant that the toolbox was largely empty when it came to 
addressing the governance and developmental implications of the drug trade 
outside of a cultivation zone.
The international and multilateral system, preoccupied with negotiating 
the politics of the transition, preferred to silo the complex and corrosive im-
pacts of the drug trade as a security threat to be assigned to law enforcement 
or even military actors, and the public health and harm reduction consensus 
appears to break down where there is a perceived intersection between crimi-
nality and conflict, which often justifies a hard line of law enforcement or even 
militarised approaches to breaking that nexus.
This has been particularly exacerbated in cases such as Mali and Afghan-
istan, where armed militants involved in the drug trade are also accused of 
terrorism. Focusing on the link between narcotics and terrorism further secu-
ritised law enforcement efforts and intelligence gathering to the point that the 
war on drugs and the war on terror became interlinked, and that ‘the tradition-
al separation of narcotics and terrorism counter measures and agencies has 







The criminal justice- led approaches prescribed by the international nar-
cotics control regime proved both ineffective and damaging in weak states 
with limited law enforcement capacity, where the integrity of both lead-
ership and serving officers was easily or already compromised (Aning and 
Pokoo, 2014), and— more importantly— where the actors involved in the il-
licit economy had a degree of legitimacy in their communities (Reitano and 
Hunter, 2016).
What we have learned, moreover, is that criminal agendas and the political 
landscape intersect in many different ways, so that separating criminal and 
conflict actors is a naive objective (Bosetti et al., 2017) that fails to account for 
the violent- governance paradigm.
2.1 The Violent- Governance Paradigm
Conflict zones and poorly managed post- conflict transitions offer many op-
portunities for those that are well resourced and comfortable using violence 
to achieve their own objectives and consolidate power while state institutions 
are weak (Shaw and Reitano, 2017). This is due to the quintessential nature of 
armed conflict regardless of the ideology or interest that might have sparked 
the conflict:  that it is a competitive fight for power and influence that uses 
violence.
During the lifespan of a conflict what is therefore created can be termed 
a ‘violent- governance paradigm’— a mutually reinforcing cycle where politi-
cal leverage is achieved through access to resources that have value or can be 
monetised; where resources buy the support of local communities through the 
provision of livelihoods and access to existing political influence (through cor-
ruption); and where resources also buy access to arms and foot soldiers (mili-
tias, armies or paid security or ‘heavies’), which in turn can be used to pressure 
or attack the opposition, erode a monopoly on violence, secure control of ter-
ritory and assets, or extort support from local populations (Figure 7.2).
To describe this in another way— one that is perhaps better grounded in the 
established governance literature— a conflict is a sovereignty challenge, where 
sovereignty is defined as ‘a tentative and always emergent form of authority 
grounded in violence that is performed and designed to generate loyalty, fear, 
and legitimacy from the neighbourhood to the summit of the state’ (Blom 
Hansen and Stepputat, 2006). This definition justifies the right to sovereignty 
(either locally or nationally) for any group that wields violence to create legit-
imacy (Stepputat, 2018).
There are strong parallels between this definition of sovereignty and 
the techniques via which criminal groups operate to secure access to and 










similarly use violence or the threat of violence to secure control over terri-
tory and resources and ensure the compliance of those living within their 
territory, to intimidate communities and authority figures, and to extract 
criminal rents (Varese, 2017). Violence is the means by which competi-
tion within and between organisations is played out, internal discipline is 
ensured, threats to the group are overcome, and reprisals are carried out 
( Reuter, 2009).
Even in a conflict zone where the monopoly on violence is contested, a 
government may have significant capabilities with regard to the use of force 
in response to security challenges. But legitimacy and violence do not always 
equate directly to one another. Where the legitimacy of the state using force is 
compromised, by corruption or the perception that the use of force was ille-
gitimate, then non- state actors have the capacity to build their own legitimacy 
with the communities in which they are embedded (Idler and Forest, 2015). 
They can do this by using violence to secure access to resources and to earn 
criminal rents through the creation of protection economies (Shaw, 2016b), 
and then distributing part of those rents and other services to the benefit of 
the communities.
Criminal groups across the world provide concrete goods to communities, 
but also deliver services, from security and justice to social and public goods 
such as health, education and humanitarian relief (Cockayne, 2007). In a con-
flict zone all the same principles apply, but the provision of physical security 
to groups who feel persecuted by the state is a particularly potent means by 
which armed groups can challenge state authority and build the loyalty of the 
community (Mcloughlin, 2009). If the conflict is driven by the perception that 
state resources are being unjustly captured and retained by the government 
or elites and that livelihoods for ordinary people are being provided through 
the illicit economy, then a Robin Hood syndrome can come into play, in which 
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has been distorted by the state (Martinez- Gugerli, 2018), earning them even 
more social capital.
With trust and legitimacy with local populations established, these popu-
lations may offer protection and coverage for criminal groups, giving them a 
stronghold from which to plan and carry out their operations (Reitano and 
Hunter, 2016). More importantly, however, legitimacy can strengthen their po-
litical capital within a framework of disputed authority, building up criminally 
financed actors as viable players in conflict negotiations and giving them a seat 
at the table.
The violent- governance paradigm highlights the interdependence between 
violence, legitimacy, and access to resources, and that responses targeted at 
reducing any single one of these levers are likely to prove inadequate. Even 
where violence levels can be reduced through mediation, for example, access 
to resources, local legitimacy, and the constant threat of a return to violence 
can maintain the status quo. The gang truces negotiated in El Salvador illus-
trate this point very clearly (Dudley, 2013), as do the consistent failures of ef-
forts with regard to ceasefires and ‘cantonment’ in Mali (Boutellis, 2015). In 
fact, as armed groups consolidate control over territory and populations, vio-
lence levels may fall (or change) as the threat of violence and of symbolic hits 
becomes sufficient to keep civilians aligned to their authority (Catino, 2014).
Constraining groups’ access to resources is another strategy put forward as 
a means to undermine the potency of armed groups that are criminally re-
sourced. Upstream interdiction efforts to cut off drug supply chains and the 
freezing or seizure of criminal assets are the primary responses proposed by 
law enforcement to the challenge of addressing drug trafficking and the il-
licit economy more broadly. Yet both strategies are notoriously weak in the 
best case scenarios— surveillance and interdiction affect only a tiny fraction 
of total global flows of narcotics (unodc, 2019b); the prohibitive costs, legal 
constraints and regulatory requirements of anti- money laundering regimes 
and asset seizure make this a symbolic rather than a practical tool (Reuter and 
Truman, 2004)— rendering them almost nonsensical in a conflict setting where 
there is no meaningful state institution to support those frameworks. Further-
more, armed groups with territorial control are able to build their resource 
base opportunistically from any other licit or illicit resource flow, and through 
protection taxation on local populations (rhipto, 2018; Reitano et al., 2017).
What is required is a simultaneous, coordinated and long- term effort to 
reduce all three aspects of the violent- governance paradigm:  armed groups’ 











3 Bringing the Drug Policy Agenda to the Negotiating Table
The violent- governance paradigm illustrates that measures and strategies to 
combat illicit economies must be understood as profoundly political efforts 
(Felbab- Brown, 2017). While violence and conflict may have many drivers, too 
often the drugs issue is used as a catch- all concept that a simplistic set of law 
enforcement responses can address. Instead— as is true also in non- conflict 
scenarios— simplifying complex conditions and ignoring the underlying fac-
tors that underpin illicit drug economies can serve to inflame rather than mit-
igate violence, injustice and social fracture.
Colombia and Afghanistan are two prominent cases of countries where the 
‘war on drugs’ has become enmeshed in a national conflict. In these countries, 
not only have counter- narcotics policies proven ineffective, they have also had 
disastrous consequences for the population. An overly securitised response to 
criminal actors has led to a spiralling ‘arms race’ between the state and well- 
resourced criminal groups, which has considerably intensified ordinary peo-
ple’s levels of suffering and done little to reduce either the scale of trafficking 
or levels of violence, or to build a space around which a more sustainable re-
turn to peace may be brokered.
The nascent use of new military technology such as autonomous warfare (e.g. 
drones), cybertechnology, or artificial intelligence may offer some opportuni-
ties to improve surveillance and issue targeted strikes that reduce civilian casu-
alties. But these are technologies that are unregulated, untested (Nakamitsu, 
2019) and equally available to criminal groups, particularly those enriched by 
the drug trade or supported by external proxies. So there is little current evi-
dence to suggest that they will significantly change the game.
A more effective focus is required to address drug markets in conflict zones, 
both to reduce the potential of the drug trade contributing to fuelling or pro-
longing conflict and to prevent it from exacerbating the humanitarian chal-
lenges or long- term development prospects of affected communities. The 
question, then, is if there would be any benefit in applying a drug policy lens to 
conflict, post- conflict, and peacebuilding scenarios where there is a significant 
drug economy to be addressed.
There clearly are benefits. What has become very clear in contexts both in 
and out of conflict zones is that there is a need to widen the concept of harm 
reduction to encompass the entirety of the supply chain, not just zones of 
production (Shaw, 2016a). The 2020 report of the Global Commission on Drug 
Policy focuses on the harm caused by drug- trafficking enforcement, conclud-






dealing with protagonists in the illicit economy, and to applying developmen-
tal solutions to questions of their involvement (gcdp, 2020).
In matters of organised crime, the law enforcement community often has 
the biggest voice and speaks with the greatest authority. So, for the political ac-
tors preoccupied with negotiating a complex humanitarian emergency, a ces-
sation of violence, and a feasible transition, there will always be a temptation 
to abdicate issues of narcotics control to that community. If the drug policy 
proponents can inject into this environment the need for harm reduction- first 
policies, and propose good practices based upon practical lessons learned, 
then that would be of considerable added value. Too often, both political and 
development actors are searching for innovative ideas for programming, and 
discover little in the process (gi- toc, 2015).
That said, it still needs to be asked whether or not the drug policy com-
munity has those lessons learned to offer. As Felbab- Brown has highlighted, 
there is a big difference between cultivation countries— where there is visi-
ble evidence of production— and places where there is no visible cultivation. 
In the former— contexts such as Afghanistan, Colombia or Myanmar— there 
is a labour- intensive illicit industry that is geographically bounded and that 
generates livelihoods. Thus, it can clearly be linked to the territorial control 
of specific actors, and there are measurable yardsticks for achievement in re-
ducing production (Felbab- Brown, 2017). It is in these theatres that alternative 
development approaches have proven themselves able to take root and display 
efficacy (Brombacher, Chapter 4, this volume). But in the context of trafficking 
economies, or in narcotic industries that have no visible cultivation— such as 
in the growing markets for amphetamines, synthetic opioids or the abuse of 
prescription drugs— there is far less on offer.
We have yet to see a credible alternative livelihood from the legitimate 
economy be crafted for militia groups whose expertise is moving illicit narcot-
ics across difficult terrain or taxing the movement of goods in both the licit and 
the illicit economy. Perhaps here, the domain of disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (ddr) has more to offer, though ddr practitioners have so 
far largely failed to see their own relevance in these debates. In a post- conflict 
period, a long- term engagement to prevent violent actors entering the criminal 
economy and to stop war economies centred around illicit narcotics being em-
bedded into the peacetime economy and political transition is required (Shaw 
and Reitano, 2017).
Countermeasures of this sort will have to be predicated on a deep analy-
sis of the contesting parties’ interests, agendas and claims. They will also re-
quire understanding, mapping and continually updating the infrastructure 






commitment must be devoted to building trust and relationships, addressing 
their grievances and mapping alternatives— if not for the immediate warring 
parties then for the next generation of society, to dissuade them from con-
tinuing the struggle. Their political grievances must also be addressed if they 
are to see an incentive in setting aside illicit interests and the legitimacy and 
political leverage that they convey, and to buy in to the complete eradication of 
violence, and the resolution of conflict. This means that resources will need to 
be spent on diplomatic relations and on foreign aid. In cases where underde-
velopment and inequitable land use are a source of tension, these too will have 
to be addressed hand in glove with drug policy. These are not a normal part 
of traditional counter- narcotics policy, but they are consistent with a harm 
reduction- based, development- led approach.
Addressing people’s perceptions of and relationships with the narcotics 
economy can be one means of eroding the violent- governance paradigm. In 
drug- trafficking transit countries where there is little domestic consumption, 
involvement in the narcotics economy may have little stigma associated with 
it, as it is a significant source of livelihoods and wealth. But it can upset tra-
ditional, cultural, and religious norms, introduce new levels of violence into 
society, and change the domestic political economy significantly. Educating 
communities to understand the second- order risks of the drug trade, particu-
larly where it is linked to conflict actors or political instability, is one area in 
which drug policy approaches may have experience to share, and may also 
serve as a way to mobilise community responses with regard to the rule of law, 
justice and public health (Reitano and Shaw, 2014). In regions where there are 
significant local user populations and harm is readily apparent— such as in 
the countries along the East and southern African littoral— civil society may 
prove a more ready advocacy group and partner when it comes to addressing 
the drug trade (Haysom, 2020).
The key risk, however, in pushing a drug policy agenda into a conflict or 
post- conflict environment without the programmatic palette of options to of-
fer is that this might politicise and further militarise the fight against drug traf-
ficking. The description of the violent- governance paradigm implies the im-
portance of the state itself in defining the contours of the illicit economy, and 
the legitimacy that criminal groups are able to develop. Case studies of Mali 
and Libya have highlighted the fact that regional and central authority figures 
may themselves plan an active role in enabling, protecting or extracting rent 
from the illicit economy. On the one hand, drug trafficking can build political 
leverage for actors able to extract rents and translate them into violent govern-
ance. On the other hand, drawing on the international community’s emphasis 




the accusation of narco- trafficking to discredit legitimate opposition or impor-
tant voices in a transition (Lacher, 2014).
Arguably, boosting drug policy’s position on the international agenda in an 
already complex environment when one has few credible solutions to offer 
brings with it greater risks than it does benefits. However, encouraging the 
drug policy community to continue to build the evidence base, to experiment 
and to innovate in policy and programming that target the illicit economy and 
violent actors along drug supply chains, and to better understand what an ef-
fective downstream harm reduction approach might look like are important 
steps to take.
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The prohibition of illegal drug production, use and trafficking has resulted in sever-
al shortcomings and negative consequences for other global development objectives. 
According to available evidence, current drug control policies undermine the inter-
national community’s commitments to public health, criminal justice, sustainable 
development, women rights, human rights, poverty alleviation and the reduction of 
inequalities. This policy comment focuses on the impact of repressive drug policies on 
state institutions and politics.
In a unique conjunction of interests, prohibition allows transnational criminal or-
ganisations to weaken state institutions, corrupt civil and military officials and influ-
ence control policies because of the entrenched neo- patrimonialism in political life. 
Therefore, prohibition allows populist and political contenders to stigmatise a minor-
ity population— people who use drugs, in opposition to the desires of the majority 
rule. The use of political emotions, based on fear or promise of change, undermines 
effective responses to drugs, erodes the rule of law and trust between authorities and 
populations, and weakens state institutions and democratic governance. This policy 
comment provides examples from low- and middle- income countries, as well as 
cases from high- income countries, of the impact of drug prohibition and its illegal 
proceeds on governance through neo- patrimonialism, clientelism and the weakening 
of  institutions.
1 Introduction
The international drug control regime, defined by international drug conven-
tions (the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 
Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and the United Na-
tions Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1988), has as its main objective the elimination or significant reduc-
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conventions allow access to drugs for medical use or scientific research. They 
set the parameters for reducing the demand and supply of drugs, for coop-
erating judicially, and for eliminating drug money laundering (unodc, 2013). 
Moreover, they contain the schedules of drugs— the tables that define which 
drugs are illegal and which are to be controlled— as well as what level of con-
trol is to be imposed on access to these substances.
There is extensive literature and evidence of the failure of the current con-
trol regime, based on prohibition and repression, to achieve any of its objec-
tives in eliminating recreational drug use (gcdp, 2011; Csete et al., 2016). Fur-
thermore, compliance with laws and policies prohibiting the use of drugs is 
weak, proven by the fact that several hundreds of millions of people use drugs 
annually.
The international control regime inspired national laws and coincided with 
national and regional escalations against illegal drugs. The most famous was 
United States (US) President Nixon’s ‘war on drugs’ in 1971 (Nadelmann, 1998). 
Repression and law enforcement were used to counter the production of coca 
in the Andean region, opium in the Golden Crescent and the Golden Trian-
gle and cannabis on a global scale. At the same time, national political frame-
works, especially in countries that were under colonial rule in the first half of 
the twentieth century, have seen the development of neo- patrimonial regimes 
based on single parties, on military rule, or on authoritarian rule, and where 
social peace was usually ‘bought’ by the leaders in place in a client– patron re-
lationship with their constituencies.
The sheer extent of the demand for drugs, as well as the value of the illegal 
market and its control by criminal organisations, provides illicit resources so 
extensive that they have the power to cripple state institutions, corrupt offi-
cials and deepen the neo- patrimonial nature of many political systems, as well 
as undermine the rule of law by expanding defiance between authorities and 
populations (gcdp, 2014). Current drug policies based on prohibition and re-
pression, combined with weak institutional frameworks and allowance bases 
in several political systems, have a deep impact that can be seen in places such 
as Latin America, where corruption reaches high levels (Morris, 2012), Africa, 
where fragile institutional frameworks and presidentialism offer fertile ground 
for illicit funds (wacd, 2014), and high- income countries in specific margin-
alised and poor areas, where local or national Big Men1 hold political power 
 1 Big Men as a political science concept was developed by Jean- François Médard (1990), and 
inspired by the work of the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins on Melanesian Big Men, as so-
cially important individuals that carry a mix of interest to the general well- being and calcu-










based on clientelism. The availability of drug proceeds has, on the one hand, 
allowed organised crime to infiltrate state institutions. On the other, it has 
blurred the lines between the officials’ role as those in charge of ending drug 
trafficking, and the fact that those same officials ultimately benefit from it.
2 Politics and Drugs
The use of drugs has been steadily increasing, as documented over the past 
twenty years, and so has the illegal market (idpc, 2018). The supply chain 
tends to find different ways of adapting to prohibition in order to respond to 
this existing demand— which has been described by many scholars and gov-
ernments as the ‘unintended’ consequence of drug control— resulting in the 
empowerment of criminal organisations and providing them with the capaci-
ty to weaken state institutions and smuggle drugs, corrupt officials, and influ-
ence the control measures put in place in different jurisdictions. This policy 
comment goes further, by highlighting the opportunistic links between drug 
trafficking, criminal activity, political funding and electoral cycles. They each 
feed each other, support each other when needed, and fiercely fight each other 
when it best serves their interests.
The nature of political authority and its relationship to public institutions 
in dominantly drug producing and transit countries differ from those in dom-
inantly consuming countries. The majority of the former were achieving in-
dependence and establishing their state institutions and political systems at 
the time of the adoption of the international drug control regime, starting 
with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961. The drug control regime, 
based on prohibition, can thus be seen as antithetical to the nature of insti-
tutions in these countries, where both formal and informal institutions influ-
ence the political system. One of the main characteristics of these informal 
institutions is neo- patrimonialism. The term is derived from the concept of 
patrimonialism, which Max Weber uses to describe the principle of authori-
ty in traditional politics (Weber, 2003 [1921]).2 The neo- patrimonial concept, 
action calls for confrontation with others to prove the superiority that they themselves stage. 
For Médard, the Big Man must create loyalty with as many people as possible for his benefit, 
so that he can then mobilise his clients to gain prestige compared to his political  competitors.
 2 In patrimonial political systems, an individual holds the power and exercises it for his per-
sonal prestige, giving the people only limited rights. Authority is fully personalised, more 
shaped by the leader’s preferences than by a codified system of laws. The leader ensures 
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developed by Jean- François Médard, takes the following meaning: ‘the notion 
of neo- patrimonialism has for us the interest of being less normative than that 
of corruption and more comparative than that of the “politics of the belly” ’3 
(Médard, 1990).
The neo- patrimonial nature of these regimes during their establishment 
has allowed for political funding vacuums, where the proceeds of drug 
trafficking— for example, with fragile economies, nascent state institutions, 
and in the middle of the Cold War— became important sources of revenue 
for the consolidation of the political regimes themselves. In the case of 
Mexico, it is reported that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (pri, 
the former unique party and ruling party since 1929 with alternation for 
two mandates in 2006 and 2018)  built relationships with drug trafficking 
to fund political campaigns (Andrés and Delia, 2017). In the case of West 
Africa, these informal neo- patrimonial characteristics are based on several 
rents from what were illicit economies at independence, including the con-
trol by the state of formerly illegal markets for diamonds, precious metals, 
oil, or fishing; and current illicit economies such as the increase in drug 
trafficking are fuelling corruption and funding political campaigns (Felbab- 
Brown, 2010).
Another characteristic of informal economies with an impact on democra-
tisation and politics in these countries is the use of drug control to consolidate 
political power, and that could be read through the lenses of presidentialism 
and the role of Big Men. In contemporary politics, such a situation can be 
found in the Philippines, where— during the presidential campaign in 2016— 
the Duterte Administration condoned drug killings and promised to eradicate 
drugs (idpc, 2018). More recently, the Hasina Administration condoned extra-
judicial arrests of political opponents on drug- related offences ahead of the 
2018 general election in Bangladesh (The Daily Star, 2019). This characterisa-
tion of the Big Man resorting to drug policy to affirm his political credentials 
can also be seen in the US, where the Trump Administration simplifies com-
plex drug markets and the interconnectedness of trafficking, money launder-
ing, production and ethnic networks in the Americas into blame for migrants 
and the Mexican authorities (Klar, 2019). Such a discourse is constructed for 
the sole benefit of the political leader, and not to reduce drug trafficking, use, 
environment, and redistributing the wealth to the populations, who are no longer citizens 
but become customers in a clientelist relationship.
 3 Translated by the author, original text in French: « La notion de néo- patrimonialisme a pour 
nous l’intérêt d’être moins normative que celle de corruption et plus comparative que celle 











or production, or to protect the well- being of the communities concerned by 
the negative consequences of drug policies.
3 Drug Trafficking and Neo- Patrimonialism in State Institutions
State institutions, in adopting the prohibition of drugs in the 1930s and recon-
firming this position in the 1960s, have given up control of the drugs issue, 
inadvertently or not, placing organised crime as the central authority for mar-
ket regulation, while retaining the role of mitigating harmful effects (Tinasti, 
2019). This policy choice of prohibition cannot be effective without the elim-
ination of the demand and the supply of illegal drugs, and can only therefore 
strengthen the financial and structural capacity of transnational criminal 
 organisations.
Two of the unintended consequences of the international drug control re-
gime, as defined by the United Nations (UN) and based on ‘reactive law en-
forcement’ activity (unodc, 2008), are directly linked to the weakening of 
state institutions: policy displacement and geographic displacement.
The former is highlighted by state investments in drug law enforcement, 
estimated at usd 100 billion annually (Transform Drug Policy Foundation, 
no date). According to UN estimates, an annual investment of usd 1.15 bil-
lion would cover the needs of all people who inject drugs (pwid) globally and 
end hiv transmission among this population through investments in health 
and harm reduction services (Schwartlender et al, 2011). Such disproportionate 
budget allocation, which clearly ignores the fact that public health should be 
the first priority in terms of drug control, reinforces the negative impact of 
drug control policies not only on people who use drugs and on their commu-
nities, but also on society. This example also links to the preference of political 
regimes to use ‘tough stance on crime’ approaches and provide more resources 
to law enforcement agencies than to health agencies, without specific evalua-
tions of the outcomes of such a policy preference.
Geographic displacement, also known as the ‘balloon effect’, refers to the 
relocation of the market from one location, where control measures are tight, 
to another, where controls are more lenient. In history, successes in controlling 
illegal cocaine production in Peru led to the displacement of production and 
its related problems to neighbouring Colombia and Bolivia. Moreover, in re-
cent decades, the balloon effect saw the traditional cocaine trafficking route in 
Central America and the Caribbean migrate towards a route from Latin Amer-
ica to Europe and North America, crossing the Atlantic twice and transiting 
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This new route uses similar methods to smuggle drugs through West Africa. 
It relies on weak institutions in the region, it highlighted corruption of high- 
level officials, both civilian and military, and the neo- patrimonial nature of 
political regimes, and it weakened the rule of law (wacd, 2014). A lack of ac-
countability structures, combined with weak law enforcement and ineffective 
financial system regulations to counter money laundering, along with the in-
sufficient capacity of the judicial system, combined with normalised clientelist 
political behaviour, means countries in the region are more vulnerable to the 
reach and power of transnational organised crime (Olukoshi, 2013).
The African routes (cocaine through West Africa and heroin through the 
eastern coast of Africa) are representative of geographical displacement and its 
impact on governance and state institutions. The choice to strategically smug-
gle the substances along these routes is not only based on ethnic relationships 
that facilitate illegal trade (West African networks in Western Europe; Asian 
families’ networks in East Africa) or on the strategic geographic position of the 
continent. It also depends on multilayered gaps in governance, weak institu-
tions, and how easy these make it to infiltrate the legal economy and corrupt 
officials that are already basing their political legitimacy on clientelism and al-
lowances granted. This situation is exacerbated by money laundering in high- 
income countries. For instance, 99 per cent of the illicit financial flows from 
drug proceeds laundered in Europe, where financial regulations seem stricter 
than elsewhere, are not recovered (Europol, 2017). According to the UN, half of 
the estimated profits of the illegal drug market are laundered through the legal 
financial system, and confiscations remain limited (unodc, 2017).
Finally, the examples provided also highlight the vicious cycle of neo- 
patrimonialism leading to corruption, itself feeding weak institutions and 
illicit financial flows. Weak institutions— especially in areas of conflict or 
countries experiencing socio- economic difficulties— represent, in return, 
fertile ground for criminal organisations. Once these organisations infiltrate 
such environments, they become sources of ineffective institutions and polit-
ical, social, and economic instability, ultimately influencing policy outcomes. 
The seemingly endless cycle destabilises any efforts to implement sustainable 
 development.
With the same combination of policy gaps, poor areas in Mali saw the devel-
opment of the illegal market as a substitute for the welfare state, providing ba-
sic services and employment opportunities to local communities. This results 
in the weakening of the rule of law and state interventions, and destabilises 
the relationship between communities and state institutions (gcdp, 2018). On 
the other side of the continent, powerful drug trafficking families are linked 







corruption— from the top levels of state government to the smallest police 
units in border areas of the country. Moreover, these few families have suc-
ceeded in ensuring their legal protection through corruption using illicit drug 
proceeds (Haysom et al., 2018).
4 Drug Policy, Elections and Political Emotions
Drug trafficking proceeds are also used to undermine electoral processes, 
to weaken political competition by intimidating certain candidates or sup-
porting others, and to define political participation by influencing a popula-
tion’s choices and the ability to vote freely. For example, the assassinations 
of the front runner in the Colombian presidential campaign of 1990 by car-
tel members or of more than a hundred politicians by criminal organisa-
tions between 2017 and 2018 in Mexico showcase the power of organised 
crime in impacting democratic processes, including by the use of violence 
(Agren, 2018).
Drug control policy is also used to influence voters’ choices even in estab-
lished democracies. In France, Nicolas Sarkozy (President, 2007‒12) used drug 
policy in his presidential campaigns of 2007 and 2012 to take a ‘tough stance on 
crime’, and to focus law enforcement efforts on the banlieues— French social 
housing- dominated suburban areas with major socio- economic challenges, 
the majority home to ethnic minorities (Gross, 2012). Taking an opposite ap-
proach, Canada’s Justin Trudeau (Prime Minister, 2015‒present) included the 
legalisation of cannabis on his electoral platform in 2015, based on the com-
mitment to address the problematic use of cannabis, especially among minors, 
and to take the market away from criminal organisations that decide on the 
potency and availability of the substances they sell.
Whether they provoke fear or promise reform, these examples demonstrate 
a clear link with political emotions (Stoler, 2018). They trigger support for or re-
jection of an electoral platform, a party, or a candidate. Prohibitionist discours-
es play on the fear of insecurity related to the violence generated by the illegal 
market, the anger of citizens at state institutions’ failure to provide safe and 
inclusive cities, and the hope that a harsher response to drugs will ultimately 
eliminate the drug market.
Moreover, the use of drug control policies to influence electoral processes 
is more visible, as it coincides with two major milestones that changed the 
reception of political discourses: the general ‘democratic recession’ of the last 
decade and the progress of drug policy reform movements. The democratic re-
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of democratic practices, the instability of democratic institutions, or the rise of 
authoritarianism (Diamond, 2015). The instability and illiberal nature of third 
wave democracies (Huntington, 1991) tended to see electoral competitors rely 
on and be inspired by the ‘war on drugs’ rhetoric to advance their own political 
agendas, or to conceal their own shortcomings.
In the Philippines, for instance, drugs have become an important health 
and social issue due to a concentration of contemporary social, political, en-
vironmental and economic challenges. Drugs did not, however, cause these 
problems, as the Philippine administration claims. With a steady increase in 
economic inequalities, the lack of a welfare state, climate catastrophes, an ex-
ploding demography, religious and ethnic conflicts, and a high prevalence of 
drug use, drug policies based on repression were an aggravating factor of a gen-
eralised societal ‘ill- being’, rather than its cause. Furthermore, after three years 
of state- condoned extrajudicial killings, the prevalence of use or trafficking of 
drugs does not show any signs of receding, even if the government claims a 
reduction in crime of 30 per cent.
It should be noted that this figure should be understood in the context of 
an illegal market that continues to flourish, but functions under more diffi-
cult constraints, thereby exposing vulnerable and impoverished communities 
to more violence. Moreover, the targeted use of the ‘war on drugs’, which in-
creased during the midterm elections in May 2019, has established a culture of 
political violence in the country (Kishi and Raleigh, 2019). This data does not, 
however, undermine administrations’ populist approach of using the ‘war on 
drugs’ for political gain, since taking a ‘tough stance on crime’ in times of crisis 
is attractive to the voting body (Kenny, 2019). This trend of majoritarianism is 
visible even in established democracies, where increasing portions of the elec-
toral body cast their votes in favour of populist movements.
Transnational criminal organisations also use their financial and social 
power to influence the outcomes of electoral processes or to weaken state in-
stitutions at different levels of the supply chain (unodc, 2017). On the funding 
of electoral campaigns, Guinea- Bissau remains the most documented exam-
ple. Anecdotal data on the funding of elections and support from organised 
crime and drug proceeds can, however, also be found in Mauritania, Jamaica, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone during the last two decades (Gberie, 2013). Corruption 
incentives from criminal organisations also influence the military. Examples 
include weapons reportedly transferred from the military to criminal organisa-
tions in Guatemala and almost 30 per cent of the military in Mexico deserting, 
often to engage in organised crime (Health Poverty Action, 2018). Another ex-
ample is Indonesia, where corruption is so endemic in the police, corrections, 









as a barrier to reducing the supply of and demand for drugs in the country 
(Havenhand, 2019).
5 Conclusions
The analysis and country examples provided in this chapter highlight how the 
institutional capacity to trigger and sustain development, especially in low- 
and middle- income countries, is undermined by drug trade proceeds and 
the financial power of organised crime. Politics, political regimes, opposition 
rights, voter rights, and participation in public and political affairs are trumped 
by the prohibition paradigm, providing both criminal organisations and polit-
ical hopefuls with opportunities to weaken democratic governance for their 
private gains. Prohibition has resulted in a grey area where the illegal drug 
market can be used to fund electoral cycles, but can also be used as an alibi as 
needed on political platforms and in political campaigns.
State institutions, by adopting the ‘global prohibition’ approach to drugs, 
have not only deprived themselves of the capacity to control the drug markets 
and handed, to some extent, enormous profits to criminals, they have also 
deprived themselves of their capacity to impose the rule of law and negative-
ly impacted their relationships with their populations. The path that seems 
most appropriate to an effort to end this vicious cycle of neo- patrimonialism 
fed by corruption, illicit financial flows, and clientelism based on the pro-
ceeds of drug trafficking is the end of the prohibition of drug use. Legal reg-
ulation of all drugs, each by a different model according to its potential for 
harm and its uses, carries the promise of setting legal rules that apply to all. 
It could end the darkness and invisible yet defining spaces such as the illegal 
drugs market that allow for undemocratic governance, challenge the rights 
of political competition, favour those with access to illicit funds and net-
works, and hurt political participation by discriminating against certain tar-
geted groups of citizens linked to the illegal drugs market, including harmless 
consumers.
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chapter 9
The Meaningful Participation of ‘Stakeholders’ 
in Global Drug Policy Debates— a Policy Comment
Ann Fordham
 Abstract
This policy comment seeks to address three key questions relating to the participation 
of civil society in international drug policymaking. Firstly, who are the relevant ‘stake-
holders’ and what options do they have to participate in drug policy discussions at 
the United Nations level? Secondly, have certain ‘stakeholders’ been able to positively 
influence the direction of global drug policies? And thirdly, who are the ‘most affected’ 
communities and what could be done to improve their meaningful engagement in the 
definition of drug policies that directly impact their lives? Unpacking the terminology 
around civil society, stakeholders, and most affected communities, the chapter argues 
for a clearer distinction between ‘rights- holders’ and ‘duty- bearers’. Masking the inher-
ent power imbalances between the different stakeholders risks underplaying the rights 
of affected communities and legitimising a place at the table for corporations as ‘equal 
actors’ in spite of fundamentally different interests. The commentary concludes that 
the increased involvement over the past decade of civil society as well as other United 
Nations entities around the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
on the World Drug Problem (ungass) has markedly influenced the global drug poli-
cy debate by shifting more attention towards health, human rights and development 
concerns.
1 Introduction
Everyone has the right to participate in public life. This includes the right 
to meaningful participation in the design, implementation, and assess-
ment of drug laws, policies, and practices, particularly by those directly 
affected.







This policy comment seeks to address three key questions relating to the par-
ticipation of ‘stakeholders’ in the formulation, design, implementation and 
evaluation of drug laws and policies at the global level. Firstly, who are the 
‘stakeholders’ and how are they included, or not included, in drug policy dis-
cussions? Secondly, how have certain ‘stakeholders’ been able to positively 
influence drug policies? And finally, what more can be done to improve the 
impactful and meaningful engagement of the ‘most affected’ stakeholders in 
the global drug policy discussions that take place at the United Nations (UN)? 
In addition, the framing of the development perspective when it comes to dis-
cussing the ‘most affected’ will also be examined.
For the purposes of this policy comment, the main focus will be on un-
packing civil society participation in UN drug policy formulation and debates. 
Some reference will be made to the role of other stakeholders, particularly oth-
er UN entities whose primary focus is not drug control, and their impact on the 
direction of drug policy discussions. The role of the private sector needs to be 
better acknowledged and understood, especially in terms of the growing trend 
towards permitting the use of medical cannabis, as well as legal regulation of 
cannabis for adult recreational use. This paper, however, will largely examine 
the question of civil society participation, and in particular the representation 
and inclusion of the ‘most affected’ communities. This policy comment is not 
a ‘stakeholder analysis’ as that is a much more detailed exercise and as such is 
beyond the scope of this project. It does, however, seek to enumerate the vari-
ous types of so- called ‘stakeholders’ that are relevant to drug policy.
2 Who Are the ‘Stakeholders’?
Numerous UN declarations on drug control have referred to ‘the important 
role played by all relevant stakeholders’ (un cnd, 2019, 3) and sought to en-
sure their involvement and participation in policy discussions. In this context, 
‘stakeholders’ are often enumerated as ‘law enforcement, judicial and health- 
care personnel, civil society, academia and relevant United Nations entities’ 
(un cnd, 2019, 6). Sometimes the private sector is also included in this list.
The term ‘stakeholder’ itself merits some interrogation. It is used widely 
across the UN system (UN General Assembly, 2015), but it originates from the 
corporate world and has benefited corporations enormously by allowing them 
to have a legitimate seat in policymaking, standard- setting or project- oriented 
forums (Buxton, 2019; George, 2015). Crucially, the term does not differentiate 
between ‘rights- holders’ and ‘duty- bearers’. This obfuscation, whether by ac-
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power imbalances between the different stakeholders by treating them as 
‘equal actors’ (George, 2015, 3). The recently agreed partnership framework 
that brings together the UN and the World Economic Forum (wef, 2019) with 
the aim of accelerating the achievement of Agenda 2030 by strengthening in-
stitutional collaboration between the two entities has been called out as highly 
problematic in this regard. A letter to the UN Secretary- General from 240 civil 
society organisations expressed concern that the agreement further deepens 
the corporatisation of the UN, and called on him to strengthen mechanisms 
for engagement with the most- affected communities:
These communities which are human rights holders and are committed 
to preserving the common wellbeing of people and the environment; as 
well as to building a stronger, independent, and democratic international 
governance system must be treated differently from “stakeholders” who 
only have profit at stake.
fian International and tni, 2019, 1
This is increasingly relevant to the drug policy sphere as moves towards canna-
bis regulation continue apace. For drug policy formulation, the role of trans-
national corporations (such as the rapidly proliferating pharmaceutical can-
nabis companies) as stakeholders must be carefully considered. Their ‘stake’ 
is significantly different from that of civil society and affected communities 
for example— namely, it is ultimately to increase shareholder value (George, 
2015). UN drug policy does not yet have a formal multi- stakeholder forum or 
group, as might exist in other UN settings, such as the Multi- stakeholder Fo-
rum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the Sustainable Development 
Goals (sdg s) (UN, 2019), which explicitly includes ‘business and industry’ 
alongside the categories of ‘women’, ‘farmers’, ‘children and young people’. It 
has been suggested that a system of governance that ‘combines some form of 
legitimation with a vague undefined form of accountability has proved very 
advantageous to corporations’ (Buxton, 2019). For example, there are serious 
concerns around how large corporations are behaving in the growing can-
nabis industry, especially with respect to marginalising traditional growers, 
lobbying to influence government policy and problematic practices such as 
land grabs (Paley, 2019). These concerns must be taken into account as can-
nabis companies increasingly seek to engage in UN drug policy debates. Cor-
porations have greater power and resources than affected communities, such 
as traditional small farmers, but the latter have a right to meaningful partic-










With respect to drug policy, the affected communities often face violations 
of their rights, and their role at the table is to hold the ‘duty- bearers’, in this 
case member states, accountable. The meaningful participation of affected 
communities is therefore fundamentally different from the role played by oth-
er stakeholders and this needs to be acknowledged and recognised.
3 Who Are ‘Most Affected’?
The 2016 Outcome Document of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on the World Drug Problem (ungass) noted that ‘affected populations 
and representatives of civil society entities, where appropriate, should be en-
abled to play a participatory role in the formulation, implementation, and 
the providing of relevant scientific evidence in support of, as appropriate, the 
evaluation of drug control policies and programmes’ (UN General Assembly, 
2016, 4).
The genuine and meaningful participation of affected communities in pol-
icy design, implementation and evaluation has long been ubiquitous in devel-
opment, health and social policymaking processes. This should, however, be 
without reservation. In that sense, the caveat in the ungass Outcome Docu-
ment of participation ‘where appropriate’ is problematic. Governments con-
tinue to reserve the right to limit participation according to their own criteria 
with regard to when it is deemed appropriate. This also plays out in terms of 
whom they deem ‘appropriate’ participants. Caveating participation in this 
way undermines the rhetoric of meaningful participation. From a human 
rights perspective, the people who are most affected have a right to be mean-
ingfully included in all the decisions that affect their lives (undp, International 
Centre on Human Rights and Drug Policy, unaids and who, 2019). The 2030 
Agenda commitment seeks to ensure that no one is left behind, and commits 
to the participation of ‘all stakeholders’ (UN General Assembly, 2015).
It is relevant to drug policy discussions that the rights of certain groups 
have been enshrined in UN declarations. For example, indigenous peoples 
have been granted special rights to self- determination (UN General Assem-
bly, 2007). The recently adopted UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and 
Other People Working in Rural Areas enshrines certain and specific rights for 
those engaged in ‘small- scale agricultural production for subsistence and/ or 
for the market, and who [rely] significantly, though not necessarily exclusively, 
on family or household labour and other non- monetized ways of organizing 
labour, and who [have] a special dependency on and attachment to the land’ 
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and implementation of policies, programmes and projects that may affect 
their lives, land and livelihood’ is clearly stated in Article 12 of the Declaration.
The right to participation for people who use drugs has not yet explicitly 
been enshrined in a UN declaration, although the International Guidelines 
on Human Rights and Drug Policy outlines all the relevant human rights that 
must be respected, protected and fulfilled in relation to this affected com-
munity. People who use drugs’ right to participation in the design and im-
plementation of policies and programmes that affect them has long been 
championed by the International Network of People who Use Drugs (inpud) 
under the slogan ‘nothing about us without us’ (Canadian hiv/ aids Legal 
Network, 2005). The use of this slogan in activism has its roots in the disa-
bility rights movement and is a radical rejection of paternalistic control and 
oppression by others. Politically active people living with disabilities used the 
slogan to ‘proclaim that they know what is best for them and their communi-
ty’ ( Charlton, 1998, 4).
Furthermore, those most affected, and civil society and community groups 
more generally, often perform a vital function in the effective implementation 
of policies and programmes, as well as ensuring transparency, good govern-
ance and accountability in policymaking (Pompidou Group, 2015). One of the 
most pertinent examples of this comes from the hiv movement, where a key 
principle in policy and programme design denotes that people living with hiv 
must be central to such developments.
In drug policy debates, however, civil society and community groups have 
often been viewed by some governments as a problem to be managed or avoid-
ed because drug control is traditionally enmeshed in politically sensitive agen-
das such as national security, law enforcement, border control and criminal 
justice (Fordham and Haase, 2018).
In terms of seeking to ensure the meaningful participation of those most 
affected by drug policies, it is firstly critical to define who are the ‘most affect-
ed’. The International Drug Policy Consortium has defined this as specifically 
including, but not limited to, ‘people who use drugs, people involved in sub-
sistence farming of crops destined for the illegal drug market, formerly incar-
cerated drug offenders, indigenous peoples, and other communities such as 
affected women, children and youth’ (idpc, 2018). This list is by no means ex-
haustive; for example, people who are currently incarcerated and affected eth-
nic minorities must be included. In addition, the lack of access to controlled 
medicines for the relief of pain and palliative care brings in a further affected 
population of pain patients. People who live in situations of conflict and/ or are 
forcibly displaced, fleeing violence or insecurity, may also be caught up in the 








Across all the different categories of communities affected, it has been wide-
ly accepted that the burden of punitive and repressive drug control policies has 
been largely borne by people who are marginalised and in situations of vulner-
ability (idpc, 2018). More often than not, socio- economic vulnerability is a key 
characteristic of those who are ‘most affected’ when it comes to drug policies. 
This is logical given that an illicit economy, such as the drug market, serves as a 
survival economy for so many who live on the margins of society, in situations 
of poverty and without genuine opportunities to engage in the formal econo-
my. Some have argued that this inconvenient truth has been largely ignored 
by the development sector and that there is a need to consider ‘not only the 
harms generated by illicit economies, but also the positive roles they may play 
by providing a social safety net or even a means of wealth creation and upward 
mobility for poor, marginalised communities’ (Gutierrez and Balfe, 2019, 21).
The specific impacts on women have received greater attention in recent 
years in global drug policy debates. ‘Discrimination and inequality shape 
women’s experiences of drug use and in the drug trade and the impact of drug 
control efforts on them, with disproportionate burdens faced by poor and oth-
erwise marginalized women’ (Schleifer and Pol, 2017, 253).
Women who use drugs face greater stigma, which deters them from access-
ing health services. In general, coupled with the overall scarcity of harm re-
duction services, there is a severe lack of gender- sensitive programmes (idpc, 
2018). It has been argued that the socio- economic vulnerability that women 
face makes them more susceptible to involvement in the drug trade, although 
they are most often engaged in the lower echelons (Giacomello, 2014). Women 
are incarcerated at much higher rates than men for drug- related offences in 
most parts of the world and are afforded far less familial and community sup-
port than men during incarceration (Csete et al., 2016).
In addition, the starkly disproportionate impact on people of colour is now 
widely acknowledged. The UN Working Group on Peoples of African Descent 
has stated unequivocally that there is a ‘lack of recognition that enduring ra-
cial disparities and race- based outcomes are related to policy priorities that 
are grounded in discrimination and negative racial stereotypes’ (UN Working 
Group of Experts on People of African Descent, 2019) and that people of Afri-
can descent are disproportionately affected by punitive drug laws and policies 
(UN Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent, 2016). However, 
the ‘intersecting discrimination’ of racial disparity in drug law enforcement 
has not been adequately highlighted or acknowledged in the UN drug control 
debates (Schleifer and Pol, 2017).
From a more traditional development perspective, the ‘most affected’ would 
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a broader definition of development is taken, however, one that redefines the 
traditional ‘north– south’ divide that often masks the deep socio- economic in-
equality in the richer, developed, so- called geographical ‘global North’ coun-
tries, then it allows for the inclusion of those people and communities who 
are marginalised in developed countries as well (Trefzer et al., 2014). Towards 
this end, the term ‘global South’ is ‘being employed in a postnational sense to 
address spaces and peoples negatively impacted by capitalist globalization’ 
(Garland Mahler, 2018, 6). This is an important lens through which to address 
the question of the ‘most affected’ by drug policies because unjust laws and 
policies disproportionately affect the most marginalised in all societies. With 
respect to people who use drugs, for example, the brunt of draconian policies 
towards drug use are mostly borne by people who are vulnerable and mar-
ginalised, regardless of whether they are caught using drugs in London or in 
Jakarta. In both developed and developing countries, people who use drugs 
and who are wealthy and have social capital are far less likely to be caught 
up in criminal justice responses. This dynamic can also be observed in rela-
tion to access to pain medicines. What is referred to as a ‘global pain crisis’ is 
actually a crisis of access for the world’s poorest, who have little or no access 
to pain relief and palliative care (Bhadelia et al., 2019). Access is not limited 
in developed countries, where 90 per cent of the world’s morphine is con-
sumed (gcdp, 2015); and the same is true of people with high revenues in 
less- developed nations. Financial resources can help to address this overall 
dearth of access.
Therefore, socio- economic vulnerability, poverty and intersectional dis-
crimination such as that based on race and gender are the common character-
istics of communities that are most affected by drug policies.
4 Meaningful Participation?
‘Respectful, strategic, constructive, transparent and accountable lines of com-
munication should therefore be created between governments and civil soci-
ety representatives, in order to ensure meaningful exchanges of information 
and perspectives. However, conditions for a truly open, respectful and mean-
ingful dialogue with those most directly affected by drug policy will only be 
created if governments remove criminal sanctions for people who use drugs 
and subsistence farmers engaged in illicit crop production’ (idpc, 2016, 16).
The dominant punitive approaches to drug control, in particular criminali-
sation, further deepen and exacerbate the marginalisation, vulnerability, and in 








face. Although the UN rhetoric identifies them as important ‘stakeholders’ 
and calls on governments to ensure their meaningful participation, there is 
no acknowledgement of the significant barrier that criminalisation creates in 
terms of the ability to participate in public life. In addition to fuelling stigma 
and discrimination, criminalisation also becomes a literally physical barrier to 
participation if people are incarcerated and/ or excluded because of a criminal 
record.
With respect to drug control, more repressive governments have shown 
themselves to be resistant to civil society participation and in some cases 
have been openly hostile to community representatives, including within 
the deliberations and sessions of the United Nations Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs (un cnd) (Fordham, Haase and Nougier, 2020). At the national 
level, policy makers have also been unwilling to engage with certain commu-
nities on the basis of their criminality as defined by existing drug laws. For 
example, in Colombia, as the medical cannabis industry opens up and the 
government eyes the potential profits from production, traditional cannabis 
farmers are struggling to get a seat at the table (Rivera, 2019). From a social 
justice perspective this is deeply problematic, as these traditional farmers 
should be supported to transition into the licit market, which will require 
political will, as well as capacity building, technical support and financial in-
vestment. Furthermore, restorative justice must be implemented— for those 
who have been criminalised under previous regimes— when the activities 
they have engaged in are no longer subject to criminal penalties (Jelsma, 
Kay and Bewley- Taylor, 2019). From the perspective of reparations towards 
those who have disproportionately borne the brunt of punitive drug poli-
cies, such as people of colour and people from lower- income communities, 
positive discrimination policies to support and enable their participation in 
the newly legal cannabis market are critical. Examples of social equity pro-
grammes, such as that implemented by the Massachusetts Cannabis Control 
Commission in the United States, which seeks to ‘promote and encourage 
full participation in the marijuana industry by people from communities 
that have been disproportionately harmed by marijuana prohibition and 
enforcement and to positively impact those communities’ (Massachusetts 
Cannabis Control Commission, 2019, 2), represent a serious and genuine ef-
fort at reparations.
Within policymaking spaces, strong resistance and hostility towards certain 
affected groups who are criminalised or have been criminalised makes genu-
ine participation difficult and is also often a serious impediment to organising 
for collective activism. This resistance calls into question the successive com-
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5 The Civil Society Task Force on Drugs
In relation to the UN drug control debates, civil society participation has 
been facilitated for the last thirty- five years by two ngo committees, based in 
Vienna (Vienna ngo Committee on Drugs (vngoc)) and New York (New York 
ngo Committee on Drugs (nyngoc)), respectively. Over the years, various in-
itiatives have been undertaken by these committees around high- level meet-
ings and diplomatic gatherings to encourage and support civil society engage-
ment (Fordham and Haase, 2018).
The most recent effort is the Civil Society Task Force on Drugs (cstf), which 
was first convened ahead of the 2016 UN General Assembly Special Session 
on the World Drug Problem (ungass) to enable ‘comprehensive, diverse, bal-
anced, and inclusive’ representation of civil society groups in the ungass pro-
cess. In setting up the cstf, special attention was paid not only to trying to 
ensure regional representation, but also— and for the first time— to including 
representatives of affected populations and global issues (called ‘global voice’ 
seats), which involved seats for people who use drugs, people in recovery from 
drug dependence, families, youth, farmers of crops deemed illicit, harm re-
duction, drug prevention, access to controlled medicines, health workers, and 
criminal justice personnel (cstf, 2016). When the cstf was reconvened for the 
2019 Ministerial Segment, an additional seat was added for ‘alternative devel-
opment’ as a ‘global voice’ seat. Representation on the cstf had to be carefully 
balanced in terms of ideology, as the spectrum of civil society that engages in 
drug policy discussions is broad. At one end, there remain groups very much 
committed to the achievement of a ‘drug  free world’. At the other, there are ad-
vocates for the full legal regulation of all drugs. In between these two positions, 
there is a great deal of nuance and diversity (Fordham and Haase, 2018).
For the 2016 ungass, the representatives on the cstf organised consul-
tations with their various constituencies to facilitate genuine input into the 
debates and discussions. The regional representatives organised consultations 
within their regions, while the representatives of affected populations and the 
‘global voice’ thematic areas organised among their peers. Numerous consul-
tations were conducted via online surveys, interviews, and in some cases con-
ferences (cstf, 2016).
One of the largest in- person consultations took place in the Netherlands 
and convened approximately sixty farmers and farmers’ representatives for 
the Global Forum of Producers of Prohibited Plants, for a discussion of their 
views on and experiences with illicit crop control policies. The Heemskerk 
Declaration, the official outcome of the forum, which included a list of pol-







submitted as part of the official input from the cstf (Metaal, 2016). inpud 
made a submission based on five consultations undertaken throughout 2015; 
one was conducted virtually, while the others took place in Tanzania, Thailand, 
Georgia and the United Kingdom. Representatives from over twenty- four drug 
user organisations from across twenty- eight countries were consulted (inpud, 
2016). Alongside the numerous other thematic consultations, ranging from 
those affected by the lack of availability of controlled substances for medical 
and scientific purposes to recovered users, youth and families, these submis-
sions sought to bring the perspectives of those with lived experience into the 
UN drug policy discussions. Despite the huge effort coordinated through the 
cstf for the official civil society input into the ungass process, the report was 
never formally considered by member states during the deliberations, which 
was disappointing for the civil society representatives who had been active in 
the cstf (Fordham and Haase, 2018).
While the cstf mechanism has been the most inclusive to date in terms 
of seeking to ensure that the voices of affected populations are heard in the 
UN fora on drugs, it remains challenging to genuinely bring in the voices of 
those most affected on the ground. This difficulty is acknowledged especial-
ly in relation to the commitment to ensure ‘no one will be left behind’ and 
to ‘endeavour to reach the furthest behind first’ (UN General Assembly, 2015). 
The United Nations Development Programme (undp) has identified five fac-
tors affecting the furthest left behind: discrimination, geography, governance, 
socio- economic status, and shocks and fragility (undp, 2018). ‘Governance’ is 
a factor that is particularly poignant for drug policies and the meaningful par-
ticipation of those most affected. Under this point, the undp asks how people 
are disadvantaged by ‘ineffective, unjust, unaccountable or unresponsive glob-
al, national and/ or sub- national institutions’ and are affected by ‘inequitable, 
inadequate or unjust laws, policies, processes or budgets’. Moreover, ‘absolute 
deprivation’ and ‘relative disadvantage’ are underscored as preventing those 
left furthest behind from being able to ‘participate in or benefit from human 
development’ (undp, 2018, 7).
Within the UN drug control fora, these challenges are brought into sharp 
relief. Part of the issue arises from the continued lack of genuine and explicit 
acknowledgment by member states of the failure to achieve the stated goals 
of reducing the size of the illicit market, and of the damage caused by puni-
tive drug policies. The inability to accept these inconvenient truths creates 
resistance to allowing participation and acknowledging inputs from certain 
civil society actors, in particular. This creates a challenge for member states to 
agree as to ‘who’ exactly is most affected. As noted above, those that the system 
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barriers to their participation. One clear example of such structural barriers is 
the inability to travel to attend meetings because of denial of entry visas based 
on previous criminal records.
6 The False Dichotomy
Within the un cnd setting, member states are still known to question civil 
society participation in drug policy, continuing to regard many groups with 
suspicion and viewing them through a simplistic prism of whether they are 
‘liberal’ or ‘prohibitionist’ (idpc, 2008, 1). This binary categorisation of civil 
society has hampered access for the more reform- oriented civil society groups, 
including those advocating for harm reduction. In 2009, Antonio Maria Costa, 
the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(unodc), referred repeatedly to the ‘pro- drug lobby’ in his foreword to the 
annual World Drug Report to malign civil society organisations that challenged 
and questioned the status quo of prohibitionist drug policies (unodc, 2009, 
1). This analysis mischaracterised pro- reform groups as ‘libertarian’ bodies who 
sought less control of drugs in ‘pursuit of the old drug legalization agenda’ (un-
odc, 2009, 3). In fact, the most prominent organisation calling for legal regu-
lation, Transform, argued that prohibition left the drug market uncontrolled 
and in the hands of organised crime. It posited that legal regulation would al-
low state control of the drug market, taxation, and quality/ purity standards 
(Rolles, 2009). This false dichotomy continues to define civil society participa-
tion in the UN drug policy fora to this day, although over the years the groups 
advocating for reform, for harm reduction and for stronger human rights over-
sight have grown in visibility, strength and number, and have in turn attained 
more legitimacy at the un cnd.
There has been a significant shift in the voices represented at the UN, which 
for the first few decades of the un cnd’s existence consisted almost exclu-
sively of civil society representatives who called for prohibition, encouraging 
governments to implement repressive measures to reduce demand and supply 
(Fordham and Nougier, 2019). Over the past two decades, however, there have 
been an increasing number of credible reform- minded civil society groups en-
gaging at the UN level to redress this balance and challenge the punitive thrust 
of dominant drug control policies (Fordham, Haase and Nougier, 2020). In ad-
dition, many of the civil society groups from the other end of the spectrum have 
increasingly taken on a more moderate rhetoric, reflecting that reform groups 
have been successful in shifting the debate. At the ungass, reform messages 









7 Other ‘Stakeholders’— UN Entities
The reform narrative coming from civil society has gained significant ground, 
which is most clearly demonstrated by the progressive tone coming from the 
UN system. Over the years, there has been a significant effort to draw atten-
tion to the lack of ‘system- wide’ coherence on the issue of drugs at the UN 
level, in particular with respect to the disconnect between drug control and 
human rights (Barrett, 2008). Although there was recognition that drug policy 
was a cross- cutting issue that would require coordination across the UN sys-
tem (Bridge et al., 2017), several attempts to bring this about failed, creating a 
‘Vienna drugs and crime monopoly’ that became increasingly more siloed over 
the years (Jelsma, 2019). While other UN entities that were not specialised in 
drug policy were invited to contribute to the debates that took place in Vienna 
as another group of ‘stakeholders’, in reality they were given very little space to 
do so (Jelsma, 2019).
The 2016 ungass heralded a shift in this dynamic. The UN General Assem-
bly declared that the 2016 ungass ‘shall have an inclusive preparatory pro-
cess that includes extensive substantive consultations, allowing organs, en-
tities and specialized agencies of the UN system, relevant international and 
regional organizations, civil society and other relevant stakeholders to fully 
contribute to the process’ (UN General Assembly, 2014). In addition, the Dep-
uty Secretary- General at the time, Jan Eliasson, reinforced this approach. The 
fact that, in parallel, the new sdg s were being negotiated in New York may 
also have provided a further impetus for strengthening UN system coordina-
tion in all relevant settings. In the end, an unprecedented number of the other 
relevant UN entities made submissions to the ungass process (Fordham and 
Haase, 2018). In 2015, the Human Rights Council passed the first ever resolu-
tion related to the impact of drug policies on human rights, resulting in both a 
high- level panel at the Council and the first report from the Office of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, which was presented as a submission to the 
ungass (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2015). Nearly all of the 
submissions highlighted the failures and damage of punitive policies. Many 
of them called for reforms, including specifically the decriminalisation of peo-
ple who use drugs, with the exception of the submissions by unodc (Hallam, 
2016). This broad and progressive engagement from across the UN system had 
a positive impact on the tone of the debate, with the ungass Outcome Docu-
ment viewed as more forward- looking than previous consensus- agreed decla-
rations on drugs from the UN (Bridge et al., 2017).
Since the ungass, there has also been a marked shift in the tone of UN 
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Board (incb) and the unodc with respect to their strict view on how to imple-
ment drug control. Both organisations have since become more vocal regard-
ing some of the most serious human rights violations committed under the 
guise of drug control— for example, around the question of the death penalty 
in Indonesia (unodc, 2016), extrajudicial killings in the  Philippines  (incb, 
2017b), and human rights abuses more broadly (incb, 2017a).
The most recent and significant development in terms of the UN system’s 
engagement has been the development of the UN System Common Position to 
support member states in the practical implementation of the ungass Out-
come Document. In addition to providing coherent messaging on drug policy 
for UN entities that aligns strongly with human rights obligations as well as the 
sdg s, the common position establishes a ‘United Nations system coordination 
task team, to be led by unodc, and composed of interested United Nations 
system entities’ to deliver on the objectives of the document (Chief Executives 
Board for Coordination, 2019, 14). These twin initiatives of the Common Posi-
tion and the task team have been exceptionally hard- won and ‘provide unprec-
edented authoritative guidance for UN entities and can help guide the current 
international drug control system into the 21st century’ (Jelsma, 2019, 1). Cru-
cially, the Common Position explicitly promotes ‘alternatives to conviction and 
punishment in appropriate cases, including the decriminalization of drug pos-
session for personal use’(Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2019,14) and 
makes this a cross- UN recommendation. This has finally brought the unodc 
in line with the other entities that recommend the decriminalisation of drug 
use and possession for personal use.
Reform- minded civil society groups have made a direct contribution to this 
shift in rhetoric, and have been consistent and unwavering in advocacy mes-
sages with respect to the UN debates for many years, seeking to create pressure 
and tension in the system and to draw out its inconsistencies.
8 Conclusion
Participation in public life by rights holders and organizations that repre-
sent them is a fundamental principle of human rights. Participation also 
improves the efficacy of political systems, as well as policy development 
and implementation. Civil society space is therefore a threshold issue, 
not only for human rights, but also for development and peace and se-
curity more broadly. When civil society sits at the table, policymaking is 










The strong, meaningful and genuine participation of civil society, and in par-
ticular the most affected populations, must be fought for and protected. Al-
though this principle is enshrined in numerous UN resolutions, when it comes 
to global drug policy debates, the reality falls far short of the ideal. In general, 
the key barriers to civil society participation are discrimination and inequality 
(ohchr, 2018). Under a global drug policy regime that purports to actively 
promote a ‘society free of drug abuse’ (un cnd, 2019, 1), many of those most af-
fected and criminalised by punitive policies face discrimination. These include 
people who use drugs and subsistence farmers of drug crops. This discrimi-
nation undermines their participation as rights- holders in the policy debates 
and must be challenged and questioned. Factors such as geography and socio- 
economic vulnerability act as further barriers to their ability to participate in 
policy discussions— especially at the UN level, but also at more local levels.
Much more needs to be done to facilitate the participation of the most 
affected in the UN drug policy debate. The efforts of the cstf have been in-
valuable in this regard. For the 2016 ungass, the cstf defined the affected 
population groups and this was critically important given that member states 
would not be able to reach consensus on this categorisation and, because of 
ideological opposition, certain groups would likely be excluded. The cstf con-
sultations also sought to ensure that the voices of those from the geographical 
global South were included, alongside those of the most affected. Given the 
very real resource and visa challenges faced by some community representa-
tives who sought to participate in person, these efforts were crucial.
To further strengthen civil society participation in UN drug policy debates, 
including formal seats for civil society representatives in the governance struc-
tures of the Vienna- based drug control institutions could be considered. The 
example of the Joint United Nations Programme on hiv and aids Coordinat-
ing Board (unaids pcb), the governance body for unaids, is an enlightened 
model in this regard. There are five seats for non- governmental organisations 
on the unaids pcb— three from developing countries and two from devel-
oped countries or countries with economies in transition. These five organ-
isations have one representative each; they are also each supported by five 
additional ngo s, which stand as alternate members. Crucially, ensuring that 
people living with hiv are represented in this structure is a fundamental prin-
ciple. This is a distinctly different governance model from that seen in Vienna, 
where civil society representatives are only permitted to participate at the un 
cnd as observers.
The participation of other stakeholders beyond rights- holders needs to be 
considered in relation to their ‘stake’ in the debate. Allowing the term ‘stake-
holders’ to mask the differing status of the various groups is problematic. 
 
 
Meaningful Participation of ‘Stakeholders’ in Debates 167
Although the private sector increasingly does have a stake in drug policy as 
the cannabis market opens up, transnational corporations driven by the profit 
motive must not be elevated to the same status as those participating as rights- 
holders. Masking the inherent power imbalances between the different stake-
holders risks underplaying the rights of affected communities and legitimising 
a place at the table for corporations as ‘equal actors’ in spite of fundamentally 
different interests.
Finally, the significant strides made towards ensuring greater participation 
in UN drug policy from across the UN system must now be further strength-
ened. This has been a key advocacy ask from civil society over the years, in 
the knowledge that the siloed approach taken at the UN with respect to drug 
control needed to be broken apart. The global drug policy debate has become 
more dynamic as a result of the increased involvement over the past decade of 
civil society, as well as of other UN entities, heralding an irrevocable break in 
the long- revered global consensus on punitive drug control and shifting great-
er attention towards health, human rights and development concerns.
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chapter 10
The World Drug Policy Problem. An Interview with 
José Ramos- Horta
José Ramos- Horta and Khalid Tinasti
 Abstract
José Ramos- Horta is a former president of Timor- Leste, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
and a current member of the Global Commission on Drug Policy (gcdp). Khalid Ti-
nasti, one of the guest editors of this volume, interviewed José Ramos- Horta to gain in-
sight into his views and analyses of drug control policy. They discuss his experience as 
one of the drafters of the Constitution and criminal justice responses in Timor- Leste, 
and his role as the UN Secretary- General’s Special Representative and head of the Unit-
ed Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea- Bissau (uniogbis) at a time 
when the country was labelled a ‘narco- state’. Khalid Tinasti also asked him about his 
views on the future of the drug market in the context of a growing drug policy divide 
between countries that enforce a punitive approach to drug use and those now legalis-
ing cannabis and other substances for recreational purposes.
Drug control policies create major ‘unintended’ consequences such as a wide-
spread illegal and violent drug market; policy displacement, with major 
 resources diverted to law enforcement rather than public health; and geo-
graphical displacement, with violence moving from one region to another as 
the war on drugs escalates. How did these findings influence your position on 
drug policy? What triggered your call for drug policy reform?
Like the rest of the world population, and for a long time, I  have looked at 
drug control as an important feature in the security arsenal of each country to 
protect people from poisoning, to reduce criminals’ financial profits, to protect 
institutions from money laundering and corruption, and to reduce the burden 
of disease on the health system. Like many, I could also see that while drugs 
were widely used, the drug trade was visible on urban streets and drug control 
was still capable of ‘containing’ the issue.
With time, it became clearer that the impacts of drug policy were not only 
found where they were most glaring, such as in the explosion of incarcera-
tion for non- violent offences in the last few years or the spread of infectious 
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diseases due to the lack of harm reduction services, but also in different 
aspects of development and, more worryingly, in the poorest populations 
(gcdp, 2018). I  started seeing people in pain not being able to access pain 
relief; the poorest being arrested when their prevalence of use was no higher 
than that of wealthier members of society; women being sentenced to long 
prison terms for minor offences such as acting as a courier, with a devastat-
ing impact on their children and communities; and without any reduction in 
drug production, use or traffic. It is this inability of drug control to achieve 
its own stated objectives of achieving a drug free society, combined with its 
numerous negative consequences, that made me look into the issue of drug 
policy from the perspective of the people impacted, and no longer from a 
security angle.
The late Kofi Annan called me in 2016 with a message from the members 
of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, who were inviting me to look into 
their work, analyse it and— if I was in agreement— to join my voice to theirs. 
I was delighted to look into the ineffectiveness of drug policies, and to provide 
recommendations on reforms. As the late Kofi said privately:  ‘usually, young 
people bring the wind of change on conservative issues. With the Global Com-
mission, we, the elderly, have brought the wind of change on drug policy’.
You were the UN  Secretary- General’s Special Representative and head 
of the  United Nations Integrated  Peacebuilding  Office in Guinea- Bissau 
( uniogbis), at a time when the country was being labelled a ‘narco- state’. You 
have opposed the use of this rhetoric— why?
A few months after my appointment by the UN Secretary- General as his Spe-
cial Envoy, the Security Council renewed the mandate of the uniogbis, add-
ing the monitoring of drug trafficking and the fight against organised crime to 
its remit. The mission of accompanying the country through a political tran-
sition and democratic elections became more complex, as we had to address 
the interconnectedness between drug trafficking proceeds and the funding of 
political figures, public institutions and the military.
I have focused my efforts on rebuilding democratic institutions and dia-
logue, and on attracting international re- engagement with Guinea- Bissau. 
I have therefore focused on the social and economic determinants of the drug 
trade in the country. That is the reason why I refused to label Guinea- Bissau as 
a ‘narco- state’, a term used by academia, practitioners and diplomats. Rather, it 
is a country where the development gap was filled by illicit financial interests, 
and where there is more need for structural development support to address 
the issues of poverty than for enforcement support to fight organised crime.
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Since the 1930s, and the introduction of the first international drug trafficking 
and production crimes, the response to illegal drugs has focused on punitive 
policies. You have been involved in drafting the Constitution of Timor- Leste, a 
Southeast Asian country facing issues of smuggling similar to its neighbours, 
yet which chose to implement proportionate sentences and to ban the death 
penalty. What is the rationale behind your country’s criminal justice approach 
to drugs?
Our national constitutional framework was built on the premises of restoring 
justice and dignity to the people. As a state, we needed to ensure that we had 
democratic institutions and the rule of law. These two pillars needed to build 
on a fair institutional environment, and that starts with a constitution that is 
protective of people, and inclusive of their diversity. We also needed to have 
laws that are proportional to the offences they are designed to punish. Our 
penal code of 2009 has no specific penalties for drug use, but there are many 
other articles that punish drug use, possession and trafficking, such as the use 
of intoxicants in the public space, the use of children in the production or 
trafficking of drugs, smuggling and money laundering crimes. The latter are 
the most severely punished crimes, incurring prison sentences of up to 12 years 
(Timor- Leste Government, 2009).
Since its independence, our country has preserved the right to life and 
therefore never allowed or accepted the use of the death penalty for any crime. 
I will recall here that the UN Committee on Human Rights has repeated time 
and time again that drug trafficking offences do not meet the ‘most serious 
crimes’ threshold, and that the death penalty should therefore not be used to 
address these crimes. This stance has also been promoted by the International 
Narcotics Control Board, the international body in charge of country compli-
ance with the three drug control conventions (incb, 2016).
Therefore, the rationale behind our response to drugs is one of proportion-
ality and of mitigating factors. We cannot, one the one hand, promote more 
structural and systemic changes to address poverty and, on the other, make 
life harder for impoverished communities through disproportionate drug pol-
icies and enforcement. This is also how the rule of law is maintained over the 
longer term.
Could Southeast Asian countries, which are the fiercest proponents of punitive 
drug policies, enforce their way out of drug- related problems?
The history of Southeast and north- east Asian countries and illegal drugs goes 
back to the massive opium dependence of the nineteenth century, and to its 
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impact on social, economic and cultural life. These historic landmarks cannot 
be minimised or overlooked; they are a central part of reforming towards peo-
ple- based drug policies. Today, these same countries are facing new challenges. 
Being large producers of plant- based drugs but also of methamphetamine, and 
thanks to the socio- economic progress of the last few decades, they have also 
become a new transit and consumption hub. For instance, Australia’s illegal 
market is the most expensive in retail prices to the consumer, so it seems lucra-
tive for traffickers to transit through our region from other producing  countries.
Identifying the issues is one thing, and we do it as well in Southeast Asia as it 
is done in the rest of the world. Now, what the most appropriate response might 
be is another discussion. Evidence and data show that no one can enforce 
themselves out of drugs, and no one can impose discipline with over- punitive 
laws. I believe it is time to try something different; something where people and 
those most concerned, such as youth, are considered as partners in drug policy. 
For this to be a reality, our policies need to adapt, and our societies need to 
accept that some people will use drugs regardless of legal or social punishment.
Countries that spearheaded drug prohibition in the past are now radically 
reviewing their approaches, with some legalising the use of cannabis or psil-
ocybin for recreational purposes. Yet other countries with a tradition of mild 
substance use (such as opium in India) have lost this privilege to drug prohibi-
tion. Are we witnessing a new global divide on drug policy?
This is a gradual approach that has taken two decades (Bewley- Taylor, 2012), 
but that has speeded up considerably in the last decade with the establish-
ment of the Global Commission on Drug Policy, and then the organisation of 
the UN Special Session (ungass) on drugs in 2016. Nevertheless, the growing 
diversity in drug policies on the ground is a worrying trend.
International norms were established to provide the international commu-
nity with common tools and effective coordination against common threats. 
This divergence in the international drug control system, be it positive and 
take the form of a move towards regulated drug markets— and my hope is that 
these markets will be regulated according to the dangerousness of the sub-
stance and not the commercial potential of a prospective market— or nega-
tive and take the form of over- repression and sometimes extrajudicial pun-
ishments, is a breach in the implementation of international law. This is never 
good, and questions the rule of law. Nevertheless, this situation does nothing 
to mitigate the original error of the international community— that of having 
a normative framework that is absolutely not aligned with what evidence re-
ports on the ground. We know demand for drugs is significant, we know that 
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supply will fill that demand, but we refuse to implement smart laws to reduce 
the harmful associated effects of drug use, while introducing many negative 
consequences of drug control. What good can come when our young people, 
simply wishing to have fun with recreational and occasional drug use, are met 
by the police, the criminal justice system, and the never- ending consequences 
of a criminal record? When laws are unfair, they are breached, and those who 
enforce them find ways to adapt them. This is damaging for the national and 
international rule of law.
These national policies, which are currently diverse on the ground ( from de-
criminalisation of use to harm reduction scale- up; from state- condoned ex-
trajudicial killings to legalisation of some substances), contrast heavily with 
the old consensus that prevailed among UN member states until just a decade 
ago. Is the UN still relevant in drug policy debates?
I am someone who will always believe in the value of multilateralism, and in 
the extraordinary capacity of our countries to carry out the most difficult tasks 
when we work collectively. The covid- 19 epidemic has indeed clearly high-
lighted this: no country can end the epidemic alone, there is no need to dupli-
cate efforts, and if we work together and mutualise resources we can progress 
faster and better. The UN still seems to be the appropriate space for doing so.
Now, as stated by my colleague at the Global Commission, Helen Clark (an 
internationalist and supporter of the international system), UN norms are usu-
ally overlooked and disrespected when they are the right guide for good pol-
icies. In drug policy, these same norms and conventions, which are outdated 
and were drafted at the time of social hygienism, are a barrier to good policies 
on the ground. It is because we firmly believe in the need for international 
co- operation on drug policy that we have criticised the UN for not keeping 
up with the world, in practice or in thinking. It is not the UN’s Secretariat or 
technical agencies but its member states that are in a position to reform and 
amend the drug control conventions. They are the ones that could make the 
UN central or irrelevant in drug policy.
Given the low levels of investment in drug- related social and health services, 
combined with punitive laws and social stigma, do you consider that the Sus-
tainable Development Goals are achievable for people who use drugs and for 
their communities?
Drug policies are clearly a cross- cutting public matter, influencing and im-
pacting a variety of policy areas and development objectives. In fact, when 
The World Drug Policy Problem 177
law enforcement activities against drug use and trafficking are practised indis-
criminately— and usually arbitrarily, focusing on the most vulnerable— the 
rule of law and equitable justice are under threat (Sustainable Development 
Goal (sdg) 16); when people who use drugs do not seek treatment or access 
harm reduction because of fear of arrest, healthy lives for all become impos-
sible (sdg 3); when it is the poorest who are harmed the most, not only by 
drugs but also and as much by police repression, poverty eradication efforts 
are questioned (sdg 1); when it is women who are the most frequent victims 
of current drug policies, being incarcerated more than men for drug use or 
trafficking, gender equality is flouted (sdg 5); when there are violent confron-
tations between law enforcement and criminal groups, with innocent citizens 
caught in the middle, no cities can be safe (sdg 11); and the list could go on 
and on.
The implementation of the sdg s and the Agenda 2030 are a serious path-
way to try to right the past’s wrongs. The sdg s are a bold agenda. As Ruth 
Dreifuss— the Chair of the Global Commission— said, they require some pre-
conditions to be agreed upon: that a drug free world will not be achieved; that 
drug- related health issues and social unrest are fuelled by current prohibitive 
laws and policies; that the war on drugs has resulted in weak and ineffective 
public institutions in many places; and that drug traffickers have benefitted 
from this very weakness. We need to recognise the issues at hand, so that we 
can be more pragmatic about how to address them.
After 50  years of the war on drugs, even the UN recognises that at best the 
‘world drug problem’ has been ‘contained’. The UN also falls short— along 
with national authorities— of providing clear plans to achieve the desired 
drug free world. What are the elements that prevent the international commu-
nity from recognising that the initial aim was wrong?
The criminalisation of the consumption, production and retailing of ille-
gal drugs seems reasonable when they are seen as unnatural contaminants 
pushed into a society from the outside or by deviant forces, creating a depend-
ence that is ‘evil’ and takes control of people’s minds and bodies. Nevertheless, 
consuming mind- altering substances is a near- universal impulse that has been 
documented across cultures throughout history. In anthropology, ‘mood- or 
consciousness- altering techniques and/ or substances’ are part of the list of 
‘human universals’, alongside music, language, play, and other elements, form-
ing the basic cultural toolkit. And this still holds true today: there are few indi-
viduals who never consume psychoactive substances, be they alcohol, tobacco, 
coffee, chocolate or khat. Therefore, most individuals and societies have an 
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understanding of the appeal of psychoactive substances, at least of those that 
are socially acceptable in their culture (gcdp, 2017).
When it drew together the different pre- war conventions into the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the international community was also hoping 
to stop the scourge of dependence. Nevertheless, international and national 
laws are made to evolve, to adapt to progress in science and in society, and to 
be amended or terminated by elected officials. The problem here is that de-
pendence and its related issues are most problematic and visible among the 
poor, those who have no voice in the public debate, and those who are already 
under economic pressure. This has turned drugs from a public health issue 
concerned with preventing harm which could have been more effectively dealt 
with under another regime than prohibition; into a political problem in every 
country, since drug policy is now related to weak and ineffective institutions, 
ill- health, minority repression, corruption, unfair judiciary systems, over- pu-
nitive law enforcement apparatuses, overcrowded prisons, state- condoned ex-
trajudicial punishments and a concentration of these harms among the poor-
est in society.
Yet now that we see more and more jurisdictions adopting the legal regu-
lation of cannabis or mushrooms, we believe that more has been done in the 
last ten years in terms of recognising the reality of drugs than in the preceding 
50 years.
As the United States retreats from its position as the proponent of the war on 
drugs due to its current opioid- driven overdose crisis and the state- based le-
galisation of cannabis, and as the Russian Federation takes over as the global 
advocate of prohibition, do you foresee any major changes in international 
and national drug policies in the next decade?
The major changes that I see in the next decade in terms of drug policy are 
both negative and positive. The current divisions of opinion in international 
settings provide the opportunity for countries to be more flexible in imple-
menting better drug policies nationally, and for regional multilateral strategies 
to move closer to the realities of a regional block of countries. At the same 
time, these same opportunities are a challenge, since the noncompliance with 
human rights law and its violation have been occurring in the name of drug 
control.
Caution is also needed with respect to how the legal regulation of cannabis 
is implemented. If it means establishing a commercial model for a ‘new’ indus-
try, then few of the issues will be solved since the majority of those involved in 
the ‘old’ illegal market will be left out. Moreover, consumers who benefit from 
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effective illegal supply chains have no incentive to buy in the legal market. If 
this regulation is inclusive and respectful of communities and the existing 
structures of this illegal global industry, then there is the worry that drug pol-
icy reform will end with cannabis policy reform, since the problem of over 70 
per cent of consumers will be solved. However, issues related to cannabis use 
are not as problematic as those associated with more potent substances, such 
as opiates or cocaine.
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chapter 11
The Rif and California: Environmental Violence 
in the Era of New Cannabis Markets
Kenza Afsahi
 Abstract
This chapter explores the different forms of environmental violence practised against 
humans and nature (including the cannabis plant) in a context of intensive cannabis 
cultivation. In particular, it examines the effects of the industrial farming of cannabis 
since the 1960s on water, land, forests, animals and farmers. It also investigates the ex-
ploitation of the labour force, which has comprised vulnerable populations, especially 
women and landless agricultural workers since Rifian agriculture was first integrated 
into colonial capitalism in Morocco. While this study focuses on the Moroccan territo-
ry, the situation presented is by no means unique at the global level. The phenomenon 
can be seen developing both within a framework of prohibition and when legal and 
illegal actors adopt a capitalist system of exploitation, as is the case in California.
1 Introduction1
The cannabis industry has undergone numerous reconfigurations in recent 
years.2 It is now a multifaceted sector in terms of the products it offers, the 
 1 I would like to thank Khalid Mouna for his comments and suggestions on an earlier version 
of this text and also Najib Akesbi for giving me access to his work on Moroccan agriculture. 
I am also grateful to Abdellatif Adebib and Marta Jonville for our exchanges and for always 
being on hand when I needed them. My thanks go also to Anthony Silvaggio for sharing in-
formation on the environmental consequences of the cannabis industry in California.
 2 This chapter examines industrial cannabis farming practices that pose an environmental 
risk. The many uses of cannabis for ecological purposes (rehabilitation of contaminated 
soils, replacement of forest products, etc.) are not examined here. It should be noted that the 
recreational and medicinal uses considered in this study are not the only potential uses of 
cannabis, which has also historically been used in the South for the manufacture of environ-
mentally friendly products in domains such as food, textiles and cosmetics. However, these 
products, whether for commercial or family use, have been replaced by synthetic fabrics and 
plastic products, whose production and consumption are harmful to the environment. Sig-








large number of cannabis- producing countries involved, the mass of produc-
ers with different know- how, the many plant varieties grown and the very dif-
ferent qualities of cannabis weed, resin, oil and other preparations. The words 
used to refer to cannabis also tell their own story (Afsahi, 2017a). The past dec-
ade in particular has seen significant changes in the cultivation techniques 
used in European and North American countries, where cannabis cultivation 
has increased with the emergence of new ways of disseminating know- how, 
online seed outlets and shops selling indoor growing equipment to the public. 
These factors have all contributed to the diversification of products available. 
The increased acreage given over to cannabis and the selection processes it 
has been subject to (particularly in terms of different types of crosses) have 
influenced the genetics and biological characteristics of the original plant (to 
boost productivity and/ or thc levels). The result has been a cultivated plant 
(Gerber, 2018) that has sustained uncontrolled hybridisation over decades of 
prohibition (Afsahi, 2017b).
At the same time, environmental change has accelerated since the 1960s 
as a consequence of intensive cannabis farming and its adoption of indus-
trial agricultural practices. In the 1960s, agro- export models, driven by an 
increased demand for cannabis, led to intensive farming in the South and 
even to monoculture in some areas. The 1970s were marked by tolerance 
in regard to cannabis in the United States (US) and Morocco. This trend 
was to shift for the US a decade later with the criminalisation of cannabis 
cultivation and use (Corva, 2014). There was a considerable expansion in 
cannabis- growing acreage in Morocco in the 1980s, due to a rising European 
demand for hashish (cannabis resin) and declining production in Lebanon 
and Afghanistan. The 1990s saw California become the first US state to legal-
ise cannabis for medicinal use (Corva, 2014; Silvaggio, 2018a and 2018b). At 
the same time, Morocco was experiencing episodic crackdowns on growers 
and the destruction of cannabis fields in response to international pressure, 
which, perversely, had the effect of intensifying cannabis cultivation in the 
country. Morocco’s prohibition policy continued into the first decade of the 
new millennium. In 2012, meanwhile, Colorado and Washington became the 
first US states to legalise cannabis for recreational use following a referen-
dum in each state.
Over the last decade, industrialised countries have seen the emergence of 
an industrial agriculture phenomenon in both indoor and outdoor cultivation 
in response to new cannabis markets. This expansion is, however, having the 
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same multiple environmental consequences as legal intensive agriculture, in-
cluding soil depletion, loss of biodiversity, water pollution, increasing water 
scarcity and health risks to farmers and consumers. These impacts are very 
rarely measured or taken into account. From an economic and social point of 
view, these new, increasingly technology- driven cultivation practices (mech-
anisation, irrigation, chemicals, commodification of seeds) have created ten-
sions between small farmers and large landowners, who have easy access to 
resources and a labour force made up of the most vulnerable populations, 
namely women, children and seasonal workers.
In rich countries, after decades of fighting to obtain the right to cultivate 
and consume cannabis, industrial groups both large and small are now fight-
ing among themselves, each looking to invest in and exploit cannabis for its 
many possible uses in a variety of fields, including construction, textiles, food, 
pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. This ‘green gold rush’, which comes at a time 
of huge global environmental change, forces us to question the conditions of 
production, use and circulation of this plant, which can take many forms and 
from which many derivatives can be extracted.
Originating in central Asia, cannabis was introduced via waves of migration 
to the Middle East, Africa, Europe and finally the Americas. It is now grown 
just about everywhere on the planet and has adapted to diverse climatic con-
ditions not just outdoors but also indoors, for example in warehouses, green-
houses and cupboards with artificial lights and soils.
In the case of the Rif region (Morocco), after the signing of the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the subsequent increase in international de-
mand for cannabis, the Moroccan authorities followed a logic of prohibition 
and repression in line with the international convention, while the farmers 
looked to intensify their cannabis cultivation to meet demand. Environmental 
questions, if they were considered at all, were secondary for both actors.
The environmental consequences of cannabis production have received 
very little attention from researchers of any discipline, and have scarcely been 
mobilised by the activists who have fought prohibition for decades. Neverthe-
less, the environmental argument has been put forward many times to show 
the benefits of cannabis (insulative, depolluting, etc.) and to moralise the 
 market.
This study, which is part of an ongoing research project exploring the ecol-
ogy of cannabis, is a reflection on the global cannabis economy and its cur-
rent social, economic and environmental issues. It focuses on different forms 
of environmental violence against natural resources, humans and the canna-
bis plant, in a context of intensive cultivation. The concept of ‘environmental 
violence’, which originated in the field of environmental criminology (South 
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and White, 2016), is understood here as violence against the natural environ-
ment, certain species (human and non- human) and the planet. This analytical 
framework takes into account not just social damage but also plant protection, 
the violence plants are subjected to and the environmental and health impacts 
of intensive crop farming. The environmental crimes considered here also ex-
tend beyond those that have been defined by law. This approach, which is root-
ed in the field of actor- network sociology (Latour, 1994), attaches importance 
to non- human objects as actors in their own right.
This chapter will set out some of the changes that are affecting forests, land, 
water and animals. It will examine a range of social, economic, political and 
cultural practices that reflect a different way of telling the story of nature, a 
notion that seems to be taking on new meaning for growers today. It will also 
look at the exploitation of the labour force, which has comprised vulnerable 
populations, especially women and landless agricultural workers ever since 
Rifian agriculture was first integrated into colonial capitalism in Morocco. 
While the study focuses on the Moroccan territory, the situation presented is 
by no means unique at the global level. The phenomenon can be seen develop-
ing both within a framework of prohibition, and when legal and illegal actors 
adopt a capitalist system of exploitation and try to find an alternative to this 
ultimately doomed situation. The experiences of Morocco and the US state of 
California have been drawn on here as fitting examples because their differen-
tiated regulations regarding cannabis cultivation show that the mechanisms 
put in place for indoor and outdoor production limit the consideration of en-
vironmental issues.
While market dynamics mean the cannabis cultivation context is subject to 
rapid change, environmental change can only be observed over a long period 
of time. It is thus impossible to measure the effects of cannabis cultivation 
over the space of just a few years. Moreover, it is difficult to approach the prob-
lem of environmental crime in a now globalised market at the level of a sin-
gle social group and a single space. This analysis therefore needed to take into 
account several different levels of scale (geographical, historical, etc.) and the 
wide range of actors involved (farmers in the South, growers in the North, legis-
lators, etc.). It compares the practices of actors in the South (the Rif) and in the 
North (California) to reveal two conceptions of a relationship to the environ-
ment in two different legislative, economic and technical contexts. The study 
is based on observations and informal, semi- structured interviews carried out 
on a sample of diverse actors in Morocco (farmers, cooperatives, etc.) and a 
sample of workers who had participated in growing activities in industrialised 
countries. In the absence of technical indicators showing changes in the natu-
ral resources concerned, we sought to gain an understanding of environmental 
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crime and the resulting injustices from social indicators and from stakehold-
ers’ accounts of conflicts or tensions relating to the sharing of resources 
(Blanchon, Moreau and Veyret, 2009). These data were supplemented by ex-
changes with American researchers and by documentary research on the envi-
ronmental question as it related to cannabis cultivation in California.
The first part of this chapter examines how the link between the Rif farm-
ers and their environment has evolved with the intensification of cannabis 
cultivation for hashish production. This over- exploitation has also impacted 
workers, particularly the most vulnerable, including women and landless ag-
ricultural workers. The second part of the chapter will attempt to show how 
environmental violence in the South has spread to industrialised countries.
2 Towards Environmental Simplification in the Rif
People aren’t interested in crop diversity any more. In our ancestors’ 
time, there were walnut trees, fig tree, cherry trees, vines, everything all 
together, and the local kif3 [Morocco’s traditional cannabis cultivar] was 
planted in small plots so that it didn’t take over the place, our ancestors 
chose specific plots, the most fertile, land that was well prepared, it had 
to be flat … they grew on terraces, mainly because it stabilised the soil, 
they even used the rocks, the stones they found on the plots, they kept 
the shape of the land, respected it, everything had a role, they planted 
trees when they needed to … It was a love affair between human, earth 
and insect, they only touched the top 10 centimetres of soil because the 
fertile earth’s right at the surface, because insects live in it, they’re part of 
the system, but now with the tractors, they kill everything, there used to 
be butterflies and there was this really unique species of locust.
Rif farmer, interview 2019
As this Rif farmer indicated, Moroccans have had a close connection with can-
nabis (or kif) for centuries. They used it in food, medicine and religious ritu-
als, as well as for technical and recreational purposes or simply to help them 
endure harsh labour conditions (Afsahi, 2017a). It would be grown in small 
quantities in gardens alongside traditional crops, either for domestic use or to 
sell at market.
 3 In Morocco, ‘kif ’ refers both to the plant itself and to a traditional preparation intended to be 







The French and Spanish protectorates (1912‒56) were to play a key role in 
changing the Moroccan populations’ relationship with this plant and their en-
vironment. France appropriated fertile land in various regions of Morocco to 
develop industrial plantations (Pascon, 1977; Lazaret, 2009[1968]). In 1914, with 
a view to financing its administration through the Régie du Tabac et du Kif mo-
nopoly (a company controlled by the Paris- based investment bank Banque de 
Paris et des Pays- Bas), the French authorities developed and produced a man-
ufactured kif, which they sold to local populations at a great profit. Between 
1912 and 1954, the French protectorate issued a number of dahirs (decrees), 
which were modified over time in response to the context of international pro-
hibition, to regulate the cultivation, sale and use of cannabis (Afsahi, 2011). 
The Spanish authorities divided their protectorate into three zones: a political 
administration zone (Tétouan), an economic zone with fertile land and access 
to a water reserve (around the Loukkos River in Larache), and what was con-
sidered a rebel zone, which was populated by tribes and managed according to 
local custom (Jbala and Rif) (Mouna, 2018). The Spanish authorities tolerated 
cannabis cultivation in their protectorate to win over the Berber tribes. They 
levied taxes on the kif produced, and because they did not have access to the 
useful agricultural areas of Morocco, they exploited the Rif woodlands for tim-
ber. Spain changed the status of Morocco’s woodlands with its dahir of 1919, 
which ordered that the woodlands, which until then had been managed by 
local tribes and communities (jamaa), would henceforth be in the public do-
main and managed by the state. The Spanish authorities turned the country’s 
traditional slash- and- burn agricultural system into one that was focused on 
the over- exploitation of large forests for timber (Grovel, 1996).
When Morocco gained its independence in 1956, cannabis cultivation was 
definitively banned, although it was still tolerated within a small area located 
between the communes of Ketama and Bab Berred in the central Rif region, 
considered Morocco’s historical home of cannabis cultivation. The colonial 
legacy, the country’s prohibition of cannabis under international pressure, and 
the increased demand for cannabis in the 1960s all resulted in a further change 
in local populations’ relationship to their environment. Prohibition created 
spaces for deviance. New tensions drove the farmers to brutally exploit the 
land. The government, which was trying to eradicate cannabis cultivation in 
the Rif, met with resistance from farmers and suspended its efforts.
The accelerated modernisation of cannabis production in the Rif and the 
development of a cannabis monoculture aimed largely at the export market 
has now become the norm. ‘Monoculture’ refers to an agricultural or forestry 
practice in which a single species is cultivated over a large area with intensive 
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rugged, monoculture involves small areas of land, sometimes even parcels of 
land, devoted to a single, aligned, standardised cannabis crop. This monocul-
ture has reshaped the Rif landscape and replaced the former multi- crop land-
scape described below:
On our land, there was loubia (beans), dra (maize), all the vegetables, 
turnips, they didn’t buy anything in the old days, there were fruits, a vine 
for zbibes (grapes), which they’d eat in the winter, figs, guergaa (nuts), 
everything, cherries, these were developed people, even those who had 
nothing had at least forty or fifty goats. Every house had its own milk, 
butter and honey.
Rif farmer, interview 2019
Between 1960 and 1975, Moroccan populations largely cleared the woodland 
areas in response to the state’s attempts, prompted by the growth of cannabis 
cultivation, to demarcate them (Grovel, 1996). Privatising state- owned land, 
burning down the woodlands and waiting for the state’s reaction before start-
ing cultivation, came to resemble a game played between the farmers and the 
forestry authorities. The farmers’ opinions on the impact of the Spanish pro-
tectorate were mixed. Some saw the arrival of the Spanish as marking the onset 
of an ‘ecological disaster’ due to the radical change in the population’s relation-
ship to the woodlands, while others saw it as a new rationalisation of space and 
source of income, as this farmer recounted:
The logging companies arrived, there was an upside to the Spanish being 
here, they didn’t just chop down trees willy- nilly, they were organised, 
they built sawmills, they’d chop down the trees and then plant new ones, 
they provided people with a living, fed them, paid them on time, they 
weren’t exploited […] they couldn’t survive, they never used to cut any-
thing down, only old trees[…].
Rif farmer, interview 2019
The suppression of the jamaa’s role in managing their own needs and rights 
concerning land and forests changed the relationship that they had to their 
livelihoods and needs. Local populations no longer allowed the land to rest 
from one year to the next to increase its fertility, but instead used fertilisers 
or moved crops into the forests to conceal them better or to take advantage 
of more humus- rich soil. Cannabis revenues improved the livelihoods of poor 
populations and created new needs. This new economy also led to the emer-
gence both of a new poor population that was dependent on the cannabis 
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market and of more powerful actors with access to transnational trafficking 
networks.
Although the laws imposed by the Spanish, and subsequently by the Mo-
roccan state, stipulated that woodlands should be protected, they did not take 
into account local populations’ traditional forestry practices, beliefs and inti-
mate relationship with all living species. Nature was seen as independent of 
those who had inhabited and preserved it for centuries, and who would con-
tinue to use it and benefit from it.
During the 1980s and 1990s, land exploitation intensified as cannabis cul-
tivation was established in new areas, either by historical cannabis growers 
or through the introduction of techniques disseminated by returning farm 
workers (who would capitalise on periods of tolerance from the authorities). 
In the 1990s, due to a lack of land and in response to tightened forestry con-
trols, some farmers began to go in search of new arable land, particularly in the 
province of Taounate. In partnership with local producers, they rented land 
in the traditional growing areas and experimented with production processes 
that had been difficult to implement for topological reasons (fertilisers and 
pesticides, tractors, modern irrigation systems). These new farms, especially 
in Chefchaouen province, practised monoculture in large irrigated valleys. 
Cannabis cultivation thus increased from a few dozen hectares in the 1950s to 
more than 100,000 hectares in the early years of the twenty- first century and 
spread over the five provinces of Al Hoceima, Chefchaouen, Taounate, Tétouan 
and Larache (Afsahi, 2011).
The cannabis monoculture system was not peculiar to the Rif, however, but 
rather derived from the state- run agrarian system that had been developed for 
legal crops since the colonial period. This modern style of agriculture incorpo-
rated hydraulic systems (dams) and the development of pesticides and fertil-
isers. Hence, even though it was not known as an agricultural territory, the Rif 
was the second region in Morocco to use fertilisers (Akesbi, 2005). Throughout 
this period, a number of programmes were introduced across Morocco, en-
couraging mechanisation and the excessive monoculture of legal crops. The 
so- called ‘agro- export’ model of agricultural development that was adopted 
produced the same effects as it did everywhere else in the world— namely, 
food dependency, rural poverty and the destruction of natural resources— and 
for the same reasons. As a result, Moroccans today depend on international 
markets for their basic food supply (Akesbi, 2013).
In the Rif, the totality of the land owned has been used to the maximum 
extent possible for cannabis specialisation. Farmers have thus taken over the 
forests and communal lands, created tracks for transporting the hashish, dug 
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flat enough. They have, completely illegally, created an agro- export system 
that is identical to that created by the state in other agricultural regions. This 
approach has not, however, prevented the state from prosecuting them, and 
thousands have had arrest warrants issued against them or been sent to prison.
This new order, which is based on capital accumulation and the mass ex-
ploitation of natural resources, has brought with it highly visible inequalities 
and social injustices (Stengers, 2009). The gap between a very rich minority 
and almost the entire impoverished population has led to a new phase of de-
forestation and fighting for natural resources, even within families. Family sol-
idarity has thus given way to competition between family members (Mouna, 
2010) and all that this implies in terms of parcelling out land with increasingly 
reduced surface areas. As the area for cannabis cultivation has expanded be-
yond the historical growing area, there has been a rationalisation of both the 
territory and the lands used for cultivation, which are now characterised by 
increasingly rectilinear forms and controlled with modern production meth-
ods. The fact that this land is entirely given over to cannabis plantations has 
created ecological simplifications (Tsing, 2015) and reduced biodiversity in the 
Rif. Crop diversity, which used to limit both nature- related and commercial 
risks, has disappeared along with market gardens, residential gardens, fruit 
trees (except olive trees), some traditional livestock and some wild animals, 
such as monkeys and wolves, as this farmer from the historical cultivation area 
recounted:
There used to be a lot of animals here, all kinds of insects, butterflies I’ve 
never seen anywhere else, grey, multicoloured, birds, a huge variety of na-
tive birds, you’d never see them when you came down from high up in the 
mountains, in the cedars, there used to be wolves (there still are some but 
they’re rare), wild boars, you still see a few, because they need the forest 
to hide in, stags in the zone, in the Spanish zone on the Tétouan side, for 
hunting. There used to be hyenas, my father told me. The last panther was 
killed in the mountains in the 50s by a Spanish officer, a white panther 
with black spots. You still see hedgehogs, and snakes, there used to be 
different kinds of snakes, my grandfather raised a snake in his house that 
ate mice … my grandfather gave it eggs, he raised it, it used to be in the 
house, it wasn’t poisonous or anything, it was like a guard dog.
Rif farmer, interview 2019
The animals that used to like eating the cannabis residues or seeds (e.g. roost-
ers) are now tied up to prevent them from venturing into the fields. With the 





markets for food. Nature has thus been subordinated and commodified by hu-
mans for greater economic profitability with no concern for the environmental 
consequences (Petel, 2018).
While the woodland areas have been one of the battlegrounds for control 
for the Rifian populations involved in cannabis cultivation, water resources 
have also become increasingly problematic. Today, this poses a real challenge 
for Rifian populations, given the substantial pressure on groundwater and sur-
face water for agricultural use. Throughout Morocco, with recurrent droughts, 
farmers are now dependent on irregular rainfall. At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, droughts in Morocco occurred only once every eleven years. By 
the 1960s, this had increased to once every seven years, and by the 1990s there 
was a drought every two years. In 1999 and 2000, the country recorded two 
consecutive years of drought for the first time (Akesbi, 2014). These droughts 
have led to pressure on the woodland environment, pasturelands and water 
tables, whose reserves are declining. New patterns of water use have emerged 
that are no longer characterised by the sharing of water resources, but by con-
flicts between small farmers and large landowners, who can afford to dig wells 
and build reservoirs.
Moreover, while the Rif is the biggest user of fertilisers and pesticides in 
Morocco, water pollution resulting from the intensive use of these substances 
in cannabis cultivation has never been measured in the region. This situation 
brings us back to the question of environmental justice. Regarding water as a 
shared social and cultural good is thought to lead, in a context of no state con-
trol, to continuing environmental inequality between growers in terms of their 
access to and use of water (Belaidi, 2010).
Ever since the intensification of cannabis production began in the Rif, the 
question of resources has thus been a constant issue. It has created a divide be-
tween those who own the fertile soils, agricultural acreage, water sources and 
labour force needed for cannabis cultivation and production, and those who 
do not. Even within the same territory, the intensification of crop production 
has generated considerable wealth for some villages (those with large tracts 
of irrigable land where mechanisation is possible) and none for others (those 
with only small parcelled acreages, usually situated at high altitudes). This has 
created tensions and has even led to instability.
Profound ecological changes have altered not just these populations’ way 
of life but also their conceptions of the land, forests, water and farming tech-
niques and practices. Their stories about natural resources and animals have 
also changed. For example, many of the farmers argued that the more fertil-
iser and pesticides they used, the better the soil would be. As Salvador (2011) 
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environmental damage, such as the chemical industry, have tended to defend 
their production methods and those of polluting enterprises more generally. 
Their jobs took precedence over their health and that of their descendants. 
The author thus shows that the environmental question is closely linked to the 
social dimension.
Some connections with nature have nevertheless remained for Rifian pop-
ulations. Although the farmers have cleared much of the woodland area, most 
have continued to consider olive trees as sacred. They are the only fruit trees 
that can be seen still standing in the cannabis fields. Furthermore, the farmers 
of Ketama look on the cedar forests of Mount Tidirhine as their inviolable her-
itage and have protected them from timber traffickers.
2.1 Women and Seasonal Workers: Exploitation of the Labour Force
Since the 1960s, Rif farmers, in addition to exploiting natural resources in this 
context of intensified cannabis cultivation and hashish production, have in-
creased their use of family and seasonal labour. Because the rugged terrain 
has prevented the mechanisation of some cannabis farms, thousands of work-
ers with either precarious status (paid workers or servants) or invisible status 
(undocumented workers) are used at all stages of cultivation and production, 
namely sowing, weeding, thinning out, harvesting, drying and storage, sieving, 
pressing and selling (Afsahi, 2011). These workers, who are employed largely 
because of their vulnerability (women, seasonal agricultural workers, chil-
dren), perform the most gruelling tasks in the cultivation process. The women 
are generally involved in the weeding, thinning out (removal of male plants) 
and harvesting, rather than the more technical activities such as sowing and 
production. Neither do they take part in the more visible activities, such as 
transportation and retail, but are instead used to free up the men for these 
tasks (Afsahi, 2015). The low visibility of women conceals a gender division in 
domestic roles as well as certain internal selection mechanisms (Frau, 2012) 
and many inequalities. Some of the tasks they are given are incorporated with-
in domestic work more broadly, which increases their invisibility (Krinsky and 
Simonet, 2012). In addition to their domestic tasks, women are given the role of 
looking after the livestock and the children, and fetching firewood and water. 
They are also responsible for preparing meals for the seasonal farm workers.
This use of female labour helps to legitimise cannabis cultivation as a family 
activity, which to some extent minimises the risks for the men involved and 
shields them from being arrested (Afsahi, 2015). Very occasionally, women re-
place men in the retail task. This only happens when the men are in prison or, 
in the case of some fishing villages, out at sea for long periods. Thus, the wom-









Women are oppressed in many ways. As workers, daughters, mothers and 
wives they are burdened with many tasks and have little autonomy. They have 
a considerable, often unpaid workload, and they receive no social recognition 
or personal income. The women and men seem to have some kind of implicit 
social contract, which provides that— in exchange for their work in the fields— 
the women’s standard of living or domestic comfort increases albeit they will 
not receive any pay.
Growers who have devoted increasing amounts of land to cannabis culti-
vation and begun to produce the end product themselves have supplemented 
family labour with a large number of agricultural workers (Aziza, 1994; Maurer, 
1968). These workers come from all over Morocco, but particularly from the 
communes bordering the historical cultivation area of the central Rif.
Hence, every year, at the start of the cannabis cultivation period, workers 
from different towns and regions converge on the Rif in the certainty they 
will find work. Seasonal migration from some urban areas is common, notably 
from Meknes and Fez as well as some more distant cities such as Kenitra. The 
agricultural workers negotiate their daily wage with the chief of each tribe 
according to seniority, know- how and supply and demand. A  distinction is 
made between multiskilled workers, who are able to help with domestic or 
agricultural tasks or even with road construction and marking, and special-
ist workers, who work solely on transforming the cannabis plants into resin. 
These latter workers are the more in- demand of the two types, especially in 
the new cultivation areas that have not yet acquired this specific know- how. 
Recruitment is based on trust. An employer will ask a good worker to come 
back the following year, and a good worker is able to recommend a new work-
er. Workers are also recruited at markets or in the countryside, where foreign 
workers are highly visible because they can be seen travelling with their per-
sonal belongings across territories according to the seasonal harvesting cy-
cles, seeking out any contracts employers are willing to offer them. Despite 
being paid, seasonal agricultural workers constitute precarious and invisible 
labour. Very rarely do they have a voice or the right to participate in a decision 
(Mouna, 2010).
3 Internationalisation of Cannabis Cultivation and Resource 
Exploitation
Today, industrialised countries are cannabis producers in both legal and il-
legal contexts. It is important to stress here that environmental crime is de-
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or animals, regardless of its legality or illegality (Manirabona, 2016). Given 
the globalisation of the cannabis market, it is essential for harmful impacts, 
whether legal or illegal, to be considered in an international context. In a study 
of the intermediate actors and mediators involved in the production and circu-
lation of both cannabis seeds and knowledge between Morocco and Holland, 
the present chapter’s author saw how highly localised actors (in the Rif) were 
linked to highly mobile actors (in Holland) (Afsahi, 2017a and 2017b).
Morocco and California have been selected as cases studies for the present 
study not so much to show the interdependence of the two areas as to show 
how environmental crime today transcends state borders in terms of cannabis 
cultivation practices and the exploitation of natural and human resources, a 
phenomenon that has remained at the margins of the concerns of various ac-
tors in the cannabis industry.
After decades of campaigning by user and patient associations, as well as 
the high- profile activists (Michka, Miya Jansen, etc.) who have popularised 
knowledge about cannabis and influenced public and consumer opinion (con-
sumers increasingly prefer local products), new legislation in different nation-
al contexts (the US, Canada, the EU, etc.) has led to new forms of the marke-
tisation of cannabis. Countries are attempting to create regulated markets at 
every stage, from cultivation through to consumption, with the aims of reduc-
ing or even replacing the illegal market, adding economic value to the prod-
uct through taxation, and protecting human health. As a result, the market is 
booming, and many industrialists are looking to invest in and exploit cannabis 
in a number of different sectors, including construction, textiles, food, medi-
cine, cosmetics and recreation. As such, they are in competition with cannabis 
producers in the South.
These industrialised countries are beginning to think about the positive 
(risk reduction, economic contribution of new markets, weakening of the 
black market) and negative (increase in consumption by young people) effects 
of these new markets in the contexts of prohibition and legalisation. However, 
very few human and social science studies have examined the environmental 
consequences of industrialisation and the growth of the cannabis market in 
industrialised countries. Moreover, the arguments in favour of legalisation and 
the issues at stake have focused on economic, social and public health benefits 
without taking into account environmental damage. The only studies to have 
addressed the environmental question have been Silvaggio’s (2018a and 2018b) 
studies of cannabis farming in Humboldt, Mendocino, and Trinity Counties 
(an area in Northern California known as the Emerald Triangle), Bauer and 
coauthor’s (2015) study of water demand for cannabis irrigation and the im-







cannabis cultivation in the US and August’s (2013) study of the role of women 
in the cannabis industry.
In California, cannabis was introduced most notably by the hippy communi-
ties of the 1960s and 1970s. The local industry subsequently developed through 
an underground network of producers, consumers and dealers (Rendon, 2012). 
Since the 1980s, California has been known for producing some of the best 
cannabis products in the world. Initially, cannabis cultivation had little impact 
on the environment in California. However, after decades of logging and poor 
land management, and following the legalisation of cannabis for medical use 
in 1996, California entered a new phase in its industrialisation of cannabis. Not 
only did cultivation increase from 20 or 30 plants per farm to plantations con-
taining hundreds or even thousands of cannabis plants, with all the associated 
harmful consequences for the physical environment, this new agriculture cre-
ated a real need for workers who would cultivate, harvest and sell the canna-
bis. Local workers were soon joined by young, international, seasonal workers. 
This over- exploitation of the natural environment has also been facilitated by 
a number of legal grey areas. Most growers in the region conceal their crops or 
say that they are intended for medical use or for dispensaries licensed since 
2016. In reality, only a tiny fraction of production is destined for this legal mar-
ket. The rest is channelled into the country’s black market, an industry with an 
estimated value that varies considerably but that is rarely reported at less than 
usd 10 billion (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2018b).
Indoor cannabis cultivation in California, which emerged in response to a 
crackdown on outdoor cannabis cultivation in the 1980s, has also had an im-
pact on the environment (Corva, 2014). Domestic cannabis cultivation, which 
has been developed in most industrialised countries to avoid control measures 
and unfavourable climatic conditions, uses a highly controlled environment 
for growing (lamps and irrigation). It has also introduced many new tech-
niques to influence the growth cycle of cannabis, for example by crossing mul-
tiple varieties to create new varieties with higher thc levels, increased yields 
or new tastes and effects. In California, indoor cultivation has created a pro-
duction environment that is suited to the hybridisation of different varieties 
of cannabis plants with specific characteristics, such as a shorter growing time, 
higher potency or a particular smell, making Californian cannabis among the 
most famous varieties in the world (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2018b).
However, these growers have impacted the local environment. Indoor pro-
duction, whether small- or large- scale, requires large amounts of fossil ener-
gy to power generators, lighting and advanced climate control systems. Mills 
(2012) observed that the emerging industry of indoor cannabis cultivation 
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that cannabis cultivation accounted for 1 per cent of national electricity con-
sumption, which was equivalent to usd 6 billion in the case of the US. An 
average kilogram of end product is associated with 4,600 kg of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Indoor cannabis cultivation is believed to account for 3 per cent 
of energy consumption in the state of California (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2018b). 
Several other US states (including Colorado and Alaska)— along with Wash-
ington, D.C.— have legalised cannabis production, and thus encouraged in-
door cannabis cultivation. Hood (2018) shows that in the state of Colorado, for 
example, where the majority of legal cannabis is produced indoors, electricity 
consumption has put a strain on power grids, with cannabis cultivation ac-
counting for more than 4 per cent of Denver’s total electricity consumption. 
Moreover, Ward (2018) reports that the packaging for one gram of cannabis 
concentrate can weigh up to 30 times more than the product itself.
The scientific literature in the field of environmental crime has shown that 
environmental criminals tend to target areas where legislation is most lax. Re-
searchers have noted that environmental crime has been exported from devel-
oped to developing countries (South, 1998). This can certainly be seen in the 
period following the intensification of cannabis cultivation in the South in re-
sponse to increased demand for cannabis in industrialised countries from the 
1960s onwards. However, today, prohibition and new regulations accompanied 
by the rise in cannabis cultivation appear to be producing relatively similar 
levels of environmental damage in both developed and developing countries, 
albeit environmental inequalities remain (Chancel, 2017).
Countries in the South are more exposed to economic and social inequal-
ities, which lead to environmental inequalities. These are defined as unequal 
access to natural resources and unequal exposure to environmental harm and 
risks (Hache, 2013). The populations most affected by the consequences of 
environmental crimes are the poorest, and often it is the wealthiest who are 
the agents of these crimes (Hache, 2013). Similarly, at a local level, populations 
with the lowest incomes are the most exposed to pollution phenomena or en-
vironmental risks (Hache, 2013). According to Chantal (2017), inequalities are 
cumulative because economic and social inequalities also translate into envi-
ronmental inequalities.
At the global level, the cannabis cultivation context is characterised by ine-
qualities in terms of access both to the market and to natural resources for the 
most vulnerable populations. This is especially true for farmers in the South, 
who face food security difficulties as well as technical challenges and violence 
when it comes to accessing land and water resources. The direct exploitation 
of resources by colonisers, followed by the indirect exploitation of resources 









The cannabis market is moving towards an increasingly unequal exchange be-
tween industrialised countries, which have evolved in terms of their regula-
tions, and the South, which remains at the margins of this development.
Hence, the Rif is no longer able to rely on its scorching sun to enhance the 
reputation of Moroccan hashish and compete with the new European canna-
bis market. For at least a decade now, hybrid seeds and new cultivation and 
extraction techniques have been imported from industrialised countries. 
Hybrids produce two to three times higher yields per hectare than kif, and 
greater psychotropic effects than traditional Moroccan hashish (Chouvy and 
Afsahi, 2014). Most farmers have thus replaced their local, traditional canna-
bis varieties to diversify their supply. However, these hybrids are even greedier 
when it comes to fertilisers, pesticides, water and labour, further deteriorating 
an environment already weakened by decades of intensive cannabis cultiva-
tion for industrial- scale production. As ideas and knowledge have circulated 
between legal and illegal spheres and between industrialised countries and 
Morocco (Afsahi, 2017b), Morocco has adopted an increasingly technical, hy-
per- intensive European agricultural model that involves large quantities of 
fertilisers, pesticides, greenhouses, pollinators, hybrid seeds, lamps, and new 
hashish extraction techniques. Many foreigners have also settled in the Rif to 
produce locally, taking advantage of the sunshine and very cheap labour. Ac-
cording to judicial sources, violent crimes have been committed in Issaguen in 
connection with conflicts over water usage rights. This is a new development 
in an area known for its absence of violence.
The Rifians’ connections with kif have changed with these new practices. 
They now have new, more distant connections with the new hybrid varieties 
that have been introduced. This intensification of cultivation has also snuffed 
out the ecological stories and cultural and religious practices that the early kif 
growers in Morocco drew on to give meaning to their culture and their space. 
As is the case with the illegal trafficking of wild species (fauna and flora) (Ber-
nard, 2016), cannabis is today subject to risks related to biodiversity, the health 
of users and growers, the protection of original varieties and the plant’s sus-
tainability as a species. The circulation of hybrid varieties in Morocco is facili-
tated by a legislative vacuum around cannabis seeds and the ease with which 
actors in the seeds market can move between the two Mediterranean coasts 
(see Afsahi, 2017b). At the local level, the wealthiest growers, who are those 
most involved in the seeds circuit, have invested in damming water sources 
(reservoirs), which are essential for the cultivation of hybrid cannabis varie-
ties. The specially created water police unit in Morocco turns a blind eye to 
the rapid degradation of water reserves. In an article on groundwater govern-
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groundwater, unlike the use of an alternative method of surface water manage-
ment that is part of a classic planning policy pertaining to the state’s ‘hydrau-
lic mission’, reveals a liberal state policy that encourages Moroccan farmers’ 
entrepreneurial spirit. Cannabis growers have been able to capitalise on this. 
Some actors in the cannabis economy even control every stage of cannabis cul-
tivation and retail, including the short- term management of natural resources, 
and they know how to react to global changes in the cannabis market.
In contrast to California, the debate on the legalisation of cannabis for me-
dicinal and industrial use in Morocco has been subject to party politics. Legal-
isation has been rejected by cannabis growers, who do not see the econom-
ic benefits of such a change. Some are afraid of being excluded from a legal 
market, particularly the pharmaceutical market, whose networks and circuits 
they do not control. They argue that a legislative change would primarily ben-
efit other agricultural regions that are better equipped with natural resources 
(Mouna and Afsahi, 2015).
3.1 Women and Vulnerable Workers in the New Cannabis Industry
Ultimately, in both worlds (developed and developing), prohibition and new 
regulations seem to be harming the most vulnerable populations, namely ag-
ricultural workers, especially small farmers and women. The effects of regula-
tion (registration fees and taxes) in California, for example, have pushed out 
the small farmers who produce sustainably and encouraged an increase in 
large- scale plantations (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2018b; Allen, 2018). With regard 
to the vulnerable workers employed in the sector, an ethnographic study car-
ried out between 2010 and 2012 (August, 2013) in the Emerald Triangle showed 
a male dominance of the sector, both physically and in terms of decision- 
making. Women were thus relegated to subordinate roles. The ‘heavy’ work 
was assigned to men, and thinning out was usually assigned to women. A num-
ber of participants recounted how men dominated the sector and how they 
were keen to maintain the division of labour and the norms that governed this 
environment. Working conditions increased the women’s vulnerability, a fact 
that resonates with the labour market in this sector more broadly. The author 
of this study explained that the women were fully aware that the nature of the 
work also exposed them to sexual harassment.
However, since the legalisation of cannabis for recreational use in Cali-
fornia on 1 January 2018, some new trends regarding the place of women in 
the cannabis industry have emerged. While Anderson and Kavanaugh (2018) 
have highlighted the widespread perception of strong gender inequalities in 
the production and distribution of drugs, they have also shown how women 







activities generally considered to be gendered. Hence, new businesses special-
ising in bakery, confectionery and other edible products have appeared since 
the legalisation came into force. These new uses of cannabis, which are seen 
as feminine by men (who are more interested in the transactional side of the 
business), give women an important place in the economic chain formed by 
the legal sale of cannabis in some US states. This gender bias has allowed many 
women to enter the cannabis market and has practically created the idea of 
‘female domination’, as reflected in a US magazine’s proposition: ‘Will a plant 
named Mary Jane smash the drug market patriarchy?’ Some women workers 
have also formed growers’ collectives. It is worth noting that this reaction is 
not specific to California. An increasing number of cannabis events are hosting 
special sessions dedicated to women in the cannabis industry.
Moreover, the demand for labour— whether female, local, immigrant or 
young seasonal, including workers from Europe— has been growing in recent 
years, particularly since the legalisation of cannabis. There are two types of 
farms in the cannabis industry. One is made up of open, seasonal farms, and 
the other of closed ‘factories’ that continuously produce indoors. The labour 
force on farms comprises mainly students or ‘travellers’, while the labour force 
in the ‘factories’ is mainly made up of immigrant populations, particularly 
from Latin American and Mexican communities.
One young French woman recounted her experience in the cannabis plan-
tations of California in 2018:
We were on a small plantation, 450 plants (two greenhouses), in the 
Californian backwater, the middle of nowhere. The cannabis was grown 
for medical use, so the owners of the place had to use organic farming 
methods, no chemicals. […] I naively thought this was what happened 
right across the industry […] but cannabis farming is an ecological dis-
aster in California the same as it is anywhere else. The owners, they had 
a few plantations, put us in charge of the Copperhead one, there were 
two of us, isolated from everyone else. The nearest village was an hour’s 
drive away, and that included twenty minutes along a dirt track. We could 
smell the plants half a mile before we got there. My job on the farm was 
watering the plants, by hand, one by one, two and a half hours a day, 
sprinklers weren’t allowed. In the greenhouses, the temperature could 
reach 50°. So I’d go in with no clothes on every morning to take care of 
the plants, water them, take off the dead leaves, talk to them, stroke them. 
We formed a sensual bond really. It was an exchange of good working 
practices. I took care of the plants and they took care of me. They’d leave 
some resin on my skin, which relieved my aches and pains. Day in day 
The Rif and California 201
out, I sweated under those greenhouses, I meditated to the sound of the 
water, breathed in their smell. I was immersed in it from head to foot. 
And I wasn’t the only one who benefited. A whole load of animals of all 
kinds came in to drink the water and munch on the plants. Birds, rodents, 
snakes, chattering squirrels, spiders, insects, they were all there with me. 
Sometimes I saw deer, and bobcats also venture into the area. Since legal-
isation though, these small farms have been disappearing. They’re being 
replaced by large farms that privatise the seeds, like they do in traditional 
agriculture. We’re not allowed to make a living now from doing what we 
depend on for our livelihoods.
Former worker in California, interview 2019
4 Conclusion
Changes in cannabis regulation are intended to control cultural, environmen-
tal and social justice abuses, but the cannabis market currently has relatively 
few economic models that promote justice, respect for the environment and 
equity between South and North and rich and poor. The intensification of can-
nabis cultivation has further deepened territorial and social inequalities at a 
number of levels between the traditional growing countries, which have sup-
plied the international market with cannabis for decades, and the industrial-
ised countries, which have switched from importing cannabis to now specialis-
ing in cannabis cultivation and adjusting their legislation accordingly.
Environmental inequalities, which crystallise the many local conflicts over 
natural resources and the exploitation of labour forces, can be observed in dif-
ferent spaces around the world. These new cannabis- related environmental 
inequalities associated with access to natural resources (Hache, 2013) reveal 
the challenges of accessing the cannabis market and of the current cannabis 
economy.
In Southern countries, as exemplified by the Rif, large landowners exploit 
their labour force, which is made up of landless agricultural workers, women, 
and farmers. However, this is also true of California. Both these territories have 
suffered at the hands of humans, with their machinery, agricultural technolo-
gy, over- exploitation, fertilisers, pesticides, and so on.
Environmental changes in the context of cannabis cultivation show us 
how the process of destruction has accelerated in recent years and echoes a 
more global and globalised ecological crisis. The environmental impact from 
regulatory vacuums and prohibition (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2008b; Corva, 2014) 





prominent voices calling for environmental sustainability. Instead, it has fo-
cused on the millions or even billions of dollars that the cannabis industry has 
generated for large corporations, which have in turn been able to influence 
state administrations and regulatory advisory boards (Silvaggio, 2018a and 
2008b), and push for less stringent environmental policies and regulations.
New legalisation could thus risk intensifying the phenomenon of growing 
crops under glass, both indoors and outdoors, to accommodate the expanding 
market (Silvaggio, 2018a and 2008b). There is currently a lack of empirical data 
on the environmental costs associated with cannabis cultivation. However, it is 
clear that, given the economic importance of cannabis cultivation, it will have 
a significant impact on water, flora and fauna (Allen, 2018). We therefore need 
to mobilise our collective imagination to ensure that the solutions to cannabis 
prohibition— in other words, the new cannabis economies— do not follow the 
school of thought that espouses unfettered competition.
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This chapter looks at women involved in drug offences and women who use drugs, 
from the perspective of the intersection of three axes: i) gender relationships and gen-
der systems, ii) development, and iii) drug policy. Its purpose is to analyse the impacts 
of drug policy on women from a gender perspective, with a focus on two groups of 
‘women in detention’: incarcerated women and women in residential treatment cen-
tres. The paper argues that current drug policies are part and parcel of patriarchal 
structures that underlie violence against women and children and undermine gender 
equality and development.
The international framework of drug control generates, via prohibition, illicit drug 
markets and drug trafficking organisations, which mirror hegemonic gender systems 
and treat women and children as disposable objects, maintaining sexist structures that 
lead to the exploitation of women’s labour by their male partners, patriarchal relations 
with regard to illicit waged labour, and patriarchal violence and culture. The other di-
rect results of the implementation of international drug policy are the use of incarcer-
ation as a means of deterrence and the growing number of women in prison for drug 
offences.
Also in the case of women who use drugs, current drug policies contribute, with 
practical and discursive elements, to the reproduction and justification of violence 
against women and girls. The two groups of women in detention analysed in this chap-
ter, instead of being accompanied by communities, families and state institutions that 
address and attempt to repair the suffering and the crimes committed against them, 
are further isolated through institutionalisation in legal or illegal sites, in which vio-
lence against women is further reproduced and development is hindered.
1 Introduction
We cleaned it [marijuana], we packaged it, we bundled it up and it 
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of work began, because even children, and old people, people of all 
ages were involved.
gaby, Female Prison Centre Tanivet, Oaxaca, Mexico
Gabriela Cruz (‘Gaby’) grew up in a rural area in one of the most stunning 
states of Mexico: Oaxaca. Situated in the south- east, Oaxaca is a place of many 
beauties and treasures: a varied gastronomy, lush jungles, amazingly preserved 
pyramids, virgin white- sanded beaches, a multitude of indigenous languages, 
and mind- enhancing plants— Maria Sabina’s ‘little children’ full of psilocybin, 
salvia divinorum, and Gaby’s village’s main source of employment, marijua-
na. Nonetheless, Oaxaca’s abundant contributions to the world’s cultural and 
spiritual growth contrast with the national and local development context.
Half of the Mexican population lives in poverty,1 and access to education, health, 
social security, housing and basic services has decreased since 2008. In this scenar-
io, women are further discriminated against in several areas. The Human Develop-
ment Index (hdi) for men is 0.789 whereas women’s is 0.752, and men’s ‘estimated 
gross national income per capita’ is twice that of women’s (undp, 2018, 35).
In the Gender Inequality Index, Mexico ranks seventy- sixth. Another strik-
ing number is the adolescent birth rate:  60.3 births per 1,000 women aged 
15‒19 (undp, 2018, 39), compared to a global average of 44. Teenage pregnan-
cies are a regional problem: according to the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion (paho), ‘although total fertility (number of children per woman) in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (lac) has declined over the past 30 years, adoles-
cent fertility rates have only dropped slightly during that period and continue 
to be the second highest in the world, surpassed only by those in sub- Saharan 
Africa’ (paho, 2017, 13).
Gaby fits into these statistics. She had her first daughter when she was 
15 years old. Her pregnancy was the product of rape by a man from her village. 
Gaby, a victim of violence against children (Lenzer, 2015) and of gender- based 
violence against women and girls (Council of Europe, 2011), was also, by then, 
a victim of one of the worst forms of child labour (ilo, 1999). Since the age of 
twelve, she had been carrying small packages of marijuana to Mexico City. Her 
recruiter was also a man from her village.
When she grew up, she fell in love with a drug trafficker and became preg-
nant again. The trafficker abandoned her. She had no money to pay for private 
healthcare, and public healthcare in Mexico is insufficient, especially in rural 
 1 See the figures in ‘Medicion de pobreza 2008– 2018, Estados Unidos Mexicanos’, Coneval, 
https:// www.coneval.org.mx/ Medicion/ PublishingImages/ Pobreza_ 2018/ Serie_ 2008- 2018.










areas. Gaby’s child was born with physical and brain paralysis, and Gaby con-
tinued to carry marijuana in order to pay for medical examinations.
So far, the state had been almost absent from Gaby’s life. Neither the sexual 
violence nor the child- labour exploitation merited its attention or interven-
tion. Poverty and underdevelopment were balanced by the employment pro-
vided by illicit crop cultivation, and lack of healthcare was ‘compensated’ with 
local knowledge of herbs and infusions.
One day, the state became interested in Gaby. She was arrested when trans-
porting marijuana and given a ten- year prison sentence. She was locked away 
together with her child and finally became a number. The only official trace of 
Gaby lies in the registers of another global phenomenon with specific impacts 
in Mexico and Latin America:  international drug policy. Mexico is not only 
host to opium and marijuana cultivation, cocaine and heroin flows, and other 
facets of international drug trafficking (unodc, 2019). It is also home to some 
of what the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc) has labelled 
‘collateral consequences’ (unodc, 2008)— namely, the increasing incarcera-
tion of low- level offenders and drug users as well as lack of treatment for de-
pendent drug users.
In light of the drug policy paradigm, where rates of incarceration are an 
indicator of success (Bewley- Taylor, 2016), Gaby’s prison sentence represents 
a step forwards, towards a ‘drug free world’. But as we dissect Gaby’s story and 
peel back the layers of gender- based violence, social exclusion and racial dis-
crimination, as well as the impacts of imprisonment on her child, the balance 
shifts towards other possible interpretations. Gaby’s story becomes part of a 
global trend: the gendered impacts of drug policy on women and development.
1.1 Main Arguments, Methodology, and Contents
The impacts of drug policy on women can be analysed from the particular situ-
ation of, at least, four groups: i) incarcerated and formerly incarcerated women 
and girls, ii) women who use drugs, iii) female children and adolescents with 
an incarcerated ‘appropriate adult’ (an approximate form of legal guardian-
ship) or with an appropriate adult in residential drug treatment, and iv) wom-
en carers of people in prisons or of drug users.
This chapter focuses on the first two groups, specifically on women detained 
in prisons and in drug treatment centres. This choice of focus is informed by the 
author’s expertise, but also by the intersection of gender beliefs with detention,2 
 2 Detention is understood in terms of the General Provision of the Principles and Best Prac-








The Gendered Impacts of Drug Policy on Women 209
which constitutes a symbolic and material space for the reproduction of multi-
ple forms of gender- based violence against women and girls.
Drug policy is understood according to the definition provided by the World 
Health Organization (who):
In the context of psychoactive drugs, the aggregate of polices designed to 
affect the supply and/ or the demand for illicit drugs, locally or nationally, 
including education, treatment, control, and other programmes and pol-
icies. In this context, “drug policy” often does not include pharmaceutical 
policy (except with regard to diversion to non- medical use), or tobacco 
or alcohol policy.3
National drug policy is framed by the United Nations’ (UN) three conven-
tions on drugs4 as well as other relevant documents developed at the inter-
national level.5 In the case of women, three documents highlight women’s 
which states: ‘For the purposes of the present document, “deprivation of liberty” means: Any 
form of detention, imprisonment, institutionalisation, or custody of a person in a public or 
private institution which that person is not permitted to leave at will, by order of or under 
de facto control of a judicial, administrative or any other authority, for reasons of humani-
tarian assistance, treatment, guardianship, protection, or because of crimes or legal offences. 
This category of persons includes not only those deprived of their liberty because of crimes 
or infringements or non- compliance with the law, whether they are accused or convicted, 
but also those persons who are under the custody and supervision of certain institutions, 
such as: psychiatric hospitals and other establishments for persons with physical, mental, or 
sensory disabilities; institutions for children and the elderly; centres for migrants, refugees, 
asylum or refugee status seekers, stateless and undocumented persons; and any other similar 
institution the purpose of which is to deprive persons of their liberty’.
 3 In its Lexicon of alcohol and drug terms, available on https:// www.who.int/ substance_ abuse/ 
terminology/ who_ lexicon/ en/ (accessed on 5 May 2020), the who provides two definitions 
of drug policy. The second is: ‘In the context of who’s Action Programme on Essential Drugs, 
‘national drug policy’ refers to a national pharmaceutical policy concerning the marketing, 
availability, and therapeutic use of medicines. who recommends that every country should 
have such a policy, formulated in the context of a national health policy. The who List of 
Essential Drugs is an effort to assist developing countries to develop a pharmaceutical policy 
attuned to allocating scarce funds for pharmaceuticals on the basis of health needs rather 
than market considerations’. This chapter uses only the first definition, which is reproduced 
in the chapter’s main text.
 4 The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Conven-
tion of Psychotropic Substances (1971); and the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, of 1988.
 5 These include— to name only some of the more relevant documents from recent years— the 
Outcome Document of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UN General As-
sembly, 2016), adopted in April 2016; the United Nations system common position supporting 









gender- specific exposure to discrimination and violence within the context of 
drug trafficking and drug use and call on international agencies and member 
states to mainstream gender in drug policy, take into account women’s specific 
needs and realities, and adopt gender- centred actions in drug policy design 
and implementations. These documents are the UN Women (2014) policy brief 
A gender perspective on the impact of drug use, the drug trade, and drug control 
regimes, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs’ resolution Mainstreaming a gen-
der perspective in drug- related policies and programmes (un cnd, 2016) and 
the Outcome Document of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session 
on Drugs (UN General Assembly, 2016). All of these documents provide pub-
lic policy proposals, which aim to take into account the gender dimension of 
drug use and drug trafficking and implementing women- centred drug policies, 
among them: i) implement alternatives to the incarceration of women accused 
of non- violent, minor offences and who are pregnant or the primary or sole 
carers of small children; ii) gather and share sex- disaggregated data; iii) pro-
vide women who use drugs with access to treatment services tailored around 
their needs; iv) work towards the elimination of violence and discrimination 
against women; and v) guarantee women’s inclusion in the design, implemen-
tation, evaluation and monitoring of drug policy.
This chapter acknowledges the relevance of the analysis included in the 
above- mentioned documents and agrees on the general tone and contents 
of their proposals. It also, however, stresses the importance of placing drug 
policy under scrutiny using the lens of gender and feminist critique. To such 
ends, women’s narratives are the main methodological resource used to un-
pack some of the gendered impacts of drug policy on women in detention and 
their negative impact on the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 
(sdg) number 5: ‘Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls’ 
(UN General Assembly, 2015, 14). This chapter argues that current drug policies 
foster violence against women and children and further undermine gender 
equality and development.
The case studies of women in prison for drug offences presented in the sec-
ond section of this chapter are part of an awareness- raising and lobbying ef-
fort developed with the civil society organisations equis Justice for Women 
(Mexico) and the Washington Office on Latin America (wola). The cases are 
collaboration, adopted in November 2018 (UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 2019, 
12‒14); and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs Implementation of All International Drug 
Policy Commitments. Follow- up to the 2019 Ministerial Declaration Strengthening Our Ac-
tions at the National, Regional and International Levels to Accelerate the Implementation of 







The Gendered Impacts of Drug Policy on Women 211
discussed within the larger framework of women in prison for drug offences. 
They benefit from the author’s over ten years of empirical research, mostly in 
Mexican female and mixed prisons, as well as comparative law and policy re-
search on women in prison for drug offences with a focus on Latin America (Gi-
acomello, 2013a, 2013b, 2017a, 2017b; Giacomello, Erreguerena and Blas, 2017).
The information presented here on women who use drugs and are deprived 
of their liberty in drug treatment centres or in prison is the result of one year 
of research, including nine months of field work in i) two prisons, ii) two public 
and one semi- private treatment centre, iii) a semi- private opioid- substitution- 
treatment clinic, and iv) five private treatment centres (for people with low in-
comes)— three of these being for women and girls only and the others being for 
both men and women and adolescents of both sexes— in four states of Mexico.
Information on the women and girls who generously participated in semi- 
structured interviews with the author is systematised in a figure in the corre-
sponding section and the analysis is based on the entirety of the data collected, 
with two stories being narrated in more detail to give a deeper sense of the 
general findings. As can be seen from Figure 12.2, this information is not ho-
mogenous for all the informants as a result of the methodological choice of the 
author. Given the delicacy and intimacy of the topics under discussion and the 
life experiences women and girls shared in our fragile and time- bound space of 
trust, the interview was conducted as a conversation and not a closed- answer 
questionnaire with open questions. Therefore, if some information was not 
provided when asked for, if the context (time limits, a situation of danger, 
group interview, or the presence of authorities, among other factors) acted as 
an obstacle to the development of certain answers, or if the informant simply 
took control of the interview and ‘used’ it as a space for being listened to, the 
author did not stress particular missing elements, rather opting to preserve the 
continuity and confidence of the conversation.
Both the individual and the group interviews focused on three topics: i) the 
women’s relationship with drugs; ii) the intersection of drug use with life ex-
periences, which ended up being mostly a narrative of cyclical gender- based 
violence and different forms of institutionalisation (either in juvenile deten-
tion centres, drug treatment centres, prisons, or institutions for children who 
had been abandoned or ill- treated by their families); and iii) life conditions in 
treatment centres.
In the case of women in prison, we also talked about their crimes— mainly 
their circumstances rather than the legal process. Involvement in a criminal 
offence (robbery, homicide, kidnapping, drug dealing) was mostly related to 





Group interviews mainly took place in prisons due to two main factors: the 
author had the opportunity to interview between four and ten women during 
each prison visit in a constrained amount of time (usually around three hours). 
In order to listen to all of the women who attended the interviews without 
keeping them waiting or cancelling at the last minute, it was more convenient 
to develop the individual interview in a group context. Of course, participation 
in a group interview only occurred if and when women felt comfortable with it. 
The second factor, which reinforced the first, is that prison authorities brought 
the women to me in groups, although this did not happen in all prisons. In oth-
er cases, collective interviews happened because women and girls requested it. 
In one case, for example, two inmates wanted to be interviewed together but 
not with other inmates. In a public treatment centre, two adolescents asked 
to be interviewed together and the centre also recommended it, since one of 
them had experienced a crisis after sharing, during a collective therapeutic ses-
sion, that she had been a victim of rape. She was eager to be interviewed and to 
talk about her experience, but only if accompanied by her friend.
At the beginning of each individual or group interview, the women and girls 
were informed of the structure and purpose of the encounter and were invited 
to leave whenever they needed or wanted to, and to disclose only the type and 
amount of information they felt comfortable sharing. They were also prom-
ised that if they decided to withdraw from the interview, there would be no 
 repercussions.
Generally speaking, I made efforts to make them feel at ease, listened to, 
and free to leave at any time, and also to discuss topics they chose if it helped 
make them feel better. In general, the experience of being listened to seemed 
to prove successful and have a soothing effect. In one case in particular, in a 
drug treatment centre in which I myself felt in danger, the girls wanted to talk 
to me even if they knew they would probably be punished for it. Despite my 
intention to leave once I understood the gravity of the situation, two girls in-
sisted on being interviewed, because they were completely isolated and had 
nobody to talk to. I underlined that talking to me could put them in danger and 
that I had no means of protecting them. I added, however, that if they felt the 
need to talk, I would stay there until the centre’s owners (a protestant pastor 
and his wife) told me to leave, which occurred a couple of interviews later, in 
threatening tones.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that the author’s access to these interviewees 
was mainly due to her personal and professional contacts rather than to insti-
tutional processes. The latter only played out in the case of semi- public treat-
ment centres. In positive terms, this gave the author access to data that are 
often difficult to gather. Nevertheless, it also mirrors how institutional barriers 
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or, in the case of some drug treatment centres, efforts to conceal illegal conduct 
often impede research that can benefit the development of public policies.
This chapter develops as follows. Section 2, ‘Discrimination and Violence 
Against Women’, outlines some theoretical concepts, as well as data that speak 
to the persistence of unequal gender relationships. Section 3, ‘Gender and Drug 
Policy’ includes a core of case studies that are part of the author’s fieldwork on 
women in prison for drug offences and women drug users in public and private 
treatment centres in Mexico. The chapter ends with some final reflections on 
the challenges to mainstreaming gender in drug policy.
2 Discrimination and Violence against Women
I was taught that women must obey their husbands.
sonia, sentenced to 5 years for cocaine possession,  
Female Prison Centre Tanivet, Oaxaca, Mexico
2.1 Gender, Gender Systems and Patriarchal Structures
In this chapter, the concept of gender is understood i) as an identity organiser 
of binary, unequal social structures in which men have power over women; ii) 
as a relational notion; and iii) in terms of the gender system.
It is important to underline that the fictional binary division between men 
and women as the only possible sexual and gender identities, which is one of 
the pillars of gender systems, is preserved in this piece. This is not because 
the author believes that it accurately describes sexual and gender identities, 
but because it is part of the gender systems that underpin and build the in-
terviewed women’s narratives and experiences, as well as the way drug policy 
refers to gender. Other gender identities, and the transformative power of what 
we mean by gender and how it is enacted in individual and social contexts, are 
therefore not part of the theoretical framework of this chapter.
Gender as a ‘background identity’ (Ridgeway, 2009) and ‘primary form of pow-
er relationship’ (Wallach Scott, 2008) refers to how characteristics, roles, attrib-
utes and expectations are built on people’s perceptions of themselves and others. 
This is valid in people’s individual and social relationships, in their relationships 
with their own bodies and sexual identities, and in how they are perceived and 
expected to be by others. Gender identity interweaves with other social identity 
constructs, such as race, ethnicity and class, and forms part of multi- layered lev-
els of social stratifications and stereotypes attached to people and social groups.
Differences between men and women, men and men, and women and 








Correll, 2004), with women being traditionally portrayed as inferior to men. 
Héritier (2007) defines women’s lower social status with the concept ‘differ-
ential valence of sexes’, which is always present, although with differences be-
tween societies, social groups and historical times.
Gender, therefore, constitutes a changing set of cultural beliefs and symbols 
that underlie the ongoing construction and reinterpretation of what we mean 
by the binary and asymmetrical conceptions of ‘men’ and ‘women’ and how 
such conceptions are enacted by individuals, relationships and social contexts.
Gender roles and attributes are transmitted in the shape of a binary system 
of prohibitions and expectations. In other words, gender is both proscribed 
and prescribed. The combination of gender prescriptions and proscriptions 
constitutes what is here defined as ‘gender axioms’— that is, particular sets of 
behaviours that both respond and correspond to the beliefs that lie beneath 
them. For instance, women are expected to love their babies and are pro-
scribed from taking drugs during pregnancy. Such prescription and proscrip-
tion are glued to each other by the traditional gender belief— rooted in the 
interpretation of women’s bodies— that reproduction is not only biologically 
possible, but naturally desired. Women who do not want to become mothers 
have to explain their decision, whereas that does not happen to women who 
opt for motherhood. Furthermore, the ‘natural role of women as life- givers’ 
should find a cultural correspondence in the ‘cultural role of women as carers’, 
thus guaranteeing a continuum between sex and gender identity that can be 
presented as a coherent product of gender- based prescriptions and prohibi-
tions. Not fulfilling the prescription or transgressing the proscription leads to 
a breach of the gender axiom, which in turn leads to stigma and punishment.
Gender axioms encompass both hegemonic gender beliefs and alternative 
gender beliefs (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004), with the former prevailing on the 
latter in terms of how people expect to be treated and conduct their behaviour. 
Hegemonic and alternative gender axioms are, however, not fixed, isolated 
structures, but exhibit interplay with each other and can be incorporated into 
an individual’s life story simultaneously. This is the case with women involved 
in drug offences for example. Non- hegemonic agency (namely, transporting 
drugs) is framed in some of the narratives as an act of positive transgression 
(a choice to commit a crime), but also as the acting out of hegemonic gender 
beliefs and roles, such as being a poor, single mother who has to provide for her 
children, or being an obedient spouse. The combination of agency and gender- 
based victimisation, then, is not only an analytical approximation (Giacomello, 
2017a) but also a narrative nurtured by a rich and plural array of gender beliefs 
that coexist despite binary representations of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘hegemonic’ and 
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Gender, therefore, must be understood not only as an identity axis and a 
relationship’s organiser, but also as a system that operates as a matrix of man-
dates and hierarchies that constrain and direct people’s conduct. These are 
also inherently difficult to resist— in part because of the fear of stigma, and 
partly because of the rewards of attaining ‘normality’ (Goffman, 1961). But also 
because one is always situated within gender relationships— at the interper-
sonal or self- identity level, as well as in the normative and cultural arrange-
ments that regulate societies as a whole, and in its practical effects on formal 
and informal institutions such as language, religion, family, education, state 
institutions, economic organisation and political structures.
Gender systems are in constant flux and changes are reflected in the ad-
vancement of women in all spheres. As it will be shown through data and 
women’s narratives in the following sections, however, the ‘inferiorisation’ of 
women is a persistent element. The ‘differential valence of sexes’ is embodied 
in and reproduced through the six patriarchal structures described in Walby’s 
Theorizing Patriarchy: i) a patriarchal mode of production in which women’s 
labour is expropriated by their husbands; ii) patriarchal relations with regard 
to waged labour; iii) the patriarchal state; iv) male violence; v) patriarchal rela-
tions in sexuality; and vi) patriarchal culture. These six partially independent 
structures compose patriarchy ‘as a system of social structures, and practices 
in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’ (Walby, 1989, 214). These 
structures also interweave and manifest themselves in the realm of drug traf-
ficking, drug policy, and their effects on women.
2.2 Data on Gender Inequality
Despite the fact that the last century has witnessed enormous progress towards 
gender equality, women still lag behind men in all areas:  education, health, 
economic independence and access to resources, economic competitiveness, 
and participation in political decision- making bodies.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap 2018  ‘benchmarks 149 
countries on their progress towards gender parity on a scale from 0 (dispari-
ty) to 1 (parity) across four thematic dimensions— the sub- indexes Economic 
Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, 
and Political Empowerment ’ (wef, 2018, vii). The main findings show that the 
gender gap lies at 32 per cent and that the overall global gender gap will close 
in 108 years.6










Gender inequality not only constitutes a violation of human rights, it hin-
ders the development of society as a whole. As outlined in the Human Devel-
opment Indices and Indicators report:
The disadvantages facing women and girls are a major source of inequal-
ity and one of the greatest barriers to human development progress. […]. 
Worldwide, the average HDI value for women (0.705) is 5.9 percent lower 
than that for men (0.749) […]. Much of the gap is due to women’s lower 
income and educational attainment in many countries. The gender gap 
is widest in low human development countries, where the average HDI 
value is 13.8 percent lower for women than for men.
undp, 2018, 5‒6
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes 17 interdependent 
and indivisible goals with 169 associated targets. As outlined in the intro-
duction to this chapter, goal number 5 advocates for gender equality and 
the empowerment of women and girls. The goal breaks down into specific 
targets7 that reflect the main obstacles to reaching equality between men 
and women: violence against women, women’s double or triple work bur-
den especially in unpaid care- giving activities related to domestic tasks and 
child rearing (that is, caring for others at the expense of care for oneself), 
and women’s greater exclusion from formal employment and therefore so-
cial protection, not to mention glass ceilings and pay gaps, which constitute 
 7 The targets are: ‘5.1 End all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere; 
5.2 Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private 
spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation; 5.3 Eliminate all 
harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation; 5.4 
Recognize and value unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of public servic-
es, infrastructure and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility 
within the household and the family as nationally appropriate; 5.5 Ensure women’s full and 
effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision- making 
in political, economic and public life; 5.6 Ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive 
health and reproductive rights as agreed in accordance with the Programme of Action of 
the International Conference on Population and Development and the Beijing Platform for 
Action and the outcome documents of their review conferences; 5.a Undertake reforms to 
give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control 
over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, 
in accordance with national laws; 5.b Enhance the use of enabling technology, in particular 
information and communications technology, to promote the empowerment of women; 5.c 
Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gen-
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some of the most powerful tools in the ongoing oppression of women 
and girls.
The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(eclac) Quadrennial report on regional progress and challenges in relation to 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an (eclac, 2019) shows that Latin America is the most unequal region in the 
world. Income distribution can be illustrated by examining households’ share 
of total income. The highest income quintile (quintile v) accounts for about 45 
per cent of total household income, while the lowest- income quintile (quintile 
i) receives, on average, just 6 per cent (eclac, 2019, 114). Also, after more than a 
decade of falls in poverty and extreme poverty, both have increased since 2015. 
Poverty does not affect all people equally: the report shows that ‘women make 
up a higher proportion of those living in poor households. In Latin America, 
the femininity index of poverty remained stable and high between 2012 and 
2017, at around 113’ (eclac, 2019, 116), which means that for 100 men from the 
age of 20 to 59 living in poverty there are 113 women in a similar situation.
2.3 Violence against Women
Gender- based violence is crucial to understanding women’s participation in 
drug offences as well as the development of dependent drug use.
The Council of Europe’s Convention on preventing and combating violence 
against women and domestic violence, also known as The Istanbul Convention, 
defines gender- based violence against women as ‘violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women dispropor-
tionately’ (Council of Europe, 2011, 8). The UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights defines gender- based violence and its intersections as follows:
Gender- based violence is considered to be any harmful act directed 
against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis of their gender. 
It may include sexual violence, domestic violence, trafficking, forced/ ear-
ly marriage and harmful traditional practices. An understanding of how 
gender intersects, for instance, with race, religion, economic situation, 
political affiliation and geography is also critical to addressing patterns 
and forms of gender- based violence.
ohchr, 2014
The intersectional approach— that is, the recognition of the intersection of 
multiple inequalities (Walby, Amstrong and Strid, 2012) and how this affects 
different people and groups in different ways— is key to understanding the 









by white middle- class women is not the same as that experienced by wom-
en of colour or indigenous women. Furthermore, women in detention, either 
accused of a drug offence or in treatment centres, simultaneously experience 
gender- based violence. This includes sexual violence, intersectional forms of 
violence and discrimination (for being poor, for not fulfilling the gender axiom 
of ‘the good mother’, for being indigenous, etc.) and specific drug policies’ im-
pacts that reinforce gender- based violence: the deprivation of liberty, on one 
hand, and reinforced stigmas towards female illicit drug users, on the other. As 
one of the women I interviewed expressed it: ‘a male drug user is just a user; a 
female drug user is a user and a whore’.
According to UN Women,8 35 per cent of women worldwide have experi-
enced either physical and/ or sexual intimate partner violence or sexual vio-
lence by a non- partner (not including sexual harassment) at some point in 
their lives. The extreme expression of gender- based violence is the gender- 
related killing of women and girls. Whereas men are victims in 80 per cent of 
all homicides, 82 per cent of the victims of intimate partner homicide are wom-
en (unodc, 2018a, 11) Such gender- based killings are often the culmination of 
years or decades of gender- based violence. Globally, the rate of gender- based 
killings by family members or intimate partners— legally defined as ‘femicides’ 
or ‘feminicides’ and punishable as such in most Latin American countries— 
was 1.3 per 100,000 of the female population in 2017 (unodc, 2018a, 11). In 2018 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, most countries had a higher rate than the 
global average: 6.8 in El Salvador (the highest in the region), 5.1 in Honduras, 
3.4 in Trinidad and Tobago, 1.4 in Mexico, 1.3 in Ecuador, and 1.7 in Uruguay.9
3 Gender and Drug Policy
In this section, the gendered impacts of drug policy on women in detention 
are analysed.
Based on the theoretical framework of gender and patriarchal structures ex-
posed in the first part of this chapter, the expression ‘gendered impacts of drug 
policy’ refers to two arguments: the first is that women and men involve them-
selves differently in drug- related activities, both in quantitative and qualitative 
 8 See Facts and figures: Ending violence against women published by UN Women at https:// 
www.unwomen.org/ en/ what- we- do/ ending- violence- against- women/ facts- and- figures 
(accessed on 5 May 2020).
 9 See the page Feminicidio published by the Observatorio de Igaldad de Género, cepal at 
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terms. For instance, the majority of drug users and people incarcerated for 
drug offences are men. Men achieve leadership status in drug trafficking or-
ganisations more often than women, and are also more likely to have a leading 
role in institutions that are responsible for drug demand or supply control ef-
forts. That is, both drug policy institutions and affected populations are male- 
represented and dominated. With reference to Walby’s patriarchal structures 
(1989), both drug trafficking organisations and drug policy reproduce patriar-
chy by assigning women to the lowest positions in the criminal chain with little 
possibility of becoming leaders, and— at the same time— exploit their labour 
through family and partner relationships. Women’s labour is thus not only ex-
propriated and conditioned to glass ceilings, the tasks women are induced or 
forced to perform also put them at greater risk of being captured by law en-
forcement, which is reflected in the disproportionate increase in the numbers 
of women incarcerated for drug offences, as we shall see later in this chapter. 
Also, as it will be shown by women’s testimonies, both women who are ac-
cused of drug offences and women who use drugs experience cyclical gender- 
based violence practiced against them. Whereas this is not directly provoked 
or incited by current drug policy, the prominence of punitive and stigmatizing 
discourses and practices derived by the implementation of the current drug 
policy framework contributes to such violence being overlooked, and— to a 
certain extent— to its implicit justification.
Using gender as an analytical tool to evaluate drug policy not only requires 
describing the participation of women and men differently, it also implies 
taking into account differential roles: forms of participation, ways of involve-
ment, drugs of choice and effects of the implementation of apparently neutral 
 regulations.
Based on the above, the second assumption that underlies the understand-
ing of the gendered impacts of drug policy is that differential is synonymous 
with detrimental to women, based on transversal unequal gender relation-
ships. That is, Héritier’s ‘differential valence of sexes’ runs across drug traffick-
ing, drug use and related policies.
As argued by Walby (1989, 224) ‘the argument that the state is a patriarchal 
structure does not imply that the state is a monolith’. Such a statement is valid 
for international drug policy itself and for its application in the national con-
text. This is why this chapter both opens and closes with remarks on women- 
centred positions within the mainstream drug policy narrative, which both ac-
knowledge and attempt to tackle gender inequalities in terms of the outcomes 
of current drug policy. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that unless drug policy 
is analysed and challenged as a patriarchal structure, such proposals can only 
scrape the surface of inequalities and not truly resolve them.
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The next part of this chapter is structured in two sub- sections. In the first, 
women’s accounts of their involvement in drug trafficking are presented, tak-
ing into account gender- based discrimination and violence and the intersec-
tion of patriarchal structures, along with the dynamics of the drug trade and 
the consequences of supply- control efforts. The last of these implies the in-
creasing rate of female incarceration for minor, non- violent offences. In the 
second sub- section, women drug users’ narratives are presented in relation to 
their life stories and the gender systems operating in drug treatment centres.
3.1 Women in Prison for Drug Offences
The incarceration of women for drug offences is a global phenomenon that 
has witnessed a staggering increase, as outlined by civil society (Álvarez, 
2018, 2019a, 2019b; pri; 2020; wola et al., 2016), international organisations 
(iachr, 2017; incb, 2016; unodc, 2018b; UN Women, 2014) and academic studies 
(Anderson, 2005; Bailey, 2013; Fleetwood, 2014; 2017; Giacomello, 2013a; 2017a; 
Maher and Hudson, 2007). It is also the main cause underlying the growth of 
the female prison population. Although women still constitute a significant 
minority in all prison systems, making up 6.9 per cent of the global prison pop-
ulation (Walmsley, 2017), the Institute for Criminal Policy Research’s prison 
lists testify that the female incarceration rate has increased by 53 per cent since 
2000. In comparison, general prison population growth advances at the same 
pace as the world population, increasing by roughly 20 per cent in the same 
time frame (Walmsley, 2017, 2).
As presented in unodc’s 2018 World Drug Report, women make up approxi-
mately 10 per cent of those brought in contact with the criminal justice system 
for drug- related offences around the world. This percentage varies, however, 
across regions: Oceania, Asia and Latin America have higher proportions, fol-
lowed by Europe. Africa, meanwhile, has much lower numbers, with women 
constituting less than 5 per cent of those arrested for drug offences (unodc, 
2018b, 28).
In a report by Penal Reform International (pri), which analyses sentenc-
ing practices in the case of women accused of drug- related offences— carried 
out in 18 different jurisdictions across the globe— it is demonstrated, for in-
stance, that ‘in a number of jurisdictions covered, non- custodial sentences are 
the more common form of sentences for low-level drug-related offences for 
women (for example, in England and Wales, Germany and New Zealand). In 
contrast, in Russia, non- custodial sentences are only issued in about 4% of 
drug-related offences cases’ (Linklaters, 2020). In Thailand, meanwhile, 82 per 
cent of all women in prison are there for drug offences (Álvarez, 2019a); in the 
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In Latin America, drug offences constitute, depending on the country, either 
the principal or the second reason for the incarceration of women (Giacomello, 
2019). This results from the intersection of three factors. Firstly, Latin America 
is not only the most unequal region in the world and one with high levels of 
violence against women, but it is also a punitive one. Whereas the world incar-
ceration rate— the number of people in prison per 100,000 of population— 
stands at 145 (53 per cent of countries have a lower rate), in the Americas the 
rate is 233 prisoners for 100,000 inhabitants, and in Central America it goes up 
to 316 (Walmsley, 2018). The second factor is that Latin American countries in 
general tend to enforce the use of prison as a response to drug offences, thus 
increasing the prison population. A study by the Collective of Studies on Drugs 
and Law (Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho, cedd) shows that in most 
Latin American countries the number of people in prison for drug offences 
has increased much more than the general prison population and the popu-
lation as a whole. In Brazil, for instance, between 2006 and 2014, the general 
population increased by 8 per cent, the prison population by 55 per cent and 
the number of people in prison for drug offences by 267 per cent. These same 
categories, respectively, saw increases of 19 per cent, 142 per cent and 289 per 
cent in Colombia between 2000 and 2015 and of 13 per cent, 49 per cent and 
127 per cent in Argentina between 2002 and 2014 (Chaparro, Pérez Correa, 
Youngers, 2017, 26).
As shown in the study Childhood that matters (Niñez que cuenta) (Giacomello, 
2019), which looks at the impact of drug policies on children with incarcerated 
parents in Latin America and the Caribbean, the punitive approach to the im-
plementation of drug policies has a proportionately higher impact on women. 
Figure 12.1 shows the percentage of men and women incarcerated for drug of-
fences in selected countries.
With the exceptions of the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, the differ-
ences are striking. The use of pre- trial detention and prison sentences for mi-
nor, non- violent drug offences partly explains this trend (García Castro, 2019).
The general regional trend toward incarcerating people is a direct result of 
international drug policies and their implementation in punitive countries. 
Both the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1988 Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances call for the 
use of incarceration against people who participate in drug trafficking (namely 
in Article 36 of the former and Article 3 of the latter). Furthermore, the number 
of arrests of people accused of drug offences is an indicator at the internation-
al level of successful national drug policies (Bewley- Taylor, 2016). While some 
margin for manoeuvre is provided in relation to dependent drug users (adding 









American countries. Furthermore, the response to micro- scale trafficking, of-
ten linked to drug dependence, is usually imprisonment or pre- trial detention. 
The increase in levels of incarceration, the prison crisis that affects most coun-
tries in Latin America, and the impacts of incarceration on children with in-
carcerated parents are therefore a direct consequence of current drug policies 
and their aims.
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter through the case of Gaby, 
what national ‘success’ mirrors is the continuation of an ongoing, invisible 
and unquestioned set of multiple forms of violence against women and girls. 
The following cases represent some of the women incarcerated for drug 
offences in Mexico. They strengthen existing knowledge with regard to in-
carcerated women’s profiles, and to their involvement and participation in 
drug offences. These are often poor, uneducated women with a history of 
violence used against them as children and/ or sexual gender- based violence 
used against them as women and girls, who grew up in a context of general 
underdevelopment and a lack of state services, in which drug trafficking or-
ganisations can proliferate. Women mainly become involved in trafficking 
through their male partners. Their role as agents in a context of victimisation 
makes the difference between consent and coercion to commit a crime more 
complex. Whereas most of the women I interviewed acknowledge their ac-






































The Gendered Impacts of Drug Policy on Women 223
or trafficking them across borders, the context of their involvement conveys 
a ‘forced choice’ rather than free, willing and full consent. In addition, these 
complexities show the inextricable relationship between gender, violence 
and punishment in which agency and victimisation coexist (Giacomello, 
2017a).
3.1.1 Gaby
As described in this chapter’s introduction, Gaby was a victim of sexual vio-
lence and child- labour exploitation during her childhood. Both went unpun-
ished. Her only appearance in official records is as a drug trafficker. During her 
detention, she was transferred from a mixed prison— a prison where men’s 
facilities have a few spaces for women; either dorms, sections, or some sort of 
separate buildings— to Tanivet, an all- female facility closer to the state capital. 
It is worth pointing out that female prisoners in Mexico are mostly hosted in 
mixed prisons, since the country only counts 19 female prisons out of a total 
of 311 prison centres (cndh, 2018). Prison conditions in Mexico are dire for 
everybody, but women in prison are further exposed to the violation of several 
rights, including the right to health, sexual and reproductive rights, the right to 
education, dignified living conditions, work, and sometimes the right to prox-
imity to their families and to communication, among others. Furthermore, 
sexual abuse can be used as a bargaining commodity in exchange for services, 
and human trafficking for sexual exploitation can happen in mixed prisons as 
well, including the sexual abuse of children who live with their mothers. Ac-
cording to the National Commission on Human Rights, in 2018 there were 436 
children living with their mothers in prison (cndh, 2018). Gaby’s son was no 
longer in Tanivet with her since she had had to face the choice of whether to 
keep him with her or send him to a public institution to receive rehabilitation 
for his conditions. At first, she asked the judge to grant her the right to accom-
pany her son to rehabilitation and come back with him so they did not have to 
part. The judge, however, argued that ‘children are one matter and the crime is 
a different one’, adding that ‘she should have thought about it before trafficking 
marijuana’. Such arguments constitute a violation of Article 9 of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, which protects the children’s right to be close to 
their families as long as it is in their best interest. They also do not take into ac-
count the UN Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non- custodial 
Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules) on applying non- custodial 
measures to women who are sole or primary caregivers of children (Giacomel-
lo, 2018). Gaby had to choose between her son’s right to health and his right to 








Gaby’s involvement in drug trafficking began when she was a child. She 
was recruited by a high- ranking man in drug trafficking. Later, she was also 
involved with and participated in transporting marijuana because of a man, 
which exposed her even more to the risk of arrest. She was, as many of her 
prison companions, a child with limited opportunities who became a woman 
in a male- dominated environment, within a patriarchal state where violence 
against women not only goes unpunished, but is considered legitimate. The 
state’s response, in the form of her incarceration, further violated Gaby’s rights 
and reduced her opportunities for empowerment. It also put her son’s well- be-
ing at risk: first by not providing proper living conditions and access to health-
care in prison, and then by forcing his separation from his mother as the only 
option if he was actually to receive treatment and rehabilitation.
Drug policy rhetoric and its system of indicators presented the stage upon, 
and the umbrella beneath which, state violence could be legitimately de-
ployed. Gaby and her son are part of an official narrative of the prosecution 
and punishment of offenders. Such narratives must be contrasted by others 
that show them as victims of continued state omissions and violations, and 
unequal and violent gender relationships.
3.1.2 Sonia
Sonia’s story shares common traits with Gaby’s. She was accused of possession 
of cocaine, which translated into a five- year prison sentence. She transported 
the drug from Guatemala to Mexico, hidden under her skirt, travelling on a bus, 
with her two- year- old son on her lap and her recruiter- husband sitting beside 
her. The way she tells her story echoes those of most drug mules: an economic 
emergency— a debt incurred by her husband— which led to her husband par-
ticipating as a mule in the largest world land corridor for cocaine. He then told 
her to travel with him: in that way, they would pay off the debt more rapidly. 
She refused at first, not wanting to put her family’s well- being at risk, but she 
finally accepted. The gender axiom mandated that she obey her husband and 
endure the violence. She did both and simultaneously fulfilled the prescription 
of the good mother: she would take her youngest son with her, since it was her 
responsibility to look after him.
Gender prescriptions can be used to camouflage trafficking: young, beau-
tiful women crossing borders and seducing guards, normal- looking women 
queuing as prison visitors, ‘families’ travelling together, the woman dutifully 
sitting by her husband (Giacomello, 2013a). In this case, Sonia’s husband sug-
gested she should hide the drug taped to her legs, under her skirt.
When arrested, they were taken to the federal police prosecution office. Of-
ficials threatened to take Sonia’s son from her ‘and give him to a family who 
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truly loves him’. Threats using children are a rather common means of psycho-
logical torture in detention, usually threatening forms of physical and sexual 
torture (inegi, 2016).
The child was later sent to a public institution and both Sonia and her hus-
band underwent pre- trial detention. He was released and she was sentenced. 
The lawyer convinced Sonia to plead guilty to the accusation, so her husband 
could be freed and go back to Guatemala with their child. Sonia has not seen 
her children since her imprisonment, her husband having never fulfilled his 
promise to visit.
Gender axioms acted to Sonia’s disadvantage. Not only was she a victim of 
domestic violence through the prescriptions of the role of the good wife and 
mother, she was made to carry drugs across borders herself. She was tortured 
by federal police on the basis of gender axioms, then incarcerated in lieu of her 
husband. Such women have a name in Mexican prisons: pagadoras— payers; 
that is, women that do time covering up for or being accused together with, or 
instead of, male partners or relatives (Giacomello, 2013a).
Both Gaby and Sonia, together with dozens of incarcerated women I have 
spoken with over the years, share three axes that condition their agency in drug 
offences, since most of them acknowledge having committed an offence. The 
first is underdevelopment: multifactorial poverty, lack of access to basic servic-
es, little or no economic opportunities, the feminisation of poverty, and a low 
level of schooling. This axis is reinforced by gender discrimination and violence, 
which run through these women’s lives and have an impact on how they be-
come involved in drug offences, the roles they play and their exposure to being 
caught transporting drugs. The axis of drug policy manifests itself in two ways. 
First, through the creation, via prohibition, of illicit drug markets and drug traf-
ficking organisations, which mirror hegemonic gender systems and treat wom-
en and children as disposable objects, maintaining sexist structures that lead to 
the exploitation of women’s labour by their male partners, patriarchal relations 
with regard to illicit waged labour, and patriarchal violence and culture.
The other direct result of drug policy is the implementation of a punitive 
discourse that rests on incarceration as a means of deterrence. This has not 
only clearly failed, given the growth of illicit drug markets (unodc 2019), it has 
two consequences that are obliterated by the rhetoric and purposes of drug 
policies themselves. The incarceration of poor, uneducated women who are 
mostly victims of violence is one such consequence. The impact of incarcer-
ation on millions of children with incarcerated parents and the creation of 
institutionalised, transnational children is the other ( Giacomello, 2019).
Drug policy, therefore, creates the conditions for women’s exploitation 






incarceration. Women incarcerated for drug offences are, rather than traffick-
ers, trafficked women. The interplay of gender systems and drug policy sets 
the stage for the human trafficking of women by both the patriarchal state and 
criminal organisations. Through the current implementation of drug policy, 
particularly the hyper- use of the criminal justice system to the detriment of 
health- centred approaches, states not only fail to accomplish their mandates 
in terms of development and gender equality, they also generate and reinforce 
new and existing forms of discrimination and violence against women.
That is also the case for women who use drugs, as shown in the following 
section.
3.2 Women’s Drug Use and Access to Treatment
In 2008, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime identified five unintended conse-
quences related to the implementation of the current international drug policy 
framework, which is made up of the three above- mentioned UN conventions. 
These consequences are: i) the creation of a criminal market; ii) ‘policy displace-
ment’, meaning that more resources have been put into supply- control efforts, 
thus neglecting public health- oriented measures, despite the fact that public 
health is ‘the driving concern behind drug control’ (unodc, 2008, 216); iii) geo-
graphical displacement, or the ‘balloon effect’, which changes production trends 
and trafficking routes in order to avoid law enforcement; iv) substance displace-
ments; and, finally v) ‘the way the authorities perceive and deal with the users 
of illicit drugs’. The unodc continues, ‘A system appears to have been created 
in which those who fall into the web of addiction find themselves excluded and 
marginalised from the social mainstream, tainted with a moral stigma, and often 
unable to find treatment even when motivated to seek it’ (unodc, 2008, 216).
This section is concerned with the following unintended consequences: pol-
icy displacement (ii) and how authorities deal with drug users (v).
Available information shows that, at the global level, women use illicit drugs 
much less than men do, while women’s non- medical use of opioids and tranquil-
lisers is at a comparable level to that of men, or higher (unodc, 2018b, 6). Data 
from Latin America (cicad, 2019) and Mexico (inegi, 2017) confirm these trends. 
Gender differences with regard to drug use tend, however, to be reduced or dis-
appear among adolescents. Women usually become involved in drug use mainly 
through intimate male partners, and tend to develop dependency more rapidly 
than men, a phenomenon known as the ‘telescoping effect’ (unodc, 2018b).
According to the Council of Europe’s Pompidou Group’s study Improving the 
management of violence experienced by women who use psychoactive substanc-
es, women drug users experience more and more severe violence than i) men, 







The Gendered Impacts of Drug Policy on Women 227
use drugs have experienced more violence than people who do not use drugs 
(Benoit and Jauffret- Roustide, 2016). Women drug users are victims of i) do-
mestic and intimate partner violence; ii) violence during childhood; iii) drug- 
use scenes, mainly sexual violence; iv) sex work- related violence; v) human 
trafficking- related violence and vi) institutional violence. The latter manifests 
in different settings, including police stations and patrols, as well as in drug 
treatment centres, particularly in those shared by male and female patients.
Women’s access to treatment is constrained by several factors, but the main 
one is the intersection of gender systems and drug policy. The lack of public 
health focus in drug policy not only voids the whole drug control system’s sup-
posed rhetoric and aims, it puts people’s lives at risk. As stated by the Study on 
the impact of the world drug problem on the enjoyment of human rights from 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (ohchr, 2015), current drug 
policies lead to several violations of drug users’ human rights. These include 
the right to health, as policies do not guarantee access to treatment. They also 
criminalise drug users. In addition, people who use drugs can be victims of 
discrimination in healthcare settings. Lack of harm reduction services in the 
community and in prisons further reduces opportunities to reach drug users 
and to reduce the transmission of hiv and hepatitis B and C, or to prevent 
overdoses. Stigma and criminalisation around drug use discourage users from 
looking for support in the healthcare sector, for fear of being arrested. sdg 
number 3, ‘Ensure healthy lives and promote well- being for all at all ages’, (UN 
General Assembly, 2015, 14) specifically addresses these issues in targets 3.3 (by 
2030, end the epidemics of aids, tuberculosis, malaria and neglected tropical 
diseases and combat hepatitis, water- borne diseases and other communica-
ble diseases) and 3.5 (strengthen the prevention and treatment of substance 
abuse, including narcotic drug abuse and harmful use of alcohol).
Lack of sufficient treatment facilities, on the one hand, and barriers to ac-
cess to existing treatments, on the other, both result directly from drug policy 
in specific national settings. Both are worse for women. According to the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board, ‘fewer women than men who need to access 
treatment are able to do so’ (incb, 2016, 8). This is directly related to cultural, 
social and structural barriers in which drug policy and gender interweave:
Globally, women make up one third of people who abuse drugs, but just 
one fifth of those who are in treatment. Women encounter significant 
systemic, structural, social, cultural and personal barriers to accessing 
substance abuse treatment. At the structural level, the main obstacles 
include a lack of childcare services and judgmental attitudes to wom-






treatment programmes do not admit women with children. Women 
who use drugs may not seek treatment for fear of losing custody of their 
children. Other reasons for low uptake of treatment by women include 
hostile attitudes of medical staff or clinics being inundated with male 
clients, making them uninviting for female clients.
incb, 2016, 7
Women also face greater barriers to accessing harm reduction services and 
treatment in prison (Sander, Shirley- Beavan and Stone, 2019) and in the com-
munity. This is not exclusive to Latin America but can be defined as a global 
problem, with different countries providing different levels and quality of ac-
cess (Ayon et al., 2019; Médecins du Monde, 2019; Uusküla et al., 2018); further-
more, women who use drugs and are victims of violence are usually denied 
access to shelters for women victims of violence based on their drug use, either 
by law or by institutionalised practice, thus leaving them and their children in 
a situation of further vulnerability due to the actions of state and private insti-
tutions (Benoit and Jauffret- Roustide, 2016; hri, 2013).
3.3 Women in Drug Treatment Centres in Mexico
In Mexico, public drug treatment facilities are scarce: only 44 residential cen-
tres, plus 11 facilities operated by Centres of Juvenile Integration (Centros de 
Integración Juvenil (cij s)— a government- funded civil organisation) versus 
an estimated 2,108 private centres (conadic, 2019a). Only half of the pri-
vate centres are registered with the National Commission against Addictions 
(Comisión Nacional contra las Adicciones, conadic), which is, among oth-
er functions, the authority responsible for the monitoring of drug treatment 
centres. Of the 1,045 registered centres, only 348 are recognised by conadic, 
which means that they have been evaluated and supervised. Of these, 99 are 
for men and women, 34 for women only and the rest for men only (conadic, 
2019b). cij s are also mixed. As in the case of prisons, therefore, women are 
mostly treated in mixed centres. The sizeable dominance of unregistered and 
unsupervised residential treatment centres translates into a myriad of meth-
ods, living conditions, and often abuses. Most centres, colloquially known as 
‘barns’ (granjas) or ‘annexes’ (anexos) are places where physical punishment 
is common, together with psychological ill treatment, forced labour, sexual 
abuse and killing. For drug users forced to live in these centres indefinitely, not 
waking up the next day is a concrete threat. Unfortunately, academic research 
on this topic is scarce, as venturing into these centres is risky.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the following pages are 
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of an ongoing research project that the author is developing for the University 
of Chiapas and equis Justice for Women (Mexico). Table 12.1 shows how the 
interviews are distributed.
The interviews with women and girls were carried out individually or in 
groups, depending on the women’s choice. Both in prison and treatment cen-
tres, privacy was guaranteed and the conversations took place in confidential 
settings. The interviews centred on two main topics: the development of de-
pendent drug use in relation to interviewees’ life stories, and interviewees’ ex-
periences in residential treatment. Figure 12.2 shows the information gathered 
for each woman or girl. It systematises the information on 21 women and 4 girls 
in drug treatment centres, 15 women in prison and 2 former drug users who 
work, respectively, as director and sub- director at private treatment centres.
The first two columns indicate name and age; in the next nine— coloured— 
columns the first drug used is marked with the interviewee’s age at first use (ei-
ther with the specific age or with an age range or time period; see the figure’s key 
for details). Where two or more drugs were used for the first time at the same 
age range, the additional substances are referred to in the same way. ‘ats s’ stands 
for amphetamine- type stimulants. The next— monochrome— column reports 
whether the woman or girl has been a victim of sexual abuse. This question was 
never formulated specifically, the topic only being brought up by the author if 
conditions of confidence had been established or by the interviewees themselves. 
Therefore, when sexual abuse was not discussed, the case is labelled ‘not speci-
fied’ in grey colour. If there is no sign, it indicates that the woman or girl specifical-
ly affirmed that they had not been raped. The final column records the number of 
children, with pregnancy at the time of interview denoted by an asterisk.
table 12.1 Type and number of informants
Group Number of interviews
Women in drug treatment centres 21
Girls in drug treatment centres 4
Boys in drug treatment centres 4
Women in prison 15
Women in prison for drug offences (no drug use) 3







In terms of drug use, the data reflect national trends, with alcohol and to-
bacco being the first drugs used and marijuana the first illegal one (Instituto 
Nacional de Psiquiatría Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz, 2017). Drugs of impact— 
that is, those that cause more individual and social harm— are mainly crystal 
meth, heroin and cocaine- type drugs. All drug use, with one exception, begins 





























































 figure 12.2  Information gathered on women and girls who use drugs
  source: created by author
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members (mainly fathers and brothers) are the main vector of introduction to 
drug use. For example, Marta was given cocaine by her father, a federal police 
officer, when she was 12, so that ‘no one could fool her when she grew up’. Most 
women have families with precedents of alcohol abuse.
Of the 43 women and girls, 21 reported sexual abuse. The main perpetra-
tors were uncles, stepfathers, fathers, grandparents and cousins. A total of 23 
had children, reflecting the trend of teenage pregnancies mentioned in this 
chapter’s introduction. That was the experience of Sarah, who was abused 
by her older cousins when she was eight and until she was 11, every Sunday 
afternoon, right after mass. Or Tamara, who was abused by her grandfather 
and then sent to a juvenile detention centre after she stabbed him to death at 
the age of 16. ‘Cat’ (Gato) was raped by her grandfather beginning when she 
was three years old and then by her father at the age of 16. Sexual violence is 
































































































B. Women in prison
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not usually reported, and when it is female children are usually not believed. 
None of the multiple forms of violence these women suffered as children led 
to consequences for the perpetrators. They did, though, for their victims. These 
women’s relationships with drugs are intrinsically related to their life stories 
and gender (Romero Mendoza et al., 2018).
The following cases provide an example of the narratives that shape the 
findings of the research presented here. The first is the case of Alejandra, an 
incarcerated women at the time of the interview. The second is that of Sol, a 
young adolescent who worked as a killer for a drug cartel and was detained 
against her will in a private treatment centre.
3.3.1 Alejandra
‘You have had a very difficult life …’, I state, after more than 40 minutes of lis-
tening to her, feeling that a piece was missing. ‘After a situation that happened 
to me … I changed. I was happy …’ she says looking down, ‘I was happy, happy 
…’ she reaffirms, her mind recollecting memories from a time in her childhood. 
‘Did someone hurt you?’ I ask. Her story finally begins.
Alejandra (Ale) was thirteen and she lived in a village in Chiapas, a poor 
state in the south of Mexico. She lived with her grandparents and her siblings. 
Both her parents lived in other Mexican states. One morning she was walking 
to school. She usually walked with a schoolmate, her platonic love. But that 
day he did not show up. Two neighbours appeared. They hit her ankles with a 
stick and forced her to walk with them to a nearby field. She called for help, but 
nobody came. ‘They did everything they wanted with me’, she said, raping and 
beating her for hours. When they let her go, they urged her not to tell anybody 
and threatened to rape her sisters if she did. They started standing in front of 
her house every day, checking on her, forcing her into fearful silence. After a 
few days, she shared what happened with her grandmother. Yet even after her 
family told the police, nothing happened. She went back to school a few days 
after that, changing the way she went back home, trying to avoid them. But one 
day the same two men intercepted her. They took her to a house and kept her 
captive, raping and beating her. ‘There were kids in the room’, she said, perhaps 
the men’s sons or nephews, and they would say to them: ‘Look and learn how 
to treat women’. After three days, they released her.
That was the story that changed Ale’s life. Her adolescence and youth were 
marked by drug abuse and detention in a juvenile penal centre. She was accused 
of being an accomplice in a homicide, and turned to prostitution to obtain mon-
ey to pay for drugs. Yet she needed more drugs to find the strength to sell herself 
again. When I met her, she was in pre- trial detention in the female section of the 
medium- security prison El Amate, being held for robbery with violence.
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3.3.2 Sol
Sol was 15 years old when I  interviewed her. She was kept in an ‘anexo’. Her 
family brought her there by force and she was dragged inside, with violence, 
by the anexo’s ‘guards’ (inmates who acquire some degree of authority within 
the centres’ vertical regime of control). She feared for her life: on the one hand, 
Fito, a ‘military man’ or ‘former police man’ in charge of the centre’s security— 
as the women and girls I spoke to described him— could punish her and her 
fellow inmates for giving an interview. On the other, she knew that the drug 
cartel she used to work for might attempt to murder her: ‘I left the cartel; there 
is no way out of the cartel, only death’.
Her drug use began when she was six, with inhalants. She grew up in the 
red zone of a city in northern central Mexico, with her mother, a sex worker. 
Then her mother moved to Tijuana, on the northern border, where she started 
working as a ‘company lady’ for a drug cartel. Sol’s father worked for a rival 
drug cartel on the other side of the border, in Ciudad Juárez. Sol was raped by 
her stepfather when she was four and then again, at the age of eight, by her 
mother’s boss. He forcibly enrolled Sol to sell drugs, hire other women for the 
cartel and, later, to become a hitwoman, a sicaria.
Both Alejandra and Sol, and most of the women and girls I spoke to, shared 
a common life experience that can be summarised as follows: first, as children, 
violence is perpetrated against them within their family, mainly in the form 
of sexual and physical violence, neglect, and verbal violence. When they at-
tempt to share details of these episodes of sexual violence they are not be-
lieved; on the contrary, they are accused of being liars or blamed for provoking 
their stepfathers or other male perpetrators. Other reactions— usually from 
their mothers— include battery. Two main scenarios develop before them: be-
coming involved in a cycle of gender- based violence in the context of rela-
tionships with older men, drug- use settings, and institutional settings (police 
stations, prisons and drug treatment centres); this usually leads to multiple 
pregnancies— as teenagers first and adult women later— and, sometimes, sex 
work, partner- induced sex exploitation and crime. They might also end up liv-
ing on the street. In either case, fleeing from violence opens up new means 
of abuse.
In those cases in which they are forcibly enrolled by organised crime, the 
hitwomen I spoke to— four of them in prison and two girls in a drug treat-
ment centre— experienced this in early adolescence. By the time I spoke to 
them, they all had been victims of multiple rapes and had killed uncounta-
ble numbers of people. When asked about the role of the state, incarcerated 




During the first part of the interviewees’ narratives, drugs are clearly a coping 
mechanism against the pain caused by neglect and abuse in the household and 
in intimate partner relationships. When dependence develops and life starts 
revolving around drugs, their reference points— mainly family— fall apart and 
riskier situations occur, such as living on the street, sex work and exposure to 
criminalisation and incarceration. At this point, compulsory treatment comes 
into play, and women, once again, as in the case of women incarcerated for 
drug offences, are isolated in male- dominated spaces where plural forms of 
gender- based violence against women take place. Patriarchal structures— 
namely violence against women, and patriarchal culture— reproduce them-
selves in drug- using circuits as well as in treatment centres.
The treatment centre where I interviewed Sol was particularly dangerous 
and I was prompted to leave by the owner, allegedly a protestant pastor, as 
already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. As happens in other 
treatment centres, people were held there compulsorily for an indeterminate 
length of time. Selma, for instance, was held in a drug treatment centre for a 
full year without ever setting foot outside. It is a very gloomy, smoky place, 
too small for all the people living in it, with no ventilation or natural light. 
Because of her good conduct and achievements with regard to her treatment, 
she was allowed to go home to visit her young daughter. She went to the United 
States, near the border with Mexico, where her family lived. There she met 
her cousin, with whom she used to smoke methamphetamine before going 
into treatment. She smoked again. Despite the fact that she was reunited with 
her daughter, and that she had used the drug again, she dutifully returned 
to the drug treatment centre. Selma’s return to the centre should have been 
seen as a major accomplishment in her recovery. The centre, however, found 
out that she had relapsed, and relapsing is considered a condition of drug 
dependence. So she was sanctioned: she had to sit for weeks on the ‘bench 
of the relapsing users’, on display for the entire centre. This happened four 
months before I  interviewed her in August 2019. She explained to me that 
her relapse implied that her previous record of treatment had all but never 
existed. ‘I have to accept that I have been here for four months, not one year 
and four months’.
It is important to stress that this centre is certified by the public nation-
al authority. People are held there indefinitely. The length of the treatment 
is decided by the owners themselves based on an arbitrary evaluation of the 
process of recovery, while aiming for abstinence. Patients— usually referred to 
as ‘inmates’— are generally brought there by their families against their will 
and left in the hands of the owners, who isolate and make a living out of a se-
cluded population of drug users on an obligatory path to abstinence. In other 
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cases, drug users are picked up— practically kidnapped— by a centre’s staff 
and forced into vehicles to be transported to the centre. Such ‘collectors’ are 
known as ‘the Celestial Patrol’. Personally, after interviewing Selma I  felt an 
urgent need to escape. Never had I felt such a sense of imprisonment, not even 
in the top security section of a female federal prison.
Besides sexual violence, which does not seem to occur in the centres I vis-
ited, other forms of gender- based violence and discrimination affect women, 
especially in mixed centres. These can be divided into three forms: discursive, 
structural, and normative.
Discursive gender- based violence is reflected in how a centre’s personnel 
refer to women who use drugs: more problematic than men, trying to attract 
men’s attention for sexual purposes, individually responsible for drug depend-
ence and its consequences. Girls and women are guilty of their drug consump-
tion, structural conditions being completely dismissed and unaccounted for 
in the dependence diagnosis. Drug use is seen as an individual problem that 
people must resolve themselves through treatment and seclusion, aiming for 
abstinence. This discourse is applied to men as well; in the case of women, 
however, ‘personal failure’ is reinforced by the transgression of gender axioms. 
Women users are doubly labelled and stigmatised, facing even further discrim-
ination when they are mothers.
Such discourses are entrenched in structural and normative conditions. In 
structural terms, mixed centres have fewer places for women. For instance, 
in one of the public centres I visited, out of a total of 40 beds, only six were 
assigned to women. The assumption that women use drugs less than men is 
not a sustainable justification for this disparity, since among adolescents the 
gender difference is almost inexistent. Also, given the barriers that women face 
to accessing treatment, lack of spaces can translate into exclusion, and there-
fore into pushing women away from healthcare rather than convincing them 
to seek help.
Patriarchal structures are reproduced in treatment centres’ gender systems. 
For example, in a mixed treatment centre in Baja, California, the director, a 
former drug user himself, had married one of the female inmates, who is now 
sub- director. Women in mixed centres often need to find themselves what I de-
fine as ‘a dominant male’ to make them their property, so that other users or 
staff do not try to openly sexually objectify them. In horizontal relationships 
among competing masculinities and their interaction with vertical patriarchal 
sexual domination over women, women are forced to ‘choose’ a sexual partner 
that will take them out of the realm of ‘disposable sexual object’ to the legit-
imate place of ‘woman of someone’. This is also pointed out in the Pompidou 
Group’s report:
236 Giacomello
The relations between women users, men users and the staff of these 
communities reproduce relations in the outside world: women are often 
stigmatised and harassed by certain male users, but also by some mem-
bers of staff. Any friendly gesture on the part of the women may be per-
ceived as an attempt to seduce. If they flirt, women are also judged and 
found guilty because of the deeply ingrained notion that they are using 
their bodies to get drugs in exchange. This sometimes leads women to 
accept, as they did before taking up residence, a relationship based on a 
protection strategy, to avoid harassment and violence on the part of other 
male residents and the staff of the centre.
benoit and jauffret- roustide, 2016, 25
In that same centre in Baja, while men were allowed to go out to carry out 
‘services’ for the centre— basically collecting money in the street or working 
for free in bakeries and other similar establishments or warehouses— women 
could never leave the centre. The reason given was that women had to be ‘pro-
tected’, mainly from themselves, since they were believed to sexualise them-
selves to seduce men.
Gender discrimination beliefs detrimental to women are reproduced in 
other practices. In two public mixed treatment centres I  visited, men and 
women can have no contact with one another and have to follow clothing 
regulations that do not provoke sexual behaviours. For example, women can-
not wear shorts, skirts or dresses. When verbal, written or oral interchanges 
happen between men and women, women are usually accused of inciting the 
men. One female patient told me that on one occasion she left her dorm in 
the middle to the night to go to the toilet and that she was wearing tight leg-
gings. The day after, she received a warning and was told, ‘You are trying to get 
yourself raped’. This woman had been a victim of sexual abuse since she was 
three years old.
Empirical research, together with the wider framework of gender systems, 
drug policy and women’s barriers to accessing treatment, support the argu-
ment that in the case of female drug users and in addition to discursive and 
practical elements, current drug policies are inscribed in patriarchal struc-
tures that create conditions for, and the justification of, gender- based violence, 
domestic violence and violence against women and girls. The two groups of 
‘women in detention’ analysed in this chapter, instead of being accompanied 
by communities, families and state institutions that are supposed to address 
and attempt to repair the suffering and the crimes committed against them, 
are further isolated through institutionalisation on legal or illegal sites, in 
which violence against women is further reproduced.
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4 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on two groups of women in detention: incarcerated 
women and women in residential drug treatment centres. It has analysed, with-
in the theoretical framework of gender, how gender, development and drug 
policy intersect. It has argued that the current system of drug control is part 
and parcel of patriarchal structures and that the interplay of drug policy and 
gender systems that are detrimental to women establishes the conditions for 
gender- based violence against women and girls. It does so by promoting the 
prosecution and incarceration of people accused of non- violent, minor drug 
offences, and by a discursive and practical framework of the stigmatisation and 
criminalisation of people who use drugs. Drug policy creates a platform for the 
trafficking and sexual and labour exploitation of women and children, in their 
families and communities, as well as by organised crime and state institutions. 
By fostering a system of law enforcement to the detriment of a public health ap-
proach, current drug policies have unleashed a human rights crisis that main-
ly affects disadvantaged populations in developing countries and drug users. 
Interwoven with gender systems based on the ‘differential valence of sexes’ as 
discussed above, disparities manifest themselves in the feminisation of poverty 
and violence against women. Both elements are underlying causes of women’s 
involvement in drug offences and dependent drug use, and hinder development 
and women’s empowerment, as well as the achievement of gender equality.
The international drug policy arena has taken notice of these issues in re-
cent years. unodc has produced material on women and drug use and dedi-
cated a booklet to women in the 2018 World Drug Report (unodc, 2018b). The 
International Narcotics Control Board (incb, 2016) has dedicated a special 
chapter in one of its annual reports to women’s participation in drug offences 
and drug use.
As introduced at the beginning of this chapter, in preparation for the UN 
Special General Assembly on Drugs in 2016 (UN General Assembly, 2016), UN 
Women (2014) submitted the policy brief A Gender Perspective on the Impact 
of Drug Use, the Drug Trade, and Drug Control Regimes. In it, the organisation 
affirms that ‘apart from a more humane and balanced approach to internation-
al drug control efforts, centered on human rights and emphasizing the public 
health dimensions of this crisis, this approach must also be gender- responsive’ 
(UN Women, 2014, 3).
In March 2016, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs approved the resolution 
Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Drug- related Policies and Programmes 
(un cnd, 2016). Despite the existence of the two previous resolutions on 









recognises women as users and points out barriers to access to treatment. It 
also stresses women’s involvement in trafficking— mainly in the lowest po-
sitions of criminal organisations and often occurring through deceit and 
coercion— and highlights the importance of women as agents in drug policy, 
calling for women’s active involvement in ‘the development and implemen-
tation of national drug- related policies and programmes’ (un cnd, 2016, 3). 
Among other actions proposed by the resolution are i) to collect and share 
quantitative and qualitative data, disaggregated by age and sex, related to the 
world drug problem; ii) to prefer non- custodial measures when sentencing or 
deciding on pre- trial measures for a pregnant woman or a woman who is a 
child’s sole or primary carer; and iii) ‘to increase the coverage of existing pro-
grammes and to ensure access to those programmes while providing training 
and supervision for all relevant health and social care professionals working 
with women, including in prison settings’ (un cnd, 2016, 4).
Also, in the final document of the UN General Assembly (2016), there is a 
specific reference to mainstreaming gender perspectives:
Mainstream a gender perspective into and ensure the involvement of 
women in all stages of the development, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of drug policies and programmes, develop and dissem-
inate gender- sensitive and age- appropriate measures that take into ac-
count the specific needs and circumstances faced by women and girls 
with regard to the world drug problem and, as States parties, imple-
ment the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.
UN General Assembly, 2016, 15
Such calls are meaningful and necessary. Collecting sex- disaggregated data, 
promoting the use of alternatives to incarceration for women who are pregnant 
or primary caregivers, improving and broadening women’s access to treatment 
and including affected women in drug policy’s design, implementation and 
evaluation are all fundamental steps that should be encouraged. However, they 
will only have a cosmetic impact if they are not part of a wider spectrum of ur-
gently needed transformations in the international system of drug control and 
its implementation, rhetoric, indicators and practices. A  ‘deep evaluation’10 
 10 Bacchi develops the methodology of deep evaluation as an ex ante policy analysis that 
consists of developing ‘a form of policy evaluation that encourages critical scrutiny of 
conceptual premises, models of implementation and conventional forms of evaluation 
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(Bacchi and Eveline, 2010) should replace the current practice of gender analy-
sis in drug policy, to ensure the transformative power of gender mainstreaming 
and to eradicate the reproduction of patriarchal structures. Such an approach 
should start at the core of the international system of drug control and its in-
stitutions, which should lead the way for nations to undertake the same paths.
Furthermore, it is paramount that women who use drugs, drug use commu-
nities, professionals, and civil society organisations working on related issues, 
foster and become part of alternative, stigma- free, empowerment- oriented 
narratives and practices around gender, the use of drugs, women’s needs and 
strengths, gender- based violence, and caring responsibilities. The active par-
ticipation of women who use drugs is not only ethically desirable, it is indis-
pensable to the development of tools that i) effectively respond to the diverse 
situations of women and drug use, ii) address women’s needs, and iii) acknowl-
edge and build on their strengths, providing orientation, strategies and practic-
es for women who use drugs in general, with an intersectional approach.
Given the current status of violence against women and structural inequal-
ities in most developing countries, it is obvious that current drug policy is not 
the only or even the main cause of violence against women and girls and that 
even deep changes in the way the drug conventions are implemented would 
not tackle background gender systems. If, however, gender inequality is not 
addressed properly by the international system of drug control as part of a 
‘scrutiny from within’, drug policy will remain a strong component of patriar-
chal structures, and a handy rhetoric and practical tool to reproduce women’s 
symbolic and concrete detention.
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 chapter 13
Incorporating Child Rights into Scheduling 
Decisions at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs
Damon Barrett and Diederik Lohman
 Abstract
This chapter focuses on the child rights implications of bringing new substances into 
the global drug control regime. Focusing on the examples of ketamine and khat, which 
in turn highlight the issues of access to medicines (sdg 3) and child labour (sdg 8), it 
outlines the process for placing substances under international control and the child 
rights implications of such decisions. To date, however, child rights law has not been 
featured in this procedure. While child rights law may not be determinative in terms 
of outcome, the chapter focuses on an important process in global drug policy gov-
ernance. If decisions to place substances under international control within the drug 
control architecture of the United Nations engage the obligations of child rights trea-
ties, then there is a strong case for formally taking the obligations arising under those 
treaties into account.
1 Introduction
Children are at the centre of drug policy debates, but aside from prevention, 
and rhetorical statements of concern about future generations, substantive 
policy discussions remain limited. This is especially noticeable in relation to 
supply- side controls (e.g. crop eradication, interdiction) and their develop-
ment aspects. Similarly, child rights discussions have become more prevalent 
in drug policy discussions as the silos between human rights and drug policy 
within the UN have been broken down over time. Mention of child rights re-
mains, however, fairly superficial, usually a mere reference to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in a preambular resolution paragraph. Less visible are 
substantive aspects relating to state obligations under international child rights 
law across the supply chain. This chapter focuses on the child rights implica-
tions of placing substances under international control, the legal and admin-
istrative effects of such decisions, and their relevance for development. Build-
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focuses on access to essential medicines (sdg 3.8) and addressing the worst 
forms of child labour (sdg 8.7). Its central argument is straightforward.
If decisions to place substances under international control within the drug 
control architecture of the UN engage the obligations of child rights treaties, 
then there is a strong case for formally taking the obligations arising under 
those treaties into account. The examples of ketamine (an essential medicine, 
used for anaesthesia) and khat (a stimulant plant), both not yet under inter-
national control, illustrate the relevance of the scheduling process for child 
rights and development, and make the case for the routine inclusion of child 
rights obligations in that process. Our argument is therefore procedural, rather 
than one of outcome. But in aiming to mainstream child rights in an impor-
tant aspect of global drug policy governance, it speaks directly to sdg 16.6— 
accountable institutions.
2 The International Drug Control System: Two Imbalances
Three multilateral treaties form the core legal framework for international 
drug control. Each enjoys near universal ratification or accession: the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961, as amended by its 1972 Protocol (UN, 1961. 
Hereafter:  ‘Single Convention’), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
1971 (UN, 1971. Hereafter:  ‘1971 Convention’), and the Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (UN, 1988. Hereaf-
ter:  ‘Trafficking Convention’). The Single Convention replaced multiple prior 
treaties, creating one ‘single’ treaty, and primarily controls plant- based sub-
stances and their derivatives— in particular coca, opium poppy and cannabis. 
The 1971 Convention controls synthetic substances that had been omitted from 
the Single Convention. These include, for example, amphetamines, lsd, and 
ecstasy (mdma). The Trafficking Convention, on the other hand, is primarily 
an instrument of transnational criminal law, bolstering the weak penal provi-
sions of the earlier treaties, and was adopted in response to the growing illicit 
drug trade. Critically, the entire system builds upon the ‘general obligation’, set 
out in Article 4(c) of the Single Convention, ‘[…] to limit exclusively to medical 
and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, export, import, distri-
bution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs’. That obligation recognises 
that many of the substances controlled under the drugs conventions have im-
portant medical uses (e.g. morphine). However, any other uses, such as for 
recreational, cultural or religious purposes, fall outside of this definition and 







Beyond debates about the ethics of the above distinctions (e.g. the effects 
on indigenous communities or cultural minorities of controlling traditional 
plants), there are at least two imbalances in the system that are of relevance 
to development, and that the cases of ketamine and khat exemplify. The first 
is the administration of the licit market for medical and scientific purposes. 
Under the Single Convention, a system of import/ export authorisation is estab-
lished as an ‘estimates’ and ‘statistical returns’ system (Articles 12 and 13). This 
is intended to ensure adequate supply of controlled medicines and to verify 
that imports and exports are for such purposes. There is no such system for the 
1971 Convention, the preamble of which states merely that access for medical 
purposes should not be ‘unduly restricted’. The system has not been working. 
For example, an estimated 83 per cent of the world’s population lives in coun-
tries, overwhelmingly in the developing world, with low to non- existent ac-
cess to opiates for moderate to severe pain (Seya et al., 2011). Paediatric access 
brings additional challenges (Marston, 2011). While non- medical use of certain 
substances is a serious problem, national and international scheduling leads to 
reduced availability and accessibility of medicines, may negatively affect per-
ceptions of the medicine, creating a ‘chilling effect’ on prescribing (hrw, 2009, 
2011, 2013, 2015, 2016 and 2017), and may drive up cost (De Lima, 2018). These 
concerns go to the heart of controversies surrounding ketamine, to which we 
return below.
The second imbalance is its supply- side focus. While there are general pro-
visions relating to the prevention of drug use and the treatment of depend-
ence, the three treaties are overwhelmingly geared towards cutting off drugs 
at source, and interrupting illicit flows (see Barrett, 2020, Annex ii). As part of 
this, the production of certain crops (coca, cannabis and opium poppy) is to be 
made a crime (Article 3, Trafficking Convention), and the eradication of those 
crops is a specific obligation of States Parties (Article 22, Single Convention; 
Article 14, Trafficking Convention). These measures are known to complicate 
development policy in producer regions (undp, 2015). If placed under inter-
national control, khat would be subject to the same requirements. A further 
complication discussed below, however, is the role of children in the farming 
of such crops once they are rendered illicit. On that, the drugs conventions are 
silent.
3 Placing Substances under International Control
However bland it may seem on the surface, the process for deciding which 
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as ‘scheduling’, is critical. The process involves both a technical review by the 
World Health Organization (who) and a political vote by the United Nations 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (un cnd). Made up of fifty- three member 
states, the un cnd is the main policy- making body within the UN system for 
drug control, and has the mandate under the drug treaties to place substances 
under international control, which it can do via a majority vote, following the 
review by the who.
Under the treaties, controlled substances are listed according to their risk 
profile. Each ‘schedule’ carries specific international obligations in relation to 
the substances it contains (see Hallam, Bewley- Taylor and Jelsma, 2014). Sub-
stances seen as particularly risky, with little or no therapeutic value, are placed 
in the schedules carrying the most stringent controls (Article 2, Single Con-
vention; Article 2, 1971, Convention; Article 12, Trafficking Convention). Thus, for 
example, all of the substances in schedule I of the Single or 1971 Conventions 
are subject to all of the obligations under the relevant treaty, while substances 
in schedule iii of each treaty are only subject to some of them. Importantly, 
without a decision to ‘schedule’ a substance, the treaties do not apply to that 
substance at all. For example, as alcohol is not under international control, 
despite being a harmful substance, these treaties do not apply to it. Similarly, 
they do not currently apply to ketamine or khat.
Under the Single Convention’s system, a state party to the conventions, or 
the who, may notify the UN Secretary- General of the need for a change to the 
schedules— that is to say, the inclusion of a substance, its removal, or moving it 
from one schedule to another (Article 3(1) Single Convention; see also UN, 1973, 
80). The Secretary- General then brings this to the attention of the un cnd, or 
to the who if the issue was raised by a State Party. A technical review of the 
substance, weighing the risk of abuse versus its therapeutic potential, is then 
carried out by the who’s Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (ecdd). 
Based on this review, the who may recommend not scheduling the substance 
or that it be placed on a specific schedule, or, if the substance is already on 
a schedule, it may recommend moving it to another, or removing it entirely. 
The process under the 1971 Convention is similar, but the role of the who is 
explicitly ‘determinative as to medical and scientific matters’. Moreover, states 
are expressly allowed to take into account other relevant ‘economic, social, le-
gal, administrative and other factors’ (Article 2(5), 1971 Convention). This is not 
stated clearly under the Single Convention process.
Scheduling decisions are ultimately made by a majority vote at the un cnd. 
Under the Single Convention system decisions are made through a simple ma-
jority vote. Under the 1971 Convention it requires a two- thirds majority. Thus, 




or thirty- six states under the 1971 Convention, explicitly agree to schedule a sub-
stance, international legal obligations for all states parties are engaged. This is 
a rare power for such a commission, as it effectively changes the scope of the 
relevant treaty without the need for a plenipotentiary conference. There is no 
possibility for states to opt out of their treaty obligations with regard to a spe-
cific substance. States must ‘carry out the onerous decisions of the Commis-
sion as expeditiously as practicable’ (UN, 1973, 98). Rarely discussed, however, 
is that the above decisions, made by majority vote, not only affect drug treaty 
obligations, but also have consequences for broad child rights obligations of 
universal application.
4 Scheduling Decisions: Delimiting the Scope of Child Rights 
Treaties
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989. Hereafter: ‘crc’) is the only 
core UN human rights treaty to refer to drugs. Article 33 reads:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legisla-
tive, administrative, social and educational measures, to protect chil-
dren from the illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances 
as defined in the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the use 
of children in the illicit production and trafficking of such substances 
( emphasis  added).
There are two clauses here, or essentially two rights of direct relevance to the 
examples of ketamine and khat: protection from the illicit use of drugs, and 
prevention from involvement in the illicit drug trade. The key word is ‘illicit’. 
The reference to the ‘relevant international treaties’ establishes how ‘illicit use’ 
is ‘defined’, but also indicates which substances Article 33 covers. The drafting 
history of the crc demonstrates that the reference to the ‘relevant internation-
al treaties’ was intended to delimit the scope of Article 33. In the technical re-
view phase of drafting, the wording of the drugs conventions then in force (the 
Single and 1971 Conventions) was adopted, limiting Article 33 to the substances 
under international control, and thereby excluding alcohol and tobacco from 
this provision (who, 1988).
Substances ‘defined by the relevant international treaties’, of course, is not a 
closed list. The scheduling process can change it, thereby changing the scope 
of application of the crc. In practice, it has been an ever- expanding list with 
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was adopted. As substances enter onto international drug treaty schedules, 
all states party to the crc must, because of Article 33, take ‘all appropriate 
measures’ to protect children from using them illicitly, and prevent the use of 
children in illicit production and trafficking. This in turn affects the remaining 
articles of the crc, which must be read as a whole when considering what an 
‘appropriate measure’ may be (Barrett and Tobin, 2019). As such, scheduling 
decisions made by the few dozen Commission members in Vienna affect the 
legal obligations of all 196 states party to the crc, and may extend beyond the 
relatively vague wording of Article 33 itself. This includes states that have not 
yet ratified or acceded to the drug conventions at all,1 or those that may one 
day denounce them. In other words, if a state were to decide that it no longer 
wished to be bound by the Single Convention, its child rights obligations would 
still be engaged by decisions made under a regime to which it is no longer a 
party. There is no indication from the available drafting documents that the 
consequences of scheduling decisions for crc obligations were fully discussed 
(Barrett, 2020, 50‒53).
A further treaty involved is International Labour Organization (ilo) 
Convention No 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ilo, 1999a. Hereaf-
ter:  ‘ilo 182’; see also ilo, 1999b). One of the ‘fundamental’ ilo treaties, it 
too enjoys near universal ratification or accession, including by the United 
States, which is the only state to have not ratified the crc. Article 1 requires 
that States Parties ‘[…] take immediate and effective measures to secure the 
prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter 
of urgency’.
From there, the definition of the worst forms of child labour includes, at 
Article 3(c), ‘the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in par-
ticular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant in-
ternational treaties’. (emphasis added.)
Article 7(1) further requires the ‘effective implementation of the treaty’, in-
cluding ‘the provision and application of penal sanctions or, as appropriate, 
other sanctions’ (See Noguchi, 2016).
The same delimitation ‘as defined in the relevant international treaties’ is 
there. The drafting history reveals that the wording was intended to mirror 
Article 33 of the crc in order to avoid contradiction. There was, however, no 
discussion of the fact that scheduling decisions by a vote at the un cnd would 
engage the obligations of all ilo 182 states parties (ilo, 1999c). As with the 
 1 Currently these are Palau, Papua New Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, the Solomon Is-










crc, then, these explicit obligations under ilo 182 (including applying crimi-
nal sanctions) are engaged by decisions of the un cnd.
5 Child Rights Implications of Scheduling Decisions
Article 33 is central to any discussion of child rights and drug policy, but given 
the scope of the crc, it is genuinely difficult to find any article that cannot be 
linked to drug use or the drug trade. For example, the child’s right to health 
(Article 24) and access to essential controlled medicines; the child’s right to an 
adequate standard of living (Article 27), and crop eradication campaigns; or 
protection from economic exploitation (Article 32) and agricultural work. In 
addition, the ‘general principles’ of the crc apply to all policies, including the 
principle of the best interests of the child (relating the wider crc to Article 33; 
see Barrett and Tobin, 2019 and Barrett, 2020). Traditionally, this principle has 
focused on children’s best interests being served by their not using drugs. This 
is obvious, but does not end the discussion. What of those children affected in 
other ways by what seem to be arcane procedures in Vienna, including those 
along the supply chain, or those in need of access to essential medicines?
5.1 Ketamine and the Child’s Right to Health
Ketamine is a synthetic medicine, is included on the who model essential 
medicines list for children (who, 2017), is recognised as a ‘safe and effective 
choice for sedation in children’, and is ‘perhaps the most widely used agent in 
the world’ for this purpose (wsia, 2014). The medicine is not currently under 
international control, but over the years there has been political pressure for 
ketamine to be controlled internationally due to its recreational use (e.g. un 
cnd, 2014a). The who has, however, recommended against scheduling keta-
mine at repeated meetings of its Expert Committee on Drug Dependence. This 
is due to its low risk as a public health concern and its high medical benefit. In 
the words of the ecdd, it is ‘a widely used anesthetic and analgesic, especially 
in developing countries, because it is easy to use and has a wide margin of 
safety when compared with other anesthetic agents’ (who, 2016). The who’s 
caution against scheduling ketamine is borne out of the lack of access to con-
trolled medicines already noted above, which is seen as a failing of the system 
into which ketamine would be drawn. The worry was that ‘if ketamine were 
placed under international control, this would adversely affect its availability 
and accessibility. This in turn would limit access to essential and emergency 
surgery, which would constitute a public health crisis in countries where no 
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In 2015, however, China sought to place ketamine on schedule i of the 1971 
Convention. According to China, ketamine had become a major public health 
concern due to recreational use. For China, placing the medication under inter-
national control was essential to countering this public health threat (un cnd, 
2015a). China’s proposal ran contrary to the who recommendation, leading to 
lengthy debates at the cnd as to the legality of acceding to it (un cnd, 2015a; 
tni, 2015). Some states supported China, while others disagreed, focusing on the 
medical benefits of ketamine (un cnd, 2014b). What was not at issue were the 
international child rights obligations raised by the debate. The importance of the 
medicine certainly was discussed, but the child rights obligation on crc states 
parties to ensure access to such medicines for children in need was not. In par-
ticular, the child’s right to health under Article 24 of the crc would clearly be 
affected— including, importantly, its ‘core minimum’ standard of access to essen-
tial medicines (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2013). This right applies 
to every state, bar the US, whether voting on the decision at the un cnd or not. 
These obligations were entirely missing from the un cnd ketamine discussions.
With a who review assessing risk versus therapeutic benefit, however, the add-
ed value of bringing in a child rights perspective is a valid question. First, the crc 
demands a focus on the impact on children and foregrounds their best interests 
as a legal requirement. This, alone, is an important factor, and brings the chal-
lenge of appropriate paediatric access to the forefront. Second, states do not cast 
off their human rights obligations because they are voting at the un cnd. Bring-
ing in human rights law— in this case child rights law— may help to redress the 
above imbalances in a system that, rooted in concerns about addiction and the 
drug trade, has tended towards ever more substances being controlled. Third, and 
directly related to this, a child rights focus strengthens the access- to- medicines 
aspect of the drug control system, which is by far its weakest element. Under the 
drug conventions, there is— strictly speaking— an obligation to ensure adequate 
stocks. The right to health focuses on ensuring access, locating this in a duty of the 
state towards everyone within its territory (under the crc the right to health is not 
linked to citizenship but to geographical location in the territory).
Finally, states party to the crc must give reasons for limiting the child’s right 
to health. As ketamine is an existing, widely used essential medicine, placing 
it under international control would (as the ecdd noted) have the effect of 
limiting its current availability. While states may limit rights in certain circum-
stances, such limitations must be justified with respect to the goal being pur-
sued, necessity, and proportionality. These factors are currently missing from 
un cnd decision- making (Lohman and Barrett, 2020). Incorporating child 
rights into the process may help to fill this gap, at least with regard to the child 








5.2 Khat, Child Labour, and Prevention from Involvement in the Illicit 
Drug Trade
Turning to a very different example, khat is a stimulant plant with a long history 
of use, especially in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as among im-
migrants from these regions (Beckerleg, 2008). It is primarily used socially and 
in some cases for traditional medicine (emcdda, undated). It is a major export 
commodity for some countries. Its active components, cathinone and cathine, 
are controlled under the 1971 Convention, but unlike coca, opium poppy, and 
cannabis— which each have traditional, cultural, or religious uses— khat itself 
was not placed under international control when the treaties were drafted.
While khat has been discussed at the un cnd for decades, concerns about 
excessive use, in particular among men from diaspora communities in Euro-
pean countries, have increased recently. The International Narcotics Control 
Board (incb), which oversees the implementation of the drug conventions, 
has recommended that states place plants containing psychoactive substances 
under international control (a recommendation aimed at khat), while many 
states have banned the plant (Hallam, Bewley- Taylor and Jelsma, 2014). In 
2006, however, the ecdd reviewed khat and recommended against schedul-
ing the plant itself, stating, ‘The level of abuse and threat to public health is not 
significant enough to warrant international control […] The Committee recog-
nized that social and some health problems result from the excessive use of 
khat and suggested that national educational campaigns should be adopted to 
discourage use that may lead to these adverse consequences’ (who, 2006, 11).
To date, khat remains outside of international controls, but the debate re-
mains active. Here, however, we see a limitation of the ecdd technical review, 
which focuses on pharmacology and on the health risk versus benefits. What 
the ecdd does not look into are the potential negative effects on traditional 
practices or the economies of developing countries, not to mention the risk 
of adding to the criminal market in drugs or potential damage to relations 
between the authorities and immigrant communities (gdpo, 2014). Children 
may, of course, be affected by all of these aspects, and many rights within the 
crc are applicable. The un cnd decision- making process does not, howev-
er, currently provide official space for such consequences to be foregrounded. 
The fact that child rights treaties are explicitly affected by scheduling decisions 
may assist in opening up this space. Children’s involvement in khat production 
is a clear example of why this is needed.
There are many ways in which children are involved in the khat indus-
try, including picking, trimming and bundling; selecting good quality plants; 
transport to market; and assistance with sales. As a 2017 study from Ethiopia 
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involved), and with the work varying from family smallholdings to larger com-
mercial operations in the context of a growing industry (Negash, 2017, 25‒31).
While there are important concerns about child labour in this context (i.e. 
work that harms the child’s physical or mental well- being, or deprives children 
of a childhood), placing khat under international control would result in a very 
specific legal distinction, which is why attention to process matters. By a vote 
of the un cnd, khat would become illicit ‘as defined by the relevant interna-
tional treaties’, thereby engaging Article 3 of ilo 182. By the decision of the 
un cnd, then, children’s involvement in khat production would automatically 
become a ‘worst form of child labour’, even though no working conditions will 
have changed. This would be a profound difference, brought about by a diplo-
matic process rather than attention to the realities on the ground. Instead of 
being a qualitative assessment of child labour conditions and standards relat-
ing to agriculture (e.g. type of work, hours, access to rest and leisure, access to 
education), the un cnd vote would in effect result in an absolute ban under 
a fundamental ilo treaty and, indeed, the crc. Children’s involvement would 
automatically become illegal exploitation, thereby proscribing any and all of 
the above types of activities. Indeed, the word ‘use’ was an intentionally broad 
formulation used in drafting the crc and the Trafficking Convention, mirrored 
in ilo 182, and intended to capture even very minor roles in the drug trade 
(Barrett 2020, 45‒46 and 50‒56). Recalling the wording of Article 7(1) of ilo 
182, then, states would have obligations to ‘[…] take immediate and effective 
measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child 
labour as a matter of urgency’, including the ‘application of penal sanctions or, 
as appropriate, other sanctions’.
This is not to say that khat farming is without problems. All agricultural 
work carries child rights implications, and there is much harm, as the above- 
mentioned Ethiopian study identified, including access to education and 
uptake of khat chewing. But to legally define all involvement in khat produc-
tion as a ‘worst form of child labour’ would be a significant legal difference 
demanding direct attention in un cnd decision- making. Currently, however, 
these child rights questions rooted in treaties outside of the drug control re-
gime are not accounted for in the scheduling process.
6 Conclusion: from Discretion to the Routine Inclusion of Child 
Rights Considerations in Scheduling
The drug conventions do not preclude taking crc and ilo obligations into 





ability of the un cnd to take into account other relevant ‘economic, social, 
legal, administrative and other factors’ in making its decisions. No such aspects 
are set out explicitly in the Single Convention, though the element of discretion 
is retained. In drafting, it was agreed that ‘administrative’ and ‘social’ consid-
erations may guide the decision (UN, 1973, 90). As such, child rights law and 
child rights effects ‘may’ be brought to bear based on the terms of the drug 
conventions themselves.
Such discretion, however, necessarily entails the discretion not to include 
child rights considerations. This chapter has proposed instead that there is a 
legal imperative to do so. As we have discussed, there is a clear linkage between 
un cnd scheduling decisions and child rights treaties. There is a range of child 
rights— beyond those specific to drugs— that may be engaged, and certain de-
cisions (as exemplified by khat) that can change the legal status of something 
as serious as child labour. Every time the Commission adds a substance to 
international control it extends the obligations of child rights treaties to that 
substance. Every time it removes one, it removes those obligations.
To move child rights considerations from ad hoc discretion to a routine as-
pect of such decisions, however, would require a formal process of some sort. 
One way to do this would be to adopt a form of child rights impact assessment 
relating to the substances in question. This could be done in isolation, or as 
part of a wider human rights impact assessment of such decisions (e.g. based 
on the right to health; see Lohman and Barrett, 2020). Such a system could 
be set up via a resolution of the un cnd, requesting child rights assessments 
from its secretariat, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (unodc). As political-
ly unlikely as this may seem, un cnd resolutions have called for the need to 
bear in mind crc obligations, including those sponsored by some of the most 
conservative governments (e.g. un cnd, 2018). Even without a resolution, the 
unodc could still produce a Conference Room Paper for each substance in 
question, advising states of the child rights implications of their decisions, per-
haps seeking assistance from unicef and the who in this regard. In many 
cases there may be little to add, such as a new compound very similar to a sub-
stance already controlled. In some important cases, however, as ketamine and 
khat demonstrate, there may well be important legal and practical child rights 
considerations to address. A rights- based analysis, rooted in treaty obligations, 
would place the relevant child rights implications before the entire Commis-
sion, and could also be distributed to the more than 140 non- members of the 
un cnd that are parties to the crc and ilo 182, but would not have a sched-
uling vote. This would allow those states to engage diplomatically on issues 
that would affect their legal obligations within and beyond the drug control 
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with the monitoring bodies of the child rights treaties— the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child and the ilo Committee of Experts on Standards and 
Recommendations— given that the scope of those treaties would be expanded 
by each new substance placed under international control.
In this way, accountability for child rights could be strengthened within the 
scheduling process, and the silos between human rights and drug control with-
in the UN system could be further broken down.
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Well- conceived drug- control policies could contribute importantly to economic and 
social development and public health.   Unfortunately, the reality of drug policies 
in most countries is rather that they undermine public health by failing to protect 
people who use drugs from infectious disease and the risk of drug overdose. Drug 
laws and policies that mandate incarceration for minor, non- violent drug offences 
have profound health costs as the risk of infectious disease in prison is high, and 
too few prisons offer appropriate health services for people who use drugs.   Overly 
zealous drug- control policies, moreover, have led to enormous human suffering, as 
many countries have restricted the use of opioids for the relief of pain associated 
with cancer and other conditions.  Protection of the health of communities involved 
with the production of drug crops such as coca leaf and opium poppy has rarely fig-
ured in ‘alternative development’ programmes for these populations.  A few countries 
have shown that intentionally health- focused drug- control policies can lessen some 
of these harms.
1 Introduction
Health is rightly understood as both a precondition of development and a cru-
cial outcome of development processes and policies. Policies on psychotropic 
drugs have the potential to influence public and individual health positively, 
one route by which they might contribute to sustainable development. Howev-
er, even as it has become almost obligatory in international drug policy circles 
for governments to espouse ‘public health approaches’ to drug policy issues, 
it is clear that drug policymaking is taking a toll on the health of people and 
communities touched by drug consumption, drug crop cultivation and drug 
law enforcement. In most countries, drug policies consistent with good public 
health practices have been much harder to find than the corresponding rhet-





health but, by extension, have the potential to contribute greatly to the health 
of the public and thus to sustainable development.
2 Infectious Disease
The importance of drug policies and programmes, both for national responses 
to infectious diseases and for the health of individuals, is well documented. As 
noted by the Joint UN Programme on hiv/ aids (unaids), ‘[a] mid the wide-
spread stigma and discrimination, violence and poor health faced by people 
who use drugs, [they] are beset by persistently high rates of hiv’ (unaids, 
2019, 2). The incidence (rate of new infections) of hiv declined by about 25 
per cent in the global population from 2010 to 2017. Yet among people who use 
drugs, it increased in many countries, particularly outside of the European Un-
ion (EU) (unaids, 2019, 2). Hepatitis and tuberculosis also disproportionately 
affect people who use drugs, partly because in many countries they are likely to 
find themselves in prison or jail at some point, settings that can be incubators 
of tb, hepatitis and hiv.
Drug- related infectious diseases are preventable by well- understood, effec-
tive and cost- effective measures. With regard to hiv, hepatitis C, and tubercu-
losis, governments’ failure to invest in drug- related harm reduction measures 
is a global health tragedy. Vast evidence supports the fact that hiv, for exam-
ple, can be well contained among people who inject drugs by ensuring their 
ready access to clean injection equipment and, for people who use opioids, by 
making opioid maintenance therapies and other well- tested treatments easy 
to take up and sustain, including in prison (unaids, 2019).
In most of the EU and Switzerland, harm reduction services with respect to 
infectious disease are extensive and well established as part of drug policy. hiv 
incidence among people who inject drugs is rare in these countries (European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2019b). Equally importantly, 
countries in which drug use and the possession of drugs for personal use are 
decriminalised or at least not penalised— that is, people are not incarcerated 
for minor infractions— are able to steer people to the health and social servic-
es they may need, rather than undermining their health by incarceration.
Some lower- income, lower- middle- income, and middle- income coun-
tries have also made strides in drug- related harm reduction with respect to 
infectious disease outcomes. For example, Moldova has sustained a widely 
praised syringe programme in its prisons for many years (hri, 2018). Numer-
ous countries— including Malaysia, Afghanistan, India, Vietnam, Kyrgyzstan 
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one prison setting (hri, 2018). In the Middle East and North Africa, Morocco 
and Iran have pioneered methadone therapy, Iran in prisons as well as in the 
community, showing the feasibility of this intervention in middle- income 
countries (Himmich and Madani, 2016).
Sub- Saharan African countries have, in many cases, struggled to sustain 
harm reduction activities, but there are some successes. Tanzania led the 
way in the region with a methadone programme launched in 2011. Integrated 
methadone and hiv treatment services have been piloted there more recently 
(Cooke et al., 2019). Kenya and South Africa have followed, with methadone 
programmes as well as sterile syringe programmes (hri, 2018). Controversies 
remain, especially around needle exchange. For example, the city of Durban, 
South Africa (now part of the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality) discon-
tinued its needle exchange in 2018, alleging that the service was ineffective in 
curbing the unsafe disposal of syringes (Scheibe et al., 2020). Although many 
of these programmes have benefited from donor support, there is substantial 
evidence that harm reduction interventions such as these are cost- effective as 
investments for governments in countries of all income levels, mostly because 
of savings from averted hiv and hepatitis C transmission (Wilson et al., 2015).
Investment in harm reduction services is, in many countries including the 
United States (US), impeded by the scientifically unsound idea that the only 
way to deal with health problems associated with drug use is to insist on ab-
stinence from all drug use (hri, 2018; Smith, 2019). Harm reduction is thus al-
leged to facilitate or encourage drug use, even though there is no evidence that 
providing clean syringes or a safe space to inject drugs leads people to initiate 
drug use or to sustain drug use longer than they otherwise would.
3 Overdose Mortality and Morbidity
In addition to infectious disease, morbidity and mortality related to drug over-
doses are beginning to be seen on a previously unimaginable scale, due partly 
to the dramatic expansion of markets for fentanyl and other lethal synthetic 
opioids. In the US, for example, overdose deaths linked to opioids increased 
six- fold from 1999 to 2017 (Scholl et al., 2019). Overdoses were an important 
contributor to a decline in life expectancy among some age groups in the white 
population, a phenomenon rarely seen in US history (Woolf and Schoomaker, 
2019). About 60 per cent of overdose deaths in the US in 2017 were linked to 
synthetic opioids, mostly fentanyl, a 45 per cent increase over the 2016 level 
(Scholl et al., 2019). The proportion of overdose deaths linked to fentanyl in 













79 per cent in the first quarter of 2019 (Government of Canada, 2019). Fentanyl 
and its analogues such as carfentanil are among the most lethal examples of 
new psychotropic substances (nps s)— relatively easy to manufacture, usually 
potent in tiny doses, and requiring new laws and law enforcement approaches 
globally.
As with infectious diseases, death and disability linked to drug overdoses 
are eminently preventable. Overdose mortality in the EU in 2017 was estimat-
ed at 22.6 deaths per million of population, about one tenth the rate of 217 
per million in the US that year (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction, 2019a). This difference undoubtedly reflects the much great-
er policy embrace of overdose prevention measures in the EU compared to 
the US, including the testing of street drugs for toxins, ensuring availability of 
naloxone for recently released prisoners and others at risk, as well as emer-
gency medical personnel, supervised consumption sites, and the prescription 
of medical- grade heroin for selected patients (discussed below). The overdose 
mortality crisis in the US is directly related to decades of unscientific demo-
nisation of these and other overdose- related harm reduction measures (Chen 
et al., 2019).
In Canada, where policy- level and programmatic development of harm re-
duction services is more advanced than in the US, there has been a recognition 
in some circles of the need for services that not only mitigate the effects of an 
overdose (such as naloxone distribution and supervised consumption sites), 
but more directly address the toxins in street drugs that are causing overdose 
(Fischer et al., 2019). Some Canadian policymakers and service providers have 
called for an expansion of the harm reduction pillar of their drug policy to 
include more of these ‘safe supply’ measures (Vancouver City Council, 2019). 
Safe supply means ensuring access to safer versions of the drugs people regu-
larly use, including heroin, rather than leaving people to rely on street drugs of 
unknown origin.
Supervised provision of medical- grade heroin to allow people to avoid 
the harms of street drugs— a prime example of safe supply— has been part 
of drug policy for some time in Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Denmark and more recently Canada (Strang et  al., 2015). 
These programmes have generally been conceived as intentionally small- 
scale for the relatively small proportion of people who use opioids for whom 
methadone and other traditional therapies have not been optimally effective. 
But widespread adulteration of street drugs with lethal substances argues for 
the expansion of such programmes. The argument cannot go far, however, in 
places where harm reduction is seen only as facilitating drug use. The same 
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for political, not scientific, reasons. Drug testing means using fentanyl strips 
or more sophisticated tools such as mass spectrometry to detect adulterants 
in street drugs before they are ingested. Again, numerous ngo s conduct drug 
testing, especially at night spots and festivals, in the EU (European Monitor-
ing Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2019b), but this activity remains rel-
atively rare in the US and in lower- income countries. It is unsurprising that 
prescription heroin programmes are found only in higher- income countries 
since these programmes have relatively heavy requirements in terms of human 
resources and security measures. However, some testing of street drugs is pos-
sible with relatively low- cost equipment and does not require highly trained 
medical personnel.
4 Access to Controlled Medicines
Beyond treatment for drug use disorders (dud s), opioids and other psycho-
tropic medicines have a wide range of clinical uses, including for persons living 
with pain and those with terminal conditions. The World Health Organization 
(who) encourages national policymakers to find a balance between ensuring 
that controlled medicines are available to those who need them and ensuring 
that these medicines are not diverted to non- medical use (who, 2011). It is 
clear that overzealous drug- control policies in many countries have resulted in 
unbalance, to the point where doctors are afraid to prescribe medicines that 
are associated with criminal sanctions for non- medical use. Furthermore, the 
drug- control hoops through which they must jump are perceived as too oner-
ous to be worth the trouble (Burke- Shyne et al., 2017).
As noted by the Lancet Commission on Palliative Care, there is thus an 
‘access abyss’. For example, a miniscule 0.1 ton of the approximately 300 tons 
of morphine used in the world is used in low- income countries (Knaul et al., 
2017). Millions of terminal patients die in needless pain, and millions suffer 
from chronic pain over long periods in low- and middle- income countries, as 
essential controlled medicines for palliative care and pain relief stay largely in 
high- income countries. As the Lancet Commission asserts:
A prevalent but unwarranted fear of non- medical use and addiction to 
opioids […], both among health- care providers and regulators and among 
patients and their families, has led to insufficient medical use. Unbal-
anced laws and excessive regulation perpetuate a negative feedback loop 
of poor access that mainly affects poor people […] Efforts to prevent non- 







and other opioid analgesics, have overshadowed and crippled access to 
opioids for palliative care […] [and other] legitimate health needs.
knaul et al., 2017, 1398
Drug- control authorities and health ministries urgently need to work with leg-
islators and other policymakers to find a way to ensure that drug policies do 
not add to this unnecessary and massive human suffering.
The Lancet Commission noted progress in a few countries— including 
Mexico, Jamaica and Vietnam— but concluded that the mentality associ-
ated with the over- regulation of controlled medicines by drug authorities 
can take a long time to overcome, even when better policies are in place. 
This point is well illustrated in India. One estimate suggests that as many as 
10 million people may have needed palliative care in India in 2015, but there 
was virtually none to be had (Jacob and Mathew, 2017). Although morphine 
and penthadine were prescribed for palliative care in India before 1985, the 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (ndps) Act of that year intro-
duced burdensome requirements for physicians to obtain permission to pre-
scribe them, instilling fear of arrest if the requirements were not met. As 
a result, the use of these medicines fell dramatically (Jacob and Mathew, 
2017). Following concerted advocacy by palliative care advocates, an amend-
ment to ndps in 2014 lightened these requirements and eased fears among 
physicians about using these medicines. However, both a long period of little 
or no training of physicians in palliative care and a culture among patients 
of fearing opioids and hiding pain have remained obstacles to better use. 
A more effective official strategy and longer experience with palliative care 
in the southern state of Kerala, which include extensive training of health 
professionals, may signal a way forward for the country (Jacob and Mathew, 
2017; Laurance, 2017).
5 Health Problems Associated with Law Enforcement and 
Incarceration
As already noted, when drug use and minor possession are not punished by im-
prisonment or other harsh penalties, access to health and social services is ob-
viously greatly facilitated. Avoiding the health consequences associated with 
incarceration and involvement with criminal law systems is desirable. Because 
of harsh drug laws, including significant custodial sentences for small- scale 
possession, drug use disorders are over- represented in prison populations in 
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Canada, and Australia, relatively few countries offer treatment of drug use dis-
orders in prisons (hri, 2018)— again despite evidence that methadone pro-
grammes, for example, are very effective and manageable in this setting.
It is well documented that where prisons do not offer treatment for those 
with opioid use disorder, overdose risk for these persons is high in the first 
days after release (Binswanger, 2019). Where treatment is offered in prison, 
links to treatment providers in the community can be made to ensure that 
people who are released from prison have a smoother transition to care once 
outside prison walls. Ensuring access to naloxone for recently released per-
sons and their family and friends can also save lives, but it is a priority in 
too few countries (hri, 2018). Treatment for drug use disorders in prisons 
and links to care upon release are cost- effective and feasible best practices, 
but they are impeded by the low priority of prison health, moral judgments 
against prisoners and people who use drugs, and unscientific prejudice 
against harm reduction.
In some countries, people charged with drug offences are particularly sus-
ceptible to being held while awaiting trial, often because they are unable to 
pay bail— or bribes— to secure pretrial release. Pretrial detention settings are 
probably even less likely than prisons to offer any kind of treatment for drug 
use disorders. The Global Fund to Fight aids, tb and Malaria (2017) advises 
its grantees that reducing reliance on pretrial detention can be an important 
means of reducing prison overcrowding, which is a major contributor to tb in 
prisons and undoubtedly an overall impediment to improving health services 
for people in the custody of the state. Reduction of prison overcrowding is ap-
propriately seen as part of health- based drug policy. For people who use drugs, 
overcrowding in non- prison settings is also a tb risk factor (Deiss et al., 2009).
True alternatives to incarceration for drug- related offences can also be an 
important part of health- oriented drug policy. Unfortunately, some countries 
that claim they are trying to see people who use drugs as ‘patients, not crimi-
nals’ do not seem to exemplify good health practices (Csete and Wolfe, 2017). 
Too many countries, notably in East and Southeast Asia, impose ‘treatment 
detention’ on people, in institutions that resemble forced labour camps and 
rarely have any scientifically sound treatment services (Lunze et al., 2018). De-
tention and coerced labour must not be imposed in the name of treatment. 
Cruel, inhuman and degrading practices too often figure prominently in what 
is called ‘treatment’ for dud s, and in detention centres these practices are 
hard to monitor and reform.
Police practices can also contribute to positive or negative health out-
comes among people who use drugs. Aggressive and repressive policing can 









injecting rather than smoking— and to seek refuge in more remote and dan-
gerous places, where harm reduction services are hard to find (Jürgens et al., 
2010). Too many countries still reward and promote drug police based on the 
number of arrests they make, which tends to encourage arrests of small- scale 
users who are often the lowest- hanging fruit— exactly the population that 
should be steered out of the criminal law system and towards health servic-
es. Arrest quotas may also push police to focus their activities near needle ex-
change sites or other places where people who use drugs may congregate, a 
practice that may discourage use of these vital services.
It is encouraging that police forces in some cities are seeking to do better. 
The Open Society Foundations have documented a number of cases, including 
in low- income countries, where, after training and with the support of senior 
police officials, police have modified their practices to minimise interference 
with or even to encourage the use of health and harm reduction services (osf, 
2018). Police in some jurisdictions, even in places with harsh drug laws such 
as the US, have agreed to steer people engaged in minor drug infractions to 
health and social service- providers rather than into the criminal legal system 
(osf, 2018).
6 Health among Drug Crop Growers
Challenges associated with efforts at alternative development for households 
and communities involved with the production of coca, opium poppy, canna-
bis and other drug crops are described elsewhere in this volume. It is worth 
underscoring that alternative development programmes have generally ne-
glected both the lingering health consequences of crop eradication efforts and 
the importance of ensuring access to health services as part of development 
initiatives. The long- term health impact of decades of mass spraying of coca 
fields in the Andes with glyphosate, for example, may not be known for years. 
But the work of Camacho and Mejía (2017), for example, suggests that the 
short- term consequences of this action may include an elevated risk of mis-
carriage, respiratory illness, and dermatological problems. In 2015, the Interna-
tional Agency for Research on Cancer (iarc), a group affiliated with the who, 
declared glyphosate a probable carcinogen based on a review of about 1,000 
studies by independent experts (Guyton et  al., 2015). Monsanto (acquired 
by Bayer in 2018), the principal manufacturer of glyphosate under the brand 
name RoundUp®, faces legal actions in several countries from claimants alleg-
ing cancer incidence linked to the product (Croft, 2019). Aside from the effects 
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also poses health hazards that are often not addressed due to the illicit nature 
of the work (Grisaffi, 2014).
As Buxton (2015) notes in her critique of alternative development schemes, 
health is at the centre of every internationally agreed concept of sustainable 
human development, but it is sorely lacking as a central element of many al-
ternative development schemes for drug crop producers. Ensuring access to 
health services, which is often precarious for communities depending on illicit 
drug markets for survival, should be a priority in alternative development. The 
Doi Tung development effort in opium poppy- growing regions of Thailand be-
ginning in the 1980s and the innovative cato scheme in Bolivia, both regarded 
as successful alternative development efforts, featured significant investments 
in health, education and transportation infrastructure as central activities 
(Williamson, 2005; Ledebur and Youngers, 2013).
7 Conclusions
Evidence- based, health- focused drug policies could be an avenue leading 
to the improved health of the public and thus sustainable development. 
They could help the public worldwide to understand and confront the 
social determinants and stigma of drug dependence and the futility of 
abstinence- only approaches. They plainly could play a direct role in the 
reduction of infectious diseases and lethal overdoses. They could help to 
save millions of people living with pain from their suffering. They could be 
an example and a vehicle for criminal justice reform of the kind that would 
underscore the importance of alternatives to incarceration for non- violent 
offences, and could greatly improve the health of communities affected by 
draconian drug laws and law enforcement. They could improve the quality 
of life of people whose livelihoods depend on the production of drugs and 
drug crops.
But the history of drug control, by contrast, is littered with policies energised 
by pious moral judgement, implemented by gross misapplication of criminal 
law, and exemplifying a rejection of science that is at times nearly inexplicable. 
The explosive spread of hiv linked to drug injection in the 1980s and 1990s led 
some countries, especially in Europe, to find ways to allow some consideration 
of good public health practices to temper repressive drug policies, at least to 
some degree. It remains to be seen whether the overdose mortality crisis in 
North America, which is unfortunately likely to spread to other regions with 
the proliferation of fentanyl markets, will create new corners of policy space in 
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chapter 15
Prohibitionist Drug Policy in South Africa— 
Reasons and Effects
Andrew Scheibe, Shaun Shelly and Anna Versfeld
 Abstract
The moral approach that has been used to interpret and implement the Single Conven-
tion on Narcotic Drugs exacerbates the health burden faced by people who use drugs. 
Drawing on our experience in research, programming and policy relating to drug use 
and health in South Africa, we illustrate the negative consequences prohibition has 
had for the health of people who use drugs in our country. We argue that South Afri-
ca illustrates how approaches that stigmatise people who use drugs are morally jus-
tified at the expense of human rights and public health outcomes. We highlight how 
South Africa is perpetuating prohibitionist approaches on international platforms and 
question why this has endured. Conflicting health and law enforcement policies, local 
conservatism and donor conditionality have thwarted harm reduction expansion and 
evidence- based drug policy development, resulting in notable harms. Persistent mor-
ally-based perspectives contribute to stigma and discrimination in healthcare facili-
ties and negatively affect treatment- seeking by people who use drugs. Criminal justice 
responses have increased tb exposure and entry into correctional centres that do not 
offer evidence- based drug treatment services. Encouragingly, progressive health and 
hiv policy affecting people who use drugs has recently been developed, and the recent 
decriminalisation of cannabis opens a door for policy debate. We recommend that 
to improve health, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs should be challenged to 
prioritise rights and health and that the personal use of drugs be decriminalised. We 
also highlight the need for mechanisms to hold health and other actors accountable 
for ensuring that the health and rights of all people are prioritised and strengthened.
1 Introduction
It was early evening when Taariq, aged 30, arrived at the emergency room 
of a public hospital in Cape Town, South Africa. He had recently transi-
tioned from smoking to injecting heroin. Due to inexperience, had missed 
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painful, and he was scared. He revealed his drug use and explained what 
had happened to the healthcare worker, who said he would have to wait 
to see the doctor. Through the night he was kept waiting, watching staff 
assist people who arrived long after him. The doctor, who eventually saw 
him the next morning, opened with a volley of assault, ‘There are oth-
er people out there with real sicknesses, and now I  must sit here with 
you?’ The doctor did not touch him, barely looked at his swollen arm, 
prescribed antibiotics and said, ‘If your arm turns blue, come back. We 
will have to look at amputation.’ Taariq was sent away, fearful of engaging 
with the healthcare system again.
People who use drugs face a range of health risks, including those directly re-
lated to their substance use, as well as the social and structural risks related to 
the use of illegal substances. The majority of countries in the world, includ-
ing South Africa, criminalise the non- medical use of scheduled drugs (Csete 
et al., 2016). Our starting point is that, internationally and locally, prohibition-
ist policy is deeply rooted in the moral and political past. The United States 
(US) and selected Western European countries, and more recently the Russian 
Federation and China (idpc, 2018b), have imposed their moral, political and 
prohibitionist agendas on sovereign nations (Alexander, 2008; Hari, 2015). Like 
many less powerful countries, South Africa has been drawn into, and contin-
ues to enact, these policies under the guise that they are for the international 
good, despite well- documented and significant harms (Csete et al., 2016; idpc, 
2018a). Even given recent moves in the country to decriminalise personal can-
nabis use (Parry et al., 2019), there are unlikely to be significant changes in drug 
legislation in the foreseeable future. However, as the opening vignette and the 
rest of this chapter show, prohibition- oriented policy has significant health 
and well- being ramifications in South Africa.
We begin by summarising the international public health consequences of 
prohibitionist policy, following this by a description of the socio- demographic, 
health and policy context in South Africa, as well as a historical perspective on 
local drug policy. We then turn to examining how these local policy dynamics 
were developed in South Africa in the context of international frameworks, 
before examining what the local ramifications of prohibitionist policies and 
approaches are. Finally, we note positive changes, towards more rights- centred 
approaches, that have recently taken place, before concluding with our vision 
for a better approach to drug policy and practice in South Africa.
In our approach, we include a focus on harm reduction, and the particu-
lar issues affecting people who inject drugs. We focus on this group of people 







276 Scheibe, Shelly and Versfeld
health and social consequences of drug policy and its implementation. A fur-
ther reason for the focus on people who inject drugs is particularly relevant to 
this chapter: despite the predominance of smoking drugs and a historical ab-
sence of widespread injecting drug use, foreign donor funds have focused only 
on people who inject drugs as part of hiv prevention programming.
We draw on our reflections, discussions, reading and experience as research-
ers and practitioners in the realms of health and substance use in South Africa. 
Our collective experience reflects more than 30 years of involvement in hiv pre-
vention and harm reduction, community- based quantitative research among 
people who use drugs, anthropological research on substance use, evidence- 
based substance use services and engagement around drug policy processes. 
Although we bring a wealth of experience to this chapter, we acknowledge that 
there are likely to be other perspectives and nuances linking the health of peo-
ple who use drugs and drug policy, which we have not included. Furthermore, 
the political agenda, processes and actors that drive drug policy are not always 
clear (Gstrein, 2018). Nonetheless, we suggest that this chapter contributes to a 
global understanding of how and why standing drug policies continue to dom-
inate, despite the failures and harms they have caused. This contribution to the 
literature also provides a concrete example of the health consequences that 
prohibitionist policies have had and continue to have in South Africa.
2 Prohibition and (Ill) Health
Overdose, hepatitis C, hiv and extrajudicial killings and torture illustrate some 
of the public health consequences of prohibitionist approaches. The largest 
public health impacts of overdose and infectious diseases are seen in the US, 
China and Russia, collectively home to 45 per cent of people who inject drugs 
(unaids, 2019). In 2017, 70,237 people died from drug- related causes— mostly 
opioid- related overdoses— in the US (unodc, 2019c). Approximately 1.4 mil-
lion people who inject drugs in China live with hepatitis C (Liu et  al., 2019; 
unodc, 2019c). In Russia, 336,542 people who inject drugs are living with hiv, 
and hiv incidence is increasing (unaids, 2019; unodc, 2019c). Over the past 
decade, more than 4,000 people have been executed globally for drug offences 
(Girelli, 2019). In the Philippines, there have been more than 27,000 extrajudi-
cial killings since President Duterte came to power (idpc, 2018a). High levels 
of torture, disappearances, forced treatment and rights violations linked to the 
drug trade are reported in low- and middle- income settings (idpc, 2018a).
Prohibition precludes the safe supply of drugs, contributing to poisoning and 
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results in clandestine use in hostile environments (Belackova and Salmon, 
2017) and unintended injury (Kaushik et al., 2011; Hartogsohn, 2017). Prohibi-
tion limits access to evidence- based health services. Less than 1 per cent of 
people who inject drugs globally have access to sufficient and required levels 
of needle and syringe programmes and opioid substitution therapy services 
(Csete et al., 2016; unodc et al., 2017; who, 2018; International aids Society, 
2019; unaids, 2019). Even fewer people who use drugs have access to overdose 
prevention and management services (Harm Reduction International, 2018). 
Current drug policy also contributes to inequitable distribution of and access 
to opioids for pain relief— less than 0.5 per cent of morphine- equivalent opi-
oids are distributed to low- income countries (Knaul et al., 2018).
As a result of the criminalisation of drug use, many people come into con-
tact with law enforcement and are incarcerated (Dolan et al., 2016). Medica-
tions for the management of withdrawal or replacement therapy while in po-
lice custody are seldom available (unodc, 2019b). People in prison who use 
drugs, particularly in low- and middle- income settings, face a significant risk 
of contracting tb and other infectious diseases (Dolan et al., 2016). Outside of 
high- income settings, most prisons have poor living conditions and violence is 
common, increasing the risk of trauma and mental illness (Baranyi et al., 2019). 
Few prison services provide the recommended package of evidence- based 
health services for people who use drugs or the appropriate mental health ser-
vices (unodc et al., 2013; Fazel et al., 2016). Incarceration has profound ad-
verse effects on the physical health of people and their dependents (Wildeman 
and Wang, 2017). Post- release, unemployment is inevitable, and there are high 
risks of recidivism and associated consequences (Baranyi et al., 2019).
People of colour, women and the poor are at greater risk of experiencing 
the harmful consequences of drug use in the context of prohibition (Taylor 
et al., 2016; Mitchell and Caudy, 2017; Muehlmann, 2018). This is highlighted 
in the US, where the levels of incarceration (Carson, 2018), likelihood of arrest 
for a drug- related offence (Carson, 2016), and likelihood of receiving a higher 
sentence (Rehavi and Starr, 2014) are significantly higher among African Amer-
ican males than among their white counterparts. The racial disparity in polic-
ing the war on drugs has also been well documented in the United Kingdom 
( Eastwood et al., 2013).
3 Responding to Drug Use
The dominant models of ‘treatment’ for people who use drugs in the US are 
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(Fletcher, 2013). Belief in the all- or- nothing approach has caused great harm to 
some people (Moos, 2005), and can prolong drug dependence (Miller, 2008). 
Medical explanations of addiction have recently challenged the moral expla-
nation for dependent drug use (Leshner, 1997). The ‘brain disease’ theory, pro-
moted by the United States National Institute on Drug Abuse, supports the 
need for medically assisted therapy, but pays little attention to contextual and 
other factors that contribute to drug use and its effects (Hammer et al., 2013). 
As an alternative to abstinence and incarceration, harm reduction provides 
a less rigid response to problematic drug use. This public health- inspired ap-
proach focuses on concerns and interventions at community and individual 
levels, rather than on the causes of drug use and ways to stop it. It aims to 
maximise health through beneficent, equitable and fair means while limiting 
harm. It is also pragmatic, involves precise planning to meet clearly defined 
goals, and includes the evaluation of outcomes (Single, 1995; Pauly, 2008).
4 South Africa
In 1994, after almost 50 years of apartheid rule, and hundreds of years of co-
lonialism, both of which sought to maximise the power and opportunities of 
the white minority population, South Africa became a democracy. The transi-
tion to democracy was marked by the development of one of the world’s most 
progressive constitutions. In contrast to the regime that preceded it, the con-
stitution prioritises human rights and dignity for all and puts extensive protec-
tions in place for citizens (Cock, 2003). It emphasises that all people have the 
right to freedom from discrimination based on ‘race, gender, sex, marital sta-
tus, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, 
conscience, belief, culture, language or birth, amongst others’ and guarantees 
the right to equality, dignity, life and access to healthcare services (South Af-
rican Government, 1996). State institutions and ministries were tasked with 
improving the lives of the previously disadvantaged population in a context 
of widespread poverty, a stagnated economy, and infrastructure (including the 
health system) designed for a minority of the population. Needing new sys-
tems and funding, the government turned to international and donor bodies, 
institutions, and frameworks to structure local policy (Coovadia et al., 2009). 
The newly designed health policies drew directly on World Health Organiza-
tion (who) recommendations, except for the response to hiv, which became 
a contested area in the years of President Mbeki (Fassin, 2007).
Currently, South Africa’s population stands at 59  million (2019), 51 per 
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(Schoeman, 2017; Statistics South Africa, 2019a). Despite efforts to mitigate the 
effects of colonialism and apartheid, they continue to shape society. Though 
South Africa is considered an upper- middle- income country, with a gross do-
mestic product of usd 368 billion, it has one of the highest levels of socio- 
economic inequality in the world: half the population lives in poverty and a 
third of adults are unemployed (Statistics South Africa, 2019b; World Bank, 
2019). Massive disparities in socio- economic status continue to play out along 
racial lines. Many people face considerable challenges in exercising their con-
stitutional rights and— as we show in what follows— the context with regard 
to inequality has a significant impact on health outcomes (Ataguba, Akazili 
and McIntyre, 2011).
4.1 Health Context
South Africa has more people living with hiv (7.9  million) than any other 
nation, with the highest proportion of new infections among young, black 
women aged 15 to 25 (Human Sciences Research Council, 2018). It also has 
one of the world’s highest tb incidence rates, with 301,000 active cases in 2018 
(who, 2019).
Non- communicable diseases account for half of all deaths (260,000 an-
nually). A  third of South Africans will develop a mental illness in their life-
time (Herman et al., 2009). Violence is ubiquitous: 40 per cent of children are 
exposed to or have been victims of violence, a quarter of women have been 
raped, and the homicide rate is 33 per 100,000 people (Day, Gray and Ndlovu, 
2018). In 2018, South Africa’s score for Universal Health Care coverage1 was 66 
(of a maximum of 100)  (Day, Gray and Ndlovu, 2018) in comparison with a 
global average of 65 (range 22– 86) (Hogan et al., 2018).
4.2 The South African Health System and Financing
The South African health system is sharply divided between a highly sophis-
ticated private healthcare system, supported by the extensive use of private 
medical insurance (covering less than a quarter of the population), and a pub-
lic healthcare system that provides care and treatment (including hiv and tb 
treatment) free of charge or on an income- based scale to the majority of the 
population (Health Policy Project, 2016). In addition to public facilities, the 
Department of Correctional Services has primary health facilities and pro-
grammes for hiv, tb, sexually transmitted infections (sti s) and primary health 
 1 Score based on 16 indicators, four each for reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health; 
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conditions (Department of Correctional Services, 2018). Overall, public health 
resources largely remain distributed along previous apartheid- informed lines, 
with previously advantaged historically white areas, which are often physical-
ly and practically inaccessible to the economically excluded black majority, 
hosting the most comprehensive, quality services (Harris et al., 2011; Coovadia 
et al., 2009). A substantial portion of healthcare, particularly for marginalised 
populations and as part of the hiv response, is now provided by civil society 
organisations (South African National aids Council, 2017).
Health expenditure in South Africa comes from three primary sources. The 
government finances approximately half of all expenditure (in 2017/ 18 this was 
approximately usd 12.8 billion). In the 2017 Medium Term Budget Policy State-
ment, usd 0.3 billion was allocated to National Health Insurance over three 
years to establish a national health insurance fund and to enhance health tech-
nology assessment capacity, with additional investments planned (Day, Gray 
and Ndlovu, 2018). Donor investments account for a small proportion (2.4 per 
cent) of overall health spending, and the remaining financing is from the pri-
vate sector (Day, Gray and Ndlovu, 2018). In 2016/ 17, approximately half of the 
government’s total health budget was allocated to the hiv/ tb response, and 5 
per cent to mental health (Docrat et al., 2019), of which services for people who 
use drugs form a small part.
After the Government of South Africa, the US President’s Emergency Plan 
for aids Relief (pepfar) has been the largest investor in the hiv/ tb re-
sponse (over usd 5.6 billion since 2004), accounting for a quarter of costs 
(United States Embassy and Consulates, 2017), followed by the Global Fund 
to Fight aids, tb and Malaria (Global Fund). Apart from a project in the city 
of Tshwane, no other harm reduction services are funded by the South Afri-
can Government (Scheibe et al., 2018). Between 2016 and 2019, South Africa’s 
Global Fund programme for hiv prevention allocated 1 per cent of its budget 
to people who inject drugs (Global Fund, 2015). pepfar and the Global Fund 
have projects for people who inject drugs that will run until September 2021 
and March 2022, respectively. As a middle- income country, South Africa’s 
support from pepfar and the Global Fund, if it continues, is likely to be sig-
nificantly reduced. As others have pointed out, like international drug policy, 
these stakeholders are important external forces shaping how South Africa re-
sponds to drug use (Hearn, 2000).
4.3 Drug Use
The number of people who use drugs in South Africa is unknown, which is 
inherent in a system where the illegality of drugs precludes accurate assess-
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cannabis, methaqualone, methamphetamine, and heroin (Dada et al., 2018). It 
is estimated that over 75,000 people inject drugs (Setswe et al., 2015; Haysom, 
2019), but the most common way to consume drugs in South Africa is through 
inhalation. Cannabis most likely came to the region from Asia via Arab traders 
and has been cultivated and used for centuries (Du Toit, 1975). Methaqualone 
was introduced as a sleeping tablet and was made illegal in 1977 after it be-
came widely used outside medical contexts (Standing, 2006). Post- apartheid 
investigations revealed that methaqualone was being used in covert experi-
ments related to crowd control (Gould and Folb, 2002). Methamphetamine 
use, previously uncommon, increased at the turn of the millennium, as more 
relaxed border controls increased availability either through direct imports or 
imports of precursor substances (Standing 2006). Heroin has been available 
since the 1980s, but limited international trade and apartheid policies that dis-
couraged black Africans from seeking employment in South Africa allowed for 
tighter border controls and fewer transnational syndicates, reducing supply, 
keeping prices high, and limiting use to a small portion of the (largely white) 
population (Haysom, 2019). Since the 1990s, the heroin trade routes from Af-
ghanistan have shifted down the East Coast of Africa, resulting in increased 
availability and a threefold reduction in the price of heroin (Haysom, Gastrow 
and Shaw, 2018). Locally, heroin2 of varying quality is often smoked with can-
nabis or nicotine.
4.4 The Burden of Disease among People Who Use Drugs
Emerging data point to a notable burden of infectious diseases, deaths, and 
mental illness among people who use drugs, as well as health issues of particu-
lar importance for youth, women, and incarcerated people who use drugs. hiv 
prevalence among people who inject drugs is estimated at 21 per cent (Scheibe 
et al., 2016; University of California San Francisco, Anova Health Institute and 
National Institute for Communicable Diseases, 2018; Scheibe, Young, Moses, 
et al., 2019), and hepatitis C at 55 percent (ucsf and Anova Health Institute 
and National Institute for Communicable Diseases, 2018; Scheibe, Young, 
Moses, et al., 2019). Local data has highlighted that without appropriate and 
acceptable services, people living with hiv who use substances experience 
challenges in adhering to antiretroviral treatment, and, due to anxiety and 
depression, are less likely to report psychological distress (Kader et al., 2015). 
There are no accurate estimates for tb, but people who use drugs are defined 
as a population at increased risk (South African National aids Council, 2017). 
 2 Several local names are used to describe heroin, specifically Unga (Swahili for n: flour; v: to 
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Furthermore, the burden of infective endocarditis among people who inject 
drugs is increasingly being documented (Meel and Essop, 2018; De Villiers 
et al., 2019). The burden of disease among people who use drugs who are in 
prison settings has not been quantified (Dos Santos et al., 2014; Booyens and 
Bezuidenhout, 2015; Luyt and Moshoeu, 2017).
Data on drug- related deaths are limited by the large number of medical– le-
gal autopsies that should be carried out (ca 70,000 per annum) in the context 
of limited forensic pathology and toxicology services (Du Tooit- Prinsloo and 
Saayman, 2012). Under- reporting is likely another factor. For example, the 2019 
World Drug Report shows that the latest reported mortality data from South 
Africa is from 2012, and is limited to the city of Pretoria: 10 drug- related deaths, 
with opioids ranking as the most common cause (unodc, 2019c). Between 
2016 and 2019, at least 13 people who inject drugs who accessed harm reduc-
tion services in two South African cities died as a result of overdose.3 None 
of these deaths, however, were captured and reported in the country’s formal 
surveillance system. Moreover, people who use drugs often die prematurely 
from other causes, often linked to lack of access to appropriate services (Shelly 
et al., 2017).
Moral reflections on drug use are associated with self- stigmatisation and 
poor self- esteem among people who use drugs, which further contribute to 
mental illness (Luoma et  al., 2007). People who use drugs in South Africa 
report persistent and extensive human rights violations. Between July 2015 
and May 2019, 1,105 rights violations were reported by 403 people across 
three cities as part of the human rights reporting system implemented by tb 
hiv Care— 54 per cent (598) due to the confiscation or destruction of sterile 
injecting equipment by law enforcement officers,3 resulting in significant 
trauma.
The high prevalence of childhood adversity among South African youth 
increases the likelihood of developing substance use problems and mental 
illness, as well as hiv infection (Jewkes et al., 2010). Recent research has identi-
fied high levels of violence and trauma among women who use drugs (unodc, 
2019a). The prevalence of hiv and tb among incarcerated adult males is nota-
bly higher than among males in the general population (2 percent versus <0.5 
per cent and 23 per cent versus 15 per cent, respectively), with higher levels 
probable among incarcerated people who use drugs (South African National 
aids Council, 2017; Human Sciences Research Council, 2018).
 3 Personal communication with Zara von Homeyer, monitoring and evaluation coordinator 














Prohibitionist Drug Policy in South Africa 283
4.5 South Africa’s Post- apartheid Legislative and Policy Frameworks
The post- apartheid government inherited policies influenced by internation-
al drug policy frameworks. South Africa was (and remains) a signatory to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (UN, 1961). The maintenance of these pro-
hibitionist perspectives is evident in subsequent legal documents, including 
the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 (1992) (Gray, 2019), which draws overtly 
on the Single Convention in that it aims ‘To provide for the prohibition of the 
use or possession of, or the dealing in, drugs and of certain acts relating to the 
manufacture or supply of certain substances or the acquisition or conversion 
of the proceeds of certain crimes […]’. This conservatism has continued in sub-
sequent policies such as the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependency 
Act (Act 70 of 2008), which describes the national response to the use of inter-
nationally scheduled drugs.
This overarching conservativism and attachment to a punitive approach 
continues within a fragmented government environment in relation to drugs. 
The development and implementation of local drug policy frameworks is the 
responsibility of the national Department of Social Development. This Depart-
ment houses the Central Drug Authority, the institution tasked with issuing 
a guiding policy document— the National Drug Master Plan— approximately 
every five years.
The first National Drug Master Plan (1999) aimed to address ‘health risks 
and other damages associated with drug misuse, including the spread of 
communicable diseases, related injuries and premature death’. Despite the 
stated desire to minimise harm and promote human rights, there was no 
explicit focus on harm reduction, and the plan primarily supported supply 
reduction and a criminal justice response to drugs, as well as prevention 
strategies focused on treatment and rehabilitation (Geyer and Lombard, 
2014). With each subsequent version, there has been increasing emphasis 
on punishment or the need to ‘rehabilitate’ people who use drugs. The most 
recent National Drug Master Plan (2019‒24), however, illustrates a partial 
shift towards harm reduction through its five key principles: human rights, 
scientific evidence, ‘inter- sectionality’, person- centred approaches, and the 
inclusion of people who use drugs.4 While the latest National Drug Master 
Plan was accepted by parliament on 1 November 2019, it was publicly re-
leased on the 26th of June 2020.
 4 Information obtained from a presentation by the Central Drug Authority during a meeting 
held in Tshwane on 11 February 2020. Further confirmed by an advance copy of the National 
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Resistance around harm reduction are, we suggest, partly due to challenges 
the Central Drug Authority faces in providing clear leadership and direction. 
Firstly, the institution has been set up to be inter- sectoral and it is made up 
of representatives from 21 government departments and 13 experts, not all of 
whom come to the table with the same mandates or requirements. As the in-
stitution itself has noted, ‘The broader Central Drug Authority contains many 
civil servants representing different government departments and reporting 
to their ministers, each of whom may have different positions on aspects of 
policy related to alcohol, tobacco, cannabis and psychoactive substance use’ 
(Stein, for the eccda, 2016).
Departments focused on law enforcement are concerned with internation-
al legal frameworks. For example, at the 2019 United Nations Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs, South Africa committed to strengthening relationships with 
other international law enforcement agencies and confirmed that its response 
to drug use is guided by the three major drug policy conventions, with law en-
forcement at the forefront (un cnd, 2019). In contrast to the principles of the 
constitution, South Africa abstained from the vote supporting the Resolution 
on Contribution to the Implementation of the Joint Commitment to Effective-
ly Addressing and Countering the World Drug Problem with Regard to Human 
Rights (ohchr, 2018). In these moves, South Africa appears to be adopting 
and promoting prohibition as a policy choice.
In contrast, health- orientated institutions tend to lean more towards harm 
reduction. The Department of Health, which is responsible for managing med-
ical emergencies, medical complications, detoxification, and co- morbidities 
relating to drug use,5 is developing a more public health- oriented approach 
to drug use. This is evident, for example, in the National Hepatitis Action plan 
and the Health Sector Drug Master Plan, which provide support for increased 
coverage by harm reduction services (National Department of Health, 2018a) 
and opioid substitution therapy for people who use drugs (National Depart-
ment of Health, 2018b). The policies of the South African National aids Coun-
cil support efforts to reduce stigma and discrimination, to increase coverage of 
harm reduction services, and to protect human rights, and support legislative 
reform (South African National aids Council, 2017, 2019b). The Department of 
Health has a policy to support access to opioids for the management of pain 
(see Box 15.1).
 5 See the National Mental Health Policy Framework and Strategic Plan (2013‒20) and National 
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box 15.1 Access to opioid medications for pain
South Africa has greater access to opioids for pain relief than other Af-
rican countries (Drenth et  al., 2018) and had the highest levels of pre-
scribed opioid consumption in Africa, with a defined daily dose of 338 
per million people per day, in 2011‒13, compared to an African average of 
41 and a global average of 3,027 (Berterame et al., 2016). Increased access 
to opioids for chronic disease and cancer- related pain was driven largely 
by the palliative care movement (Drenth et  al., 2018). A  National Poli-
cy Framework and Strategy on Palliative Care (2017‒22) exists (Nation-
al Department of Health, 2017), and standard treatment guidelines for 
the management of acute and chronic pain that includes tramadol and 
morphine exist for use at the primary care level (National Department of 
Health, 2018). Access to these medications in South Africa is partially lim-
ited by their scheduling and the requirement of a doctor’s prescription. 
In Africa more broadly, this limitation is mostly linked to challenges with 
sourcing from industry and importation (Berterame et al., 2016).
Differences are sometimes even evident within departments and institu-
tions. Despite the Central Drug Authority being housed within the Depart-
ment of Social Development, these two institutions have not always pre-
sented a uniform perspective. Some of the tentative shifts towards harm 
reduction seen in Central Drug Authority position statements (Stein, for the 
eccda, 2016a; Stein and Manyedi, 2016) have been publicly countered by 
the Minister of the Department of Social Development. For example, in the 
Minister’s statement at the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in March 2019, 
she said that the event was ‘a clear illustration of the political will of our 
Governments to give practical effect to the implementation of the Three 
Drug Conventions in order to fulfil the desire and aspirations of our people 
to rid society of the scourge of drugs’ (Shabangu, 2019, 3). The Department 
of Social Development also illustrated its preference for an abstinence- 
based approach in the framing of an International Substance Abuse Con-
ference (November 2019)  it hosted and that aimed to ‘review prevention, 
demand and harm reduction, including law enforcement strategies and to 
address new and emerging trends as well as mitigation of the impact of the 
scourge of alcohol and substance abuse on families’ (South African Govern-
ment, 2019). Notably, organisations that implement needle and syringe and/ 
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Fragmented government perspectives are accompanied by varied imple-
mentation processes. Within departments, policy implementation is dis-
tributed to the nine provincial government structures, which vary between 
provinces, districts, and municipalities, depending on the dominant perspec-
tive in the region (Department of Planning Monitoring & Evaluation, 2016). 
This means that policy and action can be discrepant. Between departments 
differences in perspective can result in conflicting actions. For example, law 
enforcement agencies frequently challenge the legality of needle and syringe 
services, harass or arrest outreach workers, and continue to confiscate and de-
stroy injecting equipment (tb hiv Care Association, 2017; Dada et al., 2019). 
Overall, prohibition- inspired approaches continue to dominate the local im-
plementation landscape.
5 Historical Insights into Drug Policy Development and the Health of 
People Who Use Drugs
A historical analysis illustrates the extent to which drug prohibition in South 
Africa has been directly tied to concerns about controlling labouring people 
(Waetjen, 2019). Cannabis is an exemplar of this. In 1870, cannabis became a 
prohibited drug in the Colony of Natal (now part of South Africa). This ban 
expanded to the Cape in 1891, and in 1922 came to cover the area that now 
constitutes South Africa when the ‘Customs and Excise Duties Amendment 
Act prohibited the cultivation, sale, possession and use of cannabis, cocaine 
and a number of opiates’ (Paterson, 2009, 52). Cannabis prohibitions were tied 
to concerns that it was undermining the discipline and obedience of South 
African labour, and encouraging people of different races to interact through 
trade. In 1923, South Africa requested that the Council of the League of Na-
tions’ Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Dangerous Drugs in-
clude cannabis as an internationally banned substance. In 1925, the League 
of Nations listed cannabis as a dependence- forming substance, thus justifying 
South Africa’s ban.
During apartheid (from 1948) the church played a variety of roles— both in 
justifying apartheid and as a core location for the development of resistance 
(Prozesky, 1990). The most powerful church was the Dutch Reformed Church. 
A notably conservative institution, it was closely tied to the government and— 
though not uniformly so— supported notions of racial purity and white supe-
riority, and shaped conservative social laws (Kuperus, 1999). In this respect, in-
ternational prohibitionist approaches aligned with local political views during 
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5.1 The Long Reach of International Moral Conservatism
Globally, the framing of drug use as evil serves to justify any approach to excise 
drugs and their use, at the level of national and international practice (Lines, 
2010). Deployment of armed forces and the militarisation of police forces and 
training are all justified by ‘the war on drugs’, an approach originating in the US, 
and serve to increase the influence of the Northern powers in the global South. 
In 2016, the US Department of Defense requested more than usd 1 billion for 
international drug control activities (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
2016). The economic benefits to industry and businesses are massive, and most 
of the money from the illicit drug trade is laundered through Northern banks 
(Esquivel- Suarez, 2018). Pursuit of this Northern agenda, particularly the glob-
al control policies of the US, has been described as a form of neocolonialism or 
‘narcocolonialism’ (Oliver and Cottle, 2011).
The agendas of other superpowers such as China and Russia have played 
out locally through the partnership between Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (brics). Russia’s increasing influence, due to the economic in-
centives it has provided to South Africa, has led to its undue level of influence 
in the African setting, as evidenced by the Russia-Africa Anti-Drug Dialogue 
(raadd). In a speech to the 2016 raadd, Lieutenant General Ntlemeza of the 
South African Police Service made this clear: ‘The Russia Africa Anti- Drug Di-
alogue has one aim which is to achieve a drug- free society’. He added that the 
proliferation of drugs was fuelled by increased international trade and because 
money laundering was made easy by the ‘free movement of people’ (Lt. Gen. 
Ntlemeza, 2016). What is critically missing is an analysis of who trades and 
uses drugs, when, and how, and— importantly— who does so in a way that is 
visible to the broader public. There is, therefore, no recognition that the people 
who make and use drugs in publicly discernible ways are often those who have 
limited alternative opportunities to craft meaningful lives in which their basic 
needs are met (Adler and Aniskiewicz, 2003; Bourgois and Schonberg, 2009).
As South Africa is heavily reliant on international funders, their agendas 
also shape local health policies in ways that are not necessarily aligned with 
local needs. This has been particularly evident in the hiv response (Johnson, 
2008). Investments in the health of people who use drugs have been relatively 
small and focused on hiv prevention. For example, pepfar supported staff-
ing and infrastructure for needle and syringe services in three cities from 2014 
(Scheibe et al., 2017a; Scheibe et al. 2017b), but pepfar funds cannot be used 
to purchase needles and syringes (United States Centres for Disease Control, 
2016). Needles and syringes for these initial services were purchased with sup-
port from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Netherlands through the ngo 
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their support sites transitioned to being funded by the Global Fund, which 
also established two additional sites in the same year and started two small 
opioid substitution therapy pilots shortly thereafter (Global Fund, 2019). In 
2019, four additional harm reduction sites were established in different health 
districts: three through the Global Fund and one through pepfar (Dada et al., 
2019). To date, donor support has been insufficient to enable the provision of 
the full who package of services, with neither naloxone nor hepatitis services 
available.
The ongoing controversy and policy disharmony around harm reduction 
and the health of people who use drugs is best highlighted by the closure of 
the needle and syringe programme in Durban (see Box 15.2). Below, we turn to 
how morally inspired policy prevents the attainment of health for people who 
use drugs.
box 15.2 Enacting inaction
The needle and syringe programme in Durban (KwaZulu- Natal province) 
started in 2015 to address an unmet need (Scheibe, Shelly, et al., 2017). 
Initially, the programme was supported by pepfar, and in 2016 it transi-
tioned to the Global Fund (Global Fund, 2017), with consistent support 
from Mainline and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mainline and 
tb hiv Care, 2017). From its inception, individuals within the municipal 
and provincial departments of health contested the effectiveness of nee-
dle and syringe programmes, and highlighted their potential to increase 
drug use.6 These officials supported the then Deputy Mayor’s decision 
to halt the needle and syringe service in May 2018 (van Dyk, 2018a). This 
was sparked by needles and syringes that washed up on one of the city’s 
beaches and received media coverage (Mbanjwa, 2018). Later, claims 
were made of insufficient consultation preceding project implementa-
tion, followed by a request to obtain a trading license to distribute and 
collect injecting equipment (eThekwini Municipality, 2018). Efforts by 
the local network of people who use drugs to voice their concerns and 
demand access to this service were unsuccessful (Walford, 2018). Many 
meetings took place, several with ward councillors who were opposed 
to harm reduction and whose positions did not shift despite attempts to 
engage them on the public health benefits and supporting science (van 
Dyk, 2018b). After 24 months of negotiations, the implementing service 
 6 A full listing of the correspondence documenting the engagement between project imple-
menters and the eThekwini Municipality and the provincial and national Departments of 
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provider received authorisation from the provincial and local Depart-
ments of Health, and the service restarted on 29 June, 2020 (KwaZulu- 
Natal Department of Health, 2020). People who inject drugs have grown 
increasingly desperate as well as frustrated with the harm reduction 
service provider (van Dyk, 2018b). Reports have been documented of in-
creased needle and syringe sharing and an increased prevalence of infec-
tions (unodc, 2019a). A  repeated hiv and hcv prevalence survey has 
not been conducted since the closure of the service, but it is likely that 
infections have been widely transmitted.
5.2 Discrimination and Hindrance to Healthcare
Equivocal non- acceptance of harm reduction in policy allows for the contin-
ued moral— rather than rights- based— approach to drug use. Relevant policy, 
such as the National Drug Master Plan, frames the key aim of drug treatment 
as ‘reintegration’ into society. The assumption seems to be partly that people 
who use substances are not already and consistently part of communities, and 
partly that the communities they are part of are not deemed worthy of being 
called ‘society’. Yet anthropological work has shown that drug use is part and 
parcel of its fabric (Garcia, 2010; Saris, 2013). Even people who use drugs, live 
on the streets, and may appear to passers- by as ‘external’ to communities are 
part of families and social networks that often straddle street life and the com-
munities they come from. This conceptual segregation, we suggest, serves not 
only to shape treatment modalities, but also to justify the lack of attention to 
the needs and health of people who use drugs by framing them as external and 
unworthy. This approach has undermined access to, and the quality of care for, 
people who use drugs.
Healthcare providers in South Africa tend to come from the communities 
they serve and are often representative of dominant moral positions around 
drug use. They are neither sensitised nor equipped to manage the realities and 
needs of people who use drugs (tb hiv Care and StopTB Partnership, 2018; 
Duby et al., 2019). Consequently, stigma and discrimination towards people 
who use drugs is widely accepted in healthcare facilities. This includes de-
nial of care, conditional access to care, shaming, lack of confidentiality and 
privacy and being made to wait disproportionately long periods for services 
(Shelly et al., 2017, Versfeld et al., 2020). Moreover, there are currently no effec-
tive accountability mechanisms within healthcare facilities to manage these 
rights abuses, nor is there easy access to legal recourse for people who use 
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Stigma does not have to be personally experienced to impact on individu-
als. Peers’ experiences of stigma are powerful disincentives for individuals to 
access healthcare in South Africa. Stigma in the healthcare system also rein-
forces low self- worth, which in turn inhibits health- seeking behaviour (Vers-
feld et al., 2020). An assessment of tb and people who use drugs found that 
of the eight people who use drugs and acknowledged that they had received 
tb diagnoses, only one had started treatment (while incarcerated), only to 
cease on release from prison (tb hiv Care and StopTB Partnership, 2018). 
In a recent viral hepatitis study among 1,200 people who use drugs across 
three cities, less than 1 per cent of participants diagnosed with hepatitis C 
were linked to treatment. Fears of the public health sector were some of the 
reasons for not accessing care (tb hiv Care et al., 2018; Scheibe, Young, et al., 
2019). Earlier dialogues with people who use drugs revealed that emergency 
services frequently discriminated against people who use drugs— either not 
arriving for an overdose if reported, or arriving only after several hours (Shelly 
et al., 2017).
5.3 Continued Support for Non- evidence Based Approaches
Nationally, the programmatic responses to drug use are seldom evaluated, and 
when they are, the results tend to be poor. In the Western Cape, the Matrix 
Model outpatient programme for people who use stimulants (Center for Sub-
stance Abuse Treatment, 2006) was adapted to include people who use opioids. 
However, after 12 weeks, only 7 per cent of people using opioids were retained 
at ‘graduation’ (Magidson et al., 2017). The City of Tshwane is an exception, and 
the city funds South Africa’s largest methadone programme. However, even 
after demonstrating early successes, the project is unlikely to expand.7 One 
factor is limited political effort to reduce the high price of methadone8 (Herr-
mannsen, 2015). Fear of diversion is a second factor (Adult Hospital Technical 
Sub- Committee of National Essential Medicine List Committee, 2019), and the 
favoured models informed by American policy often impose a level of social 
control (Bourgois, 2000) in an attempt to prevent diversion. Along with others 
(Harris and Rhodes, 2013), we argue that a more effective approach is to en-
sure that there is sufficient coverage through low threshold community- based 
 services.
 7 During a review of the cosup Programme attended by the University of Pretoria on 12– 13 
March 2020, the City expressed a reluctance to expand the programme and some members 
of City Management wanted to cut the programme.
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Despite the absence of data, there is continued government support for ex-
panding the availability of abstinence- based drug rehabilitation (Zulu, 2019) 
to the exclusion of a wide range of interventions that can prevent escala-
tion or achievable alternatives for people wanting to change patterns of use 
( Miller, 1998).
6 Windows of Opportunity
Despite the overwhelming influence of prohibitionist policy and approaches 
in South Africa, some progressive changes have taken place in terms of the law, 
policy, practice and evidence. While some have notable limitations, these, as 
we describe below, also open important opportunities for transformation.
In 2018, the South African Constitutional Court handed down a judgement 
that effectively decriminalised the possession and use of cannabis in private 
spaces (Minister of Justice et al. 2018). While this is cause for celebration, it 
comes with limitations. The judgement still referred to cannabis as a ‘great so-
cial evil’ and people who do not have ‘private space’ where they can consume 
cannabis, effectively remain criminalised for their use. Parliament is further re-
quired to determine arrest thresholds as well as the mechanisms for legal reg-
ulation within 24 months of the judgement. Furthermore, possession, growing 
or production of cannabis remains illegal. This continues to justify the perse-
cution of rural populations who, for generations, have relied on cultivation for 
survival. These same growers stand to lose out in the future if the government 
issues production licenses to global cannabis businesses.
In terms of policy, the South African National aids Council has recently 
overtly supported a call for the decriminalisation of drug use (South African 
National aids Council, 2019b). Furthermore, the National Drug Master Plan 
2019– 2024 and the National Strategic Plan on hiv, tb and sti s 2017– 2022, 
explicitly support the evidence- based comprehensive package of hiv preven-
tion, treatment, care and support services for people who inject drugs, as rec-
ommended by the who. Together, these policies provide the scaffolding for 
harm reduction to take place and to contest people and institutions that per-
petuate prohibitionist agendas.
In terms of practice, attempts at inter- sectoral collaboration around drug 
use are taking place at the local and national level. This includes the devel-
opment of technical working groups that include members of the South Afri-
can Network of People Who Use Drugs, which have informed national policy 
(Shelly and Howell, 2018), and the participation of networks of people who 
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et  al., 2020). These relationships can be nurtured to influence future policy. 
The South African Network of People Who Use Drugs is a sub- recipient of a 
Global Fund grant and other philanthropic grants. This will support the de-
velopment of people to champion the rights of people who use drugs. The 
funding of the largest opioid substitution therapy programme in South Africa 
by the City of Tshwane is an important step towards investing in effective in-
terventions. While the remaining harm reduction interventions remain donor- 
funded, it is possible that another round of pepfar and Global Fund support 
for hiv prevention for people who inject drugs and harm reduction will be 
available and provide the opportunity to plan for the transition towards gov-
ernment support.
Data is also improving. The effects of the criminalisation of drug use, includ-
ing the negative health consequences, are being better quantified and quali-
fied (Harm Reduction International, 2018; ucsf and Anova Health Institute 
and National Institute for Communicable Diseases, 2018; Scheibe, Young, et al., 
2019; South African National aids Council, 2019a). Furthermore, community- 
based harm reduction services are now included in the national accounting of 
services, as documented in the South African Community Epidemiology Net-
work on Drug Use since 2018 (Dada et al., 2019).
7 Conclusion and Recommendations
Racial discrimination in South Africa played a significant role in the history of 
prohibition. Despite the negative consequences for the health of people living 
in the global South, South Africa’s (home- grown) prohibitionist perspectives 
and policies continue to reinforce the ‘war on drugs’ approach. Critical reflec-
tion on the ways the past and the current policies impact on the rights and 
health of South Africans is essential for a rights- based approach and should 
inform and motivate new policy directions.
State entities must challenge the application of the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. Policymakers must rethink the dominant law enforcement and 
criminal justice approach, and encourage an emphasis on the rights, health 
and well- being of people who use drugs. Perhaps most importantly, the moral 
and stigmatising language, particularly the framing of drug use as ‘evil’, must 
be addressed.
The decriminalisation of the possession and use of drugs will immediately 
reduce the burden on marginalised communities. Reducing the number of peo-
ple who use drugs that enter the criminal justice system will reduce exposure 
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economic exclusion. Reallocation of financial resources from supply reduction 
and the criminal justice system towards community development and a con-
tinuum of evidence- informed prevention and harm reduction services would 
strengthen communities. Healthier communities with better social integra-
tion and opportunities will ultimately reduce the levels of problematic drug 
use as well as many of the associated harms.
While there is a need for people who use drugs to be able to access appro-
priate health services— free of stigma, within the community— it is also essen-
tial to avoid the over- pathologisation of people who use drugs. The solution 
is not a simple health response to drug use, but a more comprehensive inter- 
sectoral response that looks at systemic and contextual issues. Mechanisms 
are required to enhance accountability around violations of the human rights 
of people who use drugs. Locally, strategic litigation against the state, institu-
tions and individuals should be instituted where the health and well- being of 
people who use drugs are violated.
Stigma is pervasive. It ranges from the stereotypes portrayed in the media 
to the dismissive treatment of people who use drugs by healthcare work-
ers, and it needs to be addressed. Following the principle of ‘nothing for 
us without us’, people who use drugs should actively be involved in, and 
consulted on, the design and implementation of research, service delivery, 
the training of health professionals and journalists, and the development of 
drug policy.
The inequitable access to services and issues of spatial discrimination can 
best be addressed by locating services within communities and providing ser-
vices to people who use drugs along a continuum of medical and social servic-
es. Policy needs to support a range of evidence- based interventions that would 
cater for drugs commonly used and the methods people use them. Examples 
include harm reduction services for people who smoke stimulants and drug 
consumption rooms.
The human resources required to provide harm reduction services need to 
be capacitated. In addition, policy and practice needs to allow for task shift-
ing, with increased health services provided by trained peer outreach workers, 
counsellors, registered nurses and other cadres of health professionals.
Harm reduction services should be created with a sense of inclusion and so-
cial integration, both geographically and ideologically. We would suggest that 
there are lessons to be learned from the City of Tshwane Community Oriented 
Substance Use Program that provides integrated interventions for drug use as 
part of a community- oriented primary healthcare approach.
Countries, communities and organisations that rely on donor funding that 
is restrictive and only funds a narrow set of prescriptive interventions and 
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programs should advocate for non- restricted funding, and insist on support for 
evidence- based interventions for substance use.
Countries from the historical global South, specifically South Africa, must 
re- evaluate their drug policies and look to approaches based on the science 
and needs of their communities. There are windows of opportunity that need 
to be used to protect the rights of all people and provide opportunities for all 
to enjoy health. Perhaps all that is needed is that our policies align with our 
constitution, the highest law of the land.
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